Rich Robins v. State Bar of Texas, Commission for Lawyer Discipline, and Chief Disciplinary Counsel

ACCEPTED
15-25-00144-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
September 25, 2025 AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/22/2025 1:34 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
No. 15-25-00144-CV
RECEIVED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/22/2025 1:34:58 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
15th COURT OF APPEALS Clerk

at Austin, Texas

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rich Robins,
Appellant,
v.
State Bar of Texas, et al
Appellees.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Appealed from the 189th District Court of
Harris County, Texas as directed by Judge Tamika Craft
___________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S AMENDED RESPONSE RESPECTFULLY
OPPOSING THE COURT’S EJECTION NOTICE
REGARDING THIS CASE

___________________________________________________________

Rich Robins
2450 Louisiana St. #400-155
Houston, TX 77006-2380
Rich@RichRobins.com
Tel. 713-574-6279

PRO SE APPELLANT

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___________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S AMENDED RESPONSE RESPECTFULLY
OPPOSING THE COURT’S EJECTION NOTICE
REGARDING THIS CASE

___________________________________________________________

Sept. 22nd, 2025

Pro se appellant Rich Robins hereby files this slightly amended
opposition response to the court’s pending ejection notice regarding his case.

A. Introduction

1. The Appellees (Plaintiffs at the trial court level) are the State Bar
of Texas & Commission for Lawyer Discipline (hereinafter the “State
Bar”). Attorney Michael Graham is their appellate counsel.

2. The pro se Appellant (defendant at the trial court level) is Rich
Robins (hereinafter “Appellant Robins”).

3. Pro se appellant Robins hereby respectfully files this opposition
to the Court’s pending ejection of this case. As further background,
Appellant Robins mentions the following...

B. Facts

4. Appellant Robins includes Exhibit 1, below, as his most recent
trial court petition filed pursuant to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act against the State Bar of Texas, et al.

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C. Argument & Authorities

Procedural background

5. Appellant Rich Robins desires to appeal to the 15th Court of
Appeals from a judgment signed by Judge Tamika Craft-Demming on
June 16th, 2025 in the 189th District Court of Harris County. The case
number is #2025-10213. The judgment very hastily dismissed Robins’
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims against the Appellees, based
on mere TRCP 91a grounds. Appellant Robins subsequently timely filed a
request, and later a revived request for Findings of Fact & Conclusions of
Law on July 4th 2025 and August 1st, 2025, respectively. Tamika Craft
filed no response whatsoever while the 1st Court of Appeals still refrains
from ruling on a longstanding case there which challenges the legitimacy
of her purported and very narrow electoral victory of 2022. See Erin
Lunceford v. Tamika Craft, No. 01-23-00921-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Dec. 12th, 2023). More than one justice in that court is not only a
member of the State Bar of Texas but also an officer in it. Appellant
Robins has previously politely filed a motion to recuse Andrew Johnson in
that court regarding Robins’ underlying administrative dispute with the
Texas Bar. Those folks expeditiously denied it, though, and without
explanation. The 1st Court of Appeals similarly demanded that his
administrative case transfer attempt to the 15th Court of Appeals (initially
approved by the 15th Court of Appeals, too) be denied, as well... But for
their interference, this appeal would have been concluded long ago and
most likely favorably for Appellant Robins.

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Facts underlying the Appellees’
ethics violation accusations against Appellant Robins

6. In part, this case is about the ethics rules-related consequences
inflicted by the Appellees upon Appellant Robins. They primarily relate
to his having not rushed to formally declare to a never-visited (by him),
faraway court up in Tyler, Texas the (undocumented) reported death of a
female client & eventual litigant (Cindy Crisp). She was approximately 59
years old when Appellant Robins worked with her telephonically, without
ever meeting her or receiving any compensation for himself, ever. She
needed to try to recover compensation for herself from an estate vendor in
Tyler, Texas who had issued her two bounced checks that he had written as
the total liquidation amount for her estate. The estate vendor did so around
the time when he also bounced dozens more checks to other people, while
Tyler’s police department expressly refused to get involved because the
victims were not from Smith County. Anyhow, the two checks to the
client were for approximately $7,000. Appellant Robins inserted in the
lawsuit that the Appellant would settle for twice that amount
(approximately $14,000) if no further legal wrangling would transpire.
This would include court filing fees, loss-of-use remedies and interest for
the clear breach of contract case. The client did, after all, repeatedly say
that her estate was worth several multiples of the final checks’ amount and
that she had been “ripped off”. Appellant Robins filed the lawsuit in
Tyler, which he has only visited for a single day, ever. That lone visit
happened nearly a year after filing the abovementioned lawsuit and months
after Robins had already taken the initiative to report the possibility of the
(then still undocumented) death to the court.

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7. No rule, not even TRCP 151 or TRCP 7, authorized Appellant
Robins’ disclosing to strangers that she was reportedly dead. Disclosing it
subjected her and her family to identity theft risks, and even worse if she
was actually still alive and consequently endured a forced hospitalized
death for organ donation purposes. It happens. Meanwhile, no obituary
was ever published for her, either. Compounding matters, Appellant
Robins was officially and repeatedly denied a death certificate by state
authorities when he repeatedly attempted to quietly obtain one. At any
rate, her status as living or dead did not matter for her relevant legal rights
to recover on a small ($7,000) claim that Appellant Robins pursued for her.
Appellant Robins knows of no outstanding creditors for her to this day, as
the total amount of the checks was smaller than Medicaid’s statutorily
stated minimum amount ($10,000) required for it to file collections
actions. Furthermore, even to this day there is still no way to exclude the
possibility that the client is confidentially cryopreserved, either. Cryonics
service providers have learned repeatedly that heirs who find out about
monetary deposits financing a relative’s cryopreservation would prefer to
“pull the plug” on the cryopreserved body’s deep freeze container and take
the money for themselves.

8. Appellant Robins’ religion aligns with that of the Church of
Perpetual Life, a science-based alliance in which death is considered
optional thanks to cryonics and other evolving technologies. Everyone
reading this is welcome to visit www.Perpetual.life. They are nice,
informative and seemingly very sane folks who (unlike too many people at
the State Bar of Texas) are not out to predatorily seek profit at society’s
expense. Cryonics or other life extension approaches plus time travel

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could someday enable us all to visit with our deceased loved ones. The
Bar appellees in this appeal mocked and scorned Appellant Robins’
cryonics-related precautions, in writing, as he can easily prove. Their
deities have dollar signs, after all.

9. Because of Appellant Robins’ taking months to investigate
before voluntarily mentioning the client’s supposed passing to the court
months before his lone visit there days after a devastating Houston
hurricane (Harvey), the Commission for Lawyer Discipline accused him of
misrepresenting. Their persecution resembled its more recent grievance
prosecution of attorneys Brent Webster, Ken Paxton & Sidney Powell
(etc.). The Texas Bar appellees inflicted on Appellant Robins the only
ethics or criminal prosecution that he has ever endured for anything at all
during his nearly 30 year legal career. So here we are. The
corresponding DTPA lawsuit (Exhibit 1), below, provides additional
details. Meanwhile:

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals’ involvement is needed to help make
the State Bar of Texas’ ethics rule interpretations uniform statewide.

