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ACCEPTED
15-24-00114-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
8/25/2025 5:41 PM
No. 15-24-00114-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK

In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

Austin, Texas 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

Cecile Erwin Young, in her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner
of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Molina Healthcare
of Texas, Inc.; Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc.,
Appellants,
v.
Cook Children’s Health Plan, Texas Children’s Health Plan,
Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance
Company,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the 353rd Judicial District of Travis County,
No. D-1-GN-24-003839

Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.’s
Response to Appellees’ Motions for
Temporary Relief

Scott Douglass &
McConnico LLP
Jason R. LaFond
State Bar No. 24103136
Cheryl Joseph LaFond
303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 495-6300
jlafond@scottdoug.com
Counsel for Appellant Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.
Table of Contents

Page

Table of Authorities ................................................................................................ iii
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Background .............................................................................................................. 2
A. Medicaid and CHIP ..................................................................................... 2
B. STAR and CHIP Managed Care.................................................................. 2
C. The STAR CHIP procurement ................................................................... 3
1. The preexisting STAR and STAR CHIP contracts ............................... 4
2. Reprocuring the STAR CHIP contracts ................................................ 7
a. Procurement reform ........................................................................ 7
b. The current procurement ................................................................ 8
c. This lawsuit ................................................................................... 10
Argument ................................................................................................................ 11
I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Replicate the District Court’s
Injunction......................................................................................................... 12
A. The Court’s original jurisdiction is insuﬃcient because there is
no risk of mootness. .................................................................................... 13
B. Rule 29.3 does not apply because the Losing Plans have no rights
to protect. ...................................................................................................16
C. The Court’s inherent authority is not a source of jurisdiction. .................. 21
II. No Court Has Jurisdiction to Enjoin These Procurements. ............................. 23
A. The Losing Plans’ claims are unripe because their administrative
appeals remain pending.............................................................................. 24
B. HHSC retains exclusive jurisdiction over the Losing Plans’
challenges to the procurements because the Losing Plans have
not exhausted administrative remedies. ..................................................... 27
1. The exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies. ......................................... 28
2. There is no loophole for the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims. ............. 30
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................ 31
Certiﬁcate of Compliance ...................................................................................... 33

Appendix

Tab

1 Print-outs from LBB Contracts Database

ii
Table of Authorities

Page(s)

Cases
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970)............................................................................................. 19
Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett,
35 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2000).................................................................................... 27
Chaﬁn v. Chaﬁn,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) .............................................................................................15
City of Anson v. Harper,
216 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) ........................................ 27
City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
506 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.) ............................................ 29
City of Hous. v. Rhule,
417 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................................ 27
City of Laredo v. Martin,
52 Tex. 548 (1880) .............................................................................................. 22
Coyne-Delany Co. v. Cap. Dev. Bd. of State of Ill.,
616 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1980) ................................................................................ 16
CPS Energy v. ERCOT,
671 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................................ 29
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,
582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) ................................................................................ 22
Elview Constr. Co. v. N. Scott Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
373 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1985) ............................................................................... 18
HealthAmerica Corp. of Ky. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.,
697 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1985) .................................................................................. 18
Henderson v. Shinseki,
562 U.S. 428 (2011) .............................................................................................15
HHSC v. Sacred Oak Med. Ctr. LLC,
2021 WL 2371356 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021) .................................................... 21
iii
Holt & Co. v. Wheeler Cnty.,
235 S.W. 226 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1921, writ dism’d w.o.j.) .............................17
In re Abbott,
601 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................................... 23
In re Abbott,
645 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. 2022) ................................................................ 16, 19, 21, 23
In re Entergy Corp.,
142 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................................ 29
In re Geomet Recycling LLC,
578 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. 2019) .................................................................................. 22
In re Lasik Plus of Texas, P.A.,
2013 WL 816674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, orig.
proceeding) .........................................................................................................13
In re Smith,
2004 WL 254079 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, orig. proceeding) ............................13
In re State,
711 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. 2024) .......................................................................... 12, 24
In re TEA,
619 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. 2021) ........................................................................... 11, 12
In re Teague,
2006 WL 302123 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, orig. proceeding) ...................13
J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Bristol Twp.,
505 A.2d 1071 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1986) ............................................................... 18
Jennings v. Carson,
220 S.W. 1090 (Tex. [Comm’n App.] 1920) ....................................................... 30
La. Env’t Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge,
677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................15
Madison v. Martinez,
42 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1931, writ ref’d) ............................................ 23
MCNA Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Tech., Mgmt. & Budget,
929 N.W.2d 817 (Ct. App. Mich. 2019) ...............................................................17
MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC,
598 U.S. 288 (2023) ............................................................................................15
iv
Morath v. Lewis,
601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 2020) ................................................................................ 12
N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Tex. Dep’t of Health,
839 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) ................................ 30, 31
Parsons v. Galveston Cnty. Emp. Credit Union,
576 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, orig. proceeding) ....... 13, 16
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc.,
971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) .......................................................................... 24, 27
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940) ................................................................................... 17, 18, 19
Red River Holdings, LLC v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 768 (2009) .................................................................................. 20, 28
Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
529 U.S. 1 (2000) ............................................................................................... 27
Smith v. Abbott,
311 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) ....................................... 30
Sowell’s Meats & Servs., Inc. v. McSwain,
788 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1986) ................................................................................17
State ex rel. Mid-Mo. Limestone, Inc. v. Cnty. of Callaway,
962 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)...................................................................17
State v. Harris County, No. 15-24-00120-CV (Tex. App.—15th Court 2024) ........ 21
State v. Morales,
869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) .......................................................................... 12, 22
TEA v. Cypress-Fairbanks ISD,
830 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1992).................................................................................. 30
TEA v. Hous. ISD,
609 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020) ........................................................ 21
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .................................................................................15
Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Kirby,
150 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1941, orig. proceeding)............................... 22

v
Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Kirby,
152 S.W.2d 1073 (Tex. 1941) ............................................................................... 22
Tex. Highway Comm’n v. El Paso Bldg. & Const. Trades Council,
234 S.W.2d 857 (1950) .........................................................................................17
Tex. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp,
343 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1961) ................................................................................ 30
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State,
106 S.W. 326 (Tex. 1907) .................................................................................... 22
Weber v. Walker,
591 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, orig. proceeding) ...............................13
Webster v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline,
704 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. 2024) ............................................................................... 26
Westheimer ISD v. Brockette,
567 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1978) ................................................................................ 30
Wilson v. Cmty. Health Choice Tex., Inc.,
607 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) ............................... 14, 21
Constitutional Provisions
Tex. Const. art. V,
§ 6(a) ...................................................................................................................13
§ 8 ...................................................................................................................... 27
Statutes
42 U.S.C. ch. 7, subch. XXI; 42 C.F.R. pt. 457 ......................................................... 2
Act of June 2, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., S.B. 1, art. IX,
§ 17.09(b)(4) ......................................................................................................... 3
§ 17.09(e) .............................................................................................................. 5
Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX,
sec. 17.09(b)(4) ..................................................................................................... 3
sec. 17.09(e) .......................................................................................................... 5
Act of May 31, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 1053, § 1, art. IX,
sec. 17.09(b)(4) ..................................................................................................... 3
sec. 17.09(e) .......................................................................................................... 5
Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 22.221(a)..................................................................................................... 13, 21
vi
§ 522.0051 .......................................................................................................... 19
§ 525.0101 .......................................................................................................... 28
§ 532.0051 ...................................................................................................... 3, 28
§§ 523.0051(b), 523.053 ..................................................................................... 19
§§ 544.0101, 544.0103(d), 544.0109 ..................................................................... 8
§ 2155.076 ................................................................................................ 9, 29, 30
§ 2155.144........................................................................................................... 28
§ 2155.144(c)–(d), (n) ........................................................................................... 3
§§ 2155.144(f ); 2155.326 .................................................................................... 19
§ 2155.144(n) ........................................................................................................ 3
§ 2155.324 .......................................................................................................... 19
§ 2262.101 .......................................................................................................... 19
Tex. Health & Safety Code
§ 62.051(a) ............................................................................................................ 3
§ 62.155(a) ...................................................................................................... 3, 28
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 252.061(2) ....................................................................... 21
Regulations
1 Tex. Admin. Code
§§ 391.101(d), 391.209(5) ..................................................................................... 8
§ 391.107(6) ........................................................................................................ 19
§ 391.303(b) ............................................................................................... 9, 24, 31
§ 391.305(a)(1) ...................................................................................................... 9
§§ 391.305(c), 391307(c)–(d) ...............................................................................31
§ 391.307(c)(2)–(3), (d)(3) .................................................................................. 26
§ 391.307(d) ...................................................................................................10, 25
§ 391.309 ......................................................................................................... 9, 31
34 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.162(a) ........................................................................... 19
42 C.F.R.
§ 430.0 ................................................................................................................. 2
pt. 438 .................................................................................................................. 2
§ 438.62(a) ........................................................................................................... 6
pt. 456, subpt. L ................................................................................................... 2
pt. 457................................................................................................................... 2
Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 29.3 ................................................................................................ 16

