Baseline Energy Services, LP and Baseline Services LLC v. Billy Tom Martin

NUMBER 13-24-00564-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

BASELINE ENERGY SERVICES, LP
AND BASELINE SERVICES LLC, Appellants,

v.

BILLY TOM MARTIN, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 10
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellants Baseline Energy Services, LP and Baseline Services LLC (collectively

Baseline) challenge the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss appellee Billy Tom

Martin’s libel suit. By one issue, Baseline contends that it satisfied the initial burden to

show that Martin’s libel claim falls within the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA)
because the complained-of statements were made in connection with a governmental

proceeding. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Baseline, an energy company, employed Martin as an inventory specialist on

October 30, 2022. Martin claims that he was injured while fulfilling his work-related

responsibilities on February 2, 2023, which “resulted in severe pain in his lower back and

sternum, leading to a diagnosis of a herniated disk.” According to Martin, on February 7,

2023, he “initiate[d] a workers’ compensation claim,” reported the injury to his supervisor,

and “requested a reasonable accommodation from” Baseline “to work from home

temporarily.” Baseline terminated his employment that day. On April 1, 2024, Martin filed

suit against Baseline for disability discrimination and workers’ compensation retaliation.

On August 16, 2024, Martin filed his live pleading claiming that Baseline retaliated

against him for filing workers’ compensation and that when he sought unemployment

benefits, Baseline, “motivated by retaliatory intent,” denied his claim without any basis.1

Next, Martin sued for disability discrimination because “at the time [Baseline took] the

adverse employment actions . . . he was an individual with a disability as defined under

the Texas Labor Code.” Finally, Martin sued for libel claiming that Baseline “through

actions directly taken or sanctioned by their agents, falsely claimed both internally within

the organization and externally, notably during proceedings related to [his] claim for

unemployment benefits, that [he] had abandoned his job.” Martin alleged, “[t]hese

statements were published to third parties, including but not limited to employees within

1 According to Martin, his workers’ compensation claim was eventually approved after a lengthy

nearly one-year appeal with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC), which according to Martin,
“substantiates” his “claim that the initial denial was without merit and retaliatory in nature.”

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[Baseline’s] organization and representatives of the unemployment benefits office,

thereby satisfying the publication necessary for a libel claim.”

On September 19, 2024, Baseline filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA,

generally stating that Martin could not provide by clear and specific evidence a prima facie

case for “any and all of the essential elements of his claims”; therefore, the trial court

should “dismiss his case.” Baseline said, “Even assuming [Martin] can present the

requisite evidence, however, [Baseline’s] speech was protected and justified so as to

establish defenses as a matter of law—further warranting dismissal.” Baseline cited

Gallegos v. Escalon, arguing that statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings are

protected by judicial immunity. 993 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1999, no pet.).

Baseline stated in its motion to dismiss that it had “absolute immunity in making

the alleged statements” and Martin’s libel “claim rel[ied] upon statements made by

[Baseline] ‘internally within the organization and externally, notably during proceedings

related to [Martin’s] claim for unemployment benefits.’” Baseline further argued, “Any

communications made to the TWC during unemployment investigations or proceedings

are covered by absolute judicial immunity and therefore cannot, as a matter of law, serve

as the basis for a libel action.” Martin did not file a response to Baseline’s motion.

The trial court held a motion to dismiss hearing on November 5, 2024. Baseline

did not appear at the hearing because according to Baseline the weather prevented its

attorneys from traveling to the hearing. At the hearing, Martin asked the trial court to deny

Baseline’s motion to dismiss because Baseline did not appear. The trial court denied

Baseline’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

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II. STANDARD REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo. Izaguirre v.

Aguilar, No. 13-19-00225-CV, 2021 WL 727017, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Feb. 25, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall,

579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019)). “In conducting our review, we consider the pleadings

and evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. (citing Dyer v. Medoc Health

Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied)).

The TCPA allows for dismissal of lawsuits that unacceptably threaten the rights of

free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association. Id. (first citing In re Lipsky,

460 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015); then citing Fawcett v. Grosu, 498 S.W.3d 650, 655

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g)). “A defendant invoking

the act’s protections must show first, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

plaintiff’s legal action is ‘based on, relates to, or is in response to’ the defendant’s exercise

of one or more of the enumerated rights.” Id. (quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 586). If the

defendant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must then establish clear and specific evidence

of a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question, or the case is

dismissed. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

In its motion to dismiss, Baseline claimed that the trial court should dismiss all of

Martin’s causes of action because Martin could not establish by clear and specific

evidence a prima facie case for each element of each of his claims. However, Baseline

did not allege any facts that would place Martin’s claims, other than libel, within the TCPA.