10. By litigating this dispute in the 15th Court of Appeals, we can
jointly make it clear at the statewide level what the Bar appellees’ ethics
rules actually permissibly mean. Regarding the Bar appellees’ (to quote
the Supreme Court of Texas in its fairly recent decision favoring Brent
Webster) “boundless” rule prohibiting attorney misrepresentations, for
example, we can finally get statewide clarity regarding at what point one
may even disclose a client’s rumored but nevertheless undocumented death
despite intimidatingly strict ethics rules protecting client confidentiality.
Afterwards, perhaps Texas could subsequently begin to catch up with other

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U.S. states where cryonics centers exist and (in some locales) thrive while
Texas has endured the (literally) chilling weight of this ethics dispute as it
continues to lack such an active center. The list of U.S. states where
active cryonics facilities serving humans actually exist presently includes
Michigan, Arizona, California, Oregon and Florida, but not Texas.
Nevertheless, the prospect of making death optional has its appeal (now
literally). The Fifteenth Court of Appeals, with its statewide electorate
and focus on state agencies, governmental actions & inactions can help
Texas catch-up especially here in Space City (i.e. Houston). Cryonics
breakthroughs are needed to help make long distance space travel more
viable, after all. Ask Elon… Or see the movies Passengers, Planet of the
Apes (1968) and Avatar.

11. The Texas Bar maliciously uses its unconstitutionally
maintained influences to entice judges and even some justices to exclude
highly relevant evidence and rule-exceptions at trial, while cherry picking
incomplete evidentiary tidbits to suit its self-serving narrative. The end
result does not protect the public but rather the bar bureaucrats’ gravy train.
Texas needs for a court of the 15th Court of Appeals’ comparatively high
caliber to enter the scene for society’s benefit, please.

12. Appellant Robins appeals the judgment in this DTPA case to
the new Fifteenth Court of Appeals in Austin, Texas. That court has
exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over matters arising out of or
related to civil appeals brought by or against the state.

13. The 15th Court has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction
over certain enumerated matters. Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220(d); §25A.007.

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Meanwhile the Texas Legislature restricted the 15th Court’s jurisdiction by
divesting it of jurisdiction over criminal matters. In re Dallas Cnty., 2024
WL 3908122, at *15. Nowhere do the relevant provisions of the Texas
Government Code prohibit jurisdiction regarding the State Bar of Texas or
its statewide Commission for Lawyer Discipline, however. See generally,
Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220.

14. Puzzlingly enough, earlier this year the 15th Court of Appeals
denied jurisdiction to unrelated litigation against the Commission for
Lawyer Discipline. See Turnbull v. Commission, 15-24-00095-CV (15th
COA, 2024). The legal climate has since evolved, though, in part due to
new jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Texas (cited below). It is
time to let this jurisdictional debate regarding the State Bar of Texas either
settle favorably for appellants asserting their rights to the 15th Court of
Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction, or otherwise go directly to the Supreme
Court of Texas. Texans want and need governmental rules (such as
attorney ethics ones) to be interpreted similarly throughout the entire state.

15. Texas’ Governor Abbott, Senator Joan Huffman and other
proponents of the 15th Court of Appeals’ creation envisioned a Texas where
government regulations mean the same in all 14 different state appellate
districts. This goal is particularly important in the legal profession, where
presently some ethics rules are interpreted substantially differently,
depending upon the appellate district. Sometimes a lawyer’s services
cover more than one lone appellate jurisdiction, as is the case with Robins’
underlying dispute with the State Bar of Texas. One cannot obey
conflicting interpretations of the same rule without running into even more
ethics problems with the profiteering Bar appellees. The resulting
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unpredictability makes it more costly to retain legal representation in
Texas. That helps almost nobody.

Relevant statutory authority requires that disputes against
the State Bar of Texas (and its progeny) go to the 15th Court of
Appeals

16. Texas’ Legislature limited the 15th Court of Appeals’
jurisdiction to specific civil matters, including:

[M] atters brought by or against the state or a board,
commission, department, office, or other agency
in the executive branch of the state
government…or by or against an officer or
employee of the state or a board, commission,
department, office, or other agency in the
executive branch of the state government arising
out of that officer’s or employee’s official
conduct….

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(d)(1). Such appellate matters may

be heard only by the 15th Court of Appeals, instead of any other

intermediate appellate court. Id.

17. The Legislature’s use of a disjunctive “or” in the

abovementioned text is significant. In viewing that text with some

emphases inserted, it appears as:

[M] atters brought by or against the state or a
board, commission, department, office, or other
agency in the executive branch of the state
government…or by or against an officer or

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employee of the state or a board, commission,
department, office, or other agency in the
executive branch of the state government arising
out of that officer’s or employee’s official
conduct….

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(d)(1) (emphasis added). The “or”

disjunctions are important.

18. “Or” as underlined in the abovementioned text

disjunctively indicates an alternative. The two “or” conjunctions,

therefore, indicate that the Texas Legislature intended to divide

qualifying civil matters into four categories: (i) by or against the

state; (ii) by or against a board, commission, department, office, or

other agency in the executive branch of this state; (iii) by or against

an officer or employee of the state; and (iv) by or against an officer

or employee of a board, commission, department, office, or other

agency in the executive branch of this state. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 22.220(d)(1). Stated differently, as long as the underlying

civil case falls into one of the abovementioned four categories, the

case is within the 15th Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction.

19. An appeal against the State Bar of Texas falls into, at the very

least, category (i) mentioned above (“by or against the state”). The

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State Bar and its progeny purport to be, or purport to be part of a

legislatively created public corporation and administrative agency

of the State. See, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.011(a). Claims against

the State Bar appellees fall into the 15th Court of Appeals’

jurisdiction under category (i) described above: claims brought by

or against the State. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(d)(1).

The doctrine of last antecedent,
as depicted in Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence:

20. The Fifteenth Court of Appeals has seemingly preliminarily
interpreted jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Texas to mean that
the words “executive branch” in the 15th Court of Appeals’ statutory
enabling authorization require that a “commission” must be part of the
executive branch in order to qualify for jurisdiction in the Fifteenth Court
of Appeals. In addressing that interpretation, however, it helps to notice
that the words “executive branch” do not modify the words “matters
against the state.” The Supreme Court of Texas has embraced the
“doctrine of last antecedent” before, including in Spradlin v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc., 34 SW 3d 578 (2000). In applying that doctrine to this
appeal, the modifier “executive branch” applies merely to the word before
it, and not to the entire batch that precedes it including “matters against the
state.”

21. As an illustrative additional example offered for analytical
purposes, the grammar of the relevant enabling statutory provision for the
Fifteenth Court of Appeals resembles that of the following: “I will only eat

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apples or bananas grown in my garden." There the phrase "grown in my
garden" is understood to modify only "bananas," not "apples," according to
the doctrine of last antecedent. A more elaborate example is: “[i]nsecticide
brand X has not been formally tested on strawberries, grapes, apples,
peaches, citrus fruits or other tree-born fruits (persimmons, cherries, etc.),
but it has on tomatoes.” Not all of the entities preceding “or other tree-
born fruits” are tree-born fruits, but they are nevertheless suitably present
in that sentence. The same can be said for “executive branch” in the
statutory authorization of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals. A matter against
the state qualifies for the Fifteenth Court of Appeals even if it is not one in
the executive branch.

22. Those who feel intimidated with a perception that the presence
of the words “executive branch” in the jurisdictional sentence beginning
with “matters against the state” yields ambiguity can find solace in the
following news. The Supreme Court of Texas has recently stated in
Kelley v. Homminga that if constitutional or statutory “language is
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will carry out and the other
defeat its manifest object, courts should apply the former construction.”
Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d at 159 (cleaned up) (quoting SCALIA &
GARNER, supra, at 63). Kelley v. Homminga, 706 S.W. 39 829, 832 (Tex
2025).

