PGAL, Inc. v. Ian Miramon and Caroline Miramon

ACCEPTED
15-25-00178-cv
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/19/2025 8:41 AM
No. 15-25-00178-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
In the Fifteenth 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM
Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

PGAL, Inc.,
Appellant

v.

Ian Miramon and Caroline Miramon
Appellees

On Appeal from the 250th Travis County District Court,
Travis County, Texas, Cause No. D-1-GN-25-01130
The Honorable Laurie Eiserloh, Judge Presiding

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Judith L. Ramsey
State Bar No. 16519550
Derek Bauman
State Bar No. 24044475
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P.
4400 Post Oak Parkway, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77027
Telephone: 713.403.8210
Facsimile: 713.403.8299

Counsel for Appellant,
PGAL, Inc.

Oral Argument Not Requested
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant: PGAL, Inc.
Appellant’s Appellate Counsel Judith L. Ramsey
Derek Bauman
Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP
4400 Post Oak Parkway, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77027
jramsey@thompsoncoe.com
dbauman@thompsoncoe.com
T: 713.403.8210
F: 713.403.8299

Appellant’s Trial Counsel Cory Reed
Alissa Vasquez
Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP
4400 Post Oak Parkway, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77027
creed@thompsoncoe.com
avasquez@thompsoncoe.com
T: 713.403.8210
F: 713.403.8299

Appellees Ian Miramon and Caroline Miramon
Appellees Trial and Vincent L. Marable III
Appellate Counsel PAUL WEBB, P.C.
State Bar No. 12961600
221 N. Houston Street
Wharton, Texas 77488
(P): (979) 532-5331
(F): (979) 532-2902
tripp@paulwebbpc.com

John C. Ramsey
State Bar No. 24027762
K. Grace Hooten
State Bar No. 24092980
RAMSEY LAW GROUP, PC

i
Woodway Tower
6363 Woodway Drive
Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77057
(P): (713) 489-7577
(F): (888) 858-1452
john@ramseylawpc.com
grace@ramseylawpc.com
eservice@ramseylawpc.com

Rick Freeman
RICK FREEMAN, P.C.
State Bar No. 07428800
3660 Stoneridge Road
B-102
Austin, Texas 78746
(P): (512) 477-6111
(F): (512) 473-2131
rick@freemanlaw.com

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................ xi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................ xii
QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................................................... xiii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................5
I. The Miramons’ allegations against PGAL and other Defendants ................ 5
II. PGAL filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of Merit ............... 9
III. The Miramons responded and objected to PGAL’s evidence .................... 10
IV. The evidence not considered by the trial court ........................................... 10
V. PGAL’s Motion to Dismiss is denied, and it files this appeal .................... 14
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................15
I. Standard of Review & Applicable Law ...................................................... 15
II. Sections 150.002(a) and (b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code require a certificate of merit in the practice area of defendant
in providing the professional service, and because the Miramons failed
to do so, its claims against PGAL should have been dismissed .................... 18
III. The trial court improperly refused to consider PGAL’s relevant
evidence proving the practice area in which PGAL provided services
to the Fire Station Project............................................................................ 24
A. Texas cases demonstrating importance of review of relevant
sources .................................................................................................25
B. The courts in the cases cited by the Miramons also reviewed
relevant evidence. ................................................................................28
C. PGAL’s evidence is crucial to a key issue and should have been
considered. ...........................................................................................31

iii
D. The “low bar” on which the Miramons rely does not excuse their
failure to identify the licensure of the services provided by the
defendants. ...........................................................................................33
IV. Under Chapter 150, an engineer’s certificate is the equivalent of no
certificate against an architect defendant. ................................................... 37
V. The Miramons’ other arguments also fail ................................................... 41
VI. This court should reverse and remand for further proceedings .................. 42
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................43
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................45
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................46
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................47
Appendix 1 .......................................................................................................... 48
Appendix 2 .......................................................................................................... 49
Appendix 3 .......................................................................................................... 50

iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
CASES

Al–Nayem Int’l Trading, Inc. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.,
159 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) ....................................16, 17

AMEC Foster Wheeler USA Corp. v. Goats,
No. 09-18-00477-CV, 2019 WL 3949466 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 22,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).................................................................................... 30

Aran & Franklin Eng’g, Inc. v. Zody,
No. 13-21-00262-CV, 2022 WL 17844211 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op) ....................................21, 31
Aran & Franklin Eng’g, Inc. v. Zody,
No. 13-24-00180-CV, 2025 WL 866855 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Mar. 20, 2025, pet. filed) ..................................................15, 27

Bratton v. Pastor, Behling & Wheeler, LLC,
No. 01-23-0015-CV, 2024 WL 1662391 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] April 18, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ............................................ 34

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Pol’y No.
NAJL05000016-H87 v. Mayse & Assocs., Inc.,
635 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2021,
pet. denied)..............................................................................................20, 25, 26

In re Channelview Flooding Litigation,
No. 01-22-00946-CV, 2024 WL 5249085 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2024, pet denied) (mem. op.) ............................................ 28
Costello, Inc. v. Briggs Bros. Enters. Corp.,
No. 01-23-00307-CV, 2024 WL 187435 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)................................................... 28

Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014) .............................................................................. 16

CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc.,
390 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2013) .............................................................................. 15
v
Dorsey v. Env’t Res. Mgmt. Sw., Inc.,
No. 14-23-00017-CV, 2024 WL 4230031 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 19, 2024, pet. filed) ................................................................ 29
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) .............................................................................. 17

Eric L. Davis Eng’g, Inc. v. Hegemeyer,
No. 14-22-00657-CV, 2023 WL 8270984 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................................. 27

Gaertner v. Langhoff,
509 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ...................... 27

Gignac & Assocs., LLP v. Hernandez,
No. 13-17-00336-CV, 2018 WL 898144 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...................................38, 39

