Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00121-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/3/2025 3:47 PM
NO. 15-25-00121-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
RECEIVED IN

IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/3/2025 3:47:10 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen,
Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in their official capacities,
Appellants,
v.
Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, and Gabrielle Moore,
Appellees.

On Appeal from Case No. D-1-GN-25-002049,
In the 126th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BOARDS
LEGAL ASSISTANCE FUND
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

Matthew Hines Rosemarie Kanusky
State Bar No. 24120892 State Bar No. 00790999
600 Congress Ave., Suite 2150 112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1310
Austin, Texas 78701 San Antonio, Texas 78205
mhines@mphlegal.com rkanusky@mphlegal.com

MCCALL PARKHURST & HORTON L.L.P.

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae the Texas Association of
School Boards Legal Assistance Fund
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
I. Identity and Statement of Interest of Amicus ......................................1

II. How Bonds Issue ..................................................................................3

A. An election order seeks permission from the electorate to
incur debt....................................................................................3

B. Notice of the meeting to order an election is not notice of
the election. ................................................................................5

C. A bond order authorizes the debt to be incurred........................5

III. Argument and Authorities ....................................................................7

A. This Court should reject Contestants’ incorrect
construction of TOMA. ..............................................................7

1. Contestants’ interpretation of “subject” goes
beyond the term’s plain meaning. ...................................8

2. Contestants’ sliding-scale standard has no basis in
the Supreme Court’s TOMA jurisprudence. .................10

3. Adopting Contestants’ sliding-scale standard
would increase uncertainty and litigation risk for
public entities. ................................................................19

4. Contestants’ requested relief is an extreme and
unprecedented weaponization of TOMA’s notice
requirement. ...................................................................23

B. Contestants failed to plead or prove the elements of an
election contest.........................................................................26

IV. Conclusion ..........................................................................................30

CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE ........................................32

i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bahn v. Savage, 120 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1938), writ refused, 122 S.W.2d 191 (1938)..................................23
Barrington v. Cokinos, 338 S.W.2d 133, 143 (Tex. 1960) .....................................22
Blum v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1999).................................................27
Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ..............................................................10
City of Donna v. Ramirez, 548 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. denied) ................................................13
City of Kingsville v. Int’l Ass’’n of Firefighters, Local Union
No. 2390, 568 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1978, no writ)....................................................................................27
City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d
762, 765 (Tex. 1991) ....................................................................................10
City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex.
2018) .............................................................................................................19
Cohen v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 687 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) .................................................26
Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 439
(Tex. 1998) .............................................................................................19, 20
Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 706 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.
1986) .................................................................................................10, 11, 13
Creedmoor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs-
Edwards Aquifer Conservation Dist., 784 S.W.2d 79, 86
(Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied)........................................................13
Dacus v. Parker, 466 S.W.3d 820, 825–26 (Tex. 2015) ..........................................4
Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Tex. 2021) ..............................28, 29
Flores v. Cuellar, 269 S.W.3d 657, 660 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2008, no pet.) ..................................................................................29

ii
Greater Beauxart Garden Municpal Utility District v. Cormier,
596 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1980, no
writ)...............................................................................................................25
Guerra v. Rios, No. 13-24-00579-CV, 2025 WL 945566, *6
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 28, 2025,
pet. filed) .......................................................................................................24
Hays County v. Water Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 257–58
(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) ...............................................................17
Hotze v. White, 01-08-00016-CV, 2010 WL 1493115, at *4
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010, pet.
denied) ..........................................................................................................27
In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016,
orig. proceeding) .............................................................................................8
Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936) ..........................4, 21
Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d
641, 646 (Tex. 1975) ..............................................................................10, 14
Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1997, no writ) ...............................................................................13, 14
McCurry v. Lewis, 259 S.W.3d 369, 372–73 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008, no pet.).................................................................................28
Point Isabel Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hinojosa, 797 S.W.2d 176, 180
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) .....................................13, 15
Rossano v. Townsend, 9 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).............................................................................26
Sawyer v. Bd. of Regents of Claredon Junior Coll., 393 S.W.2d
391, 399 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1965, no writ) ...........................................29
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) ................................9
Sorrell v. Estate of Carlton, 504 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 167 (Tex.
2019) .............................................................................................................12
Stelzer v. Huddleston, 526 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1975, writ dism’d) ..................................................................................23, 24

iii
Tatum v. Collier, No. C14-87-00870-CV, 1989 WL 111365
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 1989, no
writ)...............................................................................................................26
Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d
670, 675 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) .........................................21
Texas Turnpike Authority v. City of Fort Worth, 554 S.W.2d
675 (Tex. 1977) ......................................................................................14, 16
Webb Cnty. v. Mares, No. 14-23-00617-CV, 2024 WL 5130862
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 17, 2024, no pet.) ..........................11
Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. 2019) .................................19

