Paul Joseph Shoemaker v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00281-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

PAUL JOSEPH SHOEMAKER, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 404TH DISTRICT COURT
OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of appellant Paul Joseph

Shoemaker’s post-conviction motion for DNA testing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 64.01. Shoemaker specifically appeals the trial court’s denial of testing for a cigarette

lighter, asserting all of the statutory requirements were met to obtain further forensic

testing. We affirm because we must defer to the trial court’s finding that there was
insufficient evidence establishing a chain of custody for the lighter.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 19, 2004, a jury convicted Shoemaker of first-degree felony murder

and sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b), (c).

Shoemaker appealed his conviction, but this Court affirmed. Shoemaker v. State, No. 13-

04-149-CR, 2006 WL 2521626, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31,

2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). On November 8, 2024,

Shoemaker filed his motion for forensic DNA testing seeking testing on five items: (1) the

murder weapon’s magazine, (2) a spent casing collected at the scene, (3) bullets from

inside the magazine, (4) a lighter handled by the shooter, and (5) two cigarette butts.

The victim, Richard Reyes, was shot in the chest outside the Valle Vista

Apartments in Harlingen. According to Shoemaker, the shooter initially approached the

apartments and asked for Reyes to come outside, and, while waiting, asked for a lighter

and smoked a cigarette. A trial witness, John Ramos, testified that the shooter fired once

and then attempted to reload as though the “bullet jammed,” but was unsuccessful and

fled the scene.

Based on these facts, Shoemaker asserted in his motion that it was reasonably

probable each piece of evidence had biological material, was secured related to the

offense, was in the State of Texas’s possession during trial, and, with the exception of the

cigarette butts, was not previously DNA tested. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(a),

(b)(1). He further argued that the lighter met the statutory requirements of Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 64.03(a) to be tested.

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The State initially responded that the first three items were destroyed and could

not be procured for testing. The State also argued that eyewitnesses directly identified

Shoemaker as the murderer, that most witnesses were reluctant to testify because

Shoemaker was a gang member and they feared gang retaliation, and that Shoemaker

had killed Reyes in retaliation for Reyes testifying against Shoemaker’s gang. The State

further asserted that Shoemaker had “procedurally defaulted” on his sought relief

because obtaining post-conviction DNA is merely a step to a writ of habeas corpus, which

he had already sought and failed to obtain. Finally, the State argued that the Article 64.03

requirements were not met. See id. art. 64.03.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion on January 28, 2025. Shoemaker

argued a variety of alleged exculpatory evidence supported his motion, including that:

(1) the weapon magazine had an unknown fingerprint that did not match Shoemaker,

(2) the shooter was left-handed and Shoemaker was not, (3) Shoemaker was excluded

as a DNA contributor to the cigarette butts, and (4) Shoemaker had a valid alibi. He further

argued the prior habeas corpus proceedings did not fully litigate the relevant issues and

that there is no procedural bar to meeting Article 64.03. Shoemaker also highlighted that

the State changed positions regarding items 1-3 being simply missing instead of being

destroyed. The parties clarified with the trial court that the cigarette butts were with the

Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the lighter was with the Harlingen Police

Department (HPD).

Marcos Vaca, a DPS forensic scientist, testified at the hearing regarding the DNA

testing of the cigarette butts and indicated they were still in DPS’s possession under

climate-controlled conditions. He stated it was possible the butts had fingerprint DNA but

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clarified touch DNA testing does not allow analysis of probabilities as such testing does

not reveal when a person touched an item, who touched it last, or who touched it the

most. He further testified DPS was only “accepting touch DNA cases on a case-by-case

basis.” According to Vaca, touch DNA is sensitive to destruction due to heat, moisture,

and UV light. Vaca also testified that Shoemaker’s DNA did not match any DNA on the

butts. He clarified there were cases where the police know that someone has handled an

item and no touch DNA is found. Vaca further testified that laboratories other than DPS

have better testing protocols for touch DNA.

Christopher Contreras, an HPD officer, could only verify that HPD had possession

of the lighter. He was unsure where the other items were located though claimed he never

represented they were destroyed. He testified that the lighter was found in the homicide

evidence room in a box labeled “unknown cases” and there was no paperwork indicating

how it got there. The lighter was in an envelope with “an old carbon copy property tag” on

the front dated October 5, 2002. He was unsure if a chain of custody had been maintained

for the lighter. There was no indicator of when the envelope containing the lighter had

been last opened because the only seal on the envelope was a piece of tape that was

undated and not marked with any person’s initials or name. He admitted some HPD

evidence was lost in various cases due to either a ransomware attack or the HPD moving

buildings.

