Vale S.A. v. Itabiricu Nacional De Pesquisa Mineral Ltda.

NUMBER 13-25-00526-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

VALE S.A., Appellant,

v.

ITABIRIÇU NACIONAL DE
PESQUISA MINERAL LTDA., Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

This case concerns the alleged theft of millions of tons of low-grade iron ore mined

in Brazil. Appellee Itabiriçu Nacional de Pesquisa Mineral Ltda. (Itabiriçu) sued appellant

Vale S.A. (Vale) in Nueces County, claiming that Vale wrongfully appropriated the ore

and sold some of it in Texas. The trial court denied Vale’s special appearance, and Vale
argues by one issue in this appeal that it erred in doing so. Because we agree, we reverse

and render.

I. BACKGROUND

Vale is a Brazilian mining company with operations in over thirty countries, and it

is the world’s largest producer of iron ore. Since its founding, Vale has owned and

operated a vast open-pit mine complex located in Itabira in the Brazilian state of Minas

Gerais. At the complex, Vale extracts iron from raw ore, resulting in large amounts of solid

and liquid waste byproducts, or tailings. At the Itabira Mining Complex, Vale would store

tailings, which are potentially toxic and environmentally hazardous, in an area known as

the “Polygonal.”

Itabiriçu is also a mining company based in Brazil. It was formed in 2014 to explore

and develop opportunities involving the use and repurposing of iron ore tailings. As part

of those efforts, it allegedly acquired a permit from the government of Brazil granting it

mineral rights to the Polygonal. According to Itabiriçu, Vale previously forfeited its mineral

rights to the Polygonal when it submitted a “Negative Final Research Report” in 2010

formally declaring to the Brazilian government that there were no minerals to be extracted

there. Nevertheless, despite Itabiriçu’s permit, Vale allegedly prevented Itabiriçu from

accessing the Polygonal, claiming that such access would interfere with its operations in

the rest of the complex. Itabiriçu sued Vale in Brazil in order to gain access to the site;

Vale also brought legal proceedings against Itabiriçu in Brazil. According to Itabiriçu, the

Brazilian government rejected Vale’s request to prevent other companies from conducting

research or operations in the Polygonal, and Brazilian courts concluded that Itabiriçu is

entitled to ownership of “any minerals” located there and to access the site.

2
On October 20, 2023, Itabiriçu filed the instant suit against Vale in Nueces County

Court at Law No. 2 complaining about the above-referenced acts and also alleging that

Vale “s[old] and conspir[ed] to sell its ill-gotten goods” to Voestalpine, a steel

manufacturer which owns and operates a mill near Corpus Christi.1 According to Itabiriçu,

the sales agreement between Vale and Voestalpine was negotiated in Texas and the ore

at issue was shipped directly to Corpus Christi from the Port of Tubarão in the state of

Espírito Santo, Brazil. Itabiriçu further alleged that the majority of Voestalpine’s Texas

operations were sold to ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steel producer, in April 2022.2

Itabiriçu brought claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy against Vale,

Voestalpine, and ArcelorMittal.3 Regarding personal jurisdiction, Itabiriçu alleged that the

court had general jurisdiction over Voestalpine and ArcelorMittal “because they reside in,

and conduct business, in the State of Texas.” It further argued that the court had specific

jurisdiction over all defendants because:

[o]n information and belief, the sales of iron ore were consummated in
Nueces County, Texas, and the purchased iron ore was delivered through
Nueces County as well. Each of Itabiriçu’s claims against Defendants arise
from the theft, transportation, and subsequent sale of the ore and the
conspiracy to steal, transport, and sell the iron ore.

In its live fourth amended petition, Itabiriçu elaborated as follows:

Vale took and sold approximately 108,500,000 metric tons of iron ore,
comprised of materials that [Itabiriçu] had (and continues to have) the legal
right to possess, use, and economically benefit from. On information and
belief, after unlawfully extracting these materials, Vale processed it,

1 Voestalpine AG is based in Austria. In its Nueces County suit, Itabiriçu named Voestalpine AG’s

United States-based subsidiaries, Voestalpine Texas, LLC, and Voestalpine US Holding, LLC, as
defendants. We refer to these defendants collectively as Voestalpine.
2 ArcelorMittal S.A. is based in Luxembourg. In its Nueces County suit, Itabiriçu named ArcelorMittal

S.A.’s United States-based subsidiaries, ArcelorMittal Texas HBI, LLC and ArcelorMittal Texas HBI
Holdings, LLC, as defendants. We refer to these defendants collectively as ArcelorMittal.
3 Itabiriçu also initially asserted claims of money had and received, civil theft, quantum meruit, and

tortious interference with contract; however, it abandoned those claims in its live petition.