Statutes
1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 53.14 ....................................................................................6
1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 53.9 ......................................................................................6
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 45.001 .......................................................................................5
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 45.003(g) ................................................................................22
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 1.005(12) ...................................................................................4
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 1.005(15) ...................................................................................4
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 233.003 ....................................................................................27
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 233.006(b). ................................................................................5
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.004 ..........................................................................................3
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.009 ................................................................................4, 9, 22
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 4.001 et seq..............................................................................26
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 4.003 ..........................................................................................5
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 4.004 ..........................................................................................5
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 4.009 ..........................................................................................5
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 41.001 ........................................................................................3
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 45.003 ........................................................................................3

iv
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 52.072(a)....................................................................................4
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 85.004 ......................................................................................22
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 85.007 ......................................................................................22
TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 3.006 ......................................................................................22
TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 4.002 ........................................................................................5
TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.002 ........................................................................................5
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1202.003(a) ..............................................................................6
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1202.006...................................................................................6
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1205.021 ...................................................................................6
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.001...................................................................................3
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.003...................................................................3, 9, 21, 22
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.052...................................................................................5
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1301.001.................................................................................28
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1471.011.................................................................................28
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 233.006(b). ...............................................................................6
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 312.002(a) ................................................................................8
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.041...............................................................................7, 20
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.043...................................................................................21
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.141.......................................................................26, 28, 30

Other Authorities
Comparison, Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/comparison (last viewed October
30, 2025) .......................................................................................................12
Subject, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) ...............................................8
Texas Education Agency, Enrollment in Texas Public Schools
2023-24 ...........................................................................................................1

v
I. Identity and Statement of Interest of Amicus

The Texas Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund (“TASB

LAF”) advocates for the interests of Texas public school districts in legal

proceedings that impact public education issues. Founded in 1980, TASB LAF’s

membership includes approximately 750 school districts and is governed by a board

of trustees comprised of school board members, administrators, and school

attorneys. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, TASB LAF

has retained the undersigned attorneys to prepare this brief.

TASB LAF is interested in this case because school districts routinely draft

meeting agendas under the provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act (“TOMA”),

including meetings to order bond elections. Voter-authorized general obligation

bonds, backed by ad valorem property taxes, are the primary method for Texas

school districts to fund major capital improvements, such as the construction of new

campuses, the renovation of aging facilities, and the modernization of technology

infrastructure and campus security systems. As enrollment in Texas public schools

has increased,1 bond elections have become more common and consequential.

According to data from the Bond Review Board, 159 bonds were proposed by Texas

1
According to data from the Texas Education Agency, enrollment has increased 7.4 percent
between the 2013-14 and 2023-24 school years. Texas Education Agency, Enrollment in Texas
Public Schools 2023-24, https://tea.texas.gov/reports-and-data/school-
performance/accountability-research/enroll-2023-24.pdf (last visited October 29, 2025).

1
school districts in May 2025 alone. Most of those elections were ordered with agenda

language like that used by Hays County. The trial court’s erroneous judgment

jeopardizes those elections.

For school districts, the trial court’s judgment is problematic for two reasons.

First, Contestants’2 lawsuit is premised on an incorrect and subjective TOMA

standard. If the specificity of a notice is dictated by the level of public interest or

controversy in a topic, how can a school district reliably determine how to comply

with TOMA? Compliance should not depend on a school district exhausting its

statutory discretion and pre-committing to certain bond details before publicly

debating matters of import that will inform the contents of the adopted election order.

Second, Contestants were able to obtain a judgment overturning a democratic

election without alleging or proving the necessary elements of an election contest.

School districts have an interest in maintaining the integrity of special elections in

this State, particularly bond elections. For these reasons, TASB LAF files this brief

in support of Hays County, Texas and the members of its governing body

(collectively, “the County”).

2
The term “Contestants” refers to the Plaintiffs and Appellees, Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy
Ramsey, and Gabrielle Moore.

2
II. How Bonds Issue

A. An election order seeks permission from the electorate to incur debt.

Bonds backed by ad valorem property taxes may not be issued without first

obtaining voter approval. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.001; TEX. ELEC. CODE § 45.003.

Generally, the governing body of a political subdivision is the entity authorized to

order a bond election. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.004. Bond elections may only be held

on one of two uniform election dates, and public entities typically only adopt one

bond election order per election cycle based on the uniform dates. See TEX. ELEC.

CODE § 41.001; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.003.

Before a governing body can order a bond election, it must provide notice of

that action. TEX. GOV. CODE § 551.043. School districts, like many other public

entities across the State, use broad agenda language for meetings to adopt a bond

election order, such as “consideration and possible approval of an order calling a

bond election.” The purpose of the election and the bond amount will be publicly

debated at the meeting. Many school districts do not even include bond amounts in

their draft election orders appended to the meeting agendas because they do not want

to create an appearance that their boards have already decided these issues behind

closed doors without public input.

The order authorizing and “calling” the election, referred to as the “bond

election order,” must contain a measure and proposition. The bond “measure” is the

3
“question or proposal submitted in an election for an expression of the voters will.”

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 1.005(12). The bond “proposition” is “the wording appearing on

a ballot to identify a measure” and is a summary of the measure’s “chief features.”

Id. § 1.005(15); Dacus v. Parker, 466 S.W.3d 820, 825–26 (Tex. 2015). The

authority ordering a bond election has the discretion to choose the wording of its

proposition and measure. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 52.072(a). Thereafter, the entity is

limited by its “contract with the voters” to use bond funds for the purposes

established in the order, measure, and proposition. Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 89

S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936).

Bond election orders also state: (1) the purpose for which the bonds are

authorized; (2) the principal amount of the bonds; (3) that taxes sufficient to pay the

principal of and interest on the bonds may be imposed; (4) a statement of the

estimated tax rate or maximum interest rate; (5) the maximum maturity date of the

bonds; (6) the aggregate amount of the outstanding debt principal; (7) the aggregate

amount of the outstanding debt interest; and (8) the ad valorem debt service tax rate.

