In Re ColossusBets Limited v. the State of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00150-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
October 21, 2025 AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/20/2025 3:35 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
RECEIVED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
No.15-25-00150-CV AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM
__________________________________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

15th Court of Appeals of Texas

__________________________________________________________________

In Re ColossusBets Limited, Relator

_________________________________________________________________

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST JERRY B. REED’S
SURREPLY
_________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding from Cause No. 25-BC03A-0007
Business Court of Texas Third Division Austin, Texas

__________________________________________________________________

LAGARDE LAW FIRM, P.C.
Richard L. LaGarde
State Bar No. 11819550
Mary LaGarde
State Bar No. 24037645
230 Westcott St., Suite 100
Houston, TX 77007
TEL: (713) 993-0660
richard@lagardelaw.com
mary@lagardelaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Relator’s New Procedural-Bar Theory Is Contrary
to Texas Law …………………………………………………………… 1
II. Rule 52.4(d) Does Not Bar Jurisdictional Argument …………… 2
III. Section 25A.0041’s Text and Legislative Context Do Not
Support a “One-Way Door” Rule……………………………………….. 3
A. The Legislature Delegated Procedural Authority to the
Supreme Court—It Did Not Freeze Jurisdiction Forever………….. 3
B. “Final” Means Procedural Conclusiveness—Not
Irrevocability …………………………………………………………….. 4
C. The “Limited Potential for Movement” Clause Protects
Fairness, Not Finality …………………………………………………… 5
D. Section 25A.006 Expressly Contemplates Remand When
Jurisdiction Is Lacking ………………………………………………….. 6
E.Conclusion………………………………………………………… 7
Certificate of Service……………………………………………………... 7
Certificate of Compliance………………………………………………... 8

i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
American K-9 Detection Services, LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d
246, 260 (Tex. 2018)…………………………………………………. 1
Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012)……….... 7
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440
(Tex. 1993) .................................................................................... 7

Statutes
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041……………………………………. 3,7
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a)………………………………… 1,3
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a)(3)……………………………... 1,5
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(b)(3)……………………………... 4
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d)………………………………….. 6

Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 25–28……………………………………………… 2
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4(d)…………………………………………….. 2

ii
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Real Party in Interest Jerry B. Reed files this Surreply to address

new procedural and statutory arguments raised for the first time in

Relator’s Reply, as well as its expanded interpretation of Texas

Government Code § 25A.0041(a) and (a)(3) beyond what was presented

in the Petition.

I. RELATOR’S NEW PROCEDURAL-BAR THEORY IS
CONTRARY TO TEXAS LAW

Relator’s reply newly contends that Mr. Reed may not challenge

whether the Business Court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the first

place because he failed to file his own mandamus or notice of appeal

within 30 days of the Business Court’s June 18 order. That argument

misstates both the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and controlling

precedent.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide

a case and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on

appeal or by the court sua sponte. American K-9 Detection Services, LLC

v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018) (“Subject matter jurisdiction

Page 1 of 8
is an issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal[,] it may not be

waived by the parties, and it may—indeed, must—be raised by an

appellate court on its own.”) (footnotes, internal quotation marks, and

citations omitted).

Because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, a

real party in interest may argue at any time that the trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court would be duty-bound to

raise the question even if Mr. Reed had not.

II. RULE 52.4(D) DOES NOT BAR JURISDICTIONAL
ARGUMENT

Rules 25–28 govern appeals, not original proceedings. Rule 52.4(d)

only confines a response to “the issues or points presented in the

petition.” Because Relator’s petition claims the Business Court retained

jurisdiction, Mr. Reed’s showing that the court never had jurisdiction is

squarely responsive and proper under the rule.

Page 2 of 8
III. SECTION 25A.0041’S TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT DO
NOT SUPPORT A “ONE-WAY DOOR” RULE

Relator’s newly expanded argument that Chapter 25A establishes

an irrevocable “one-way door” for jurisdiction stretches the statutory

language beyond its procedural purpose.

A. The Legislature Delegated Procedural Authority to the
Supreme Court—It Did Not Freeze Jurisdiction Forever

Section 25A.0041 does not itself purport to fix Business Court

jurisdiction “once and for all” as Relator argues. Its operative clause

directs only that:

“The supreme court by rule shall establish
procedures for the prompt, efficient, and final
determination of business court jurisdiction on the
filing of an action in the business court.”

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.0041(a) (emphasis added).

That language shows two key limits. First, § 25A.0041 is

procedural—it instructs the Supreme Court of Texas to design rules. It

does not legislate substantive jurisdictional consequences. Second, it

focuses on determinations “on the filing of an action,” meaning at the

threshold stage, not on later amendments or factual changes.

Page 3 of 8
By its own terms, the section concerns procedures for prompt and

efficient handling “on the filing of an action”, not permanent

jurisdictional attachment. Nothing in the statute says that a Business

Court retains jurisdiction even after the facts or pleadings supporting

that jurisdictional basis have changed.