3
transported it, and exported it through the Port of Tubarão to Texas. On
information and belief, Vale sold this ill-gotten ore to [Voestalpine], and to
[ArcelorMittal] following [its] acquisition of Voestalpine Texas in April 2022.

On July 18, 2024, Vale filed a special appearance and answer subject to the

special appearance, arguing in part that Itabiriçu’s “alleged claims do not arise from or

relate to any substantial connection Vale has with Texas.” It later filed two amended

special appearances with evidence, including affidavits by two corporate representatives

and copies of the sales contracts governing its transactions with Voestalpine and

ArcelorMittal. Itabiriçu filed a response arguing in part:

Vale’s efforts to sell and successful sales of iron ore to Texas from Tubarão
as described above give rise to claims of conversion, unjust enrichment,
and conspiracy to convert iron ore that was mined in Brazil and shipped to
Texas. . . . While this case does involve Itabiriçu’s rights to iron ore in the
Polygonal, this case revolves around iron ore going from Brazil into Texas
and what happened in Texas between Vale and Texas Defendants.

Vale filed a reply to the response.

After a hearing, the trial court denied Vale’s special appearance by written order

dated October 3, 2025. It later filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, including in

relevant part:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

....

3. Vale targeted Texas through a sustained, multi-year course of
conduct with its co-Defendants, including direct negotiations,
repeated visits, and the execution of contracts specifically to serve
the Texas market.

....

5. Vale held multiple meetings with Voestalpine in August 2013 and
September 2013—prior to any sales in Texas—regarding how Vale
could best serve the Texas market and to explore the possibility of a
“partnership with [Voestalpine] in Texas.”

4
....

7. In fact, testifying as a corporate representative, [Renato Prado
Ferraro, Vale’s iron ore sales director for Japan, Korea, and
Southeast Asia,] confirmed that Vale intended to be “the main
provider of [iron ore] pellets to Texas.”

8. In a 2014 email, Ferraro described this project as Vale’s “Texas
Project Supply.”

....

9. Ferraro testified on behalf of Vale that he personally visited Texas
multiple times between 2014 and 2020 in his sales capacity and that,
during these visits, he met with Voestalpine Texas employees.

10. These meetings concerned both the technical and commercial
purposes of the Texas Project.

....

13. Ferraro described the contract [between Vale and Voestalpine] in an
email to Voestalpine as Vale’s “Texas contract.”

14. When asked (repeatedly) why Vale referenced the contract with
Voestalpine as the “Texas contract,” [Ferraro] explained: “We would
call it the Texas contract because it was the easiest way to identify
the client . . . .”

15. Shortly after the execution of the contract, Vale characterized Vale
and Voestalpine as having “a strong partnership in Texas.”

....

16. Vale representatives visited Voestalpine in Texas following the
execution of the Texas Contract including in March 2017 and July
2019.

17. Vale and Voestalpine entered into at least one additional contract
related to the subject matter of the Texas Contract (with terms
negotiated in Texas), and Vale further proposed extending its
contractual relationship with Voestalpine into 2021.

....

19. Vale repeatedly sold and shipped millions of tons of iron ore to
Voestalpine and [ArcelorMittal] in Texas, for hundreds of millions of
dollars—as evidenced by over 40 bills of lading.

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20. Vale also admits that in the relevant time, Vale took iron from the
“disputed area” in the Polygonal, Vale transported it to plants in the
ltabira Mining Complex, and that iron eventually went to Tubarão for
shipping around the world.

21. Vale further claims it is impossible to segregate the ore because it
was comingled by Vale with other iron ore.

22. Itabiriçu claims that this comingled ore is comprised, in part, of
materials rightfully belonging to Itabiriçu.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

23. Given the foregoing, this Court’s exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over Vale is appropriate.

24. In its live pleading, Itabiriçu has pleaded “allegations that suffice to
permit a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.”

25. Because Itabiriçu has met its burden, Vale “assumes the burden of
negating all potential bases for personal jurisdiction that exist in the
plaintiff’s pleadings.” Vale has not met this burden.