Following this testimony, the State clarified that it was unsure whether items 1-3

were destroyed or missing, and that any representation that the items were destroyed

was a mistake. Additionally, Shoemaker withdrew his request to test the cigarette butts

under Article 64. Shoemaker then argued that the record indicated the shooter asked

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someone for a lighter, that he smoked a cigarette, that the gun jammed after he shot

Reyes, and that a magazine fell to the ground alongside a spent shell casing. Due to the

foregoing evidence and an unknown palm print on the magazine, Shoemaker argued that

the lighter was a “missing variable” and that testing it would allow him to meet his Article

64.03 burden to “show that by a preponderance he would not have been convicted had

exculpatory results been obtained.” Shoemaker argued as to other mitigating evidence

such as different motives for Reyes’s murder, the eyewitnesses ambushing him with

identification in trial, and the motivation of one witness to fabricate identification in

exchange for dismissal of charges against him.

The State responded there was no evidence the cigarettes were smoked by the

shooter and that Shoemaker’s other arguments were attempts to relitigate trial issues the

jury already decided. The State argued that there were a wide number of possible

contributors to the DNA on the lighter making it unlikely that any identified DNA would

come from the true shooter. Further, the State asserted there was no clear chain of

custody for the lighter and thus the standard for testing could not be met.

Following the hearing, Shoemaker filed a written reply to the State’s response to

Shoemaker’s motion. Shoemaker asserted further arguments regarding the lack of

procedural bar in Article 64, the lack of forensic evidence linking Shoemaker to the crime,

the preserved chain of custody for the lighter, and that Shoemaker would not have been

convicted if an exculpatory result had been obtained from the lighter. Shoemaker also

formally withdrew his request to test the cigarette butts. The State replied reemphasizing

the trial evidence and jury’s determinations. The State also argued that the unlabeled

tape on the envelope containing the lighter establishes there was an insufficient chain of

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custody.

On May 13, 2025, the trial court signed an order finding that the handgun

magazine, spent shell casing, and unspent ammunition could not be found and therefore

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief. See id. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(i). The order

also specified that while the cigarette butts existed in some form, Shoemaker had

withdrawn his request for testing and thus deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Finally,

the trial court found the lighter was in HPD’s possession but that identity was not an issue

in the case and that there was insufficient evidence to establish: (1) a chain of custody,

or (2) a reasonable likelihood the lighter contained biological material for DNA testing,

and finally that Shoemaker would have been acquitted if exculpatory results were

obtained from the DNA testing. See id. arts. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii), 64.03(a)(1)(B),

64.03(a)(1)(C), 64.03(a)(2)(A).

This appeal followed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 64.05.

II. CHAIN OF CUSTODY

Though the trial court denied testing for all five items in Shoemaker’s motion,

Shoemaker only appeals the trial court’s decision regarding the lighter. We review the

denial of post-conviction DNA testing under a bifurcated standard. Reed v. State, 541

S.W.3d 759, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Muzzy v. State, No. 13-24-00217-CR, 2025 WL

635248, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 27, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). “[W]e give almost total deference to the [trial] judge’s

resolution of historical fact issues supported by the record and applications-of-law-to-fact

issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor.” Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 768; Muzzy,

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2025 WL 635248, at *1. We further consider “all other application-to-law-to-fact questions”

de novo. Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We will sustain

the trial court’s decision if it “is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.”

Evans v. State, 628 S.W.3d 358, 362–63 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.).

Accordingly, we resolve this appeal solely on the chain of custody issue.

Shoemaker may obtain forensic DNA testing of evidence “that has a reasonable

likelihood of containing biological material.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(a-1). He

must show that the item was not previously subject to DNA testing. See id.

art. 64.01(b)(1). The parties do not dispute the lighter has not been previously tested.

However, the trial court must find that the evidence “has been subjected to a chain of

custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced,

or altered in any material respect.” Id. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii). After examining the hearing

evidence, the trial court held there was insufficient evidence to establish a chain of

custody for the lighter. We agree.

