In the Matter of K.A., a Juvenile v. the State of Texas

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Majority and Dissenting
Opinions filed April 18, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00802-CV

IN THE MATTER OF K.A.

On Appeal from the 474th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-75-J

MEMORANDUM DISSENTING OPINION

I would hold that there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile
court before appellant’s eighteenth birthday because there is some evidence that
the alleged sexual assault was not reported to the State until after appellant’s
eighteenth birthday. Because the majority holds otherwise and dismisses the case,
I respectfully dissent.

The trial court heard evidence that the State’s investigation started in 2022,
after appellant’s eighteenth birthday. Appellant’s mother testified:
Q. So you didn’t know about any of these allegations until the
investigation started in 2022?
A. Correct.

During appellant’s 2022 recorded interview with police, which was admitted as an
exhibit, appellant said he learned “last week” that the complainant had reported the
sexual assault to her school:

Q. How long ago did [appellant’s father] tell you, or when were you first
made aware that there was an actual case and she had reported it to the
school?
A. Uh, I think it was last week.

Also during the interview, the officer and appellant discussed how the school was a
mandatory reporter to “CPS,” that a CPS referral had been made because the
complainant had reported it to her school, that CPS had not yet contacted appellant
concerning his two young children, and that CPS would be in contact with
appellant “soon.”

Based on the combined and cumulative force of this evidence, a rational fact
finder could reasonably infer that the State was not made aware of the sexual
assault allegation until shortly before the interview occurred in 2022, well after
appellant’s eighteenth birthday. Absent any conflicting evidence to the contrary,
appellant’s proposed alternative inference—that the State had been aware of the
child’s outcry for at least four years prior to the interview, yet did nothing about
it—is not reasonable. See, e.g., City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821
(Tex. 2005) (noting that reviewing courts “must assume [fact finders] made all
inferences in favor of their verdict if reasonable minds could, and disregard all
other inferences”).

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Because the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that it
was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before appellant’s eighteenth
birthday, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

/s/ Ken Wise
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan. (Spain, J., majority).

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