vii
Other Authorities
Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level: A
Hodgepodge of Remedies, 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 265 (1996) ................................. 18
Contracts for Stationery, 6 Op. Att’ys Gen. 226 (1853), 1853 WL 2192 ....................17
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies,
Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 168
(1949) ................................................................................................................. 27
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00002, https://tinyurl.com/5n79scud .......... 4, 5
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00006; https://tinyurl.com/2w979v7v ............. 4
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00007, https://tinyurl.com/yyk4ztte ............ 4, 5
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00014, https://tinyurl.com/32j954cv ................ 4
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00015, https://tinyurl.com/5e7kfv8j................. 4
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00019, https://tinyurl.com/3rr56sjv ................. 4
HHSC, Request for Public Comment on Best Value Criteria for STAR & CHIP
Managed Care Procurement (Apr. 28, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2zshb6j5 .......... 8
Gary L. Hopkins, The Universe of Remedies for Unsuccessful Oﬀerors on Federal
Contracts, 15 Pub. Cont. L.J. 365 (1985) ....................................................... 20
Mem. from HHSC Deputy Executive Commissioner of Managed Care Re:
Managed Care Contract Extension and Bridge Extensions ( Jan. 5, 2023),
https://tinyurl.com/mr234skf .............................................................................. 6
Mem. from HHSC Re: Contract XXX-XX-XXXX-00014 ( Jan. 17, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/bdd5dv5u ......................................................................... 6, 7
Mem. from HHSC Re: Contract XXX-XX-XXXX-00019 ( Jan. 17, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/4zsrbvv5 ........................................................................... 6, 7
O’Connor’s Texas Civil Appeals ch. 10-D § 5 (2025) ........................... 22
RFP for HHSC Medicaid and CHIP Managed Care Services, No. 529-12-
0002 (Apr. 8, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y7fc39yt............................................... 4

viii
To the Honorable Fifteenth Court of Appeals:

The Losing Plans collectively have taken in well over $100 billion in taxpayer

money under their long-expired STAR and STAR CHIP contracts with HHSC. This

lawsuit has already netted them billions more, forcing HHSC to enter unwanted and

unauthorized bridge contracts with the Losing Plans without any competitive pro-

curement. All while this lawsuit blocks HHSC from completing the underlying re-

procurement that’s been going on for nearly a decade.

Now, the Losing Plans ask this Court to enjoin that reprocurement. But the

Losing Plans do not allege or try to prove that the result of some perfect procurement

would have been any diﬀerent or any better for them. They simply want the procure-

ment stopped for as long as possible. Why? Because another round of unwanted and

unauthorized multibillion-dollar bridge contracts is on the horizon if this case drags

on. The Losing Plans win by losing slowly.

Enough is enough. The Court should deny the Losing Plans’ motions for an

injunction pending appeal for a host of reasons. This response focuses on the Court’s

power—or not—to issue the requested injunction and antecedent jurisdictional de-

fects in the Losing Plans’ claims. The many reasons why the Losing Plans’ ultra vires

claims fail to overcome sovereign immunity and why the Losing Plans satisﬁed none

of the requirements for a temporary injunction in the district court will be fully ad-

dressed in forthcoming merits brieﬁng.
This Court should reject the Losing Plans’ motions because the Court lacks

the power to issue the requested injunction: The Court’s jurisdiction isn’t at risk,

Rule 29.3 doesn’t apply because disappointed bidders like the Losing Plans have no

rights to protect here, and any additional inherent authority the Court may have

doesn’t include issuing injunctions to protect parties pending appeal. Even more, no

court has jurisdiction to issue any injunction: The Losing Plans’ claims aren’t yet

ripe, and HHSC still has exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute. The Losing Plans’

claims fail out of the gate.

Background

A. Medicaid and CHIP

Medicaid “authorizes Federal grants to States for medical assistance to low-

income persons who are age 65 or over, blind, disabled, or members of families with

dependent children or qualiﬁed pregnant women or children.” 42 C.F.R. § 430.0.

CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Fund) is like Medicaid, but uses federal grants

to assist States in providing health insurance for children in families that earn too

much money to qualify for Medicaid but cannot aﬀord to buy private insurance. See

42 U.S.C. ch. 7, subch. XXI; 42 C.F.R. pt. 457.

B. STAR and CHIP Managed Care

Beneﬁts under both Medicaid and CHIP may be provided through a managed

care model. See generally 42 C.F.R. pt. 438 (Medicaid); id. pt. 456, subpt. L (CHIP).

Under these programs, HHSC contracts with managed care organizations (MCOs)

2
who operate health plans in one or more of 13 service delivery areas in Texas. See

9RRPX92.001. The MCOs’ relationship to Medicaid and CHIP beneﬁciaries is like

that of private insurers to their insureds.

C. The STAR CHIP procurement

HHSC has express authority to “enter into contracts as necessary to perform

any of the commission’s powers or duties.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 525.0101. HHSC also

“is the state agency designated to administer federal Medicaid funds,” and is ex-

pressly granted authority—without condition or reservation—to “plan and direct

Medicaid, including the management of the Medicaid managed care system and

the . . . procurement . . . of contracts necessary to implement that system.” Id.

§ 532.0051. HHSC additionally has express authority to administer CHIP. Tex.

Health & Safety Code § 62.051(a). And that includes the authority, without condition

or reservation, to “select the health plan providers under the program through a

competitive procurement process.” Id § 62.155(a).

More speciﬁcally, HHSC has the duty and thus the authority to “[e]nsure that

contract award decisions are determined based on best value criteria established in

solicitation documents.” Act of June 2, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., S.B. 1, art. IX,

§ 17.09(b)(4)1; see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144(c)–(d), (n) (directing HHSC to

procure for best value); id. § 2155.144(n) (providing, with exceptions not relevant

1
Accord, e.g., Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX, sec. 17.09(b)(4), 2023 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3573, 4510 (same); Act of May 31, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 1053, § 1, art. IX, sec.
17.09(b)(4), 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 2805, 3694 (same).

3
here, “[t]o the extent of any conﬂict, this section prevails over any other state law

relating to the procurement of goods and services”).

Exercising that express authority, HHSC has procured and is attempting to

reprocure contracts necessary to implement the STAR, CHIP, and STAR Kids pro-

grams.

1. The preexisting STAR and STAR CHIP contracts

The MCOs’ current STAR and STAR CHIP contracts originated in 2011. See

5RR255:17–24.2 Each judicially noticeable contract consists of nearly uniform terms.3

Cook Children’s is representative. Cook Children’s contracted with HHSC in Sep-

tember 2011. See HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00002 at 1. The term of the con-

tract goes through August 31, 2015, with extensions available through February 29,

2020. Contract at 1, pt. 2 (initial term; operational start date of March 1, 2012); id.,

attachment A at 15, § 3.02 (“The Parties may renew the Contract for an additional

period or periods, but the Contract Term may not exceed a total of eight (8) opera-

tional years.”).