Our sister courts that have examined the chain of custody requirement have held

that the requirement is not met when there is evidence that there was “mishandling of the

evidence collected by police,” “the evidence was mixed and tainted,” or if “there is nothing

in appellant’s affidavits to show the chain of custody of the evidence in question.” Evans,

628 S.W.3d at 364; Garcia v. State, No. 01-05-00718-CR, 2008 WL 2466211, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2008) (mem. op., not designated for publication), aff’d,

No. PD-1039-08, 2009 WL 3042392 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 23, 2009) (not designated for

publication). Further, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a trial court’s

determination that there was an insufficient chain of custody when the record showed that

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evidence was handled by multiple ungloved people, was not individually packaged, and

was “commingled in a common repository.” Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 769–70. The Court

further determined that the cumulative weight of the testimony “casts doubt on the

evidence’s integrity, especially for the [touch DNA] testing [appellant] seeks.” Id. at 770.

Conversely, a chain of custody has been upheld where evidence showed that the

biological evidence was received from a lockbox on a specific date and remained there

until tendered for testing on another specific date. See Brewer v. State, No. 05-02-00136-

CR, 2002 WL 31445286, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op. not

designated for publication).

Shoemaker asserts the chain of custody was sufficient because the lighter was

stored in the same homicide evidence room where evidence for pending homicides was

stored, it was found in its original envelope “in pristine condition,” and there was no

indication the original packaging was ever opened or resealed. Specifically, Shoemaker

argues that because it is standard procedure to date and initial a package every time it is

resealed, and there is no date on the sole piece of tape on the envelope, this is evidence

that the envelope was never opened. Conversely, the State argues Contreras’s testimony

regarding the lack of date on the tape means that chain of custody is broken because it

is unclear when the envelope was last opened or who opened it. Further, the State points

to testimony establishing the overall issues with the integrity of HPD evidence including

the movement of the evidence from one building to another, and cyberattacks on HPD’s

records system.

After hearing this testimony, the trial court determined there was insufficient

evidence to establish a chain of custody. We are required to afford deference to the trial

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court’s decisions based on witness credibility, including here, Contreras’s credibility as to

the chain of custody. See Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 768; Muzzy, 2025 WL 635248, at *1. This

testimony established that the envelope containing the lighter was found in an unmarked

box unrelated to the specific case and mixed in with a variety of other evidence, mirroring

the problematic evidence in Reed. See 541 S.W.3d at 769–70. While the lighter was

individually packaged and there was no record evidence regarding who had handled the

lighter in the interim, this does not establish a secure chain of custody as Shoemaker

contends and is more akin to the mishandling of evidence by police as the trial court

determined. See id.; Evans, 628 S.W.3d at 364; Garcia, 2008 WL 2466211, at *4.

Shoemaker claims this case is more like Brewer in that the lighter was placed in

the envelope on a specific date and was since undisturbed. See 2002 WL 31445286, at

*2. However, cutting against this assertion is the record evidence that the last time the

envelope was opened and resealed it was undated with no person’s initials indicating who

last opened the envelope. While Shoemaker argues that the State misinterprets the

meaning of Contreras’s testimony as to this fact and that it should be interpreted to mean

that the envelope hasn’t been opened, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably

concluded that the undated tape is indicative of an unknown person opening the envelope

on an unknown date and not following procedure when resealing it, thus breaking the

chain of custody. This was the trial court’s interpretation of Contreras’s testimony based

on its finding there was insufficient evidence to establish a chain of custody, and we must

defer to this interpretation. See Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 768; Muzzy, 2025 WL 635248, at

*1. This is especially relevant because the envelope with the lighter was found in a box

commingled with other evidence, which further “casts doubt on the evidence’s integrity.”

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See Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 769–70. This case is like Reed because Shoemaker seeks

touch DNA testing and the undated tape casts doubt on whether potential unknown

persons handled the lighter after it was placed in the envelope. See id.

Finally, Shoemaker argues that allowing the State to avoid DNA testing by relying

on its own improper preservation of evidence would allow the State to circumvent Article

64.03. However, Shoemaker’s cited authority for this contention, Larson v. State, is

distinguishable because the evidence at issue was under a specific statutory mandate to

be preserved and was already found to have been subject to a sufficient chain of custody,

which is not the case here. See 488 S.W.3d 413, 419 n.5 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2016,

pet. ref’d). The trial court’s ruling here was the first determination on whether there was a

sufficient chain of custody for the lighter, rendering Larson inapplicable. See id. Likewise,

Shoemaker’s arguments utilizing Druery v. State are wholly inapplicable because the

Druery court considered chain of custody under the Rules of Evidence and admissibility

at trial, which present entirely different legal issues and standards of review than post-

conviction DNA testing. See 225 S.W.3d 491, 503–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Therefore, because the trial court’s finding that there was an insufficient chain of

custody is supported by the record, we overrule Shoemaker’s sole issue on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of April, 2026.

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