Gore v. Trans Union LLC,
No. 05-23-00659-CV, 2024 WL 4449499 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 9,
2024, pet. denied)................................................................................................ 17
Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc. v. Willeford,
No. 01-17-00551-CV, 2018 WL 3029060 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Jun. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ..................................................... 25

Janis Smith Consulting, LLC v. Rosenberg,
No. 03-23-00370-CV, 2024 WL 4750757 (Tex. App.—Austin
Nov. 6, 2024, pet. denied)............................................................................. 26, 27

JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington,
564 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) ..................................................................17, 24, 43
Jennings, Hackler & Partners, Inc. v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist.,
471 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).................................... 40

Kayne Anderson Cap. Advisors, L.P. v. Hill & Frank, Inc.,
570 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ................39, 40
Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd.,
513 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. 2017) ............................................................20, 25, 26, 28

vi
LJA Eng’g Inc. v. Santos,
652 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) .............29, 30

Marquez v. Calvo,
No. 03-18-00597-CV, 2019 WL 2998584 (Tex. App.—Austin
July 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................................................ 28, 42

Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. E. Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp.,
520 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2017) .............................................................................. 16
Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone,
972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998)........................................................................... 16, 17

Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd.,
536 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. 2017) ........................................................................15, 16
Pelco Const., Inc. v. Dannenbaum Eng’g Corp.,
404 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet) ...................... 28

Samlowski v. Wooten,
332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) .............................................................................. 15
Sullivan v. Abraham,
488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016) .............................................................................. 16

Terracon Consultants, Inc. v. N. Pride Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 01-22-00755-CV, 2023 WL 2316351 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Mar. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) .............................................30, 43

Tex. Mut. Ins. v. Ruttiger,
381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012) .............................................................................. 16

TRW Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hussion St. Bldgs., LLC,
608 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) ...................... 15

Williams v. Cnty. of Dallas,
194 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)................................16, 17

RULES
Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) ...................................................................................... 17, 43

Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 ..................................................................................................... 35

vii
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 ................................................................................................... 36

Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1, 202.2 ..................................................................................... 36
STATUTES

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §10.001 .................................................................... 35

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002 ................................................................... 35
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150 ...............................................1, 22, 35, 37

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.001(1-c) .......................................................... 21

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.001(a)(2) ........................................................ 37
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002 .................................................passim

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 150.002(a) and (b) .........................18, 34, 35

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a) ..................................24, 30, 38, 39

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a)(2) .........................................39, 40
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)–(b) ...................................................... 18

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)–(b), (e)................................................ 19

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)(2)–(3) ................................................. 40
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)(3) ............................................20, 25, 26

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(e) .................................................15, 34, 36

Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.0222.................................................................................... 36
Tex. Occ. Code...................................................................................3, 10, 28, 29, 38

Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(b) ................................................................................. 29

Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c) ................................................................................. 29
Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(12) .......................................................................... 29

Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1001.0031(d)–(e), 1051.0016(b)–(c) ........................................ 40

viii
Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.004 ....................................................................................... 9

Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.001(a) ................................................................................. 21
Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.001(a)(7) ............................................................................ 22

Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.016 ............................................................................... 22, 38

Tex. Occ. Code § 1501.016(b) ................................................................................. 10
Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.606(a)(4) ............................................................................ 22

ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of case: Premises liability/negligence. Plaintiff’s Original
Petition alleges Ian Miramon was injured when,
while atop a fire truck in a fire station bay doing an
inspection, he was struck in the head by a large
industrial fan above the fire truck. He fell from the
fire truck and sustained injuries. CR 4-17.

Trial Court: Cause No. D-1-GN-25-001130; Ian and Caroline
Miramon v. Encotech Engineering Consultants,
Inc., Encotech Engineering Consultants, SA, Inc.,
Garza EMC, LLC, J.E. Dunn Construction
Company, JQ+TSEN, LLC, PGAP, Inc., pending in
the 250th Travis County Judicial District Court,
Travis County. The Honorable Laurie Eiserloh,
presiding.

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court granted the Miramons’ objections to
PGAL’s evidence (App. 1) and denied PGAL,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of
Merit. (App. 2) Appellant timely filed a notice of
interlocutory appeal on this denial under Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(f). (App. 3)

x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal based on Texas Civil

Practices & Remedies Code § 150.002(f).

xi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal concerns the requirements of a certificate of merit under Texas

Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 150.002. Oral argument will not assist the Court

in this case, as the issues are straightforward and uncomplicated.

xii
QUESTION PRESENTED

The trial court abused its discretion by striking PGAL’s evidence concerning
the type of professional services it provided in PGAL’s challenge to the
Miramons’ certificate of merit under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §
150.002 and erred in denying PGAL’s motion to dismiss.

xiii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires plaintiffs

suing a defendant with a professional license to include a certificate of merit with

their original petition to establish that the suit has merit. The certificate of merit must

be provided by a person with the same professional license and who practices in the

same practice area as the services provided by the defendant. Chapter 150 also

permits the defendants with professional licensing to challenge the sufficiency of the

certificate of merit. It is critical to the correct interpretation and proper application

of Chapter 150 that the trial court be able to determine the practice area of the

services performed by the defendant so that it can determine if the certificate of merit

submitted by the plaintiff is by a professional licensed in that same practice area, and

who practices in that area.

If the plaintiffs’ petition does not provide sufficient information to determine

the type of professional services the defendant actually provided, or if the defendant

files a motion to dismiss challenging the certificate of merit’s compliance with

Section 150.002 and provides relevant evidence to support that challenge, the trial

court must consider relevant sources before ruling. This is especially critical when,

as here, the defendant has multiple professional licenses, but only used one of these

licenses in performing the services involved.