26. First, Vale has availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

27. Activities evidencing Vale’s purposeful availment include (1) Vale’s
contemplation of an investment in Voestalpine’s Texas plant itself;
(2) Vale’s negotiation of the Texas Contract; (3) Vale’s technical and
commercial meetings in Texas; (4) Vale’s execution of the Texas
Contract; (5) Vale’s ongoing contract negotiations, amendments,
and extensions; (6) Vale’s on-site support to its Texas contractual
counterparts; and (7) Vale’s shipments from Tubarão to Texas.

28. Second, Itabiriçu’s claims against Vale arise out of or relate to Vale's
Texas-focused activities.

29. Itabiriçu’s claims are principally concerned with Vale’s Texas-based
conduct and the Texas contracts.

30. Vale’s Texas contracts, the subject matter thereof, and Vale’s Texas-
based conduct will be the focus of the trial and consume most if not
all of the litigation’s attention.

31. Vale’s Texas contracts, the subject matter thereof, and Vale’s Texas-
based conduct are related to the operative facts of the claim.

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32. Vale’s efforts to sell and successful sales of iron ore to Texas from
Tubarão give rise to claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, and
conspiracy to convert iron ore that was mined in Brazil and shipped
to Texas.

33. Third, exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Vale does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

34. Vale is a large company with sufficient resources to defend this
matter in Texas.

35. Moreover, Texas has a special interest in this case as it involves
wrongfully obtained goods being shipped in and out of the state.

....

37. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Vale’s Second Amended Special
Appearance.

(Emphasis and internal record references omitted.) This accelerated interlocutory appeal

followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7).4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Texas’s long-arm jurisdiction statute permits Texas courts to exercise personal

jurisdiction over any nonresident defendant that “does business” in this State. PHC-

Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007); see TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042. The statute’s “broad language” extends Texas courts’

personal jurisdiction “as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will

permit.” PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 166; BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83

S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.

1977). Therefore, “the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied if the

4 On January 6, 2026, we granted Vale’s motion to stay its discovery obligations in the trial court

during the pendency of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3.

7
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations.” CSR Ltd.

v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies federal Constitutional due process

requirements only if (1) the nonresident defendant has established “minimum contacts”

with the forum state and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction “comports with traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.” PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 166 (citing Int’l Shoe Co.

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). When a nonresident defendant “purposefully

avails” itself of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in a foreign jurisdiction,

it has minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013) (citing Retamco

Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009)). A showing of

purposeful availment requires that a defendant seek some “benefit, advantage, or profit

by ‘availing’ itself of the jurisdiction.” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex.

2010).

Only the defendant’s purposeful contacts are relevant to the minimum contacts

inquiry; unilateral activity of another party or third person, or random, isolated, or fortuitous

contacts by the defendant, are insufficient to prove purposeful availment. Cornerstone

Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, LP, 493 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. 2016)

(citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005)).

Further, a seller’s awareness “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product

into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream

into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.” CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 595

(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality

8
opinion)). Instead, there must be some “additional conduct,” beyond merely placing the

product in the stream of commerce, that indicates “an intent or purpose to serve the

market in the forum State.” Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873 (first citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at

112; then citing Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Tex. 2007);

and then citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 786). And a defendant may engage in “purposeful

avoidance” by structuring its transactions in such a way as “neither to profit from the

forum’s laws nor subject itself to jurisdiction” there. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d

58, 68 (Tex. 2016).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Cornerstone

Healthcare, 493 S.W.3d at 71; see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 414 (1984). General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts are

continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action did not arise from activities

performed in the forum state. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872; CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 595

(“General jurisdiction requires a showing that the defendant conducted substantial

activities within the forum, a more demanding minimum contacts analysis than for specific

jurisdiction.”). It is undisputed that Vale has no offices, employees, or property in Texas,

and Itabiriçu never argued that the trial court has general jurisdiction over Vale. We

therefore confine our analysis to specific jurisdiction.

The exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate only when the plaintiff’s claim

“arises from or relates to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Cornerstone

Healthcare, 493 S.W.3d at 71 (citing Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873). In other words, “there

must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the

litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. Under this rule, “[s]ellers who ‘reach out beyond

9
one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another

state’ are subject to the jurisdiction of the latter in suits based on their activities.” Michiana,

168 S.W.3d at 785 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985)).

B. Special Appearance

Any party named in a lawsuit may make a special appearance to challenge the

trial court’s personal jurisdiction over it. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.1. The trial court “shall

determine the special appearance on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made

by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the

parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” Id. R. 120a.3.

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a

question of law we review de novo. Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 66; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at

574; BMC Software Belg., 83 S.W.3d at 795.