23. What is the statutory language’s “manifest object” then? In
looking back to Senate Bill 1045 from the 88 th regular legislative session
of Texas, the Senate Research Center’s bill analysis expressly states the
following:

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Under the current judicial system, appeals in cases of statewide significance are
decided by one of Texas's 14 intermediate appellate courts. These courts have
varying levels of experience with the complex legal issues involved in cases of
statewide significance, resulting in inconsistent results for litigants.

S.B. 1045 addresses these problems by establishing an intermediate court of
appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over cases to which the state, a state agency,
or a state official is a party. The justices on this new Fifteenth Court of Appeals
are elected statewide, ensuring that all Texans have a voice in the selection of
judges who decide cases of statewide importance. See Texas Senate Research
Center, Bill Analysis for S.B. 1045, 88th Leg., R.S., (2023). See generally
https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=88R&Bill=SB1045 at
the Enrolled: Analysis section.

Is it not remarkable that the legislative intent behind the bill is to grant
exclusive jurisdiction to the 15th Court of Appeals for cases to which “a
state agency” is a party? Nowhere in that entire bill analysis does the
Senate Research Center even so much as hint at an exclusion or
exemption for the state agency known as the State Bar of Texas. Why
should it?

24. The State Bar of Texas readily refers to itself as a state
agency, too, while clinging to sovereign immunity to the detriment of
arguably nearly all Texans. Indeed, through a combination of a sovereign
immunity claim and an astonishing disbarment pursuit against Appellant
Robins, the State Bar of Texas eventually got Appellant Robins’ federal
class action lawsuit against that bar dismissed. In the process, this
rendered fellow compulsory bar members without compensatory remedies
even after the victorious McDonald v. Longley outcome from the 5th
Circuit established that that bar had been noncompliant and
unconstitutional. See: McDonald v. Longley, 4 F 4th 229 (5th Cir. 2021).
See generally https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/state-bar-texas-

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faces-fresh-challenge-mandatory-dues-2021-08-31/ . The Texas Bar may
not have its cake and eat it too, though...

25. The State Bar of Texas is “a public corporation and an
administrative agency of the judicial department of [the Texas]
government,” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.011(a). Meanwhile, in defining
state agencies, various provisions of Texas’ Government Code say the
following either directly or by reference:

Sec. 2052.101. DEFINITION. In this subchapter, "state agency"
means:
(1) a department, commission, board, office, or other agency
that is in the executive or legislative branch of state government and that was
created by the constitution or a statute, including an institution of higher
education as defined by Section 61.003, Education Code; or
(2) the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of
appeals, or the Texas Judicial Council or another agency in the judicial
branch of state government. See Texas Government Code, §2052.101

26. Elsewhere in Texas’ Government Code it similarly says:
Sec. 651.007. EXIT INTERVIEWS. (a) In this section, "state agency"
means a board, commission, council, committee, department, office, agency,
or other governmental entity in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch
of state government. The term does not include an institution of higher
education as defined by Section 61.003, Education Code. See Texas
Government Code, §651.007

27. In Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority, the Supreme Court
recently expressly referred to “jurisdiction-exercising state agencies.”
Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority, 714 S.W.3d 597, 604 (2025)
(emphasis added). In other words, state agencies have jurisdiction in the

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15th Court of Appeals. Is there anyone reading this appellant’s-opposition-
to-transfer-letter who somehow doubts that that phrase means to the
Supreme Court of Texas that if an entity is a state agency, the 15th Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over it? Although the Court found that the
Brazos River Authority is not a part of the executive branch, that does not
mean that the Court is asserting that a matter against the state must directly
involve the executive branch.

28. The 15th Court of Appeals has a uniquely statewide audience &
electorate, and a specialized focus that can be particularly useful. Local
appellate courts do not have that, nor are they designed to. Furthermore,
the State Bar of Texas is so under-regulated that a specialized court is even
more necessary when trying to discover ways to bring it into constitutional
(and other) compliance. If anyone doubts this, they are encouraged to
visit the website TexasBarSunset.com. See also: McDonald v.
Longley, 4 F 4th 229 (5th Cir. 2021) & Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass'n,
86 F.4th 620 (5th Cir. 2023).

29. Indeed, the 5th Circuit Court of Federal Appeals has has
adjudicated substantially against activities previously zealously embraced
by the State Bar of Texas. Meanwhile, the State Bar of Texas “forgot” to
even mention its rampant embezzlement problem during the most recent
Sunset Review (2016-17), as we document here:
http://www.TexasBarSunset.com/embezzling . Fortunately we were there
to help remind them. In fact, Appellant Robins was the only one to even
mention the rampant bar administrator / deputy supreme court clerk theft
problem (which lasted nearly a decade) out of all of the Texas Bar Sunset-
related public comments filed by anyone, including Nathan Hecht. See

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https://web.archive.org/web/20210501083002/https://www.sunset.texas.go
v/reviews-and-reports/agencies/comments/1331. The State Bar of Texas
gave awards to legal counsel who represented 9/11/01 terrorists, but only
gave lawfare to Appellant Robins for having protected the public from that
bar’s subsequent & cloaked attempts to get unlimited dues-increase
authority pursuant to the Sunset Review process, without even notifying
(much less seeking referendum approval from) still compulsory bar
members. Incidentally, Appellant Robins was the only attorney to testify
critically of the Texas Bar during all three available spoken public
comments opportunities involving that 2016-2017 Sunset Review of the
Texas Bar at Texas’ state legislature in Austin, too. The only Bar Sunst
Review (2016-2017) testimony made before the actual Sunset Commission
in Austin had only one testifier even mention embezzler Kathy Holder, as
that testifier (Appellant Robins) can prove with official video footage.

30. Incidentally, bar lawfare has become increasingly interesting to
entities ranging from the Federalist Society:

https://fedsoc.org/events/ethics-or-ideology-bar-associations-and-the-
boundaries-of-professional-discipline

to the White House: http://www.EastmanDilemma.com .

31. Appellant Robins understands that the 15th Court of Appeals
might perhaps be apprehensive that the enabling statutory and rule-based
language for the 15th Court of Appeals do not expressly mention disputes
with the government in the judicial branch. He therefore reiterates that
the enabling language also does not expressly and clearly exclude
judiciary disputes from the jurisdiction of the 15 th Court of Appeals, even

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as it does exclude other sorts of disputes involving the government,
especially in criminal law. So why exclude Appellant Robins’ appeal?
The 15th Court of Appeals exists for matters against the state, after all.
Meanwhile, constitutions are made to be respected.

32. As you know, courts presume that the legislature purposefully
chose which words to include in the statute and which to omit. Lippincott
v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). The
Court’s objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the
Legislature's intent, which requires one to look initially to the statute's
plain language. Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex.2008). If
that language is unambiguous, one is to interpret the statute according to
its plain meaning. Id. The statutory language involving the 15th Court of
Appeals is clear enough.

33. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Texas has stated that when
construing a statute, we give effect to all its words and, if possible, do not
treat any statutory language as mere surplusage. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Tex.2000). The
relevant statutory language analyzed above is a major reason why the 15 th
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over disputes with the State Bar of
Texas.