1
In this case, the Miramons sued for personal injuries to Ian Miramon, who fell

from a fire truck inside a fire station when he was struck by a large industrial fan

hanging above the fire truck. The Miramons sued a number of defendants, including

PGAL, claiming they are liable for his injuries due to, inter alia, the alleged unsafe

design and construction of the fire station. CR 10-11, 143. Although the Miramons’

petition lists “design of the subject property,” it does not allege the licensure

employed by any of the defendants in providing those services. CR 11. And, with

the petition, the Miramons submitted only a certificate of merit by a licensed

engineer. CR 18-20.

This certificate of merit lists the engineering license numbers of the

defendants, including PGAL’s, and states that these firms worked on the project, but

does not affirmatively state that these firms did engineering work on the project. And

PGAL did not. Simply because PGAL has an engineering license, in addition to the

architect license, it cannot be presumed by the trial court, under the strict

requirements of Section 150.002, to have used that license—especially when the

petition’s allegations are vague, and the plaintiff’s certificate of merit is challenged.

PGAL filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the Miramons’ engineer’s

certificate of merit on the basis that PGAL did not provide engineering services on

the project in question. PGAL attached evidence to its motion, showing that it had

only provided architectural services in the project.

2
The trial court struck this relevant evidence based on the Miramons’

arguments and objections. The Miramons claimed that, because PGAL has multiple

licensures, including an engineering license, it is irrelevant whether PGAL was using

its engineering license on this project. They claimed that the trial court can only look

to the pleading (which, of course, the Miramons drafted) and the Texas Occupations

Code to determine the defendant’s area of practice of the services provided. And

after that one-sided review, they claim that, if this is unrelated to the type of

professional services that the defendant actually provided, there is nothing that the

defendant can do. And, alternatively, they claim that even if PGAL performed

architectural services, an engineer’s licensure is a “similar license” and good

enough. It is not.

Section 150.002 cannot be upended in this manner. This “good enough”

strategy contravenes the strict requirements of the certificate of merit. And it ignores

Texas case law holding that, when questions are raised about whether the plaintiff’s

expert has the same professional license as the professional services provided by a

defendant, the trial court is not limited to simply reviewing the plaintiff’s petition.

The purpose is to obtain enough information to make a correct ruling based on the

services the defendant actually provided. This evidentiary ruling excluding evidence

crucial to the key issue before the trial court was harmful error, and the court erred

3
in denying PGAL’s motion to dismiss. PGAL asks that both rulings be reversed, and

this case remanded.

4
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. The Miramons’ allegations against PGAL and other Defendants.

Ian Miramon, one of the Appellees and Plaintiffs below (“Miramon”) was

working as a fireman for the Austin City Fire Department. CR 9. On the day in

question, Miramon was allegedly working at a fire station different from where he

usually worked. CR 9. According to Miramon, while one of the fire trucks was

parked inside Austin Fire Station No. 51, he climbed up on top of the fire truck to

perform an inspection. There was a large industrial fan suspended from the ceiling

above where he was inspecting the fire truck, and Miramon claims he was struck by

one of the blades of the ceiling fan. He fell to the ground, suffering personal injuries.

CR 9, 10.

Miramon and Caroline Miramon (collectively, “the Miramons”) sued a

number of entities they alleged were involved in designing, constructing, inspecting,

and maintaining the Travis County Fire and EMS Station No. 51 for the City of

Austin (the “Fire Station Project”). The Miramons’ Original Petition alleges

negligence collectively against all the entities/defendants, including PGAL, but does

not state that any of the defendants is a licensed professional. CR 4–9. Nor does the

petition identify any defendant’s professional licensure used in the project. Id. In

addition, the Original Petition, in alleging negligence, states only that the defendants

5
collectively owed the Miramons “a duty of ordinary care” (not the standard for any

particular licensed professional) and breached their duties to the Miramons:

CR 11.

Similarly, in naming PGAL as a party, the Miramons’ Original Petition does

not identify any of PGAL’s professional licenses, much less the license it used in

providing services in the Fire Station Project:

6
CR 7.

The Miramons filed a Certificate of Merit with their Original Petition. CR 18–

24. The Certificate of Merit was prepared by a professional engineer, Shane M.

Darville. Id. Mr. Darville does not affirmatively state that PGAL performed

engineering services in the Fire Station Project. He states only that the “following

engineering firms are known or reasonably believed to have worked upon the design

and/or construction of Fire Station 51.” CR 19. (emphasis added). He lists the

defendants with engineering licenses, at most proving that they have the ability to

perform engineering services, not that they did perform these services. CR 19.

The Miramons’ certificate of merit broadly and globally asserts negligence of

all the defendants under the same standard—those of a professional engineer. CR

18–20. Mr. Darville does not state he is a licensed architect and does not provide an

opinion as to whether PGAL complied with the standards for licensed architects.

7
Mr. Darville’s conclusions are limited to “where work was performed by a

licensed engineer.” CR 20. He tethers all of his opinions about negligence to the

standard of a licensed engineer. CR 20. And he does not distinguish between the

defendants. Instead, he references them collectively as the “relevant party(ies),”

assumes all the defendants performed engineering services in the Fire Station

Project, and does not provide any opinions at to the alleged negligent conduct of

each defendant. CR 19. All his opinions address only licensed engineering standards,

and the certificate is entirely void of opinions based on the standards of a licensed

architect. CR 18–20 Mr. Darville states (emphasis added):

