Dominique Shackelford v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 22, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00778-CR

DOMINIQUE SHACKELFORD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 and Probate Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 248498

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Dominique Shackelford guilty of driving while
intoxicated (DWI) with an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §49.04. In two issues on appeal, appellant argues that (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood tests. We affirm the
judgment as challenged on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2021, Dixon called 9-1-1 to report what she believed to be a
drunk driver. She was a passenger in a car driven by her husband when she saw a
blue minivan swerving erratically, bump the curb, and almost hit another vehicle.
Pearland Police Officer Nathaniel Marin responded to the call at 6:49 p.m. and was
informed that the driver was heading west. As Marin approached the described
area, he noticed a blue Dodge Grand Caravan—matching the description given by
Dixon—drive past him. Marin caught up to the vehicle as it entered an apartment
complex without using a turn signal. Marin activated his emergency lights and
stopped the van inside the complex. The van “slow rolled” through the apartment
complex for about 30 seconds before abruptly coming to a stop.

Appellant was the driver and sole occupant of the minivan. While appellant
looked for his license, Marin noticed the smell of alcoholic beverages coming from
the van. According to Marin, appellant’s eyes were “red and glossy,” and his
speech was slurred. Marin ordered appellant out of the vehicle; appellant exited
slowly and stumbled as he walked to the rear of the minivan toward the officer.
Marin noted that appellant appeared to have urinated on himself. When Marin
asked appellant if he had been drinking, appellant responded that he drank one
beer. Marin observed that appellant swayed back and forth while speaking and that
he appeared nervous and had trouble answering questions. When asked if he had
any medical conditions or was on medication, appellant said he was being treated
for anxiety and depression.

Appellant agreed to perform three standard field sobriety tests: the
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), the walk-and-turn, and the one-legged stand.
He showed signs of intoxication during the HGN test, and could not maintain his
balance during the walk-and-turn and one-legged stand tests. With all tests

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indicating appellant was intoxicated, Marin placed him under arrest at 7:12 p.m.
Marin read the required statutory warnings to appellant and asked him to provide a
breath or blood specimen, which appellant refused. Appellant told Marin that he
was going to “ruin his life,” that he was “having family issues,” and he accused
Marin of being “out to get him.” appellant was taken to the city jail where Marin
began working on a search warrant for appellant’s blood.

Marin electronically presented an application for a search warrant to a
magistrate, who administered the oath to Marin for his affidavit for the search
warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(b–1)(2). The search-warrant
affidavit reflects that the oath was administered at 9:06. The magistrate signed
(1) the acknowledgment on the search-warrant affidavit and (2) the search warrant
at 9:06 and emailed it to Marin, but the magistrate did not fill in (1) “p.m.” or (2)
date either the oath on the search-warrant affidavit or on the warrant.1 See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 2.09 (who are magistrates), 18.01(b–1), (c), (j) (search
warrant), 18.02 (grounds for issuance of search warrant); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 312.011(1) (defining “affidavit”). The magistrate did not date the search warrant,
but did sign it, and the magistrate’s name appeared in typewritten form. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 18.04 (addressing required content of search warrant).

Marin, however, “wrote in the date” on the original search warrant. Marin
then drove appellant for testing, where Marin watched a nurse obtain two vials of
blood from appellant. Subsequent analysis showed that appellant’s blood alcohol
concentration was 0.31. The next afternoon, Marin notified the magistrate by email
about the missing date. Six days later, the magistrate responded to Marin by email
indicating that the magistrate later filed in “p.m.” and the date on separate copies

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The “9:06” on both the search-warrant affidavit and the search warrant appears to have
been typed in before it was presented to the magistrate.

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of the search-warrant affidavit and the search warrant, and the magistrate initialed
those additions.

Appellant’s case was tried to a jury, which found appellant guilty and
assessed punishment at 225 days in jail. The trial court sentenced appellant to 225
days in jail and a $100.00 fine. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.0185 (fine for
intoxication convictions).

II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support his conviction; appellant’s argument largely relies on the fact that Dixon
never saw the driver of the vehicle.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

We apply a legal-sufficiency standard of review in determining whether the
evidence supports each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19
(1979); see Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under
this standard, we examine all the evidence adduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We consider all evidence in the record, whether
admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as
any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold the jury’s
verdict unless a rational fact-finder must have had reasonable doubt as to any
essential element. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

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We do not, however, re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence
or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d
742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the
witness’s credibility and the weight given their testimony, we resolve any
evidentiary conflicts or inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. See Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“As long as the jury’s finding of a
culpable intent ‘is supported by a reasonable inference, it is within the province of
the factfinder to choose which inference is most reasonable.’”).
Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge and as authorized in the indictment. Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct
jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,
does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Id.