2
See also RFP for HHSC Medicaid and CHIP Managed Care Services, No. XXX-XX-XXXX (Apr. 8,
2011), https://tinyurl.com/y7fc39yt. All web addresses cited in this brief were last visited August
25, 2025.
3
A copy of each judicially noticeable contract in the Legislative Budget Board’s Contract Database.
See HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00002, https://tinyurl.com/5n79scud (Cook Children’s);
HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00006; https://tinyurl.com/2w979v7v (Bankers Reserve Life
Insurance Co. of Wisconsin d.b.a. Superior HealthPlan Network); HHSC Contract No. 529-12-
0002-00007, https://tinyurl.com/yyk4ztte (Superior); HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00014,
https://tinyurl.com/32j954cv (Texas Children’s); HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00015,
https://tinyurl.com/5e7kfv8j (Wellpoint, née Amerigroup); HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-
00019, https://tinyurl.com/3rr56sjv (same).

4
The contracts expressly contemplate that diﬀerent contractors may take over

when the contracts’ term expires. See id., attachment B-1, § 9 (“Turnover Require-

ments”). The Turnover Requirements, for instance, include the MCO developing a

plan “that will assure . . . [t]he least disruption in the delivery of Covered Services to

Members during the transition to a subsequent contractor.” Id., attachment B-1,

§§ 9.2, 9.4.4 Thus, HHSC ensures that beneﬁciaries maintain continuity of care even

when managed care plans change a result of reprocurement. Contra, e.g., Superior

Mot. 19 (conﬂating continuity of care with continuity of MCO); Children’s Plans

Mot. 38–39 (same).

Despite the initial term of the contracts expiring years ago, these contracts now

remain on life support through annual renewals. See 6.RR.145:16–146:7. The Legisla-

ture has repeatedly expressed its displeasure with resuscitating government contracts

for additional terms not contemplated in the underlying agreement. See Act of June

2, 2025, supra, art. IX, § 17.09(e) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that agencies

and institutions minimize the use of extensions that extend a contract beyond the

base term and any optional extensions provided in a contract.”).5 And so the Legis-

lature has restricted extensions of expired contracts to no more than one year. See id.

4
The copy of Superior’s contract maintained by LBB does not include attachment B-1, which re-
produces sections from the RFP. But the contract references that attachment and expressly incor-
porates those RFP sections into the contract. See HHSC Contract No. XXX-XX-XXXX-00007, at 8–9,
pt. 10.
5
Accord, e.g., Act of May 29, 2023, supra, art. IX, sec. 17.09(e), 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws at 4511 (same);
Act of May 31, 2021, supra, art. IX, sec. 17.09(e), 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3695 (same).

5
Yet HHSC has been forced to repeatedly renew these expired contracts many

times while it tries to reprocure new contracts.6 As Commissioner Young explained:

“[A]s a matter of fact, I’m in violation of an appropriation bill rider that says I
can’t extend a contract past one year. And I have – we’ve had to extend and
extend and extend these contracts in violation of that.”7

The most recent bridge renewals were executed in early 2025 and keep these con-

tracts alive through August 31, 2026.8

These expired STAR and STAR CHIP contracts and their renewals have been

extremely valuable for the Losing Plans. By the end of the current renewal, Superior

and its parent will have received nearly $60 billion in taxpayer money.9 Wellpoint,

over $45 billion. Texas Children’s, over $18 billion. And Cook Children’s, nearly

6
Without the bridge contracts, HHSC would be immediately responsible for ensuring beneﬁciar-
ies’ medical care. See 42 C.F.R. § 438.62(a) (requiring HHSC to “arrange for Medicaid services to
be provided without delay to any Medicaid enrollee of an MCO . . . the contract of which is termi-
nated and for any Medicaid enrollee who is disenrolled from an MCO . . . for any reason other than
ineligibility for Medicaid”).
7
6.RR.145:16–146:7; see also, e.g., Mem. from HHSC Deputy Executive Commissioner of Managed
Care Re: Managed Care Contract Extension and Bridge Extensions at 2 ( Jan. 5, 2023), https://ti-
nyurl.com/mr234skf (“Extending the expiration dates of the current managed care contracts is
necessary to ensure managed care organizations continue to provide services to eligible Medicaid
and CHIP members until new contracts are awarded.”).
8
See, e.g., Mem. from HHSC Re: Contract XXX-XX-XXXX-00019 ( Jan. 17, 2025), https://ti-
nyurl.com/4zsrbvv5; Mem. from HHSC Re: Contract XXX-XX-XXXX-00014 ( Jan. 17, 2025),
https://tinyurl.com/bdd5dv5u.
9
The judicially noticeable value HHSC has reported for each MCO contract may be found in the
Legislative Budget Board’s contracts catabase, http://contracts-archive.lbb.texas.gov/, by select-
ing “2015” from the “Fiscal Year” drop-down menu, inputting the contract number into the
“Contract Id” box, and clicking “Search” at the bottom of the page. Screenshots are provided in
the accompanying Appendix.

6
$6 billion. And each round of bridge renewals is worth billions more to the Losing

Plans.10

If history is a guide, another round of multi-billion-dollar bridge contracts is

coming in early 2026 for the 2026–27 ﬁscal year.

2. Reprocuring the STAR CHIP contracts

a. Procurement reform

The current dispute arises from HHSC’s latest attempt to reprocure contracts

with MCOs to administer STAR and CHIP. Prior procurement failures led to a com-

plete overhaul of HHSC’s procurement apparatus, with a special focus on managed

care procurements. See, e.g. 6RR194:9–23; 9RRPX19.007–13. The new process

would be much more systematic; the goal “was to create a replicable and defensible

process to be applied throughout the [managed care] portfolio.” 6RR197:1–3. It

would be more focused on HHSC’s vision for what was needed for Medicaid and

CHIP. See 9RRPX116.001. It would closely coordinate among divisions, including to

develop the MCO-solicitation’s best value criteria, scope of work, and technical

questions, and to ensure that evaluators were assigned to technical questions within

their expertise. 6RR201:12–202:25, 203:25–204:8.

HHSC’s reform eﬀort was collaborative and transparent. All the parts of that

large agency worked together. See 6RR195:1–9, 203:7–18. HHSC brought in the

Comptroller, the State Auditor, and HHSC’s inspector general (an independent

10
See, e.g., memos cited supra, n.8, each at page 1.

7
oﬃce ﬁlled by the Governor11), to review its procurement processes. See

9RRPX148.015. Then, HHSC brought in private experts to do the same. See id. Spe-

cial focus was placed on managed care procurements, with Mercer Health and Ben-

eﬁts, a well-respected insurance consultant, evaluating and making recommenda-

tions for improvements. See 9RRPX19 (Mercer report). Mercer made numerous rec-

ommendations, and HHSC adopted nearly every one. See 9RRPX116.

And then HHSC staﬀ met with MCOs, including the Losing Plans, in “pre-

solicitation meetings, so to speak, where the managed care organizations could come

in and look at [HHSC’s] best value criteria and give us feedback on that criteria.”

6RR198:5–199:3; 6RR195:22–196:3. HHSC also released the proposed best value cri-

teria for general public comment.12

b. The current procurement

One of the results of that collaborative process was the STAR CHIP and STAR

Kids RFPs that began the procurements at issue here.13 The STAR CHIP RFP trans-

parently advised that evaluation would be guided by HHSC’s conception of best

value: “HHSC shall make an award to the Respondent that, in HHSC’s sole deter-

mination, provides the best value to the State of Texas as set out in this Solicitation.”

9RRPX38.021 (emphasis added); see 1 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 391.101(d) (best value),

11
See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 544.0101, 544.0103(d), 544.0109.
12
See HHSC, Request for Public Comment on Best Value Criteria for STAR & CHIP Managed Care
Procurement (Apr. 28, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2zshb6j5; see also 6RR196:4–6.
13
“The STAR Kids RFP is nearly identical to the STAR & CHIP RFP.” Superior Mot. 12.

8
391.209(5) (best value). And the RFP clearly set out how best value would be meas-

ured. See 9RRPX38.025–26, 33–40; see also 9RRPX290 (sample scoring rubric in-

cluded with RFP); 12RRDX54 (RFP scope of work). HHSC planned to have new

STAR CHIP contracts in place by February 2025. See 9RRPX38.010.