2 prior misdirections:

34. While it is true that the Supreme Court of Texas initially denied
Appellant Robins motion to transfer his administrative case vs. the State
Bar of Texas over to the 15th Court of Appeals last year, they have yet to
rule on his request for a rehearing which he e-mailed them within a day, or
so, of randomly discovering the basically unannounced recent denial, back
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during the Christmas holiday of 2024. The 1st Court of Appeals had
demanded that Robins’ administrative case transfer attempt to the 15 th
Court of Appeals (initially approved by the 15th Court of Appeals, too) be
denied. The Supreme Court subsequently gave no explanation for its
initial denial, but the matter’s having had the 1st Court of Appeals’ thumb
on the scales may be the reason. At any rate, Robins’ pending
administrative case slightly predated the creation of the 15th Court of
Appeals, to which Appellant Robins zealously sought a transfer on the
court’s opening morning. That might be why the initial denial by the
Supreme Court of Texas happened, as well. At any rate, that matter is
distinguishable from the present one which pertains to the hasty,
completely unexplained dismissal of Appellant Robins’ lawsuit pursuant to
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Appellant Robins had to file that
lawsuit to avoid possible statute of limitations grounds for that claim while
the administrative appeal remains logistically derailed by the 1st Court of
Appeals.

35. Meanwhile, Appellant Robins mentions his subsequent attempt
to transfer his Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) case from the
14th Court of Appeals (where it was never even intended to go before a
court clerk here in Harris County nevertheless mysteriously mis-directed
it) to the 15th Court of Appeals. District Court judge Tamika Craft
summarily dismissed that case, too, again with no explanation and while
the 1st Court of Appeals continues to bestow upon her a victory through
increasingly inevitable mootness at the expense of Harris County voters
who want answers. Judge Erin Lunceford still patiently awaits her ruling.
See Erin Lunceford v. Tamika Craft, No. 01-23-00921-CV (Tex. App.—

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Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 12th, 2023). Meanwhile Robins’ letter request for
a reconsideration in the 14th Court of Appeals remains pending, as one does
in the Supreme Court of Texas, too. At any rate, Robins’ RFRA case is
distinguishable from the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) endeavor
presently under review by the 15th Court of Appeals. Appellant Robins
has been doing his best to adapt to peculiar circumstances outside of his
control. He needs the 15th Court of Appeals to respect the legislature’s
jurisdictional framework that Appellant Robins believes mandates that it
not eject this appeal to Harris County where Tamika Craft mysteriously
gets her way without appellate court action.

Constitutional authorities

36. Furthermore, the Texas Constitution's open courts provision
(Article 1, Section 13) states that all courts must be open and that everyone
has the right to a remedy through the due course of law. Interpretations of
it vary, admittedly, but Appellant Robins’ position is that he has the right to
litigate this appeal in the 15th Court of Appeals. Preventing his access to
the 15th Court of Appeals requires a clear and strong statutory prohibition
against it. Such a prohibition does not exist. To the contrary, statutory
authority requires access for Robins’ matter against the State Bar of Texas.
Applying an imaginary prohibition by making the words “matters against
the state” be applicable only to the executive branch would arguably be
unconstitutional, as well as in apparently clear violation of the relevant
legislative text and certainly the legislature’s policy analysis, as detailed
above.

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37. Meanwhile, the Interstate Commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) protects the rights of litigants
not to be, among other things, arbitrarily excluded from protections such as
those provided by the 15th Court of Appeals. Appellant Robins has
interstate involvement that arguably qualifies him for such protections. He
took the State Bar of Texas at its word that it would adjudicate not
predatorily, but rather helpfully, so that attorneys could feel comfortable
assisting an increasing amount of clients here in Texas. He has found this
not to be the case, and he wants to use a uniquely statewide and specialized
court for adjudicating the disbarment that the State Bar of Texas demanded
against him which was preceded by nearly 3 decades of his otherwise
entirely ethically spotless (and still criminally spotless) record.

D. Conclusion

38. Pro se appellant Rich Robins hereby thanks the 15th Court of
Appeals for considering this letter of opposition and asks that the Court
retain his appeal. In the alternative, he asks that it do what is needed so that
this matter be conveyed to the Supreme Court of Texas before being (Robins
believes) unlawfully ejected back to a regional appellate court. They
apparently need the time to focus on finally ruling in Erin Lunceford v.
Tamika Craft, No. 01-23-00921-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.
12th, 2023). An explanation for its hasty denial earlier this year of Appellant
Robins’ abovementioned (and polite) recusal motion (his only one filed
anywhere, ever, in fact) of Bar officer and appellate justice Andrew Johnson
would be informative, too. The lack of answers helps further show why
Appellant Robins’ disputes warrant the statewide electorate and support base
that uniquely bless and grace the new 15th Court of Appeals and its fine

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justices.

Sincerely submitted,

Rich Robins
(Pro se Appellant)
2450L ouisiana St. #400-155
Houston, TX 77006-2380
Rich@RichRobins.com
Tel. 832-350-1030
_____________________________

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Exhibit 1: Robins’ DTPA lawsuit:

CAUSE #202510213

RICH ROBINS § IN THE JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
§
vs. § OF
§
§
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE § HARRIS COUNTY,
dba “TEXAS BAR” § TEXAS
aka “STATE BAR OF TEXAS” §
§

PLAINTIFF RICH ROBINS’ 1st AMENDED DPTA PETITION

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Rich Robins (hereinafter “Plaintiff Robins”).

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Rich Robins is the respondent named as the defendant in
the Commission for Lawyer Discipline’s lawsuit in case #2018-46488 in
Harris County District Court #61. He is also the plaintiff in case #2024-
18660, which has been handled by three different judges thus far, due to
noble, unsolicited judicial recusals. That petition was abruptly &
involuntarily terminated when its primary focus was the Texas Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) violations by the Defendants. Plaintiff
Robins adaptively added a DTPA-based claim to that petition but the case
was concluded anyway. Along the way, Plaintiff Robins adaptively filed this
separate petition pursuant to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA). Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.00. Although it has much in
common, factually and at times legally with the TRFRA petition, this 1 st
amended DTPA petition does not have actual TRFRA-based claims (nor
22
did its prior version, which Plaintiff Robins filed while the TRFRA petition
was still at the trial court level and before he filed his subsequent notice of
appeal for it). Meanwhile, Plaintiff Robins hereby asserts the following…

2. Plaintiff Robins brings this legal action against the State Bar of
Texas (hereinafter the “Texas Bar”), and its Commission for Lawyer
Discipline (hereinafter the “CFLD”). It is not presently brought against
the the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (hereinafter the “CDC”). The actually
named Bar defendant parties are referred to in several instances as the “Bar
defendants”.

3. This is the only disciplinary action or prosecution EVER to be
pursued against Plaintiff Robins by any bar association or other authority
during his approximately 30 years of actively practicing law. Plaintiff
Robins also has no criminal or even traffic convictions against him.