C. Analysis

On appeal, Vale observes that the contracts governing its sales of iron ore to

Voestalpine: (1) name Voestalpine’s Austrian parent company as the designated “buyer”;

(2) name Vale’s Switzerland-based subsidiary, Vale International S.A. (Vale

International), as the designated “seller”; (3) were executed in Switzerland; (4) state that

the ore was to be delivered “on a FOB basis Tubarão Port, Brazil”; and (5) do not mention

Texas. According to Vale, this shows that the decision to have the ore shipped from Brazil

to Corpus Christi was a unilateral decision made by Voestalpine (and later ArcelorMittal)

and does not show that Vale purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting

10
business here. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.319(a) (defining “FOB”);5 Spir Star, 310

S.W.3d at 873; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (“The unilateral activity of those

who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement

of contact with the forum State.”). Indeed, Vale argues that the contracts demonstrate it

attempted to purposefully avoid the jurisdiction of this State. See Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at

68.

Vale additionally argues that, even if it purposefully availed itself of the privileges

of doing business here, personal jurisdiction does not lie because Itabiriçu’s claims do not

have a substantial connection to Vale’s activities directed to Texas. See Moki Mac, 221

S.W.3d at 585. On this point, we agree.

In a sworn declaration attached to the special appearance, Vale’s iron ore sales

director for Europe and North Atlantic, Renata Costa Zingre, stated in relevant part as

follows:

6. My understanding is that Vale transports some of the raw iron ore
that it produces in its mining complexes to beneficiation plants. At the
beneficiation plants, the ore is processed and transformed into a
coarse powder, known as “pellet feed.” The pellet feed is then

5 Section 2.139(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code states:

Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means “free on board”) at a named place,
even though used only in connection with the stated price, is a delivery term under which
(1) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the seller must at that place ship the
goods in the manner provided in this chapter . . . and bear the expense and risk of
putting them into the possession of the carrier; or
(2) when the term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller must at his own expense
and risk transport the goods to that place and there tender delivery of them in the
manner provided in this chapter . . . ;
(3) when under either Subdivision (1) or (2) the term is also F.O.B. vessel, car or other
vehicle, the seller must in addition at his own expense and risk load the goods on
board. If the term is F.O.B. vessel the buyer must name the vessel and in an
appropriate case the seller must comply with the provisions of this chapter on the
form of bill of lading . . . .
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.319(a); see NuStar Energy, L.P. v. Hancock, 731 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tex. 2026).

11
transported to pelletizing plants.

7. My understanding is that the Brazilian Port of Tubarão, near the city
of Vitória, State of Espírito Santo, receives pellet feed from multiple
Vale mining complexes across Brazil. Vale operates six to eight
pelletizing plants within the area of the Port of Tubarão. At each of
these plants, the pellet feed undergoes a process where it is
transformed into small, spherical iron ore pellets. There are generally
two grades of iron pellets: Blast Furnace Pellets and Direct
Reduction Pellets. The pellets are used in different processes to
produce steel.

8. After the pellets are produced at one of Vale’s six to eight pelletizing
plants in Tubarão, Vale then transports pellets to the Tubarão port’s
loading dock for shipment to domestic and international markets.

....

11. The purpose of Vale International’s purchase/sale agreements with
[Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal] is for Vale to sell various grades of
iron ore to [Voestalpine] or [ArcelorMittal]. I understand that
[Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal] then transport the ore from Brazil to
steel plants that are located in various international locations.

12. To my understanding, at no point did Vale contemplate that any of
Vale’s obligations under the purchase/sale agreement would be
performed in the State of Texas. Further to my understanding, many
of Vale International’s purchase/sale agreements with [Voestalpine]
and [ArcelorMittal] are made on a free-on-board (“F.O.B.”) basis,
meaning that the responsibility for the iron ore pellets and all
obligations relating to them pass from Vale to [Voestalpine] or
[ArcelorMittal] at such time that Vale delivers the pellets to the
designated shipping vessel. . . . For F.O.B. transactions, the
shipping vessel is chartered and directed by [Voestalpine] or
[ArcelorMittal].

13. Under the purchase/sale agreements, [Voestalpine] or [ArcelorMittal]
requests delivery of a certain grade of ore and designates a shipping
vessel at the appropriate loading port enumerated in the contract. . . .
Vale then delivers the ore to a designated vessel that is chartered
and directed by [Voestalpine] or [ArcelorMittal]. Vale’s
responsibilities concerning the ore terminate at that point.