HHSC’s regulations require that any protest to the terms of an RFP be ﬁled

before responses are due. 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.305(a)(1). Here, only one Losing

Plan ﬁled a pre-submission protest, which was limited to a single RFP provision. See

9RRPX44. The other issues the Losing Plans now assert were apparent from the out-

set, see, e.g., Superior Mot. 7–8, 13–15, but they chose not to raise them at the proper

time and instead submitted proposals without objections.

HHSC issued a notice of intended awards, and the Losing Plans were disap-

pointed to learn that HHSC had not selected them, either at all, or in as many of their

preferred service delivery areas as they had hoped. See 9RRPX95. It was only after

HHSC announced the selections that the Losing Plans raised a laundry list of objec-

tions to the procurement. See 9RRPX155, 157–59; 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.303(b).

As its regulations direct, HHSC paused ﬁnalizing the STAR CHIP contracts to hear

those protests. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.309.

HHSC has unrestricted authority and discretion to resolve the merits of pro-

tests. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.076. HHSC’s Deputy Executive Commissioner

for Procurement and Contracting Services denied the Losing Plans’ protests, and

then the Losing Plans exercised their option to appeal that denial to Commissioner

9
Young. See CR.3315 n.1, 3529, 4249–50, 4264, 4717 n.2; see also 1 Tex. Admin. Code

§ 391.307(d). Those appeals remain pending.

c. This lawsuit

Around the same time they ﬁled their respective administrative appeals, the

Losing Plans sued to enjoin Commissioner Young from deciding them—that is, “tak-

ing action . . . to further the procurement . . . processes for the STAR & CHIP RFP”

and the STAR Kids RFP. CR.5883 (temporary injunction order drafted by the Losing

Plans and signed by the district court).

The Losing Plans’ lawsuits attempt to convert their administrative protest

grounds into ultra vires theories. Citing various procurement standards and events

during the procurement process, they “allege that [Commissioner Young] adminis-

tered the RFP in a manner that violates Texas law and that, consequently, any award,

execution, or implementation of the intended STAR & CHIP managed care con-

tracts . . . will constitute ultra vires acts.” CR.5876; see 5877–78 (list of grievances).

They challenge the pending STAR KIDS RFP on similar grounds. See CR.5878–79.

The Losing Plans’ petitions do not claim, and they never tried to prove, that

any of the errors they allege prejudiced them or caused the result of the STAR CHIP

procurement to be any diﬀerent than it would have been had the alleged errors not

occurred. They seek permanent injunctive relief that merely freezes the reprocure-

ment, see, e.g., CR.3339–40, 3556, 4276, 4279, 4763. Such an injunction will force

HHSC to continue unauthorized bridge contracts, and allow the Losing Plans to

10
continue receiving billions in taxpayer funds without any competitive procurement

of any kind.

After “a week-long evidentiary hearing,” Wellpoint Mot. 6, in which high-

ranking HHSC oﬃcials were forced to justify the agency’s contracting decisions, the

district court denied Commissioner Young’s plea to the jurisdiction and entered a

sweeping temporary injunction:

The State and Molina, after intervening, appealed. The State’s notice of ap-

peal superseded the temporary injunction.

Argument

The Losing Plans ask the Court to “reinstate the trial court’s injunction,” Su-

perior Mot. 25, and “to continue the temporary injunction ordered by the trial

court,” Wellpoint Mot. 2; accord Children’s Plans Mot. 14. But the orders the Losing

Plans ask this Court to issue “are neither procedurally nor functionally equivalent”

to the district court’s injunction. In re TEA, 619 S.W.3d 679, 689 (Tex. 2021). Any

11
order by the Court would “not” be “the reinstatement of the trial court’s order;

rather, it is a new order” of this Court. Id. So this Court must satisfy itself that an

injunction is appropriate—the district court’s views and ﬁndings are irrelevant. See,

e.g., In re State, 711 S.W.3d 641, 646–48 (Tex. 2024) (issuing injunction refused by

the district court and by the court of appeals).

The injunction the Losing Plans request is inappropriate because this Court

lacks the power to issue the asked-for injunction. And even if it had the power, no

injunction is appropriate because the Losing Plans’ claims fail: Their claims aren’t

ripe, and HHSC maintains exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute.

I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Replicate the District Court’s Injunction.

Like any other relief, “jurisdiction must exist before [an injunction] can issue.”

State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted). And “the need

for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases” like

this, “involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue inter-

ference with the other two branches of government is most acute.” Morath v. Lewis,

601 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. 2020).

The Losing Plans oﬀer three sources of authority for this Court to enjoin Com-

missioner Young and those who would perform contracts for HHSC: original juris-

diction, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3, and the Court’s inherent authority.

E.g., Superior Mot. 1; Wellpoint Mot. 3; Children’s Plans’ Mot. 7. None suﬃces.

12
Thus, the Losing Plans’ motion fails and the Court may deny it without reaching any

other issue.

A. The Court’s original jurisdiction is insuﬃcient because there is no risk
of mootness.

Courts of Appeals have original jurisdiction only “as may be prescribed by

law.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a). The Legislature has given courts of appeals orig-

inal jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction only as “necessary to enforce the juris-

diction of the court.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(a). In practice, this limit means that,

while courts of appeals “have no power to issue original writs solely to protect a party

from damage pending appeal,” or to preserve the status quo, they “may grant them

to preserve the subject matter pending appeal and prevent the case from becoming

moot.” Parsons v. Galveston Cnty. Emp. Credit Union, 576 S.W.2d 99, 99 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, orig. proceeding); In re Lasik Plus of Texas, P.A., 2013 WL

816674, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding) (Busby, J.,

sitting); accord, e.g., In re Teague, 2006 WL 302123, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2006, orig. proceeding) (similar).14

14
See also, e.g., In re Smith, 2004 WL 254079, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, orig. proceeding)
(“We lack jurisdiction to issue the writ. Andrea argues that an injunction would best preserve the
status quo pending appeal and would prevent hardship to her. Neither argument brings her petition
within our writ jurisdiction.”); Weber v. Walker, 591 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, orig.
proceeding) (“We do not . . . have jurisdiction to replace Judge Walker’s injunction with our own
because our jurisdiction is limited to issuing injunctions in situations where the failure to do so
would render the appeal moot.”).

13
As the Children’s Plans recognize, enjoining Commissioner Young from ﬁn-

ishing the procurements and enjoining the Commissioner and others from perform-

ing the resulting contracts is not necessary to prevent mootness. Children’s Plans’

Mot. 18.15 That’s because the Losing Plans seek to enjoin not only completing the

procurement, see Wilson v. Cmty. Health Choice Tex., Inc., 607 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied), but also performing the resulting contracts, see

CR.5883. Performing the contracts will go on “for at least the next six—and poten-

tially up to twelve—years.” Children’s Plans’ Mot. 10. Indeed, even after the award,

there’s a lengthy transition period before new awardees would take over from incum-

bents. See CR.951 (award date and operational date). There’s no chance that this ap-

peal will become moot before the Court has a chance to decide its merits, so the

Court has no original jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

Even so, the Losing Plans invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction because, if

the Commissioner performs the acts sought to be enjoined, she would “creat[e] new

facts in furtherance of her plea” to the jurisdiction; i.e., transform the Losing Plans’

requested relief from prospective to “retrospective.” Wellpoint Mot. 9–10; see also

Superior Mot. 30 (complaining that “Superior could be deprived of its primary rem-

edy: a declaration that the Executive Commissioner will act ultra vires should she

15
The Children’s Plans nonetheless complain that Commissioner Young may somehow “insulate
the procurement from judicial review.” Children’s Plans Mot. 18. But it was the Legislature, not
Commissioner Young, that insulated the procurement from judicial review.

14
execute or attempt to implement the contract awards and an injunction to prevent

that ultra vires action”).

But changing the nature of the Losing Plans’ claims doesn’t have anything to

do with this Court’s jurisdiction to review the district court’s appealed orders. “So

long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the

litigation, the case is not moot.” Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 476–77 (5th Cir.