For the offense of driving while intoxicated, the State had the burden of
proving that appellant was (1) operating a motor vehicle (2) in a public place
(3) while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). In this case, the State had
the additional burden of proving appellant had a blood-alcohol-concentration level
(BAC) of 0.15 or more. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(d). (“If it is shown on the
trial of an offense under this section that an analysis of a specimen of the person’s
blood, breath, or urine showed an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more at the
time the analysis was performed, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.”).

B. Application

Even though Dixon never saw the driver of the vehicle that she reported to
9-1-1, we nevertheless conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support

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appellant’s conviction.

The evidence shows that Officer Marin responded to a 9-1-1 call by driving
to the area where the driver was predicted to be. When he arrived, he saw a vehicle
that was driving in a public place that matched Dixon’s description and pulled it
over after the vehicle turned without the use of a turn signal. No other person was
in the vehicle with appellant, and Marin smelled a strong odor of alcoholic
beverages coming from inside the van. Appellant also had slurred speech and “red
and glossy” eyes. Marin then administered three field-sobriety tests, all three of
which indicated that appellant was intoxicated. Appellant’s blood sample, which
was collected several hours later, revealed that appellant had a BAC of 0.311,
which was well above the 0.15 the State needed to prove.

We conclude that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of
driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt.

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood test. More specifically,
appellant claims that the search warrant for blood was defective. See generally
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23 (evidence not to be used).

A. Standard of review

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on appeal under a
bifurcated standard. State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
The appellate court will give “almost total deference to a trial court’s findings of
historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on
credibility and demeanor if they are reasonably supported by the record.” Id.

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We review de novo a trial court’s determination of legal questions and its
application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness
credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial court’s ruling will also be sustained if it is
correct on any applicable theory of law and the record reasonably supports it. Id. at
57–58. Additionally, because appellant did not request findings of fact and
conclusions of law and none were filed, we presume the trial court implicitly
resolved all issues of historical fact and witness credibility in the light most
favorable to the ultimate ruling. See State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011).

Under Texas law, a warrant must: (1) run in the name of “The State of
Texas”; (2) identify the item to be seized and name the person, place, or thing to be
searched; (3) command any peace officer of the proper county to search the person,
place, or thing named; (4) be dated and signed by the magistrate; and (5) contain
the magistrate’s name in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form with
the magistrate’s signature. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.04. A
magistrate’s finding that a search-warrant affidavit is supported by probable cause
generally carries a presumption of validity. See Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904,
911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

B. Analysis

According to appellant, there was no constitutionally valid warrant issued
against him because it is undisputed that the magistrate did not date the original
warrant. In other words, appellant’s only challenge to the warrant was a statutory
defect under Article 18.04(4). However, the court of criminal appeals has already
addressed and rejected a similar statutory-defect challenge:

In this case, as in Dunn, the sole basis for Appellee’s motion to
suppress was a statutory defect discovered after execution of the

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warrant—the illegible signature on the search warrant in violation of
Article 18.04(5). Contrary to Appellee’s suggestion that this defect
rendered the warrant facially invalid such that it was not a “warrant”
upon which an officer could reasonably rely in good faith, Dunn
instructs that a warrant containing this type of defect is still a
“warrant” for purposes of Article 38.23(b). As we explained in Dunn,
evidence obtained pursuant to such a defective warrant should not be
rendered inadmissible, so long as the statutory requirements of Article
38.23(b) are satisfied—that is, that the officer was acting in objective
good-faith reliance upon a warrant based upon a neutral magistrate’s
determination of probable cause. We find that this case falls within the
reasoning of Dunn and, therefore, hold that a warrant containing an
illegible magistrate’s signature in violation of Article 18.04(5) does
not automatically preclude application of the statutory good-faith
exception in Article 38.23(b).

Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 61 (citing Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997)).

Thus, applying Arellano and Dunn, we conclude that a warrant containing a
defect in violation of article 18.04(4) is still a “warrant” for purposes of article
38.23(b), which allows evidence that was obtained in violation of a law to still be
used against the accused if the “evidence was obtained by a law enforcement
officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate based on probable cause.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc Ann. art. 38.23(b); see
Dunn, 951 S.W.2d at 479 (“Evidence obtained by a police officer acting in good
faith reliance upon a warrant based upon a magistrate’s determination of probable
cause should not be rendered inadmissible due to a defect found in the warrant
subsequent to its execution.”).

Appellant does not argue that the warrant was not supported by probable
cause, and he does not argue that the warrant was not issued by a neutral
magistrate. There is no argument made, or evidence in the record to suggest, that
Officer Marin was not acting in good faith. And appellant also does not identify
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any allegedly false statements in the warrant that would overcome the presumption
of validity regarding the magistrate’s probable-cause finding. While the warrant
was technically defective at issuance, we conclude that Officer Marin was still
acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate based on probable cause. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying appellant’s motion to suppress.2

We overrule appellant’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

/s/ Charles A. Spain
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

2
While we hold the trial court did not err, we are not suggesting that the search-warrant
affidavit and search warrant were either properly submitted to the magistrate or properly
executed by the magistrate. They were not.

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