BACKGROUND

4. On July 2nd, 2021 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans, Louisiana decisively ruled that the Defendants Texas Bar (&
thereby its CFLD & CDC) impermissibly, unlawfully and enduringly spent
attorney members’ coercively extracted annual dues on ideological and
political endeavors that are not germane to regulating or improving the
practice of law here in Texas. See McDonald v. Longley, 4 F.4th 229 (5th
Cir. 2021). The Court also found that the Defendants had similarly
unlawfully not given dues-paying members constitutionally adequate and
meaningful notice of how their coercively extracted dues money would be
spent or where their fees would go. Id. Additionally, the Court found that
the Defendants have not given members adequate veto authority over such

23
expenditures. Id.
5. Subsequently the Fifth Circuit issued its relevant mandate on
July 26, 2021 (ECF No. 103). It thereby sided with the amicus brief-
submitting Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and against the Texas
Bar. Perhaps not altogether coincidentally, that bar has since sought to
disbar Attorney General Paxton, in part for allegedly not investigating
something adequately enough before making a statement about it in a
court filing. That bar tried to disbar Attorney Paxton in Collin County
District Court’s case # 471-02574-2022, which is available online at:
https://apps2.collincountytx.gov/judicialrecords/case .
6. As Plaintiff Robins present petition will show, below, the same
bar nevertheless prosecuted Plaintiff Robins for investigating something
before nonmandatorily declaring it, namely word of his client’s death.
He heard from someone on the phone whom Plaintiff Robins had never
met, and who had received a considerably valuable inheritance from her
as a result of such a (potentially hasty) declaration. In the process, that
source (the client’s son) deprived Medicaid of compensation and quite
possibly Plaintiff Robins’ client of her house while she remained alive,
albeit institutionalized. Plaintiff Robins investigated this before he
ultimately disclosed word of a 59 year old client’s death to a court up in
Tyler, Texas. He declared this even as no Texas state statute, state rule
of civil procedure or binding state caselaw requires or allows for such a
disclosure in the midst of potent client confidentiality restrictions (which
survive the life of the client). One statutory provision even encourages
one to wait seven years before presuming the death of someone who is
not documented as such. Meanwhile, federal caselaw says no such
advisory is even required by the rules. Plaintiff Robins nevertheless
24
reported this to the court (up in Smith County, Texas) even though it is
undisputed that there has never been an obituary published for the client
and even though he had been repeatedly denied by state authorities a
copy of her death certificate (if one even existed).
7. For decades, the Texas Bar has already had ample notice from
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Government Code that members
are not to be coerced into funding expenditures that are not germane to
the permissible purposes of a mandatory bar. See Keller v. State Bar of
California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). See also TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.034.
The Texas Bar continues to operate an attorney disciplinary system that
is not in compliance with constitutional law, as this dispute helps show.
8. All of the Texas Bar Defendants’ approximately five claims
prosecuted against Plaintiff Robins are based on the incorrect
supposition that the Texas Bar can nondemocratically impose its will on
the state of Texas regarding Texas’ otherwise fairly tolerant and
permissive rules and laws. The particularly relevant rules & laws
involve the speed with which a lawyer representing a plaintiff here must
report to the assigned court news of the plaintiff’s death even when
independent attempts to verify it did not document and possibly could
not ever document it sufficiently reliably. The Bar defendants allege
that a few months’ delay under such circumstances is deceptive and
grounds for disbarment, even as apparently no state rule, law or case
decision labels such hesitation as impermissible, much less deceptive.
In fact, Plaintiff Robins has found caselaw asserting contrarily that one
need not even notify the court that a client has passed away in a pending
case. The closest that any Texas Rule of Civil Procedure comes to the
topic is permissible regarding how Plaintiff Robins handled matters, in
25
fact. (TRCP 151).
9. The relevant prosecution of Plaintiff Robins emerged about a
year after he became the only attorney to testify critically of the Texas
Bar during all three available public comments opportunities involving
the 2016-2017 Sunset Review of the Texas Bar at Texas’ state
legislature in Austin. Plaintiff Robins compassionately recommended
keeping the Texas Bar around for another 12 years (as he can easily
prove). However, he opposed granting the Texas Bar the deceptively &
sneakily pursued, unrestricted rights to increase annual dues whenever it
likes and as often as it likes. The Texas Bar sought that right despite
having simultaneously mass-mailed all (still compulsory) member
attorneys that their referendum rights remained intact amidst the Sunset
process. Referendum restrictions have existed regarding dues increases
for many decades, if not for the entire time that the Texas Bar has existed
with mandatory membership status. Rather than apologize for having
defrauded the membership, the Texas Bar found fault with the attentive
observer & candid caretaker Robins. The Bar defendants viciously
attacked his livelihood at the expense of Plaintiff Robins’ consumer
rights including by canceling his bar license. Within a year of
successfully getting Plaintiff Robins disbarred, the Texas Bar awarded
itself a dues increase and without seeking, much less obtaining approval
from the still compulsory Texas Bar membership.

DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

10. Plaintiff Robins intends to conduct discovery against the
Defendants under the potentially adaptively tailored Level 3 pursuant to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 190.4, etcetera.
26
PLAINTIFF ROBINS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS FOR RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION ARE NOT PART OF THIS PENDING
PETITION

11. In an effort to avoid deleting facts that are relevant to both
Plaintiff Robins’ TDRFA and DTPA claims, Plaintiff Robins mentions
that during January of 2023, the Texas Bar defendants, either directly
or indirectly revealed their legally impermissible intentions in their
first, ever, answer to the accused respondent Robins’ request for
disclosures provided to Plaintiff Robins in their ethics prosecution
against him. In those disclosures, the CFLD’s and Texas Bar’s and
arguably CDC’s prosecutor John Brannon states:

“Factual Bases….

“[Plaintiff Robins] went on to claim that “any fan of baseball star Ted
Williams realizes that a head can be rather affordably severed from a
deceased body and frozen for a desired revival and bodily regeneration
many years later ….” Respondent asserts that “[s]uch procedures have been
known to take place very secretively at the request of heirs who do not tell
others in the family, and who cremate merely the body.” The
aforementioned statements by Respondent evidence the types of
salacious, false, dishonest, defamatory, frivolous, and outrageous claims
and positions Respondent took during his representation of Crisp and
the Clinkenbeards.”

12. Although this petition does not include a TRFRA claim (as

clarified above), Plaintiff Robins mentions that he is being discriminated

against for his religious views as a longstanding follower of the Church of

Perpetual Life. That nondenominational church is available to the world at:

27
ChurchOfPerpetualLife.org .

13. That church stands for ideals such as how we are each blessed

with one life that has infinite potential through science. We are joined

together through an alliance of potential universal resuscitation.

Furthermore, those who embrace pioneering technologies in furtherance of

such goals are not to be scorned or harmed for it.

14. Plaintiff Robins always wanted what is best for his relevant and

reportedly deceased client, Cindy Crisp. He avoided rushing to declare her

dead while he hoped to somehow discover ways to locate and financially

support her. He was polite to her family members and nonjudgmental, as

psychotherapist Karl Rogers preached as part of his Humanist school of

thought. Nevertheless, the Texas Bar defendants made it crystal-clear

how hostile they are to such a supportive approach to life. They have gone

to great lengths to penalize, silence and cancel Plaintiff Robins

professionally for it, too, while they continue making a fortune from (still

compulsory) bar members each year. The Texas Bar’s annual budget is

approximately $60 million but it would be multiples more (at all Texans’

expense) if it had not been for Plaintiff Robins’ timely written and

testimonial efforts during the 2016-2017 Sunset Review process.

15. Plaintiff Robins shares the following benign & explanatory

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quote: “[t]he aim of the cryogenic process is to preserve tissues, organs and

the brain after the heart stops beating, with the body stored head-down in

liquid nitrogen at -196C. They are then considered ‘in suspension’ ahead of

possible scientific leaps to revive and return them to good health.”

Source: https://metro.co.uk/2023/01/07/brits-hope-for-life-after-death-by-
cryogenically-freezing-their-bodies-18039920

What is so unacceptable about supporting and assisting anyone’s possible
direct involvement with that pursuit?
16. Here is an example of what can happen to those (such as Robins’
client Cindy Crisp, who never discharged him as a client…) who do not hide
their cryopreservation aspirations from heirs: Alcor Life Extension
Foundation v. Pilgeram.
That relatively recent dispute, now concluded, is included by hyper-link
here:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7903137/Sons-legal-fight-dead-
fathers-frozen-head-against-cryogenics-firm-preserving-it.html

Long story short, heirs have been known to try to disrupt a deanimated
person’s cryonics-related plans, in pursuit of the relevant money for
themselves.