2020); cf. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)

(“Because standing is a constitutional prerequisite . . . under both federal and Texas

law, [Texas courts] look to the more extensive jurisprudential experience of the fed-

eral courts on this subject for any guidance it may yield.”). And the Losing Plans

don’t suggest that they or the appellants would lose interest in the outcome of this

litigation should Commissioner Young complete the procurement and the Winning

Plans begin performing the resulting contracts. See CR.5883 (enjoining performance

of the contracts). The Losing Plans’ focus on the viability of their claims “and the

legal availability of a certain kind of relief—confuses mootness with the merits.”

Chaﬁn v. Chaﬁn, 568 U.S. 165, 174 (2013); accord MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Trans-

form Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 295 (2023).16

16
Courts have worked to discipline the use of the “jurisdiction” label over the past two decades.
See MOAC, 598 U.S. at 298.16. The gist: “[C]ourts should not attach the ʻjurisdictional’ label
lightly, because” branding some alleged defect jurisdictional “ʻalters the normal operation of our
adversarial system.’” La. Env’t Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 746 (5th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011)).

15
The Court’s original jurisdiction doesn’t allow for injunctions to freeze the

merits vel non of a party’s case. See, e.g., Parsons, 576 S.W.2d at 99 (courts of appeals

“have no power to issue original writs solely to protect a party from damage pending

appeal”). Because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is not at risk, original jurisdic-

tion cannot support the requested injunction.

B. Rule 29.3 does not apply because the Losing Plans have no rights to
protect.

The bulk of the Losing Plans’ motions attempt to justify their requested in-

junction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3. See Superior Mot. 1, 4, 23–

33; Wellpoint Mot. 3, 12–21; Children’s Plans Mot. 2, 14–41. Rule 29.3 says “the

appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties’

rights” (emphasis added). That language “plainly limits the scope of the available

relief.” In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d 276, 282–83 (Tex. 2022).

Rule 29.3 can’t supply authority for the injunction the Losing Plans request

because no temporary order is necessary to “preserve” the Losing Plans’ “rights.”

Tex. R. App. P. 29.3. “A bidder on a government contract has no legally enforceable

rights against the award of the contract to a competitor other than those the govern-

ment has seen ﬁt to confer.” Coyne-Delany Co. v. Cap. Dev. Bd. of State of Ill., 616

F.2d 341, 342–43 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). The Legislature has not

16
conferred any rights on the Losing Plans in the Medicaid and CHIP procurement

process.17

Supreme Court precedent makes clear that, “[l]ike private individuals and

businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to . . . determine those

with whom it will deal.” Tex. Highway Comm’n v. El Paso Bldg. & Const. Trades Coun-

cil, 234 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1950) (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127

(1940)).

Texas Highway Commission touched on several issues, but, here, the most im-

portant holding is that legislative directives instructing agencies how to go about pro-

curing goods and services are “not intended to be a bestowal of litigable rights upon

those desirous of selling to the Government.” Id. (emphasis added). Those statutes

do not depart from “the traditional principle of leaving purchases necessary to the

operation of our Government to administration by the executive branch of Govern-

ment, with adequate range of discretion free from vexatious and dilatory restraints at

the suits of prospective or potential sellers.” Id.18 That precedent forecloses an in-

junction under Rule 29.3.

17
The Children’s Plans (at 18) mention “appellate rights,” but those rights aren’t at stake because
(1) they’re not appealing anything; (2) no one’s appellate rights aren’t at risk; see supra, Part I.A.1;
and (3) if the procurement doesn’t go their way, they have no right to “appeal” that result from
HHSC because the Legislature has not provided for judicial review.
18
Cf., e.g., Holt & Co. v. Wheeler Cnty., 235 S.W. 226, 228–29 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1921, writ
dism’d w.o.j.) (“The advantage to the bidder is no part of the design of the statute, and no such
right is created in his favor as forms the subject of an action at law or of a suit in equity.” (citing
authorities)); Contracts for Stationery, 6 Op. Att’ys Gen. 226, 226–27 (1853), 1853 WL 2192 (disap-
pointed bidder could not challenge Secretary of Interior’s determination of who was the lowest

17
The details of Lukens Steel, whose reasoning the Supreme Court of Texas en-

dorsed and adopted, help show why the Losing Plans are in the wrong forum. Pro-

spective bidders on federal contracts sued, alleging that agencies were not correctly

applying a statutory procurement requirement. See 310 U.S. at 116–17. A lower court

granted the bidders’ request for an injunction, ﬁnding the enjoined oﬃcials “ʻdisre-

gard[ed] the statutory mandate.’” Id. at 125.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that a procurement

standard does not create “enforceable rights.” Id. at 129. The Court explained—and

the Supreme Court of Texas later agreed—that when the Legislature “lay[s] down

guide posts by which its agents are to proceed in . . . procurement,” it does so “for

the purpose of keeping its own house.” Id. at 127. A procurement standard thus

bidder); Sowell’s Meats & Servs., Inc. v. McSwain, 788 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Ordinarily, in
the absence of state law creating a property interest in a disappointed bidder for state contracts, the
bidder lacks standing to question the award of the contract.”); MCNA Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Tech.,
Mgmt. & Budget, 929 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Ct. App. Mich. 2019) (“[B]ecause petitioner had no expec-
tancy to be awarded the contract, it cannot demonstrate an injury arising from the failure to be
awarded the contract.”); State ex rel. Mid-Mo. Limestone, Inc. v. Cnty. of Callaway, 962 S.W.2d 438,
441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“The rejection of Appellants’ bid does not give them an enforceable
private right.”); J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Bristol Twp., 505 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct.
1986) (“[A] disappointed bidder has sustained no injury which entitles him to redress in court, even
if the public oﬃcial who refuses to award him the contract has a statutory obligation to award it to
the lowest bidder.”); HealthAmerica Corp. of Ky. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946, 948
(Ky. 1985) (“It has long been Kentucky law that absent a showing of fraud, collusion or dishonesty,
a disappointed bidder has no standing to judicially challenge the award of a public contract to an-
other bidder.”); Elview Constr. Co. v. N. Scott Cmty. Sch. Dist., 373 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1985)
(“The general rule governing a challenge to bidding procedures is that an unsuccessful bidder lacks
standing to bring a suit challenging their legality.”); Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State
and Local Level: A Hodgepodge of Remedies, 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 265, 291 (1996) (“[E]xcept in
those states, cities, or counties where a modern procurement code has been enacted, procedural
and substantive remedies for the disappointed bidder or oﬀeror at the state and local levels of gov-
ernment may be elusive.”).

18
“create[s] duties to the Government alone.” Id. It “is a self-imposed restraint for

violation of which the Government—but not private litigants—can complain.” Id.

Refusing to treat the government diﬀerent from a private purchaser and the govern-

ment oﬃcial diﬀerent from a private purchasing agent, the Court emphasized that,

“[f ]or erroneous construction of his instructions, given for the sole beneﬁt of the

principal, the agent is responsible to his principal alone because his misconstruction

violates no duty he owes to any but his principal.” Id. at 129. “The Secretary’s re-

sponsibility is to superior executive and legislative authority,” not to contractors. Id.19

So too here. The Losing Plans complain that Commissioner Young failed to

properly give statutory “preferences” or properly “consider” or apply various stat-

utory procurement factors. E.g., Superior Mot. 13–15; Wellpoint Mot. 16; Children’s

Plans’ Mot. 4. But none of the cited statutes bestows any rights on the Losing Plans.

Each is directed at HHSC and the Commissioner, who exercises discretion without

judicial interference, and instead answers to the Governor,20 the Legislature,21 the

19
At the time of Lukens Steel, no rights meant no standing. See 310 U.S. at 129. Courts have since
become more restrictive in their use of the term, and thus ﬁnd “standing” even in the absence of
an enforceable right. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 &
n.1 (1970). But Rule 29.3 is limited to preserving “rights,” so the fact that the Losing Plans may
have standing even in the absence of rights is irrelevant. See In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d at 283.
20
See 9.RR.PX208.1–2 (HHSC organizational chart); Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 523.0051(b), 523.053
(HHSC executive commissioner must be reappointed by the Governor every two years).
21
See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 523.0051(b), 523.053 (HHSC executive commissioner must be con-
ﬁrmed by the Senate every two years).