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.009. Many bond election orders contain amendment provisions

that allow the order to include these details after the call meeting where decisions

are made about measures/propositions and final principal amounts.

4
B. Notice of the meeting to order an election is not notice of the election.

Once a bond election is ordered, the entity must then comply with statutory

notice provisions about the election that are separate and distinct from the

obligations of TOMA regarding the meeting to call the election. TEX. ELEC. CODE

§§ 4.002 (stating authority ordering election responsible for giving notice), 4.003

(requiring notice be published in newspaper and posted in public places), 4.004

(requiring that notice contain information about nature and date of election, polling

places, website listings, etc.), 4.009 (requiring internet notice); TEX. GOV’T CODE §

1251.052 (requiring voter information document to be posted in same manner as

notice). Entities spend months educating voters on the facts of the election.

When an election has concluded, the local entity conducting the election must

canvass the result. Id. § 67.002. When the election is canvassed, the 30-day election

contest period begins to run. Id. § 233.006(b).

C. A bond order authorizes the debt to be incurred.

If voters authorize the sale of bonds, the governing body must adopt a “bond

order” to authorize the issuance of some or all of the bonds approved by the

electorate (larger authorizations typically issue in series to match the funding needs

of the projects). See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE § 45.001. The bond order contains more

detailed information about the bonds, including the principal amount, purpose,

maximum maturity, and payment schedule. The agenda item for a school district’s

5
meeting to adopt a bond order says something like “consideration and approval of

an order authorizing the issuance of the district’s unlimited tax school building

bonds, series 2025 in the approximate amount of $7,000,000 for projects approved

at the district’s 2022 election; levying an ad valorem tax for the payment thereof;

and other matters in connection therewith.”

The “issuer” must then submit a record of proceedings (including financial

and election documents) to the Attorney General of the State of Texas before issuing

the debt described in the bond order. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1202.003(a). If the

Attorney General finds that the bonds have been “authorized to be issued in

conformity with law,” the Attorney General must approve the bonds and deliver

necessary materials to the Comptroller for registration. Id. Once approved by the

Attorney General and registered by the Comptroller, the bonds are considered “valid

and incontestable in a court or other forum and are binding obligations for all

purposes according to their terms.” Id. § 1202.006.

The Attorney General will not approve bonds during the 30-day post-canvass

contest period or while litigation is pending. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 233.006(b).; 1 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE §§ 53.14, 53.9. In the face of litigation (like the election contest here),

an issuer may seek court validation of its bonds through the Expedited Declaratory

Judgment Act. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1205.021.

6
Once bonds are approved by the Attorney General, the issuer and underwriter

execute agreements and close on the sale of the bonds. Construction can finally

begin, often many months if not years after the authorizing election. Because

conditions can change during that interim, public entities typically describe their

projects in general terms in their election orders, measures, and propositions.

III. Argument and Authorities

A. This Court should reject Contestants’ incorrect construction of TOMA.

TOMA provides that “[a] governmental body shall give written notice of the

date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental body.” TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 551.041 (emphasis added). Contestants argued—and the trial court

seemingly agreed—that the County’s notice language relating to the bond election

order adopted at an August 13, 2024 Meeting (the “August 13 Meeting”) was

deficient under TOMA because it did not include certain substantive details about

the County’s bond. (2.CR.655–66, 3.CR.1837–38). Specifically, Contestants say

that substantial compliance does not apply and a notice’s specificity should increase

in proportion to the public’s interest or controversy in the topic. (2.CR.666,

3.CR.1839, 41); see also Appellees’ Br. at 21–24. But Contestants’ standardless

sliding scale (1) conflicts with the plain meaning of TOMA; (2) is a

mischaracterization of the Supreme Court of Texas’ TOMA jurisprudence; (3)

7
would increase unpredictability and litigation for school districts and other public

entities; and (4) would lead to an extreme and unprecedented result.

1. Contestants’ interpretation of “subject” goes beyond the term’s
plain meaning.

The term “subject” is undefined within Section 551.041 of the Texas

Government Code. When construing an undefined term, “[t]he plain meaning of the

text is the best expression of legislative intent.” In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 464

(Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 312.002(a).

Texas courts commonly “look first to dictionary definitions” to “determine a term’s

common, ordinary meaning.” Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d

198, 208 (Tex. 2020). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “subject” to mean,

in relevant part, “[t]he matter of concern over which something is created; something

about which thought or the constructive faculty is employed,” such as the “subject

of the statute.” Subject, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).

The Legislature’s choice to require TOMA notices to describe a meeting’s

“subject,” without additional modifiers or terms, indicates that a notice may describe

the subject of a meeting with some amount of generality. Because the Legislature

does not provide any exceptions to the general rule or special circumstances under

which the definition of “subject” would be expanded or limited, this Court should

not read any such exceptions into the statute.

8
The Legislature could have required that notices of meetings to order bond

elections require a heightened level of detail—but it chose not to. The Legislature

certainly knows how to create special rules for orders calling bond elections. See

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.009; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.003. There is no textual

reason for modifying the TOMA standard for bond elections, or any other special

topic for that matter.