14. Under the purchase/sale agreements, Vale’s responsibility was to
supply the product to [Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal]. [Voestalpine]
and [ArcelorMittal] then decided where to ship its product.
[Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal]—not Vale—determine the

12
destination port of the shipments. The location of the destination port
is known to Vale for the purposes of compliance with the terms of the
contracts and customs regulations in Brazil.

15. Here, as relevant to shipments of pellets to Texas under the
purchase/sale agreements, all deliveries of the pellets to
[Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal] were made on an F.O.B. basis at
the Brazilian Port. [Voestalpine] and [ArcelorMittal] chartered the
vessels to have the pellets collected and determined that they were
to be transported to Texas.

16. Vale International negotiated the purchase/sale agreement with
[Voestalpine] through Vale International’s office in Switzerland and
[Voestalpine’s] office in Austria. To my understanding, [Voestalpine’s
United States-based subsidiaries] were not involved in those
negotiations. I am not aware of any negotiations pertaining to these
contracts that occurred in Texas. When [Voestalpine] makes
payment under the purchase/sale agreement, it wires the relevant
funds from its bank account in Austria to Vale’s bank account in New
York . . . . I am not aware of any Vale financial transaction pertaining
to these contracts that flows through Texas.

17. Prior to 2022, Vale International and [ArcelorMittal] entered into
purchase/sale agreements concerning Vale's sale of iron ore to
various destinations around the world, but that did not include Texas.
I understand that, in 2022, [ArcelorMittal] acquired a majority stake
in a steel plant located in Portland, Texas. Subject to final terms,
[ArcelorMittal] then requested in 2023—and Vale agreed—that the
terms of the operative contract and the memorandum of
understanding between Vale International and [ArcelorMittal] would
apply to all shipments made to the Texas plant. . . .

18. Vale International negotiated the operative purchase/sale agreement
and the memorandum of understanding with [ArcelorMittal] through
Vale International’s office in Switzerland and [ArcelorMittal’s] office
in Luxembourg. It is my understanding that [ArcelorMittal’s United
States-based subsidiaries] were not involved in those negotiations. I
am not aware of any negotiations pertaining to these contracts that
occurred in Texas. When [ArcelorMittal] makes payment under the
purchase/sale agreement, it wires the relevant funds from its bank
account in New York . . . to Vale’s bank account in New York. I am
not aware of any financial transaction pertaining to these contracts
that flows through Texas.

In a separate declaration, Kesley Julianelli, Vale’s “Director of Integrated Planning and

Supply Chain, Iron Ore,” stated in relevant part:

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3. It is my understanding that the products at issue in this case are iron
ore pellets. Iron ore pellets are produced by the following method.
Vale mines various forms of raw ore, such as hematite or itabirite,
from any one of its 22 mines. Vale then transports some of its raw
ore to its beneficiation plants. Vale operates over 20 beneficiation
plants across its seven mining complexes. At the beneficiation
plants, the ore can be processed and transformed into three different
products: lump ore, sinter feed, and pellet feed.

4. The pellet feed product from beneficiation plants is then transported
to several pelletizing plants that Vale operates. Before entering the
pelletizing plant, the pellet feed is blended with deliveries of pellet
feed from mining complexes across Brazil. Combining deliveries of
pellet feed from multiple sources is necessary to maintain the volume
of pellet feed needed to sustain operations at each of the several
pelletizing plants.

....

10. The process of iron ore extraction separates iron ore from waste rock
(low-grade material with no economic value). After that extraction,
the waste rock is deposited in a waste pile. The unprocessed iron
ore, known as “Run of Mine,” is fed into beneficiation plants, resulting
in final products such as lump ore, sinter feed, and pellet feed. The
waste material generated from the beneficiation process is known as
“tailings.” These tailings are iron-poor residues, which are generated
during the production process and are not utilized as marketable
products. The tailings can be deposited into storage sites, which
include structures known as “tailings dams.”

11 Within the Itabira Mining Complex, the waste rock was deposited into
waste piles. The Polygonal encompassed 27% of a waste pile. The
waste that was deposited in that particular pile consisted of hard
itabirite. The hard itabirite in that pile was stored there temporarily
until a beneficiation plant within the Itabira complex had the technical
capacity to process it. Accordingly, the hard itabirite in that pile was
temporarily considered waste until it was able to be processed. The
Polygonal also encompassed part of a tailings dam.