17. Anyway, the Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff Robins is in
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. They canceled his
religious freedoms as included in his practice of law, without sufficient (if
any) statutory, common law or civil procedure rule-based justification. If
the Texas Bar is so eager to prevent the expression of members’ concerns
29
about potentially “biologically paused” or “clinically dead but hopefully
not permanently so” clientele, it should try to amend applicable statutory,
civil procedure, and jurisprudential authorities to inform people as much.
Instead, the Defendant Texas Bar, CFLD and CDC consider themselves to
be above such “deathist” endeavors, quite possibly because they would not
gain traction with Texans anyway. Texans want to live, not subscribe to
the Texas Bar’s dark view of life. Texans certainly do not want to
empower unelected and insufficiently regulated Bar bureaucrats to
determine when other people’s rights should be terminated.

18. Plaintiff Robins’ free exercise of religion was substantially and
unlawfully burdened by the Bar defendants’ actions. Actions from all
three have not furthered a compelling government interest, as one can tell
from the absence of statutory or civil procedure rule authority saying
otherwise. Meanwhile, the Texas bar defendants’ actions against Plaintiff
Robins are not the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling
interest. For example, the Texas Bar defendants have not enacted any rules
that are expressly on point, nor have they successfully gotten (or even tried
to get) a statutory or civil procedure restriction placed on conduct involving
the (supposedly obligatory) hasty declaration of a client’s death despite the
risks of breach of attorney / client privilege (which indisputably outlives the
client), and of identity theft that could financially adversely affect the whole
family. The Bar defendants have also not prosecuted any other lawyer for
doing something similar, as far as Plaintiff Robins can tell. Incidentally,
most lawyers in the USA need not be a member of a state bar in order to
maintain their law licenses. It will be interesting to see how much longer
the status quo remains intact here in Texas, though.

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19. Meanwhile, despite federal restrictions upon the Texas Bar’s taking
such political stances, the bar defendants excluded nearly all of Plaintiff
Robins’ defenses and evidence from the fact-finder jury’s access during
pre-trial proceedings, with the predictable result’s emerging. With
practically no defenses, the jury was eager to conclude a 3 day trial with at
most a ten minute conference. None of the jury charges adequately
resembled the rules allegedly violated, while every instruction that Plaintiff
Robins submitted was similarly excluded from the jury’s consideration.
Needless to say, an appeal is underway. It is also an ongoing burden from
which Plaintiff Robins is entitled to relief pursuant to the DTPA.

Defendant Robins has endured and continues enduring
unlawful treatment by the Bar defendants:

20. The CFLD, Texas Bar and CDC have prosecuted and punished
Defendant Robins to forfeit his religious views favoring the (hopefully
merely) undead, while seeking to punish him for his having observed and
practiced his beliefs in the past as part of his practice of law.
Astonishingly enough, the CFLD petitioner would, even in the
documented absence of statewide law’s, rules’ or jurisprudence’
requiring it, have Defendant Robins rush to judgment when
circumstances are ambiguous as to whether a missing client is potentially
cryo-preserved, i.e. clinically dead (or even just missing perhaps at a
Hospice facility) instead of permanently dead. The petitioner would
have had Defendant Robins disclose such a client’s possible vulnerable
legal status even when that client’s well-being remains insufficiently
confirmed, and would consequently be compromised and a source of
great suffering upon a desired revival someday. The petitioner would

31
have even had Defendant Robins settle a case such as Cindy Crisp’s
despite his firm belief that the (possibly cryo-preserved or simply
comatose) client would disapprove upon awakening. As prominent
caselaw says, “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393
F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004), citing Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67
L.Ed.2d 624 (1981).

21. Furthermore, the Code of Federal Relations states, in relevant part:
“In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at
issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the
Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical
beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the
strength of traditional religious views. This standard was developed in
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970).” See §1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or
belief.

22. Nevertheless, Plaintiff Robins mentions how the Texas Bar /
CFLD / CDC prosecutor John Brannon claimed in a (successful) opposition
to a continuance that Defendant Robins did not refer to his religious views
favoring the potentially cryo-preserved client Cindy Crisp during a 5+ hour
deposition of Plaintiff Robins. Nevertheless, the following two exchanges
between the CFLD petitioner (“Q”) and Defendant Robins (“A”) are
revealing (as are others) as to how inaccurate such assertions by the Texas
Bar defendants were:
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Deposition, at page 47:

Q. And so, I want to try to get philosophy, religion, any type of spirituality
out of it. And just focus on that non-sector for a moment, for purposes of this
case.
A. Non-sector?
Q. If you would, please. Something that is not spiritual or religious or
philosophical. I want to get -- if you can remove that, you know, from your
vocabulary during the question and answer. That would be very helpful.
Okay?

&

Deposition page 134:
A. Yes. But please, realize, there is a difference in my world, between
being clinically dead and permanently so, biologically paused and
exterminated.

Texas Bar prosecutor John Brannon is an agent (if not also an employee) of
the CDC, as well as an employee of the CFLD and of the Texas Bar. They
work in cahoots with one another.

Sovereign immunity is not applicable:
23. Claims of sovereign immunity do not withstand scrutiny. The
following appellate court case from the Texas Bar headquarters’ backyard of
Austin, Texas shows how claims about sovereign immunity pursuant to its
own rules are inadequate under the circumstances: Commission for Lawyer
Discipline v. Rosales, 577 S.W.3d 305, 313-314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019,
pet. denied). There it states the following:

The Commission further argues that the TCPA does not apply to its
disciplinary proceedings because the Commission is entitled to "absolute

33
immunity." In support of this argument, it points to the provision
providing that the TCPA "does not abrogate or lessen any other ...
immunity available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or
common law or rule provisions," Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
27.011(a), and to Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, which provides:

All members of the Commission, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
(including Special Assistant Disciplinary Counsel appointed by the
Commission and attorneys employed on a contract basis by the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel), all members of Committees, all members of the
Board of Disciplinary Appeals, all members of the District Disability
Committees, all officers and Directors of the State Bar, and the staff
members of the aforementioned entities are immune from suit for any
conduct in the course of their official duties. The immunity is absolute
and unqualified and extends to all actions at law or in equity. Tex. Rules
Disciplinary P. R. 17.09.

According to the Commission, "[a]n obvious purpose of the immunity
provided by Rule 1[7].09 is to allow the disciplinary system to discharge
their official duties without fear of being sued or liable for monetary
judgments, such as attorneys' fees that can be awarded in [TCPA]
proceedings."

The immunity granted in Rule 17.09, however, is official immunity that
shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are
encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties. See
id.; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 460-61 (Tex. 2002) ("Official
immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees
from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform
their official duties.") (citing Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.
1994)). It is not the same as sovereign immunity, which protects the
State, and government entities like the State Bar, from lawsuits for
money damages unless the immunity has been waived. See, e.g., Reata
Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006).

22. Incidentally, even the abovementioned rule 17.09 does not purport to
immunize the Commission for Lawyer Discipline or the Texas Bar.

34
24. Similarly, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA)
says, in relevant part:
Sec. 110.008. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVED. (a)
Subject to Section 110.006 [notice & right to accommodate], sovereign
immunity to suit and from liability is waived and abolished to the extent
of liability created by Section 110.005 [remedies], and a claimant may
sue a government agency for damages allowed by that section.