Considering only the plain meaning of the term “subject,” the analysis is

straightforward. The language of the County’s agenda item—“[d]iscussion and

possible action to approve an order calling a bond election for November 5, 2024”—

contains the “subject” of the meeting because it plainly identifies the matter to be

addressed—the bond election order. The subject is not the bonds themselves. The

subject is not the projects that may be funded as a consequence of voters authorizing

the bonds. It is the order authorizing the election. As such, requiring notice of

information related to the projects and purpose of the bonds would go beyond the

“subject.” See Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (“[The]

Court may not impose its own judicial meaning on a statute by adding words not

contained in the statute’s language.”). Contestants should not be allowed to re-write

TOMA.

9
2. Contestants’ sliding-scale standard has no basis in the Supreme
Court’s TOMA jurisprudence.

Moving beyond the plain text of TOMA, the Supreme Court of Texas has “on

several occasions” considered the extent of the notice required by the word

“subject.” City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 765

(Tex. 1991). Generally, a notice is sufficient if it informs the reader that “some

action” will be considered with respect to a topic. Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of

San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1975). When a reader is “alerted to the topic

for consideration, it is not necessary to state all of the consequences which may flow

from consideration of the topic.” Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 706 S.W.2d

956, 958 (Tex. 1986); see also Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“A notice need not provide exacting

detail of all issues to be decided.”). Therefore, complete specificity is not required if

the relevant action is identified.

To determine whether a notice describes the “subject” of a meeting under

TOMA, the Supreme Court of Texas uses a “substantial compliance” standard. See

Cox Enters., Inc., 706 S.W.2d at 959–60 (recognizing that substantial compliance is

possible “even though the notice is not as specific as it could be”). Substantial

compliance is evaluated by considering “whether the notice fairly identifies the

meeting and is sufficiently descriptive to alert a reader that a particular subject will

be addressed.” Webb Cnty. v. Mares, No. 14-23-00617-CV, 2024 WL 5130862 (Tex.
10
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 17, 2024, no pet.) (internal quotations omitted)

(citing Burks, 157 S.W.3d at 883). The purpose is to identify the meeting’s subject,

not explain the consequences of the action or highlight interesting facts.

When applying the standard adopted by the Supreme Court, again, the

analysis is straightforward. By stating the action to be taken—discussion and

possible approval of a bond election order—the public was notified that the

substance of the election order would be discussed and that “some action” may be

taken. Even if the County’s agenda language did not include substantive details

about the bond proposition, the public had sufficient information to know that the

bond election order—which authorizes the bond proposition to appear on the

ballot—would be discussed at the open meeting. And, if the public was interested in

learning more about the details of the bond election order, a draft was accessible

through the County’s online agenda during the required notice period. (2.CR.1168–

75). If not outright compliance, the record establishes, at a minimum, substantial

compliance with TOMA, which is the only standard applicable to a public entity.

Cox Enters., Inc., 706 S.W.2d at 959–60.

Nevertheless, Contestants propose a contrary, more complicated, standard.

First, Contestants argue that substantial compliance should be replaced but fail to

offer a credible alternative. In their Motion, Contestants completely ignored the

Supreme Court’s substantial compliance standard. (2.CR.665–67). Then, at trial,

11
Contestants argued that substantial compliance is the “wrong test on the adequacy

of notice,” (3.RR.24), insisting instead that the court merely “compar[e] the content

of the notice and the action taken at the meeting.” (3.RR.24, 3.CR.1839).

Contestants’ proposed substitution is nonsense.

Substantial compliance and comparison are not interchangeable standards.

Substantial compliance is an analytical doctrine used to determine whether an action

complies with a statute. Sorrell v. Estate of Carlton, 504 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2019) (“Substantial

compliance means one has performed the essential requirements of a statute.”).

Comparison is “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and

dissimilarities.” Comparison, Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/comparison (last viewed October 30, 2025). In the context

of TOMA, courts compare agenda language with the action taken and then determine

whether substantial compliance is met. Without substantial compliance, the analysis

is incomplete.

Second, Contestants say that the specificity of a notice’s subject must increase

in proportion to the public’s interest in, or the controversy surrounding, that subject.

(3.CR.1839); see Appellees’ Br. 21–24. Thus, according to Contestants, the

County’s notice should have included more details simply because the proposed

bond program involved interesting or controversial projects and amounts.

12
Contestants derive this sliding-scale standard from a line of opinions that (liberally)

paraphrase the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of

Trustees of Austin Independent School District.3 This Court should reject

Contestants’ invitation to adopt an overly-expansive reading of Cox Enterprises.

In Cox Enterprises, a newspaper alleged that Austin Independent School

District violated the then-existing open meetings law “by posting an agenda listing

only general terms such as ‘personnel,’ ‘litigation,’ and ‘real estate matters.’” 706

S.W.2d at 957. The Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that notice of “personnel

matters” is not the same category as “[s]election of a new school superintendent,”

and that discussion of “litigation” does not adequately notice discussion of “a major

desegregation lawsuit which has occupied the Board’s time for a number of years.”