12. I understand that Itabiriçu’s petition in this litigation claims a property
interest in material that it incorrectly describes as “iron tailings.” The
materials in the waste pile, however, were actually hard itabirite—
and not tailings. No tailings inside the dam were ever remined and
processed for sale.

13. My understanding is that, over the period of 2015 to 2021, Vale
collected the hard itabirite it had previously deposited in the waste

14
pile, which is partially within the Polygonal, and sent it to the three
beneficiation plants within the Itabira Mining Complex to be
processed into pellet feed. The hard itabirite from the section or the
waste pile within the Polygonal was combined with the Run of Mine
from other mines within the Itabira Mining Complex when it was sent
to the beneficiation plants for processing into pellet feed. The pellet
feed from the beneficiation plants was then transported from the
Itabira Mining Complex via train to pelletizing plants in the Brazilian
Port of Tubarão. At Tubarão, the pellet feed that arrived from Itabira
was blended with pellet feed from other mining complexes across
Brazil and fed to the six to eight pelletizing plants where it was
transformed into iron ore pellets.

14. I understand that Itabiriçu claims that iron ore pellets, which
purportedly consisted of material from the waste pile within the
Polygonal, were sold to Vale’s customers and ultimately arrived in
Texas for use in steel operations. It is not possible to determine
whether any iron ore pellets that were shipped to Texas contained
any hard itabirite from a specific waste pile within the Itabira Mining
Complex.

15. As explained above, within the Itabira Mining Complex alone, Vale
operates three beneficiation plants. During the time in which the hard
itabirite from the Polygonal was collected, that hard itabirite was
entirely combined with Run of Mine from mines within the Itabira
Mining Complex before it was fed into any of the three beneficiation
plants in the complex. And once the pellet feed from those
beneficiation plants arrived in Tubarão, it was blended with pellet
feed from mining complexes all over Brazil before being fed into any
or the six to eight pelletizing plans.

16. Accordingly, it is impossible to determine whether any or the iron
pellets shipped by Voestalpine and ArcelorMittal to Texas contained
hard itabirite from the waste pile that is partly within the Polygonal.

The record contains no evidence controverting the testimony of Zingre or Julianelli.

To support specific jurisdiction, the defendant’s activities in the forum state must

“relate[] to the operative facts” of the litigation. See id. at 584 (citing Rush v. Savchuk,

444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)). In Moki Mac, evidence of the defendant’s Texas contacts was

insufficient to support specific jurisdiction because the “operative facts” of the suit

occurred in Arizona. Id. at 585. But here, despite the alleged theft occurring in Brazil, the

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trial court found specific jurisdiction based on Vale’s multiple meetings with Voestalpine’s

subsidiaries in Texas, both before and after the sales contracts were executed, and Vale’s

representative’s description of the contract with Voestalpine as the “Texas contract.”

On appeal, Itabiriçu appears to acknowledge that Vale “exercised dominion and

control” over the subject ore while it was located in Brazil. It contends that, though this

fact may establish that its conversion claim accrued in Brazil, it does not preclude a

determination that the claim has a “substantial connection” to Vale’s Texas-based

activities. See Twister B.V. v. Newton Rsch. Partners, LP, 364 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“The accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations

purposes has no implications for jurisdiction.”). That may be true in a general sense, but

the actual record in this case does not support such a determination. Even assuming the

evidence supported all of the trial court’s findings of fact regarding Vale’s activities in

Texas, none of those activities are related in any substantial way to the actual conduct

which Itabiriçu complains about in its suit—i.e., Vale’s alleged theft of iron ore and its

alleged refusal to grant Itabiriçu access to the Polygonal. All of Itabiriçu’s claims are

dependent on its assertion that it owned mineral rights to the Polygonal under Brazilian

law by virtue of its government-issued permit. Assuming this is true, Vale’s alleged

conversion of the ore would have been complete at the time it was removed from the

Polygonal—the ultimate foreign destination of the ore is irrelevant to the question of

whether it was unlawfully appropriated in the first place. The record thus firmly refutes the

trial court’s conclusion that Itabiriçu’s claims “are principally concerned with Vale’s Texas-

based conduct and the Texas contract.” Instead, based on the facts alleged in Itabiriçu’s

pleadings, a trial on Itabiriçu’s conversion claim would focus predominantly—if not

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exclusively—on Vale’s activities in Brazil.