19
Attorney General,22 the Comptroller,23 the State Auditor,24 and the cross-agency

Contract Advisory Team25. Indeed, the Legislature is actively overseeing this procure-

ment. See, e.g., 9RRPX148. Those government actors—not the Losing Plans through

litigation—keep the government’s house.

Comparing events on the federal level since Lukens and in Texas since Texas

Highway Commission removes any doubt that the Losing Plans have no rights to pre-

serve. Unlike in Texas, federal protest litigation is now common, because Congress

has authorized aggrieved federal bidders to seek judicial review of certain procure-

ment decisions, including in specialized courts. See Red River Holdings, LLC v. United

States, 87 Fed. Cl. 768, 793–94 (2009) (“[B]id protests are relatively new judicial or

congressional creations. Historically, a disappointed government contract bidder had

no right to dispute the award of a contract to another.”); see generally Gary L. Hop-

kins, The Universe of Remedies for Unsuccessful Oﬀerors on Federal Contracts, 15 Pub.

Cont. L.J. 365, 366 (1985).

The Texas Legislature has done things diﬀerently. In the 75 years since Texas

Highway Commission, the Legislature has repeatedly reformed its procurement laws.

But it hasn’t turned state procurement standards into enforceable rights or otherwise

22
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 522.0051.
23
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.324.
24
See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2155.144(f ), 2155.326.
25
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2262.101; 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.162(a); see also 1 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 391.107(6) (“Contract Advisory Team--An interagency oversight team responsible for reviewing
and making recommendations on the solicitation documents for state agency contracts in accord-
ance with Texas Government Code, Chapter 2262, Subchapter C.”)

20
engaged disappointed bidders in enforcing state law. Maintaining traditional princi-

ples of non-interference in state procurements was intentional. We know that be-

cause, at the same time, the Legislature has given disappointed bidders for municipal

public works contracts a statutory right to enforce procurement laws. See Tex. Loc.

Gov’t Code § 252.061(2). The Legislature chose to treat state procurement diﬀer-

ently, and that choice controls here.26

C. The Court’s inherent authority is not a source of jurisdiction.

The Losing Plans also invoke the Court’s “inherent authority” as a basis for

their requested injunction. Superior Mot. 23; Wellpoint Mot. 12; Children’s Plans

Mot. 16. But the Court’s inherent authority doesn’t allow an injunction here. “The

Court has the inherent authority to issue orders necessary or proper to preserve its juris-

diction during the pendency of an appeal.” Order, State v. Harris County, No. 15-24-

00120-CV (Tex. App.—15th Court Dec. 6, 2024) (emphasis added) (citing Tex.

26
The Austin Court’s decision in Wilson, cited by the Losing Plans for various points, isn’t contrary
precedent. That case didn’t concern a procurement standard; the statute there directed HHSC to
“contract with” publicly sponsored hospital district plans in certain circumstances. 607 S.W.3d at
847. The court aﬃrmed the denial of a plea of jurisdiction by an MCO seeking to enjoin HHSC’s
executive commissioner from issuing a contract award that didn’t include such an MCO. Id. at 848,
855. The parties there simply assumed the “mandatory contract” statute provided an enforceable
right to the MCO, and this issue was never raised. Indeed, the brieﬁng on the substance of the
plaintiﬀ’s ultra vires claim was limited to the meaning of the statute at issue. See Appellant’s Br.,
Wilson, No. 03-20-00153-CV, 2020 WL 2061373, at *27–38 (Apr. 14, 2020). Decisions are prece-
dent only for issues raised and squarely addressed. See, e.g., Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251,
256 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that stare decisis applies to decisions resolving “materially indistin-
guishable question[s]”).

21
Gov’t Code § 22.221(a)). As already shown, there’s no chance of mootness. So the

Court’s inherent authority to preserve its jurisdiction isn’t activated.27

More fundamentally, inherent authority is not a source of jurisdiction; it’s in

aid of jurisdiction already existing. See id. Thus, a court’s inherent authority cannot

extend beyond its jurisdiction. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 399–

400 (Tex. 1979); Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 947. The Court’s original jurisdiction to is-

sue injunctions doesn’t extend beyond “preserv[ing] its jurisdiction, because origi-

nal jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief generally lies with the trial courts.” In re

Geomet Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 90 (Tex. 2019); see generally O’Connor’s

Texas Civil Appeals ch. 10-D § 5 (2025). The same must hold for a court’s

inherent authority grounded in original jurisdiction.

And the same holds for inherent authority grounded in appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has held, for example, that it lacks inherent power in exercising

its appellate jurisdiction to appoint a receiver unless necessary to protect its jurisdic-

tion. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 326, 331 (Tex. 1907). And it has held

that, while exercising “appellate” jurisdiction—just as when exercising original ju-

risdiction—a “court is not invested by the Constitution and laws with such general

27
The Losing Plans cite some Austin Court decisions describing its supposed inherent authority to
preserve parties’ rights. See, e.g., Superior Mot. 23 (citing HHSC v. Sacred Oak Med. Ctr. LLC,
2021 WL 2371356 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021)); Children’s Plans’ Mot. 16–17 (citing TEA v. Hous.
ISD, 609 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020)). But those decisions were just applying Rule 29.3,
not any independent inherent authority. And, in In re Abbott, the Supreme Court made clear that
the Austin Court’s power, inherent or otherwise, doesn’t extend beyond Rule 29.3’s text. See 645
S.W.3d at 282–83.

22
powers as would enable it to protect the parties from damage during the pendency of

the appeal.” City of Laredo v. Martin, 52 Tex. 548, 553–54 (1880); accord, e.g., Tex.

Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Kirby, 152 S.W.2d 1073, 1073 (Tex. 1941) (adopting Tex. Emp. Ins.

Ass’n v. Kirby, 150 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1941, orig. proceeding), which

explained that a “Court of Civil Appeals” lacks the power “to issue . . . any writ

other than as authorized by the statutes conferring original jurisdiction”). It follows

that “[t]his court cannot grant a temporary writ of injunction for the purpose of pre-

venting damages that would otherwise ﬂow to a litigant who has a pending appeal in

this court. That power rests exclusively with the district judge.” Madison v. Martinez,

42 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1931, writ ref’d).28

* * *

This Court has no power to grant the injunction the Losing Plans demand. It

should deny their motions.

II. No Court Has Jurisdiction to Enjoin These Procurements.

Even putting aside the jurisdictional defects speciﬁc to this Court, authority

for the Losing Plans’ requested injunction is absent because no court may enjoin the

ongoing procurements. A court that lacks jurisdiction cannot order “relief, even tem-

porarily.” In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). The district

28
The Supreme Court hasn’t yet considered whether City of Laredo limits relief available under
Rule 29.3. See In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d at 282 n.6. So Molina limits this argument to the Court’s
inherent authority.

23
court should have dismissed the Losing Plans’ claims, and so this Court should deny

their motions.

Jurisdiction is broadly lacking for at least two reasons: One, the Losing Plans’

claims are unripe and thus not justiciable because complete relief is still available

through administrative remedies. Two, HHSC has exclusive jurisdiction over this

dispute, at least until the Losing Plans exhaust administrative remedies.

Molina’s forthcoming merits brief will show that no district court will ever

have jurisdiction to hear the Losing Plans’ claims because sovereign immunity bars

them, and therefore the Court should render judgment dismissing the Losing Plans’

claims with prejudice. For now, the ripeness and exclusive jurisdiction doctrines suf-

ﬁciently show that the Losing Plans’ claims cannot succeed, and thus that no injunc-

tion is appropriate. See In re State, 711 S.W.3d at 645.

A. The Losing Plans’ claims are unripe because their administrative
appeals remain pending.

“[A]voiding premature litigation prevents courts from ʻentangling themselves

in abstract disagreements over administrative policies’ while at the same time serving

to ʻprotect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision

has been formalized and its eﬀects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’”

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.