Martin clearly did not allege that he was entitled to the relief sought for any causes of

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action except libel based on any of Baseline’s statements or communications. On appeal,

Baseline has abandoned its motion to dismiss Martin’s causes of action for disability

discrimination, workers’ compensation retaliation, and retaliation for applying for

unemployment, and on appeal, it only seeks reversal of the trial court’s denial of its motion

to dismiss Martin’s libel claim. Baseline contends that it established that Martin filed his

libel claim in response to its exercise of its right to petition by making statements in a

quasi-judicial TWC proceeding and communications pertaining to that TWC proceeding.

The TCPA applies to “statements made in a [TWC] proceeding [because those

statements] implicate the right to petition.” Yu v. Koo, 633 S.W.3d 712, 724 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2021, no pet.); Porter- Garcia v. Travis L. Firm, P.C., 564 S.W.3d 75, 85 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“The TCPA broadly defines ‘[e]xercise of

the right to petition’ to include a communication pertaining to a judicial, official, or

governmental department proceeding, such as the TWC proceeding here.”) (alteration in

original); see also Linan v. Strafco, Inc., No. 13-05-027-CV, 2006 WL 1766204, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Quasi-judicial”

proceedings include proceedings before the Texas Workforce Commission (formerly

known as the Texas Employment Commission)”) (citation modified). Moreover, “[t]he

TCPA defines ‘exercise of the right to petition’ as including ‘a communication in or

pertaining to: . . . (i) a judicial proceeding; (ii) an official proceeding, other than a judicial

proceeding, to administer the law; [or] (iii) an executive or other proceeding before a

department of the state or federal government or a subdivision of the state or federal

government.’” Consultants in Pain Med., PLLC v. Ellen Boyle Duncan, PLLC, 690 S.W.3d

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739, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, pet. denied) (alteration in original) (emphasis

added) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(4)(A)(i)–(iii)).

Martin alleged in his petition that Baseline committed libel by falsely stating to the

TWC that he abandoned his position and that Baseline made the same communication

internally to its employees. Baseline responded that it had “absolute immunity” to make

its communications internally and to the TWC because those communications were about

its investigation pertaining to the TWC proceedings and argued, “Any communications

made to the TWC during unemployment investigations or proceedings are covered by

absolute judicial immunity and therefore cannot, as a matter of law, serve as the basis for

a libel action.” See Linan, 2006 WL 1766204, at *2 (“Texas recognizes an absolute

privilege in both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, ‘meaning that any statement

made in the trial of any case, by anyone, cannot constitute the basis for a defamation

action, or any other action.’”) (quoting Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)).

The TCPA applies to statements Baseline made to the TWC. See Yu, 633 S.W.3d

at 724; Porter-Garcia, 564 S.W.3d at 85; Linan, 2006 WL 1766204, at *2. Additionally,

Baseline’s internal statements concerned communications that pertained to the TWC

proceedings. See id.; Izaguirre, 2021 WL 727017, at *3. Thus, Baseline met its burden to

show Martin’s libel claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to its right to petition,

and the burden therefore shifted to Martin to provide prima facie evidence of each element

of his libel claim. See Izaguirre, 2021 WL 727017, at *2.

Martin did not file a response to Baseline’s TCPA motion to dismiss, and at a

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hearing on the motion, Martin did not present any evidence.2 Thus, Martin did not fulfill

his burden. See id. Martin claims that he was excused from presenting evidence, and the

trial court could have denied Baseline’s motion because Baseline did not attend the TCPA

motion to dismiss hearing. Martin does not provide authority, and we find none, supporting

this assertion. See id.; Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 29 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that

allegations in the pleadings alone could support a prima facie case and stating, “Once the

court is satisfied that the Act applies and the burden shifts to the non-movant, the TCPA

requires something beyond allegations in the pleading ‘to support a rational inference that

an allegation is true’”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly denied

Baseline’s TCPA motion to dismiss Martin’s libel claim. We sustain Baseline’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s denial of Baseline’s motion to dismiss Martin’s libel

cause of action and remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment to the extent that the trial court denied Baseline’s

motion to dismiss Martin’s other causes of action.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
4th day of June, 2026.

2 In its judgment denying Baseline’s motion to dismiss, the trial court stated, “The TCPA does not

apply to shield Defendants from this suit as [Martin] has shown clear and specific evidence supporting each
essential element of the claims, which are grounded in alleged illegal actions extending beyond protected
activities.” However, as stated above, Martin did not file a response to the motion to dismiss or present
evidence at the motion to dismiss hearing. Therefore, this statement is erroneous.

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