25. Additionally, cases such as Richards v. Mena, 907 S.W.2d 566, 569
(Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism’d) are persuasively relevant.
CPRC §106.002(b) “provides for an express waiver of the State’s
governmental immunity to those prohibited acts listed in [CPRC]
§106.001.”

26. Plaintiff Robins submits that sovereign immunity does not protect the
Bar defendants from the reach of the DTPA, either. Plaintiff Robins is a
“consumer” who naively spent several hundred dollars per year on the
purported goods & services of the Bar defendants. These include
licensing maintenance, continuing legal education (CLE), printed &
online publications, ethics hotline advisories and live course offerings,
etcetera. Plaintiff Robins detrimentally relied in various ways as a
deceived consumer while the Bar defendants continued to pursue ever-
increasing revenues for themselves, especially deceptively through the
Sunset Commission’s 2016-2017 review. The abovementioned
materials and other so-called services were intentionally misleading and
forcibly influential upon Plaintiff Robins due to the mandatory bar
membership privileges that the Bar defendants still enjoy. The situation
has been the kind that the DTPA is designed to address for society’s
benefit.

35
Meanwhile, the Bar defendants are “persons” pursuant to the DTPA.
The definition of “person” in the Texas DTPA clearly includes
organizations such as the Bar defendants. The Bar defendants comprise
a group, however organized. Claims of quasi-governmental & public
corporation status do not shield the Bar defendants from what they are:
persons, pursuant to Texas’ DTPA.

Discovery has not begun in this case, and is substantially needed
to further develop the assertions & claims. Nevertheless, the
following descriptions apply:

AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS PURSUANT TO
THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
27. Plaintiff Robins incorporates the aforementioned as if set forth
fully herein. He pursues claims against the Defendants pursuant to the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The Defendants have
engaged in false, misleading & deceptive practices at Plaintiff Robins’
expense, and that of the general public which depends upon legal services
that the Texas Bar has mismanaged and continues to subvert for its own
profiteering, in numerous ways.

28. The DTPA mandates that the law “shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, some of which are
to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business
practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty. Others are to
provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code § 17.44(a) (emphasis added).

36
29. The DTPA declares unlawful any “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code § 17.46(a), which it defines as including, inter alia¸ “causing
confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or
certification of goods or services,” id. § 17.46(b)(2), “representing that
goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which the person
does not,” id. § 17.46(b)(5), “advertising goods or services with intent not to
sell them as advertised,” id. § 17.46(b)(9), and “failing to disclose
information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of
the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was intended to
induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would not
have entered had the information been disclosed,” id. § 17.46(b)(24).

30. Texas Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(1) defines “goods” as “tangible
chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.” See also United
Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
1979) (“tangible chattels” are “those items of personal property which may
be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched.”). Texas Bus. & Com. Code §
17.45(2) defines “services” as “work, labor, or service purchased or leased
for use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of
goods.” See also Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex.
1980) (“services” means “action or use that furthers some end or purpose:
conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something: deeds
useful or instrumental toward some object.”).

37
31. Texas Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(6) defines “trade” and
“commerce” as “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, lease, or distribution
of any good or service, of any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal,
or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever
situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of this state.”

32. The Texas Bar defendants made various misrepresentations &
nondisclosures which ultimately profited them but substantially harmed
Plaintiff Robins. Texas Bus. & Com. Code § 17.46(b)(24) provides that the
phrase “false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” includes “failing to
disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the
time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer
would not have entered had the information been disclosed.”

Trangressions & lawfare by the Bar defendants…

33. The Texas Bar defendants have engaged in, and continue engaging
in, various transgressions that constitute deceptive trade practices acts. The
following list is not all-inclusive, as discovery has not gotten underway in
this dispute and we are in a notice pleadings state. In the mean time,
though, Plaintiff Robins reports that the Bar defendants have represented
that they take precautions for the bar members’ benefit which they do not.
For example, they advertise and otherwise mention in bar materials that they
provide settlement / mediation conferences, in part to clarify what (if any)
property is to be handed over to the disgruntled client, whom the bar
defendants profit from further irritating at the targeted attorney members’
expense. The Bar defendants did not make anything like that available for
38
Plaintiff Robins, though, despite requests by his substitute client (Cindy
Crisp’s son) and by Plaintiff Robins. The Texas Government Code purports
to require such settlement-friendly pursuits, too, but the Texas Bar
defendants denied this as the abovementioned grievance trial concluded.
They opportunistically exploited their own deceptiveness to try to make it
look like Plaintiff Robins had been noncompliant when in fact he had been
compliant. This situation was misleading, to say the least. Plaintiff Robins
adapted his actions in the litigation based upon the Bar defendants’ false
assurances. He also would have never helped the son of his initial (very
polite) client Cindy Crisp, who was stricken with multiple sclerosis but who
nevertheless found ways to let Plaintiff Robins know that her son willingly
presents unacceptable hazards to others.

34. The bar defendants have also held themselves out as consistently
making an effort to communicate what their interpretations of (conveniently
vague) ethics rules actually require, when they do not. They make over $13
million annually peddling Continuing Legal Education (CLE), as well as
articles, books and conference attendance “opportunities”. They
nevertheless do not warn compulsory members about all the rule
interpretations which they will surprisingly impose upon the astonished
compulsory bar member at trial. In the process, at trial they ignore
authorities requiring that such rules be strictly construed in favor of the
attorney. Such bait & switch tactics are unworthy of the licensing
monopoly privileges which the Bar defendants profit from to the tune of tens
of millions of dollars annually. The Bar defendants certainly do not make
an effort to provide restitution to the duped consumers who are still forced to
contribute to the defendants’ annual $60 million dollar budget, either.

39
Although over 80% of the Texas Bar’s active membership reliably abstains
from voting in the annual, internet-enabled bar elections (usually featuring
Bar sycophantic candidates of the Bar defendants’ choosing), that percentage
would be far higher if the Bar defendants were transparent & forthcoming all
along about their deceptiveness, unreliability, eagerness to breach warranties
and other agreements all along. Such transgressions by the Bar defendants
are not protected by sovereign immunity under other statutes and they
certainly are not pursuant to the DTPA. Transgressors include Bar
prosecutors who violate the same ambiguous ethics rules that they
hypocritically use to try to silence and cancel certain (still compulsory)
members. Such rules include the importance of avoiding driving up the cost
of litigation, of avoiding frivolous legal actions, and avoiding being
misrepresenting. Plaintiff Robins has various examples of false assertions
and other shameless, intentionally fatiguing, weaponized claims by various
employees of the Bar defendants which repeatedly remind him how
mistaken he was to recommend to the Sunset Commission that the Bar
defendants’ charter be renewed even as most lawyers in the USA need not be
bar members to get to practice law.

35. The Bar defendants’ ethics rules even have written assurances that
members will not be prosecuted for good faith errors in judgment, only for
the Bar defendants to bend over backwards to avoid letting something be
called sufficiently reasonable to qualify. Victims, such as Plaintiff Robins,
realize after it is too late that relying upon such assurances by the Bar
defendants was hazardous and even dangerous.

36. Additionally, the Bar defendants do not even attempt to comply
sufficiently with religious freedom requirements imposed on them by

40
statute, including by the State Bar Act, i.e. Chapter 81 of the Texas
Government Code). Nevertheless, they do not readily (or otherwise)
disclose to members ahead of time that they will not comply. One learns it
as a surprise from the Bar defendants at, or right before trial, and
subsequently gets heavily penalized for the privilege.