1998) (citation omitted). The ripeness doctrine thus withholds subject matter juris-

diction when “the case involves ʻuncertain or contingent future events that may not

occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Id. at 442 (citation omitted).

24
The Losing Plans protested HHSC’s procurement awards. See CR.3315 n.1,

4717 n.2, 4249–50, 4264; 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.303(b). Those protests pre-

sented exactly the same arguments the Losing Plans presented in the district court

and present here in their motions. See, e.g., CR.3324–25, CR.3641–3720, CR.4515–

64, 4627–31, 4769–4819; 9RRPX155, 157–59. HHSC’s Deputy Executive Commis-

sioner for Procurement and Contracting Services denied those protests. See

9RRPX155, 157–59.

The Losing Plans exercised their option to appeal that denial to Commissioner

Young; see CR.3315 n.1, 3529, 4249–50, 4264, 4717 n.2; 1 Tex. Admin. Code

§ 391.307(d). But rather than let Commissioner Young decide the appeals, the Losing

Plans contemporaneously sued Commissioner Young. And then they obtained an in-

junction forbidding Commissioner Young from “taking action . . . to further the pro-

curement . . . processes for the STAR & CHIP RFP.” CR.5883.

The Losing Plans’ administrative appeals thus remain outstanding and unre-

solved, but not prejudged, as Commissioner Young explained:

A. . . . [A]ssuming the Court will allow me to move forward, I would then ﬁnish
the appeals process, the review of the appeals, and make a decision, one or the
other, on each of the individual appeals. And then once that process is ﬁnished,
then I would move forward. . . . Depending on how those appeals come out.
Q. So you’re not going to sign any contracts until you decide the appeals?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And in deciding the appeal -- the appeals, you, yourself, still need to deter-
mine whether the State complied with the law --
A Yes.

25
Q -- in relation to this procurement?
A Yes, sir.29

The Court must presume that Commissioner Young will consider the Losing

Plans’ appeals with an open mind and resolve them in line with the law. See Webster

v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Tex. 2024) (discussing presump-

tion of good faith).

The Losing Plans’ pending appeals before Commissioner Young mean their

claims against her are not ripe. The Losing Plans insist that “[i]f the Executive Com-

missioner authorizes HHSC to execute contracts based on the intended contract

awards, her action will be ultra vires.” Superior Mot. 2 (emphasis added). They worry

that the Commissioner “could move forward with awarding, executing and imple-

menting new contracts.” Wellpoint Mot. 10 (emphasis added). And they openly seek

to “foreclose even the possibility” that the Commissioner might “reject[] their inter-

nal appeals.” Children’s Plans Mot. 18 (emphasis added).

The Losing Plans’ feared ultra vires acts and resulting harm are facially con-

tingent on Commissioner Young denying their appeals. “Depending on how those

appeals come out,” 6RR132:14, the Losing Plans could face no harm at all. If Com-

missioner Young accepts the Losing Plans’ arguments in their administrative appeals

(the same arguments the Losing Plans press here), she may award appropriate relief,

including cancelling the procurement, see 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307(c)(2)–(3),

29
6RR132:7–23.

26
(d)(3)—exactly what the Losing Plans hope to accomplish with an injunction, see,

e.g., CR.4185–86.30

Only if Commissioner Young denies the Losing Plans’ appeals will any action

“awarding, executing, or implementing new contracts” occur. Wellpoint Mot. 10.

But “the possibility” that the Commissioner might “reject[] their internal appeals,”

Children’s Plans Mot. 18, represents just the type of “uncertain or contingent future

event[] that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all” that keeps

a case from being ripe, Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442; see, e.g., City of Anson v. Harper,

216 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (injury that depends on

uncertain administrative action is not ripe).31

B. HHSC retains exclusive jurisdiction over the Losing Plans’ challenges
to the procurements because the Losing Plans have not exhausted
administrative remedies.

The Constitution provides that the Legislature may confer “exclusive, appel-

late, or original jurisdiction . . . on [an] administrative body.” Tex. Const. art. V,

§ 8. In turn, “[w]hen the Legislature grants an administrative agency sole authority

to make an initial determination in a dispute, agency jurisdiction is exclusive.” City

30
That relief has been achieved in similar procurement protests. See 5RR180:1–181:1.
31
These same concerns underlie the requirement that a person aggrieved by an administrative act
exhaust administrative remedies before suing. See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
529 U.S. 1, 12 (2000) (“Both “ʻripeness’ and ʻexhaustion of administrative remedies’ . . . normally
require channeling a legal challenge through the agency.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative
Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28 Tex.
L. Rev. 168, 168 (1949) (cited approvingly in Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex.
2000)). Exhaustion is discussed next in the context of exclusive jurisdiction.

27
of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). Courts do not have

subject matter jurisdiction over a case that is within an agency’s exclusive jurisdiction

at least until the aggrieved party has exhausted available administrative remedies. Id.

This doctrine proves another jurisdictional defect that dooms the Losing

Plans’ motions and their claims too. The Legislature intended HHSC to resolve all

issues concerning managed care procurements. Even if the Losing Plans could some-

how, someday sue to challenge the procurements (they can’t), exclusive jurisdiction

remains with HHSC at least until the Losing Plans exhaust administrative remedies,

which they haven’t done. The Losing Plans conjure an exception to exhaustion for

their ultra vires claims, but Supreme Court precedent forecloses that imagined ex-

ception.

1. The exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies.

The underlying procurement processes are a classic example of exclusive ju-

risdiction. The Legislature plainly intended that HHSC have sole authority to make

(at least) the initial determination of whom to contract with. HHSC has express au-

thority to “enter into contracts as necessary to perform any of the commission’s

powers or duties.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 525.0101. And the Legislature expressly au-

thorized HHSC to “procure[] . . . contracts necessary to implement” the Medicaid

managed care program and CHIP. Id. § 532.0051; Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 62.155(a); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144.

28
In addition, courts historically have had no role in the minutiae of executive

branch procurement. See Red River Holdings, 87 Fed. Cl. at 793–94. The entire ven-

ture is agency-directed, and every procurement standard is tied to a statute or regu-

lation, not common law. See, e.g., Children’s Plans Mot. 12. The procurement stand-

ards plaintiﬀs rely on are all directed at HHSC in its role as procuring agency. See,

e.g., id. 35–40. And the statutes provide for administrative procedures to allow dis-

appointed bidders to protest solicitations and contract awards. Tex. Gov’t Code

§ 2155.076.

These features demonstrate a “pervasive regulatory scheme” governing pro-

curements, including resolving complaints by disappointed bidders. CPS Energy v.

ERCOT, 671 S.W.3d 605, 618 (Tex. 2023). That scheme is conclusive evidence that

the Legislature intended that HHSC’s procurement process, including administra-

tive protests, be the exclusive means of evaluating oﬀers and resolving issues related

to HHSC’s choice of contractual counterparties. See, e.g., id.; City of Austin v. Travis

Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 617–18 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.)

(Field, J.) (ﬁnding comprehensive regime that included “a limited statutory right to

challenge certain actions” in administrative protests to create exclusive jurisdiction).

And there’s no question that administrative remedies remain open and avail-

able to the Losing Plans. See supra, pp. 24–26. Jurisdiction remains exclusively with

the agency and so the Losing Plans’ lawsuit must be dismissed. See In re Entergy

Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004).

29
2. There is no loophole for the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims.

The Losing Plans say they didn’t have to exhaust administrative remedies be-

cause they sued under an ultra vires theory. Children’s Plans Mot. 18 n.5; CR.4064–

65, 4187.

The Losing Plans have the law all wrong—there’s no loophole for ultra vires

claims that seek to replace administrative consideration with court-imposed injunc-

tions. To the contrary, Texas law has long required (at the very least) exhaustion of

administrative remedies before a plaintiﬀ may invoke a court’s equitable jurisdiction

to attack an administrative process or result. See, e.g., Jennings v. Carson, 220 S.W.

1090, 1091 (Tex. [Comm’n App.] 1920). That requirement follows from the Supreme

Court’s recognition that there’s a “vast diﬀerence in a court reviewing a ﬁnal order

of an administrative board and in prohibiting such board from making any order.”