Id. at 959. The Court concluded that “[t]he Board did not provide full and adequate

3
Shortly after Cox Enterprises was decided, the Austin Court of Appeals cited the case for the
proposition that full disclosure “requires, in view of the purposes of the statute, a correspondence
between the likely degree of public interest in a topic and the specificity with which the topic is
stated in the notice.” Creedmoor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs-Edwards Aquifer
Conservation Dist., 784 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added).
Soon thereafter, the Waco and Corpus Christi-Edinburg Courts of Appeals extended the
relationship between specificity and public interest beyond a mere “correspondence.” See
Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ) (citing Cox
Enterprises for the proposition that “[t]he notice must be more specific if the public has a special
interest in the topic under discussion”); Point Isabel Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hinojosa, 797 S.W.2d
176, 180 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (citing Cox Enterprises and Creedmoor
Maha Water Supply Corp. for the proposition that, “[a]s expected public interest in a particular
subject increases, notice must become more specific”). By 2017, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg
Court of Appeals had cited Cox Enterprises for the proposition that “[t]he required specificity of
the notice is directly related to the level of public interest in the topic to be discussed and increases
as the public’s level of interest increases.” City of Donna v. Ramirez, 548 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. denied).
13
notice, particularly where the subject slated for discussion was one of special interest

to the public.” Id.

Importantly, the Supreme Court does not say that notices must contain certain

details or that the specificity of a given notice must increase in proportion to the

public’s interest in a meeting’s subject. Instead, the Court adopts a “goldilocks”

approach—a notice must be “full and adequate,” but need not be “as specific as it

could be” or contain a description of “all of the consequences which may necessarily

flow” from the meeting’s subject. Id. (citing Texas Turnpike Authority v. City of Fort

Worth, 554 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1977) and Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San

Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975)).

On one end of the “goldilocks” zone, if a notice is so vague and unspecific

that it hides the true subject of a meeting, then the entity has not provided “full and

adequate notice.” For example, in Markowski, a firefighter named Jackie Keggins

accused the City of Marlin’s fire chief and fire captain of racial discrimination. 940

S.W.2d 720 at 722–23. At a city council meeting during which the council planned

to discuss the chief and captain’s jobs, the council provided the following notice for

its executive session: “[g]rievance of Firefighter Keggins. Action if any to be taken

on grievance of firefighter Keggins.” Id. at 726. The Waco Court of Appeals

reasoned that the notice was inadequate because it failed to inform the public that

14
the grievance involved the fire chief and fire captain and that charges were made

against them. Id.

Similarly, in Point Isabel Independent School District, the district’s board of

trustees noticed an executive session to “[c]onsider and approve recommendation of

Superintendent on employment of personnel for the 1988–89 school year.” 797

S.W.2d at 178–179. However, the “personnel” at issue included three principals. Id.

at 179. The Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals reasoned that “[t]he

significance to the public of the hiring decision in Cox, although not as great, was

similar to the hiring decisions in the instant case,” and ultimately concluded that the

notice was insufficient. Id.

In both Markowski and Point Isabel Independent School District, the subject

of the meeting was obscured because the public had no way of identifying which

individuals were to be discussed. The facts of this case are distinguishable. As

discussed further below, the public was not forced to guess which bond election

order was at issue at the August 13 Meeting.

On the other end of the spectrum, extreme specificity is not required. For

example, in Lower Colorado River Authority, the Supreme Court concluded that

notice of a meeting to consider “the ratification of the prior action of the Board taken

on October 19, 1972, in response (sic) to changes in electric power rates for electric

power sold within the boundaries of the City of San Marcos, Texas” complied with

15
the open-meetings statute because it sufficiently alerted a reader “to the fact that

some action would be considered with respect to charges for electric power sold in

San Marcos.” The Court did not require the notice to contain details of the action

taken.

Likewise, in Texas Turnpike Authority v. City of Fort Worth, the Texas

Turnpike Authority provided the following agenda language for its open meeting:

Consider request of County of Dallas, City of Grand Prairie, Dallas
Central Highway Committee, Dallas Chamber of Commerce, and
Grand Prairie Chamber of Commerce to determine feasibility of a bond
issue to expand and enlarge the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike . . . .

554 S.W.2d at 676. The City of Fort Worth argued that, “since prior resolutions of

the Turnpike Authority had declared the intention of the Authority to transfer the

Turnpike . . . as soon as the existing bonds were paid, it was necessary that the notice

specifically state that consideration would be given” to a course of action contrary

to its prior resolutions. Id. The Court rejected that argument, stating that “[t]here is

no necessity to post copies of proposed resolutions or to state all of the consequences

which may necessarily flow from the consideration of the subject stated.” Id.

The unifying principle of Cox Enterprises and its progeny is that a notice must

contain sufficient detail so as not to obscure the actual subject of the meeting. For

example, when a generalized term such as “personnel” disguises discussion of a

high-profile employment decision, Cox Enterprises applies because the public is

being forced to guess: “which personnel?” If the true subject of a meeting is not
16
obscured, nothing in Cox Enterprises or other binding precedent would require the

inclusion of additional details or consequences—regardless of the public interest or

controversy surrounding the topic. Therefore, before a discussion of public interest,

controversy, or additional specificity is relevant, a court should determine whether

the subject of the meeting has been hidden or disguised in the first place.

Here, by overemphasizing the alleged public interest in, and controversy

related to, the County’s bond election, Contestants convinced the trial court to place

the cart before the horse. Under the correct order of operations, the County’s

“subject” required no additional details because the agenda language did not disguise

or obscure some other item or purpose. That which was required to be identified—

the singular election order—was identified. And, unlike in Markowski or Cox

Enterprises, the County did not discuss some other election order or use the

discussion as a pretext to shoehorn other actions unrelated to that election order.