37. Furthermore, they have purported (through implicit if not explicit
warranties) to be in compliance with applicable laws when, as the 5th Circuit
in the abovementioned McDonald v. Longley case demonstrated, they have
been far from it. As Plaintiff Robins’ case demonstrates, they even remain
noncompliant. They generate billable hour documents of permissible fees
for lawyers, only to attack and punish lawyers later who abided accordingly
when it suits the Bar defendants.

38. Meanwhile they falsely represent in writing on their website
(etcetera) that they cannot resolve a client’s fee dispute with a member
attorney, even as one later discovers that when it suits the Bar defendants,
they are nevertheless willing to meddle, interfere and subvert a potential
conciliation process instead of offering the legally required mediation of
grievances. They avoid such mediation even when both sides requested a
peaceful, nonlitigious resolution as had been the case in Plaintiff Robins’
only prosecution. The Bar defendants even claim, Plaintiff Robins believes
dishonestly, that there is no such conciliation obligation.

39. They also boast being a source of attorney self-rule, only for the
opposite to emerge after years of membership persistence seeking reforms
such as grievance reforms proposed by Larry McDougal before, during and
after his state bar presidency. Plaintiff Robins even has video footage of
such Bar deceptiveness which had induced detrimental reliance among
41
people such as Plaintiff Robins, who thought that vagueness in the Bar ethics
rules would finally be addressed instead of left as-is without even letting the
Bar’s board of directors vote on proposed modifications, much less the
membership.

40. Additionally they assert that we should not try to co-opt a judge or
justice before whom we have litigation or other business. The Bar
defendants do not practice what they preach, though. They essentially
induce members of the judiciary to be biased in favor of the Bar defendants,
and against the legitimate interests of people such as Plaintiff Robins.

41. The Bar defendants even tried to hide from the Sunset Review
Commission the half a million dollar embezzlement by their membership
director just over a decade ago. This at least implicitly told us members that
we must do the same to preserve attorney / client confidences adequately,
especially when there is no written duty to rush to report a client’s supposed
but unproven death. Essentially, the Bar defendants emphasize the
importance of preserving client confidentiality, except when they do not. It
is misleading to say the least. Plaintiff Robins detrimentally relied on such
confidentiality that he now realizes was simple parasitic & even predatory
deceptiveness.

42. They also hold themselves out as being fair, only to parlay their
co-opting of judges and justices into excluding so much evidence and
testimony that could be exculpatory. Still compulsory members have no
idea that the Texas Bar will behave that way when the opportunity arises and
the incentives to cancel exist. Plaintiff Robins certainly did not know, after
years of detrimental reliance and misplaced trust while the Bar defendants

42
increasingly make a fortune each year out of the annual $60 million dollar
Bar budget.

43. All Texans suffer either directly or indirectly from such predatory
misdeeds. These transgressions directly and adversely affected Plaintiff
Robins in ways for which he seeks redress, plus damages & attorney’s fees.
Although the Defendants rejected his ongoing request for license
reinstatement and a restored ethically spotless license status, they have
categorically denied it, making further settlement discussions futile.
Meanwhile though:

COUNT 2: COMMON LAW FRAUD
44. Plaintiff Robins hereby incorporates by reference the
abovementioned assertions for inclusion in his descriptions of the
remaining allegations & assertions.

45. The Bar defendants rrepresented to Plaintiff Robins that they are
honest, dependable, supportive and the like, only to be anything but when
they sense that their pot of gold is potentially threatened.

46. The Defendants’ representations to Plaintiff Robins were material,
intentional, reliance-inducing and ultimately harmful to him.

47. The Defendants’ representations were false statements of fact that
surprisingly enabled the Defendants to do considerable harm to Plaintiff
Robins.

48. The Defendants made the false representations while aware of the
risk that they would prove to be false.

49. Plaintiff Robins detrimentally relied on the defendants’ false
43
representations, ultimately at considerable and ever-increasing expense.

22. The Defendants’ false representations directly and proximately
caused enduring injuries to the plaintiff, which resulted in plaintiffs’
damages that are partially listed in this lawsuit.

23. The Plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages within the jurisdictional
limits of this court.

JURISDICTION & VENUE
44. This Court has jurisdiction over this case as Plaintiff Robins’
claims involve encroachments upon his rights here in Harris County,
Texas in violation of Texas’ statutory authority.
45. Venue is similarly proper here, as well, pursuant to Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.47(b).
A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiff’s
claims occurred and continue to occur in Harris County, Texas. Venue is
also proper because the Plaintiff resides in Harris County.
46. Houston also happens to be where the Texas Bar’s very
substantial facility at 4801 Woodway Dr #315w, Houston, TX 77056
remains located. The bar defendants required Plaintiff Robins to endure
a near 5 hour deposition there regarding this dispute, in fact, before
dragging him through a four day trial before a visiting judge here in
Harris County.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

47. The Bar defendants should be held accountable and be compelled

44
to compensate Plaintiff Robins including with immediately and enduringly
ceasing with maintaining its relevant sanctions against him (disbarment for
a first time offender, who had never previously been prosecuted for
anything by any state bar during his approximately 30 year career, and who
has also never been convicted of any crime or even a traffic offense). The
Defendants should also be compelled to make financial reparations
including costs and attorney’s fees available to Plaintiff Robins, as the
relevant statutory provisions actually or potentially require. Plaintiff
Robins previously had an ethically spotless bar ethics record.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Robins prays that this Court please issue the

following relief:

a. A declaratory judgment requiring the bar defendants to reverse the
Texas Bar’s relevant disciplinary actions against him.

b. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees,
damages and costs as well as any other relief that this Court deems
just and proper.

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PLAINTIFF’S SWORN DECLARATION

“My name is Richard Robins. I am over the age of eighteen
years old, and am of sound mind. I have never been convicted of a
misdemeanor or felony. I am fully competent to attest to all of the facts
set forth in this sworn declaration and accompanying lawsuit as I have
personal knowledge regarding them. I declare under penalty of perjury
that the facts stated in this lawsuit are true & correct, to the best of my
knowledge.

Executed on June 10th, 2025.”

Respectfully submitted,

Rich Robins
(Pro se Plaintiff)
2450L ouisiana St. #400-155
Houston, TX 77006-2380
Rich@RichRobins.com
Tel. 832-350-1030
____________________________

Respectfully submitted:

Rich Robins
Pro Se Plaintiff
2450 Louisiana St. #400-155
Houston, TX 77006
Tel. 832-350-1030
Rich@RichRobins.com

46
No. 15-25-00144-CV

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Appellant’s amended response will be served upon the Appellee
by court-authorized electronic means pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.5 and also Rules 21 & 21a) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on September 22nd, 2025.

Michael G. Graham
Appellate Counsel for the Appellee, the Commission for Lawyer
Discipline
State Bar of Texas,
Box 12487
Austin, Texas 78711.
Tel. 512-427-1356
Michael.Graham@texasbar.com

BY:

Rich Robins

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Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Rich Robins on behalf of Rich Robins
Bar No. 00789589
rich@RichRobins.com
Envelope ID: 105876962
Filing Code Description: Letter
Filing Description: Amended letter in opposition to transfer of case from
15th COA...
Status as of 9/22/2025 7:32 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michael Graham 24113581 Michael.Graham@TEXASBAR.COM 9/22/2025 1:34:58 AM SENT