 “I am knowledgeable in the area of engineering services and machine
placement, including but limited to the duties and standard of care for
an engineer.” CR 18.
 “The opinions expressed … are based upon my personal knowledge,
skill, education, training, experience, practice and review and analysis
of certain evidence…” CR 18.
 “Further, ignoring such safety considerations, creating a hazard, relying on
others to make your deficiencies safe, and relying on lesser levels of the
hierarchy of controls is unacceptable for a licensed engineer.” CR 19.
 “A licensed engineer should always try to eliminate a hazard or hazards
by employing the most effective means possible.” CR 19.
 “Professional engineers are hired for their expertise and owe a
responsibility to ‘protect the public [such as Mr. Miramon] health, safety,
and welfare.’” CR 20.
 “For personnel of the relevant party(ies) related to the designed
location, placement, and/or installation of the subject ceiling fan who
were licensed professional engineers or whose work was required to
be performed by licensed professional engineers, there was a
responsibility to be properly licensed and qualified as engineers. The

8
purpose of licensing and qualifying engineers is to ‘protect the public
health, safety, and welfare. Tex. Occ. Code 1001.004.” CR 20.
 “As licensed engineers, the relevant party(ies) failed to design AFD
Station 51 in a safe condition (specifically regarding the placement of the
subject ceiling fan) ….” CR 20.
 “Based upon the facts discussed above in this certificate, it is my
opinion that the relevant party(ies) failed to exercise reasonable care
as well as meet the standard of care for licensed engineers for the
reasons articulated herein where work was performed by a licensed
engineer.” CR 20.

II. PGAL filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of Merit.

PGAL filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of Merit, claiming

that the certificate of merit filed by the Miramons was the equivalent of no certificate

and was insufficient because it was submitted by a professional engineer, not an

architect. CR 111–118. PGAL stated in its motion that the only work it performed

work on the Fire Station Project were architectural services, not engineering

services. Id. To demonstrate that fact, PGAL attached to its motion two relevant

pieces of evidence: (1) an affidavit by Christopher Ruebush, an architect with PGAL,

and member of the American Institute of Architects (CR 119–120), and (2) the AIA

Design-Build and Architect Agreement for the Project hiring PGAL as the Architect

on the Project. CR 143–233. PGAL asked that the Miramons’ claims against it be

dismissed with prejudice. CR 118.

9
III. The Miramons responded and objected to PGAL’s evidence.

The Miramons’ response made three primary arguments: (1) since PGAL has

an engineering license, and even if PGAL performed only architectural services, the

Miramons’ certificate of merit by an engineer is a “similar license” and good enough;

(2) the trial court cannot review relevant evidence and must make its decision on a

motion to dismiss only using the plaintiff’s petition and the Texas Occupations

Code; and (3) because the allegedly negligent services could have been performed

by either an engineer or an architect under Texas Occupations Code § 1501.016(b),

that the Miramons’ certificate of merit was good enough. CR 338-–346.

The Miramons’ objections to PGAL’s evidence claimed that the trial court

could only look to the Miramons’ petition to determine the sufficiency of the

certificate—which is devoid of information as to the practice areas of the

defendants—and the Texas Occupations Code. CR 4–17. The trial court sustained

this objection, and did not consider PGAL’s relevant evidence of its practice area

for the services provided. App. 1 (CR 372–374.)

IV. The evidence not considered by the trial court.

PGAL is a design firm that employs specialists licensed in a number of

different areas—architecture, engineering, interior design, and planning. CR

119–120.

10
The Affidavit of Christoper Ruebush, AIA, establishes that he is a registered

professional architect by the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners (“TBAE”).

CR 119. His Texas Registration Number is 20946. CR 119. He is a member of the

American Institute of Architects (“AIA”). PGAL is registered as Firm Number

BR1434 by the TBAE. CR 119. Mr. Ruebush states he provides professional

architectural services through PGAL. CR 119. He further states that PGAL is a

design firm which specializes in architecture, engineering, interior design, and

planning. CR 119–120.

He also verified that he is familiar with PGAL’s business, the professional

services PGAL offers, and the architectural services PGAL provided for the Fire

Station Project, the site of the incident. CR 119. Those services, Mr. Ruebush

testified, were provided through the AIA Design-Builder and Architect Agreement

(the “Agreement”) that PGAL entered with Defendant J.E. Dunn Construction

Company (“J.E.”) on November 5. 2019. CR 119–120.

The Agreement provided that J.E. Dunn was to act as the “Design-Builder”

and PGAL was to act as “the Architect” and provide architectural services for the

building of the Project for the City of Austin:

11
CR 143.

Specifically, the professional architect services agreed to be provided by

PGAL included, among other things, providing professional architectural services

for “Conceptual Design, Schematic Design, Design Development, Construction

Documents, and Construction Administration” as further delineated in the

Agreement:

12
CR 144.

PGAL’s work on the project was required to be performed to the standard

applicable to a licensed architect.

CR 147. This standard of care set out in the Agreement is the same standard used in

Texas by professional architects to evaluate the performance of peers.

Finally, the Agreement provides that other firms were to be hired to perform

engineering services—demonstrating these services were not performed by PGAL.

CR 146. The Agreement states that “the Architect”—defined in the Agreement as

PGAL—shall retain structural, mechanical, electrical, and civil engineers to

complete the project:

13
CR 146.

This critical evidence on a key issue proving that the practice area of PGAL

in this Project was architecture, not engineering, was not considered by the trial

court.

V. PGAL’s Motion to Dismiss is denied, and it files this appeal.

After an oral hearing, the trial court entered orders sustaining the Miramons’

objections to PGAL’s evidence and denying PGAL’s Motion to Dismiss. App A, B.

PGAL then timely filed its Notice of Appeal as to both orders. App C.

14
ARGUMENT

I. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

“We review a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss for failure to file a

certificate of merit in accordance with [Texas] Civil Practice & Remedies Code [§]

150.002 for an abuse of discretion.” Aran & Franklin Eng’g, Inc. v. Zody, No. 13-

24-00180-CV, 2025 WL 866855, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg

Mar. 20, 2025, pet. filed) (citing TRW Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hussion St. Bldgs., LLC, 608

S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see Pedernal

Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 493–95 (Tex. 2017)

(discussing a trial court’s discretion to grant dismissal with or without prejudice)).