If the public was already notified as to which election order would be

discussed, then what TOMA purpose would have been served by including

additional details? See Hays County v. Water Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 257–

58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (stating that the purpose of TOMA is “to

safeguard the public’s interest in knowing the workings of its governmental

bodies”). In Contestants’ motion briefing, they say that the County should have

included the following additional details in its agenda language:

17
(3.CR.1840). Such details could have, hypothetically, helped a reader form an

opinion about how to vote in the election. But the purpose of TOMA is not to provide

voters with notice of election information—various provisions in the Election Code

and Government Code already serve that purpose. See supra Section II.

Regardless, there is no allegation that this relevant information was not

available to voters. It is undisputed that the County’s online agenda included a draft

order containing the information that Contestants suggest should have been in the

Notice. (2.RR.86-87; 4.RR.P.Ex-3b). The County correctly points out that its online

agenda, containing the draft election order, should be considered in the TOMA

analysis.4 App. Br. at 43–49.

4
Contestants attempt to downplay the existence of the County’s online draft order by complaining
that “the reader would have read 552 words before realizing that that agenda item was about road
projects with a huge price tax (sic) and tax increase.” Appellees’ Br. at 26. But the amount and
purpose of the bonds appear on pages 1 and 2 of the draft order, respectively. (2.CR.1168–69).
That is hardly hidden.

18
Applying the Supreme Court’s established TOMA analysis, the County’s

notice sufficiently identified the “subject” of the August 13 Meeting. There was no

confusion about which election order would be discussed. The public was given

notice that action may be taken to adopt the election order. And, though the

substantive features of the bond proposal may have been relevant to inform the

public about the election itself, such details were not necessary to sufficiently

identify the County’s official action—the order of an election. The Court should

reverse the trial court’s judgment.

3. Adopting Contestants’ sliding-scale standard would increase
uncertainty and litigation risk for public entities.

Predictability is an important interest to be advanced, especially in the context

of statutory construction. Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex.

2019); see City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. 2018)

(“Adhering to precedent fosters efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. More

practically it results in predictability in the law, which allows people to rationally

order their conduct and affairs.”) Statutory terms should be construed to avoid

“unpredictability and standardlessness.” See Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v.

Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 439 (Tex. 1998).

The Court should reject Contestants’ theory that substantial compliance does

not apply and that the scope of “subject” changes based on public interest or

controversy because adopting such a rule would turn compliance with TOMA into a
19
guessing game. If the specificity of a notice is dictated by the level of public interest

or controversy in a topic, then whether a notice sufficiently states the “subject” of a

meeting would be “guided by officials’ personal views rather than any consistent

standard.” See id. at 439. What level of public interest or controversy triggers

heightened specificity? Who gets to decide? And, once an entity determines that it

must provide additional details in its notice, how would that entity choose which

details to include?

These questions would be difficult to answer, especially when noticing a

meeting to adopt a bond election order. On one hand, if a school district chooses not

to include bond details in its notice, it risks a lawsuit like the one here. On the other,

if the district chooses to include bond details in its notice, it risks limiting its board’s

discretion to deliberate or amend the content of its bond election order at the time

that state law requires such deliberation to occur.

Had the County posted Contestant’s version of the notice, the Commissioners

Court presumably could not have discussed alternative bond amounts, projects, or

purposes without risking a separate TOMA violation. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 551.041. In that sense, Contestants’ construction of TOMA could create a one-way

ratchet, where public entities are pressured to create increasingly specific notices at

the expense of their ability to deviate from a pre-determined action. For cities and

counties, that ratchet is particularly problematic because they, unlike school districts,

20
only have a two-week window in which to order a bond election. TEX. ELEC. CODE

§ 3.005(c) (ordering no later than 78 days before election day); TEX. GOV’T CODE

§§ 1251.003(c) (holding bond election no more than 90 days from order); 551.043

(requiring three business days’ notice of the meeting to call election).

If TOMA requires the substantive details of bond election order to be decided

three days before a meeting to order the election, all a governing body can do at the

meeting is call an up-or-down vote. Though Contestants’ construction of TOMA is

premised on increasing public access to information, it may have the ironic effect of

reducing public participation in determining the substance of a bond proposition.

What purpose would public comment serve if the details are set before the meeting

begins?

Further, adopting Contestants’ interpretation of TOMA could also increase

the risk of a “contract with the voters” challenge once projects are funded and

undertaken. Voter-approved bond proceeds “must be expended for the purposes for

which they were voted.” Lewis, 89 S.W.2d at 978. This “contract with the voters” is

created when a governing body adopts a measure and corresponding ballot

proposition. Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 670, 675

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied). However, a governing body may reserve

discretion to make future decisions about bond projects described in that measure do

21
not include “definite plans or commitments” or where the plans contemplated are

“necessarily prospective.” Barrington v. Cokinos, 338 S.W.2d 133, 143 (Tex. 1960).

Contestants argue that the “subject” of the County’s August 13 Meeting

should have included the total number of projects in the County’s bond. However,

the Contestants’ standard for the content of a TOMA notice would exceed that which

is required to be included in bond election orders, measures, or propositions. Texas

law does not require bond election orders, measures, or proposition to detail projects

or provide a total number of projects. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 3.006, 3.009, 85.004,

85.007; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.003. Although, in this particular case, the County

went above and beyond to list bond projects in its election order, (2.CR.1169–70),

entities need not include such a list.