The same is true for Itabiriçu’s claims of unjust enrichment and conspiracy, which

rely on the same underlying fact allegations. See M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola

Metro. Bottling Co., 512 S.W.3d 878, 887 (Tex. 2017) (“[A] nonresident’s alleged

conspiracy with a Texas resident does not confer personal jurisdiction over the

nonresident in Texas.”); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 679 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (“[U]njust enrichment is not a distinct independent

cause of action but simply a theory of recovery.”).6 We note that, to support its conspiracy

claim, Itabiriçu alleged in its live petition that Voestalpine “was aware (or should have

been aware) when purchasing the iron pellets that at least part was comprised of the ill-

gotten [m]ining [r]esidues Itabiriçu had the right to possess.” Relatedly, it accused

Voestalpine and ArcelorMittal of “fencing” the stolen ore. However, it did not point to any

evidence supporting either allegation in its response to the special appearance, nor does

it on appeal.

In arguing that a theft completed outside Texas may support specific jurisdiction in

this state, Itabiriçu cites Rowland & Rowland P.C. v. Texas Employers Indemnity Co., 973

S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In that matter, a Texas truck driver

was killed in an accident in Tennessee, and his widow was awarded death benefits from

6 “The mere existence or allegation of a conspiracy directed at Texas is not sufficient to confer

jurisdiction.” Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Tex. 2018). To comport with due
process, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant “must rest not on a conceptual device but
on a finding that the non-resident, through his relationship with another, has purposefully availed himself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d
769, 773 (Tex. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). This relationship “may be described in terms of
conspiracy, but such a characterization should not mask the real facts of the relationship or avoid analysis
of the attribution process.” Id. (noting “[t]he term ‘conspiracy’ is meaningful only to the extent that it helps
to elucidate these facts”); see Schroeder v. Valdez, 941 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1997, orig. proceeding) (noting “due process will not permit the plaintiff to use insignificant acts in
the forum to assert jurisdiction over all co-conspirators”).

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appellee TEIC, the worker’s compensation carrier for the decedent’s employer. Id. The

widow and her adult children also filed a wrongful death suit against the State of

Tennessee in that state, and TEIC asserted subrogation rights. See id. at 433–34. At one

point, Rowland (the family’s Tennessee counsel) sent a letter directly to TEIC in Texas,

acknowledging that he would “continue to protect [TEIC’s] subrogation claim without the

necessity of [TEIC] being added as a party” and would “continue to represent [TEIC’s]

interests in this matter.” Id. at 434. However, after the widow and her children were

awarded $217,000 from the State of Tennessee, Rowland refused to honor TEIC’s

subrogation claim as to the children’s share of the award, and instead distributed that

share directly to the children in Texas. Id. TEIC sued Rowland in Travis County for breach

of contract and conversion, and the trial court denied Rowland’s special appearance. Id.

at 435. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Rowland “had a least two

purposeful contacts with Texas”: (1) the letter its counsel sent directly to TEIC’s Texas

office, and (2) its distribution of funds to the decedent’s children in Texas. Id. at 435–36.

Crucially, the court further held that

it was these specific “contacts” which give rise to the claims TEIC asserts
against [Rowland]. In particular, it is TEIC’s contention that [Rowland’s]
promise to “protect” its subrogation interest was breached or
misrepresented when the firm distributed the proceeds to [decedent’s]
children before satisfying TEIC’s subrogation lien. . . . [Rowland’s] promise
to “protect” TEIC’s subrogation interest in Texas and [its] distribution of
substantial proceeds in Texas are sufficient purposeful minimum contacts
with this State to satisfy due process.

Id. at 436. Itabiriçu also cites Energium Health v. Gabali, in which a federal district court

found specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a theft suit despite the fact that the “alleged

conversion was not consummated in Texas.” No. 3:21-CV-2951-S, 2022 WL 16842660,

at *14–15 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2022) (noting defendants allegedly “enticed” plaintiff to send

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allegedly stolen inventory and equipment to Texas with “promises of more potential

business”).

We do not find these cases controlling. In Rowland, the defendant reached into

Texas to form an agreement with TEIC, and TEIC’s suit alleged a breach of that same

agreement. 973 S.W.2d at 436. Similarly, in Energium Health, the theft “would not have

occurred” but for the defendants’ “purposeful efforts to reach into [Texas] and induce a

forum resident to do business with [them] in reliance on their alleged misrepresentations.”