“A court abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly.” TRW

Eng’rs, 608 S.W.3d at 319. “Trial courts do not have discretion to make decisions

in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, without reference to guiding rules or

principles.” Pedernal Energy, 536 S.W.3d at 492 (citing CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC

v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. 2013) (“Section

150.002(e) authorizes further relief—dismissal with prejudice—and while granting

it is discretionary, the trial court cannot act ‘in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner

without reference to guiding rules or principles.’” (quoting Samlowski v. Wooten,

332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011))).

15
But, “[w]hen resolution of an appellate issue requires interpretation of a

statute, we engage in a de novo review.” Id. at 491. A court’s “goal in construing a

statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Id. (citing Tex.

Mut. Ins. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012)). “We look to and rely on

the plain meaning of a statute’s words as expressing legislative intent unless a

different meaning is supplied, is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning of

the words leads to absurd or nonsensical results.” Id. at 491; Crosstex Energy Servs.,

L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). “We also take statutes

as we find them and refrain from rewriting text chosen by the Legislature.” Id. at

492; see also Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. E. Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., 520 S.W.3d

887, 893 (Tex. 2017) (“When statutory text is clear, we do not resort to rules of

construction or extrinsic aids to construe the text because the truest measure of what

the Legislature intended is what it enacted.” (citing Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d

294, 299 (Tex. 2016))).

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Cnty. of Dallas, 194 S.W.3d 29, 31–

32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (citing Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp.

v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998); Al–Nayem Int’l Trading, Inc. v. Irving

Indep. Sch. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). “The

test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any

16
guiding rules or principles.” Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701

S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)). An appellate court must determine whether the

trial court’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Downer, 702 S.W.2d at 242.

An appellate court upholds the trial court’s ruling if there is any legitimate basis for

the ruling. Malone, 972 S.W.2d at 43; Al–Nayem, 159 S.W.3d at 763; JBS Carriers,

Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830, 840 (Tex. 2018); Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).

However, “[a]n erroneous exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless

it was harmful—that is, it ‘probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.’”

Gore v. Trans Union LLC, No. 05-23-00659-CV, 2024 WL 4449499, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Oct. 9, 2024, pet. denied) (citing JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington,

564 S.W.3d 830, 840 (Tex. 2018); Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)). “Exclusion of evidence

is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative or if the rest of the evidence was

so one-sided that the error likely made no difference in the judgment. (citations

omitted). Conversely, the exclusion is likely harmful if it was ‘crucial to a key

issue.’” Id. (citing JBS Carriers, 564 S.W.3d at 840).

17
QUESTION PRESENTED

The trial court abused its discretion by striking PGAL’s evidence concerning
the type of professional services it provided in PGAL’s challenge to the
Miramons’ certificate of merit under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §
150.002 and erred in denying PGAL’s motion to dismiss.

II. Sections 150.002(a) and (b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
require a certificate of merit in the practice area of defendant in providing
the professional service, and because the Miramons failed to do so, its
claims against PGAL should have been dismissed.

The Miramons failed to comply with sections 150.002(a) and (b) of the Texas

Civil Practice & Remedies Code by filing a certificate of merit by a licensed engineer

rather than a licensed architect who practices in architecture, because PGAL provided

only architectural services in the Fire Station Project.

Section 150.002 requires dismissal unless the claimant filing suit against a

licensed or registered professional for damages arising out of the provision of

professional services to simultaneously file an affidavit by a person who has the

same license and who practices in the same practice area as the defendant whose

professional services are the basis for the complaint. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 150.002(a)–(b). The statute reads, in pertinent part:

(a) In any action or arbitration proceeding for damages
arising out of the provision of professional services by a
licensed or registered professional, a claimant shall be
required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a third-
party licensed professional architect…who:

(1) is competent to testify;

18
(2) holds the same professional license…as the
defendant; and
(3) practices in the area of practice of the
defendant and offers testimony based on the
person’s:
(A) knowledge;
(B) skill;
(C) experience;
(D) education;
(E) training; and
(F) practice.
***
(b) The affidavit shall set forth specifically for each theory
of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence,
if any, or other action, error, or omission of the licensed or
registered professional in providing the professional
service, including any error or omission in providing
advice, judgement, opinion, or a similar professional skill
claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim
The third-party licensed architect, licensed professional
engineer, registered landscape architect, or registered
professional land surveyor shall be licensed or registered
in this state and actively engaged in the practice of
architecture, engineering, or surveying.

***
(e) A claimant’s failure to file the affidavit in accordance
with this section shall result in dismissal of the complaint
against the defendant. This dismissal may be with prejudice.

Id. at § 150.002(a)–(b), (e) (emphasis added). The language of the statute makes

clear that the professional submitting the certificate must have the identical license

as the license of the professional whose services are alleged to have caused the

claimant damages, and practice in that same practice area. In other words, it is not

enough that the certificate of merit affiant have one of the licenses a firm might have,

19
but must have the license that the defendant used in performing the allegedly

negligent services.

In Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 487, 494

(Tex. 2017) (“Levinson II,”) the Supreme Court of Texas concluded “[t]hat the

statute’s knowledge requirement is not synonymous with the expert’s licensure or

active engagement in the practice; it requires some additional explication or

evidence reflecting the expert’s familiarity or experience with the practice area at

issue in the litigation.” Levinson II, 513 S.W.3d at 494. (emphasis added) The

Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals re-emphasized this holding in Certain

Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Pol’y No. NAJL05000016-H87 v.