Tex. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 343 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. 1961)

(quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court’s injunction improperly prohib-

ited Commissioner Young from even deciding the administrative appeals, and the

Losing Plans ask this Court commit to the same error.

Instead, it’s only ultra vires claims that challenge an agency’s jurisdiction to

decide the matter at all that escape exclusive jurisdiction’s grip. See, e.g., TEA v.

30
Cypress-Fairbanks ISD, 830 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. 1992); Westheimer ISD v. Brockette,

567 S.W.2d 780, 785–86 (Tex. 1978).32

The Losing Plans don’t challenge the jurisdiction of HHSC, through Com-

missioner Young, to hear and decide the same challenges they raise here. Nor could

they. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.076 (protest procedures); 1 Tex. Admin. Code

§ 391.303(b) (“A respondent may protest a solicitation, response evaluation, or con-

tract award if the respondent is able to speciﬁcally identify a statutory or regulatory

provision that HHS allegedly violated”); see id. §§ 391.305(c), 391307(c)–(d). “The

fact that [an agency] might decide ʻwrongly’ in the eyes of an opposing party does

not vitiate the agency’s jurisdiction to make an initial decision.” N. Alamo Water Sup-

ply Corp. v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ

denied).33

Conclusion and Prayer

The Court should deny the Losing Plans’ motions for temporary relief.

32
The authority cited by the Losing Plans (Children’s Plans Mot. 18 n.5) is not in conﬂict—it con-
sidered whether SOAH had jurisdiction to hold any hearing or issue any ﬁnal order. See Smith v.
Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 62, 68–69 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied). That jurisdictional evaluation
is consistent with “the general rule that a trial court may intercede before administrative remedies
are exhausted where the administrative agency lacks jurisdiction.” N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v.
Tex. Dep’t of Health, 839 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied).
33
The Losing Plans brieﬂy gesture at one more possible exception: They say, “completion of the
internal HHSC appeal process does not facilitate any further administrative action or a contested-
case proceeding in state court.” Children’s Plans Mot. 18 n.5. They don’t cite any support for this
exception and there’s none. And they wouldn’t satisfy their made-up exception anyway: HHSC’s
internal appeal process facilitates ﬁnalizing the award of the contracts, see 1 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 391.309, and may obviate the need for any proceeding in state court. It’s not optional.

31
Respectfully submitted,

Scott Douglass &
McConnico LLP

Jason R. LaFond
State Bar No. 24103136
jlafond@scottdoug.com
Cheryl Joseph LaFond
State Bar No. 24104015
clafond@scottdoug.com
303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 495-6300

Counsel for Appellant Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.

32
Certificate of Compliance

Microsoft Word 2019 reports that this brief contains 8,236 words, excluding

the portions of the brief exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate

Pro-cedure 9.4(i)(1).

Jason R. LaFond

33
No. 15-24-00114-CV

In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals
Austin, Texas
Cecile Erwin Young, in her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner
of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Cook Children’s Health Plan, et al.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the 353rd Judicial District of Travis County,
No. D-1-GN-24-003839

Response Appendix

Tab
1 Print-outs from LBB Contracts Database
Tab 1
8/25/25, 1:46 PM Legislative Budget Board - State Contracts: Search Results

NOTE
Contract information maintained by the LBB and included in this report is from information submitted by each state agency. Although every effort was made to correct obvious errors an

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Current Contract Value
Code Agency Contract Award Date Bids Vendor Attachments
(Excludes Options not Exercised)
529 Health and Human Services Commission XXX-XX-XXXX-00002 09/01/2011 $5,792,960,299 1 COOK CHILDREN'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM HHSC Manage

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8/25/25, 1:44 PM Legislative Budget Board - State Contracts: Search Results

NOTE
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Current Contract Value
Code Agency Contract Award Date Bids Vendor
(Excludes Options not Exercised)
529 Health and Human Services Commission XXX-XX-XXXX-00006 09/01/2011 $28,753,091,345 1 BANKERS RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE CO OF WISCONSIN

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NOTE
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Current Contract Value
Code Agency Contract Award Date Bids Vendor Attachments
(Excludes Options not Exercised)
529 Health and Human Services Commission XXX-XX-XXXX-00007 09/01/2011 $27,163,862,562 1 SUPERIOR HEALTHPLAN INC HHSC Managed Care (24 con

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NOTE
Contract information maintained by the LBB and included in this report is from information submitted by each state agency. Although every effort was made to correct obvious errors an

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Current Contract Value
Code Agency Contract Award Date Bids Vendor Attachments
(Excludes Options not Exercised)
529 Health and Human Services Commission XXX-XX-XXXX-00014 09/01/2011 $18,203,908,109 1 TEXAS CHILDRENS HEALTH PLAN HHSC Managed Care (24

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8/25/25, 2:07 PM Legislative Budget Board - State Contracts: Search Results

NOTE
Contract information maintained by the LBB and included in this report is from information submitted by each state agency. Although every effort was made to correct obvious errors an

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Display Condensed Data Set Display Expanded Data Set

Current Contract Value
Code Agency Contract Award Date Bids Vendor Attachments
(Excludes Options not Exercised)
529 Health and Human Services Commission XXX-XX-XXXX-00015 09/01/2011 $6,091,829,223 1 WELLPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY HHSC Managed Care (

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Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Jason LaFond on behalf of Jason LaFond
Bar No. 24103136
jlafond@scottdoug.com
Envelope ID: 104826163
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.'s Response to Motions
for Temporary Relief
Status as of 8/26/2025 7:17 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michaelle Peters mpeters@scottdoug.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Julie Wright julie.wright@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Amanda DoddsPrice amanda.price@squirepb.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Maria Williamson maria.williamson@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Mandy Patterson mpatterson@adjtlaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Michelle Joyner mjoyner@scottdoug.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

William FCole William.Cole@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Abril Rivera arivera@scottdoug.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Nancy Villarreal nancy.villarreal@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

David Johns david@cobbjohns.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Jessie Johnson jessie.johnson@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Stacey Jett sjett@adjltaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Cory Scanlon cory.scanlon@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Karen Burgess 796276 kburgess@burgesslawpc.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Anna Baker 791362 abaker@adjtlaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Amy Warr 795708 awarr@adjtlaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Juliana Bennington jbennington@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Jonathan Hawley jhawley@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM ERROR
Automated Certificate of eService
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certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
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Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan

Jonathan Hawley jhawley@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM ERROR

Reina A.Almon-Griffin ralmon-Griffin@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Trisha Marino tmarino@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

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Perkins Docketing Team DocketSEA@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Matthew Gordon mgordon@perkinscoie.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Texas Children's Health Plan

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Mark Emery 24050564 mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Warren Huang 796788 warren.huang@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Paul Trahan 24003075 paul.trahan@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Susan Harris 6876980 susan.harris@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Thomas Coulter 4885500 tom.coulter@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Kayla Ahmed kayla.ahmed@nortonrosefulbright.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Wellpoint Insurance Company

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Robert Johnson 10786400 rjohnson@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Michelle Ku 24071452 mku@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Kristin Hernandez kristin.hernandez@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Stacey Obenhaus sobenhaus@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Associated Case Party: Wellpoint Insurance Company

Stacey Obenhaus sobenhaus@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Benjamin Grossman bjgrossman@foley.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Superior Healthplan Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Richard Phillips 24032833 Rich.Phillips@hklaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

J McCaig 24070083 meghan.mccaig@outlook.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Karen Walker karen.walker@hklaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Tiffany Roddenberry tiffany.roddenberry@hklaw.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Texas Health and Human Services

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Victoria Gomez victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Jennifer Cook Jennifer.Cook@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Cheryl LaFond 24104015 clafond@scottdoug.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Jason R.LaFond jlafond@scottdoug.com 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc.
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Associated Case Party: Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Associated Case Party: Cecile Erwin Young, Texas Health and Human Services

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Cory Scanlon 24104599 cory.scanlon@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

Jeffrey Stephens jeff.stephens@oag.texas.gov 8/25/2025 5:41:08 PM SENT

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