For example, school districts commonly adopt single bond propositions for

the purpose of funding the construction, acquisition, or improvement of “school

buildings,” along with student transportation and land. See TEX. EDUC. CODE

§ 45.003(g). Under what is commonly referred to as a “school facilities” or “general-

purpose” bond proposition, a school district reserves discretion to use bond funds on

capital improvements to district facilities used for educational instruction. The

individual projects can be determined long after the authorizing election. If

Contestants’ position is correct, TOMA would diminish that statutory authority and

22
force school districts to fix the scope of a school facilities proposition before an

election order is adopted. That simply cannot be the case.

Ultimately, Contestants’ sliding-scale test does not encourage better

compliance with TOMA. It merely provides additional avenues for disgruntled

taxpayers to challenge legitimate actions taken during open meetings.

4. Contestants’ requested relief is an extreme and unprecedented
weaponization of TOMA’s notice requirement.

The voiding of an election is an extreme action that should only occur when

specific legal conditions are met. See Bahn v. Savage, 120 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1938), writ refused, 122 S.W.2d 191 (1938) (“[T]he courts are

not authorized to lightly break down the barriers plainly erected by the legislature

against nullification of the will of the people when voiced at the polls.”). Texas

courts have, on rare occasions, considered whether insufficient notice of a meeting

to call an election is enough to void the election. However, contrary to Contestants’

suggestion, those courts have never affirmed such a remedy.

For example, in Stelzer v. Huddleston, the Tyler Court of Appeals considered

whether a notice for a meeting to call a bond election was sufficient under the

then-applicable open meeting law. 526 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1975, writ

dism’d). Contestants argued that, because the notice was not posted on the school

bulletin board for “a full 72 hours before the day of the meeting” and failed to

23
identify the correct building in which the meeting would be held, the bond election

was void or voidable. Id. at 711.

On the timing issue, the court found substantial compliance, reasoning that

partial compliance with the total posting time was sufficient because the public had

received notice from other media (news media) and “[t]here is nothing to suggest

that the failure to post the notice on the school bulletin board for the required time

arose from any willful or fraudulent conduct on the part of the School Board.” Id. at

713.

On the location issue, the court again found substantial compliance because

the school district only had two buildings that could have housed the meeting and

“[t]here is no complaint that anyone was denied admittance to the meeting or was

misled by the notice of the meeting place.” Id. The court refused to void the election

based on a TOMA violation.

Next, in Guerra v. Rios, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals

considered, in part, whether the following agenda language was sufficient notice for

a meeting to adopt a charter amendment election: “[c]onsideration and possible

action to approve Order Number 2024-0806-001, for the City of San Benito

November 5, 2024, Charter Amendment Special Election.” No. 13-24-00579-CV,

2025 WL 945566, *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 28, 2025, pet.

filed). The court did not void the election, concluding that “[a]ny readers interested

24
in amendments to the City Charter had more than sufficient notice that the City

Commission would be considering action relating to it by way of a special election.”

Id. The court refused to void the election based on a TOMA violation.

Finally, in Greater Beauxart Garden Municpal Utility District v. Cormier, the

Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether a utility district’s confirmation

election was void due to numerous defects in the election process, including defects

in the notice for the meeting to call the election. 596 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1980, no writ). Although the court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s

decision to void the election, the insufficient meeting notice was merely one of

several grounds for the decision. See id. at 601. For example, not only did the district

not comply with the then-existing open meetings law, but “[t]here was no election

order adopted by the board of directors,” which was sufficient standing alone to void

the special election. Id.

The above cases represent the few available instances in which an appellate

court has considered whether a notice defect for a meeting to order an election can

be a basis for overturning the election. Only one case, Cormier, resulted in a void

election. But, in that case, the open-meetings violation was one of several procedural

defects—including a lack of an order calling an election (a clearly distinguishable

25
fact compared to the instant case). Thus, it cannot be said that lack of notice—by

itself—justified the voiding of that election. 5

If this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment and concludes that the County’s

bond election is void based solely on the sufficiency of notice for the meeting to call

the election, the resulting opinion would be the first of its kind and prove extremely

harmful to the many school districts which conducted recent bond elections using

agenda language similar to that of the County’s.

B. Contestants failed to plead or prove the elements of an election contest.

Although school districts across the State would benefit from an opinion

rejecting Contestants’ construction of TOMA, this Court could dispose of this appeal

for a more obvious reason: Contestants ignored the second element of their election

contest cause of action, that the alleged illegality materially affected the outcome of

the election.

5
In their appellate brief, Contestants cite three additional cases that they claim support invalidating
an election based on a TOMA violation. See Rossano v. Townsend, 9 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Tatum v. Collier, No. C14-87-00870-CV, 1989 WL 111365
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 1989, no writ); Cohen v. Clear Lake City Water Auth.,
687 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). But none of the cases relate to
TOMA. For example, both Cohen and Rossano are election contests involving election notices,
not TOMA notices. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 4.001 et seq. Therefore, they say nothing about whether
a pre-order TOMA violation can justify an election contest. And Tatum, which does not even
involve a notice, is also irrelevant because it relates to a void election based on a deficient
disincorporation petition. 1989 WL 111365, at *5. A TOMA violation results in a voidable, not
void, action. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.141.

26
“An election contest is a special proceeding created by the Legislature to

provide a remedy for elections tainted by fraud, illegality or other irregularity.” Blum

v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1999). Section 233.003 of the Texas Election

Code sets the scope of an election contest, providing, in relevant part, that:

The tribunal hearing an election contest shall attempt to ascertain
whether the outcome of the contested election, as shown by the final
canvass, is not the true outcome because . . . an election officer or
other person officially involved in the administration of the
election . . . engaged in other fraud or illegal conduct or made a
mistake.