Mayse & Assocs., Inc., 635 S.W.3d 276, 289 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg

2021, pet. denied), holding “[t]hus, in reaching its conclusion [in Levinson II], the

supreme court rejected the interpretation of the statute as meaning the defendant’s

general area of practice and found consideration of the ‘practice area at issue’

necessary.” (citing Levinson II at 491–94). It further held, “[f]or these reasons, we

do not interpret the phrase “area of practice” in the current version of

§ 150.002(a)(3) to mean the defendant’s general area of practice and rather construe

it as the practice area at issue in the litigation.” Underwriters, 635 S.W.3d at 289

(emphasis added).

20
Again, it is the practice area of the services provided that the certificate of

merit must reflect. “Regardless of whether a non-engineer could perform the

inspections as [plaintiff] argues, it is clear that the claims [plaintiff] raised against

[defendant] arose out of engineering services. As such, we conclude that [plaintiff’s]

allegations ‘ar[ose] out of’ [defendant’s] practice of engineering.” Aran & Franklin

Eng’g, Inc. v. Zody, No. 13-21-00262-CV, 2022 WL 17844211, at *4–5 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op).

A “licensed or registered professional” includes a “licensed architect . . . or

any firm in which such licensed or registered professional practices, including, but

not limited to a . . . corporation. . . .” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.001(1-c).

The Texas Occupation Code defines the practice of architectural services

separately and distinctly from engineering services. Under Section 1051.001(a), an

“Architect” is defined as “a person registered under this chapter to engage in the

practice of architecture.” In addition, it defines “the Practice of architecture:”

(7) “Practice of architecture” means a service or creative work applying
the art and science of developing design concepts, planning for
functional relationships and intended uses, and establishing the form,
appearance, aesthetics, and construction details for the construction,
enlargement, or alteration of a building or environs intended for human
use or occupancy, the proper application of which requires education,
training, and experience in those matters. The term includes:
(A) establishing and documenting the form, aesthetics,
materials, and construction technology for a building, group of
buildings, or environs intended to be constructed or altered;

21
(B) preparing, or supervising and controlling the preparation of,
the architectural plans and specifications that include all integrated
building systems and construction details, unless otherwise permitted
under Section 1051.606(a)(4);
(C) observing the construction, modification, or alteration of
work to evaluate conformance with architectural plans and
specifications described in Paragraph (B) for any building, group of
buildings, or environs requiring an architect;
(D) programming for construction projects, including
identification of economic, legal, and natural constraints and
determination of the scope and spatial relationship of functional
elements;
(E) recommending and overseeing appropriate construction
project delivery systems;
(F) consulting, investigating, and analyzing the design, form,
aesthetics, materials, and construction technology used for the
construction, enlargement, or alteration of a building or environs and
providing expert opinion and testimony as necessary;
(G) research to expand the knowledge base of the profession of
architecture, including publishing or presenting findings in professional
forums; and
(H) teaching, administering, and developing pedagogical theory
in academic settings offering architectural education.
Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.001(a)(7).

The Miramons argue that some services can be provided by either an architect

or an engineer. CR 331–333 (citing Tex. Occ. Code § 1051.016). While this is no

doubt true, this does not excuse the requirements under Chapter 150 that the plaintiff

must provide a certificate of merit from a professional that holds the same license as

the defendant for the professional license it used to provide the services at issue.

22
It is critical to the correct interpretation and proper application of section

150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code that the trial court be able to

determine the practice area for the services provided by each defendant so that it can

determine if the certificate of merit submitted by the plaintiff is by a professional

licensed and practicing in that same practice area.

If the trial court is not provided sufficient information by the plaintiff’s

petition to correctly determine the practice area of the defendant, and/or it is not clear

what practice areas are at issue, it must review relevant sources. The Miramons’

Original Petition lists “design of the subject property” as a negligent act. That action

hypothetically could implicate architectural services, but it is impossible to

determine from the Miramons’ petition whether this was intended. The petition fails

to identify which defendant allegedly performed what services and fails to identity

the licensure of the professional services performed. It seems that the Miramons

might have been unclear purposefully. For instance, PGAL initially argued that

“Plaintiff’s claims [in the petition] clearly arise out of PGAL’s performance of

professional architectural services.” CR 338. But the Miramons mock that assertion

of clarity, by stating “[t]he Miramons’ pleadings do not ‘clearly indicate Plaintiffs’

claims arise out of’” architectural services. (emphasis in original). CR 338.

The reason for the lack of clarity, or at least the Miramons’ use of the lack of

clarity, is to defend their submission of only an engineer’s certificate of merit. As

23
the Miramons aver that their claims do not implicate architectural services, they

either have no claim against PGAL—as all of its services were architectural—or

they have muddled the negligent acts in hopes that any certificate of merit by a

professional with a “similar license” will do. But that is in direct contravention of

Section 150.002.

Section 150.002(a) and (b)’s requirements have not been met. The trial court

abused its discretion and committed harmful error in sustaining the Miramons’

objections to PGAL’s relevant practice area evidence and erred in denying PGAL’s

Motion to Dismiss. The Miramons’ certificate of merit, filed by a professional

engineer and relating only to engineering standards of conduct, is the equivalent of

no certificate as to architect PGAL.

III. The trial court improperly refused to consider PGAL’s relevant evidence
proving the practice area in which PGAL provided services to the Fire
Station Project.

PGAL submitted crucial evidence of a key issue with its Motion to Dismiss—

the practice area in which PGAL provided services in the Fire Station Project.

PGAL’s evidence was not cumulative and would have made a difference in

the judgment because it was “crucial to a key issue” in this case. JBS Carriers, Inc.,

564 S.W.3d at 840. As a result, its exclusion constitutes not only an abuse of

discretion, but harmful error which probably caused the rendition of an improper

ruling in this case.

24
A. Texas cases demonstrating importance of review of relevant sources

Texas courts often review relevant documents to determine the practice area

of both the defendant and the affiant of the certificate of merit, especially when the

practice area of either is in question. The Miramons’ assertions to the contrary are

incorrect. The following cases are illustrative on this point.