B. “Final” Means Procedural Conclusiveness—Not
Irrevocability

The modifier “final” in “final determination of business court

jurisdiction” refers to the finality of the procedural ruling within that

stage—i.e., that the issue be conclusively resolved and not linger

indefinitely—rather than to a prohibition on revisiting jurisdiction if the

basis for it later disappears.

The Legislature used “final” in connection with “prompt” and

“efficient.” Read in context, it describes administrative efficiency, not

permanent jurisdiction. The same subsection also authorizes the

Supreme Court to set limited periods during which issues or rights must

be asserted, considered agreed to, or waived. TEX. GOV’T CODE §

25A.0041(b)(3).

Page 4 of 8
That provision assumes that the Court, not the Legislature, will

determine when rights are waived and how jurisdictional determinations

are revisited—undermining any claim that the Legislature itself imposed

a one-way door.

C. The “Limited Potential for Movement” Clause Protects
Fairness, Not Finality

Relator also relies on § 25A.0041(a)(3), which instructs the

Supreme Court to consider:

[T]he limited potential for the movement of an
action between a district court and the business
court as it relates to issues of fundamental fairness
or the preservation of constitutionally or
statutorily protected rights.

That clause expressly preserves movement between courts where

fairness or statutory rights require it. By tying the limitation to

“fundamental fairness” and “statutorily protected rights,” the

Legislature recognized that certain circumstances may require transfer

or remand. A reading that forbids any later remand would conflict with

the statute’s express preservation of movement between courts to ensure

fairness and protect rights.

Page 5 of 8
Suppose multiple defendants are sued in district court, and the

Business Court’s jurisdiction depends solely on a claim against one

defendant. If that claim is later settled or dismissed, nothing in Chapter

25A suggests the Business Court should continue exercising jurisdiction

over the remaining, unrelated claims. Reading Chapter 25A as a one-way

door would compel the Business Court to try actions outside its subject-

matter mission—contrary to § 25A.006(d)’s command that a case be

remanded when the Business Court “does not have jurisdiction of the

action.

D. Section 25A.006 Expressly Contemplates Remand When
Jurisdiction Is Lacking

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d) provides that, “If the business

court does not have jurisdiction of the action, the business court shall

remand the action to the court in which the action was originally filed.”

This directive confirms that when jurisdiction is absent, the Business

Court must return the case to the originating court. Nothing in the

statute limits that command to the moment of filing or prevents the court

from reevaluating its jurisdiction later. To the contrary, the use of the

Page 6 of 8
present tense—“does not have jurisdiction”—implies an ongoing duty to

ensure jurisdiction exists whenever the question arises.

Texas courts have long held that “a court has a continuing

obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rusk

State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tex. 2012) (recognizing that

subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal

because courts must ensure it exists); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air

Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (holding that subject-matter

jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised sua sponte at any time).

E. Conclusion

Section 25A.0041’s purpose is to ensure procedural efficiency, not to

impose jurisdictional rigidity. Its “final determination” language cannot

override the fundamental rule that courts must ensure subject-matter

jurisdiction exists at all times and must remand when it does not. The

statutory text does not support Relator’s “one-way door” theory.

Page 7 of 8
Respectfully submitted,

LAGARDE LAW FIRM, P.C.
/s/ Richard L. LaGarde
Richard L. LaGarde
State Bar No. 11819550
Mary LaGarde
State Bar No. 24037645
230 Westcott St., Suite 100
Houston, TX 77007
TEL: (713) 993-0660
richard@lagardelaw.com
mary@lagardelaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on October 20, 2025, a true and correct copy of Real Party
in Interests’ Surreply was served on all counsel of record via the Court’s
electronic-notification system.

/s/ Richard LaGarde
Richard LaGarde

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the length limitations of TEX. R. APP. P.
9.4(i)(2)(B) because this brief consists of 1,013 words, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Richard LaGarde
Richard LaGarde

Page 8 of 8
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Richard LaGarde on behalf of Richard LaGarde
Bar No. 11819550
richard@lagardelaw.com
Envelope ID: 107057277
Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: Real Party In Interest's Surreply
Status as of 10/20/2025 3:38 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

David Harrell 793905 david.harrell@troutman.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Richard Lagarde 11819550 richard@lagardelaw.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Manfred Sternberg 19175775 manfred@msternberg.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Aimee Oleson 24036391 aoleson@sheppardmullin.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Mary Lagarde 24037645 mary@lagardelaw.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Jeffrey Adams 24006736 jeff@jeffadamslaw.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Jon Smith 18630750 jon@jonmichaelsmith.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Mia Lorick 24091415 Mia.Lorick@troutman.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Charles Conrad charles.conrad@pillsburylaw.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Grace Miller 24132499 gmiller@sheppardmullin.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

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Bradden Pippin 24143893 bradden.pippin@troutman.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

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Kathleen Laird Kathleen.Laird@Troutman.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Honorable Melissa Andrews bcdivision3a@txcourts.gov 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT

Ryan Dickinson ryandickinson79@gmail.com 10/20/2025 3:35:48 PM SENT