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 233.003 (emphasis added). Thus, a contestant is required

by statute to show that the outcome should have been different.

When a contestant “challenge[s] the process by which” an entity presents

“propositions to the electorate as illegal or invalid,” the “only statutory mechanism

to bring such challenges is a timely filed election contest.” Hotze v. White, 01-08-

00016-CV, 2010 WL 1493115, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010,

pet. denied). Some Texas courts have recognized, however, that a declaratory

judgment action can challenge the validity of an election if the public entity’s

statutory authority to hold the election is at issue. See, e.g., City of Kingsville v. Int’l

Ass’n of Firefighters, Local Union No. 2390, 568 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).

Contestants did not allege a collateral attack on the County’s bond election.

Nor could they because the County was clearly authorized to order the bond election.
27
TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 1301.001, 1471.011. Furthermore, Contestants could not have

used a declaratory judgment action to attack the County’s election as void because

an alleged TOMA violation merely renders an action voidable. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 551.141; City of Granite Shoals, 280 S.W.3d at 560 (“The distinction

between [void and voidable] depends on whether the municipal act is unauthorized

by law or color of law or, on the other hand, is a mere irregular exercise of power.”)

(internal quotations omitted).

Instead, Contestants alleged, and the trial court granted summary judgment

on, an election contest. Thus, Contestants could have only obtained their requested

relief—voiding the County’s bond election—by establishing all elements of an

election contest. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87-88 (Tex. 2021)

(stating that traditional summary judgment requires movant to first prove “all

essential elements of his cause of action”). Contestants should not be allowed to

avoid the consequences of their own litigation strategy.

An election contest requires more than merely proving illegality in the

election process. To succeed in an election contest, “the contestant must prove by

clear and convincing evidence” that a statutory violation occurred “and it materially

affected the outcome of the election.” McCurry v. Lewis, 259 S.W.3d 369, 372–73

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (emphasis added). To establish that the

outcome was materially affected, “the contestant must show that illegal votes were

28
counted or an election official prevented eligible voters from voting, failed to count

legal votes or engaged in other fraud, illegal conduct, or mistake.” Flores v. Cuellar,

269 S.W.3d 657, 660 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). If a contestant

presents no evidence of an incorrect outcome, it cannot prevail.

Even where a contestant can show election irregularities, courts do not

automatically presume or imply an impact—let alone material impact—on the

election outcome. See Sawyer v. Bd. of Regents of Claredon Junior Coll., 393

S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1965, no writ) (stating that, where there

“was no evidence these disqualified persons attempted to exercise any influence on

any voter, or that there was any unfairness or fraud in the conduct of the election,”

the “irregularities are not sufficient to void an election”). The bar is set high.

Assuming arguendo that TOMA claims arising solely from actions taken

before the ordering of an election are properly raised through an election contest,

evidence of a TOMA violation could only support Contestants’ first element—the

alleged illegality. Contestants were also required to both allege and establish the

second element—the material effect on the election. See Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at

87–88. Contestants did neither. See, e.g., (2.CR.771–75) (focusing claims on

TOMA); (2.CR.670) (same).

Ultimately, Contestants’ silence on the second element of their election

contest is unsurprising. How can a notice defect occurring before an election is

29
ordered cause unfairness in a resulting election? No voter was prohibited from

voting. No voter lacked notice of the election. No voter was misled as to the contents

of the ballot. There is no suggestion that illegal votes were cast.

Even in their appellate brief, Contestants cannot identify evidence of a

material impact. Instead, they claim that it would be “nonsensical” if an illegal

election order “cannot invalidate an election” on its own. Appellees’ Br. at 16. But

that is only possible in a collateral attack on a void order or election. Here,

Contestants cannot argue that the voidness of the election itself materially affected

the outcome of the election because the County’s action was valid until the trial court

issued its judgment. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.141; City of Granite Shoals, 280

S.W.3d at 560. The election order was voidable, not void from inception, and

Contestants were never relieved of their duty to prove the second element of their

cause of action.

IV. Conclusion

Amicus Curiae TASB LAF respectfully requests that the Court reverse the

trial court’s judgment and grant the County’s requested relief.

30
Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Matthew Hines

MCCALL PARKHURST & HORTON L.L.P.
Matthew Hines
State Bar No. 24120892
600 Congress Ave., Suite 2150
Austin, Texas 78701
mhines@mphlegal.com
Rosemarie Kanusky
State Bar No. 00790999
112 E. Pecan St., Suite 1310
San Antonio, Texas 78205
rkanusky@mphlegal.com

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE
TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL
BOARDS LEGAL ASSISTANCE FUND

31
CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE

In compliance with Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,

I hereby certify that this brief was computer generated using Microsoft Word and

that the number of words in this brief, including its headings, footnotes and

quotations, is 8,469.

The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that a copy of this brief was served

by electronic filing in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 on

November 3, 2025, upon all counsel of record.

/s/ Matthew Hines
Matthew Hines

32
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Matthew Hines on behalf of Matthew Hines
Bar No. 24120892
mhines@mphlegal.com
Envelope ID: 107605041
Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: 2025113 TASB LAF Amicus Brief
Status as of 11/3/2025 3:56 PM CST

Associated Case Party: HAYS COUNTY

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Case Contacts

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