In Levinson II, 513 S.W.3d at 494, the Supreme Court “generally agree[d] that

such knowledge [regarding the expert’s familiarity or experience with the practice

area at issue in the litigation] may be inferred from record sources other than the

expert’s affidavit.” (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc. v. Willeford, No. 01-17-00551-

CV, 2018 WL 3029060, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jun. 19, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op.), the First Court of Appeals concluded that the expert did not qualify

under § 150.002(a)(3) after the appellate court reviewed the plaintiff’s amended

petition, a procurement document, deposition testimony presented by the plaintiff,

and an affidavit presented by the defendant from an engineer at ExxonMobil

comparing the defendant’s duties with the expert’s affidavit.

In Mayse & Assocs., 635 S.W.3d at 289–290, also involving an architect and

engineer, the Corpus-Christi-Edinburgh Court of Appeals followed the guidance

from Levinson II and acknowledged that it could look to relevant documents, “such

as the agreement between Underwriter’s insured and [architect] Mayse.” Id. at 289.

25
With regard to the expert certificate as to the engineer, the court stated “following

guidance from the cases referenced above, we consider relevant documents to

determine DCI’s practice area at issue in the litigation” but then found that there was

enough information in the pleading that they need not review other sources. Id. at

290. And, as to one of the expert certificates as to Mayse, the architect defendant,

the court found similarly. Id.

But as to the second certificate against Mayse, the court held that the

certificate did not provide enough information, and it had to look at other sources.

Even though the certificate of merit as to architect defendant Mayes was actually

provided by an architect (“Itle”), the court still determined that the certificate of

merit did not by itself, without other relevant sources, demonstrate that the

architect Itle practiced in the same area as Mayse. “[W]e conclude additional

evidence is necessary to satisfy § 150.002(a)(3) so as not to render it superfluous.”

Id. at 293.

In Janis Smith Consulting, LLC v. Rosenberg, No. 03-23-00370-CV, 2024

WL 4750757, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2024, pet. denied), the Austin court

held, [w]e determine the practice area at issue in the litigation by reviewing the

petition and other relevant documents in the record.” Id. (emphasis added). In

Janis Smith Consulting, the court reviewed not only the plaintiff’s petition and the

certificate of merit, but also reviewed the deposition of the engineer who submitted

26
the certificate. Id. at *3. The court ultimately held that the certificate was sufficient,

and the certificate’s author need not practice in the same “subspecialty” as the

defendant—but the certificate clearly needs to be submitted by a licensed profession

with the same license who practices in the same practice area.

Even more recently, the Corpus Christi-Edinburg court held, “[w]e look to

the record to determine the practice area at issue.” Aran & Franklin Eng’g, 2025

WL 866855, at *4 (citing Gaertner v. Langhoff, 509 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (evaluating evidence in the record to determine

the “area of practice” at issue in the litigation); see also Janis Smith Consulting, LLC,

2024 WL 4750757, at *2 (“We determine the practice area at issue in the

litigation by reviewing the petition and other relevant documents in the

record.” (citations omitted)); Eric L. Davis Eng’g, Inc. v. Hegemeyer, No. 14-22-

00657-CV, 2023 WL 8270984, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 30,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)) (emphasis added).

In sum, the case law establishes that relevant documents can and should be

considered by the trial court when the plaintiff’s petition, or the expert’s certificate,

fails to provide sufficient information or if the practice area is challenged. A court

can look at these documents in determining whether a certificate is needed, and if it

is, what the licensure and practice area of the affiant must be. The trial court erred

by not considering PGAL’s relevant evidence.

27
B. The courts in the cases cited by the Miramons also reviewed relevant
evidence.

The case law cited by the Miramons does not support their argument that the

trial court can only look to the pleadings and the Occupations Code. Many of the

case cited were decided prior to Levinson II (2017), in which the Supreme Court of

Texas held that “relevant sources” can be reviewed under Section 150.002. As a

result, only those cases decided after Levinson II will be addressed below.1 And

while it is true that the trial court looks at the pleadings and Occupations Code,

appellate courts do not restrict trial courts to such a limited review.2

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in Dorsey v. Env’t Res. Mgmt. Sw., Inc.,

No. 14-23-00017-CV, 2024 WL 4230031, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Sept. 19, 2024, pet. filed), upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s

1
However, even prior to Levinson II, trial and appellate courts were reviewing relevant sources.
For example, in Pelco Const., Inc. v. Dannenbaum Eng’g Corp., 404 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet), the Fourteenth Court also reviewed the contract between the
parties in determining whether Section 150.002 applied.
2
The cases cited below were cited by the Miramons, but they are distinguishable, and either no
relevant evidence was offered to the trial court, the practice area was not questioned, or the issue
was whether or not the certificate of merit was needed at all. Costello, Inc. v. Briggs Bros. Enters.
Corp., No. 01-23-00307-CV, 2024 WL 187435, at *8 (Tex. App. –Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18,
2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) involved whether tortious interference claims against an engineer fall
under Section 150.002. The Court ultimately held that it did not, based on “the record.” And in
Marquez v. Calvo, No. 03-18-00597-CV, 2019 WL 2998584, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 10,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.), there is no mention of the submission of any relevant evidence, and the
licensure of the defendant professions is set out in the petition. Finally, In re Channelview Flooding
Litigation, No. 01-22-00946-CV, 2024 WL 5249085 at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec.
31, 2024, pet denied) (mem. op.) does not involve a determination of the practice area of the
defendant—only whether the certificate of merit failed to “set forth specifically for each theory of
recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission
of the licensed or registered professional.”
28
complaints based on the supporting documents provided by the defendants with their

motions to dismiss.