2022 WL 16842660, at *15 (citation modified). Here, on the other hand, Itabiriçu does not

allege that Vale breached any contract made in Texas or committed any part of a tort

here, nor does it allege that Vale’s contracts to sell ore to Voestalpine and ArcelorMittal

were “but for” causes of Vale’s alleged conversion. Instead, the only connection between

these contracts and Itabiriçu’s claims is that some of the ore which was allegedly

converted was later sold pursuant to these contracts and delivered to Corpus Christi.

According to Zingre’s uncontroverted testimony, the contracts specified that title to the

ore transferred to Voestalpine and ArcelorMittal while it was still situated in Brazil, and the

decision to ship the ore to Texas was made exclusively by the purchasers. Even if Vale

itself decided to “distribut[e] substantial proceeds” of the alleged conversion to customers

in Texas, the cited cases do not hold that such a finding may alone support specific

jurisdiction. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 577 (noting “the mere sale of a product to a

Texas resident will not generally suffice to confer specific jurisdiction upon our courts”).

In any event, Rowland and Energium Health are factually distinguishable because

the property which was distributed to Texas in those cases was directly and exclusively

traceable to the defendant’s alleged tortious behavior. See 973 S.W.2d at 436; 2022 WL

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16842660, at *15. On the other hand, Julianelli testified that Vale takes raw ore from “any

one of its 22 mines in Brazil,” transports it for processing at one of “over 20” beneficiation

plants, and then transports all of the processed ore together to one of “six to eight”

pelletizing plants, including one at the port of Tubarão. She stated that the specific waste

ore at issue in this case was “combined with Run of Mine from other mines within the

Itabira Mining Complex” before being pelletized and was “blended with pellet feed from

other mining complexes across Brazil” before being delivered to port. It is therefore

impossible to determine whether, and to what extent, the shipments to Corpus Christi

contained ore which had been removed from the Polygonal.

Citing Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, Itabiriçu contends that “as the entity that

wrongfully took the ore and commingled it,” Vale “has the burden to differentiate,” and if

it fails to meet that burden, “it’s liable for the whole amount.” 508 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.

1974) (“[T]he burden is on the one commingling the goods to properly identify the aliquot

share of each owner; thus, if goods are so confused as to render the mixture incapable

of proper division according to the pre-existing rights of the parties, the loss must fall on

the one who occasioned the mixture.”). Even assuming that Vale had such a burden and

failed to meet it, there is still nothing in the record indicating that Vale’s alleged theft

“ar[o]se from or relates to” any contacts with Texas. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873.

Moreover, under these facts, if a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over Vale, then so

would any court in any country that received shipments of ore mined by Vale and

purchased from Vale in Brazil. Such a conclusion would not “comport[] with traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 166.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude there is no “substantial connection”

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between Vale’s contacts with Texas and the operative facts of Itabiriçu’s claims. See

Weeks Marine Co. v. Landa, 629 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no

pet.) (finding no specific jurisdiction where suit “ar[o]se out of alleged tortious acts

committed . . . in New York,” even though appellee “accepted the terms of his

employment while he was in Texas, took a physical and drug test in Texas, was paid via

direct deposit to his Texas bank account, . . . once worked on a project in Galveston,

Texas, and . . . received medical care in Texas after the incident”); Wilco Farmers v.

Carter, 558 S.W.3d 197, 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (same where “the

operative facts of [appellees’] claims . . . concern[ed] principally whether [appellant’s]

employees exercised reasonable care in unloading the truck and whether [appellant]

exercised reasonable care in training and supervising its employees, all of which took

place in Oregon”); Info. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d 392, 404 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (same where “the majority of the focus of any trial

would be directed to [appellee’s] alleged wrongdoing in the U.K., not Texas”); Primera

Vista S.P.R. de R.L. v. Banca Serfin, S.A., 974 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. App.—El Paso

1998, no pet.) (same where defendant deposited money in Texas but allegedly made

misrepresentations to plaintiffs about that money in Mexico); see also Elecs. Rsch., Inc.

v. Reyna ex rel. J.M.A., No. 05-24-01097-CV, 2025 WL 2076021, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

July 23, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[E]ven if [appellant] has been registered to do

business in Texas since 2005, and even if appellants have performed a significant amount

of work in Texas, these facts have nothing to do with the operative facts of [appellee’s]

claims, which stem from a workplace accident in Indiana.”). Therefore, the trial court erred

by denying Vale’s special appearance. See Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 68; Moki Mac, 221

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S.W.3d at 585. We sustain Vale’s sole issue on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is reversed. We render judgment granting Vale’s special

appearance and dismissing all claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
11th day of June, 2026.

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