PBW’s and ERM’s affidavits and supporting documents amount to
some evidence that their provision of geoscience services was
necessary to plan, progress, or complete engineering services. See Tex.
Occ. Code § 1001.003(c)(12). Both appellees adduced evidence that
they performed engineering services in addition to geoscience services,
and their services required special education, training, and experience
in the field of engineering. See id. § 1001.003(b). The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that appellants’ claims arise out of the
provision of professional engineering services…

Id.

In LJA Eng’g Inc. v. Santos, 652 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2022, no pet.), the professional engineering defendant LJA attached its

contract with the plaintiff to its motion to dismiss, which the Fourteenth Court of

Appeals reviewed and considered. In Footnote 1, the court stated,

Under its contract with Sour Lake, LJA Engineering agreed that it
would design the project, prepare the construction plans and
specifications, and then inspect the work to ensure that the work
complied with LJA Engineering's design plans. Each of these
contractual obligations fits within the statutory definition of the practice
of engineering. See Tex. Occ. Code § 1001.003(c).
Id. The Court then ruled, based on the pleadings and the language of the contract,

“that each of appellees’ allegations implicates LJA Engineering's and its licensed

professional engineer employee's education, training, and experience in applying

special knowledge or judgment to the performance of LJA Engineering's contractual

obligations to Sour Lake.” Id. at 921.

29
In Terracon Consultants, Inc. v. N. Pride Commc'ns, Inc., No. 01-22-00755-

CV, 2023 WL 2316351, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 2, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.), the Fourteenth Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion to dismiss, and in doing so, reviewed of the contract between the

parties. The Court even quotes the contract language:

Notably, the Contract provides that the ‘number of tests ... described in
the Scope of Services does not constitute a minimum or maximum
number of tests ... that may be required for this project.’ Thus, the
Contract contemplates Terracon's use of professional discretion in
determining the number of tests performed. The Contract also addresses
the disposal of testing materials. Whether Terracon actually breached
these provisions is a matter to be determined at trial. But, pertinent here,
Northern Pride's allegations plainly implicate Terracon's (through its
licensed professional engineers) education, training, and experience in
utilizing special knowledge and judgment in determining how many
samples to obtain and whether to retain them.

Id. (emphasis in original).

In AMEC Foster Wheeler USA Corp. v. Goats, No. 09-18-00477-CV, 2019

WL 3949466, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.), the

Ninth Court of Appeals reviewed the relevant documents attached to defendant’s

motion to dismiss.

The defendant must also be a licensed or registered professional. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a). Foster Wheeler provided a
certification with their motion to dismiss showing it is currently
registered in the State of Texas to “offer and perform engineering
services’ along with a roster from the Texas Board of Professional
Engineers of its employees and affidavit testimony stating it has
employed licensed professional engineers for decades. Therefore,
Foster Wheeler qualifies as a ‘licensed or registered professional[.]”

30
Id. (internal citations omitted).

In Aran & Franklin Eng’g, 2022 WL 17844211, at *1, it was not the third-

party defendant, but the third-party plaintiff who provided relevant sources—

including an affidavit by an engineer. “To its response, [plaintiff] attached a

verification signed by one of its attorneys, [and] the affidavit of Rolando R. Rubiano,

a professional engineer.” Id. The other side objected to both, but the trial court

overruled the objection to the engineer’s affidavit. Id.at *2. The trial court denied

the motion to dismiss, but the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that

the allegations did involve the provision of professional services. Id at *5.

C. PGAL’s evidence is crucial to a key issue and should have been
considered.

PGAL attached an affidavit of Christopher Ruebush, architect at PGAL, who

worked on the Fire Station Project and the Agreement PGAL entered to perform

architectural services on the Fire Station Project:

31
CR 119–120.

32
CR 143.

PGAL was to provide architectural services, and hire other firms with

engineering licenses to perform engineering services:

CR 146.

D. The “low bar” on which the Miramons rely does not excuse their
failure to identify the licensure of the services provided by the
defendants.
The Miramons argue in the trial court that the only reason for a certificate of

merit is for the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous. CR

330–331. That is only true with regard to the substance and correctness of the

opinions expressed in the certificate. PGAL’s motion and this appeal concern a

distinctly different issue: whether the report satisfied the strict compliance

33
requirements that the certificate’s author have the identical license as the defendant,

and that they practice in the same area that the defendant used in providing

professional services. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a), (b). If that

standard is not met, section 150.002(e) requires that the trial court dismiss the claims.

The Miramons rely on Bratton v. Pastor, Behling & Wheeler, LLC, No. 01-

23-0015-CV, 2024 WL 1662391, *4-5, 11-12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April

18, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.), in support of this “low bar.” But that case does

not apply to PGAL’s arguments here. In Bratton, there was no question that the

certificate’s author had the same license and practiced in the same area as the

defendant. In fact, the defendants agreed the certificate met that standard: “Appellees

do not dispute that Dr. Bedient (1) is competent to testify, (2) holds the same

professional license or registration as the Appellees, (3) practices in the same area

of practice as the Appellees, and (4) offers testimony based on his knowledge, skill,

experience, education, training, and practice.” Id. at *6.

Rather, the dispute was about the “accuracy” of the opinions expressed in the

certificate and the “reliability of [the certificate author’s] foundational materials.”

Id. at 11. The court held that these questions “do not impact the sufficiency of his

certificate under Section 150.002, which a plaintiff must file at the onset of litigation

before any discovery has occurred.” Id.

34
The issue at bar here is whether Mr. Darvill’s certificate, because of his

different practice area, suffices to support the Miramons’ claims against PGAL,

which performed architectural services. Under Section 150.002(a) and (b), it does

not. Mr. Darville’s opinions, whether correct or not, have no relevance to PGAL’s

work on the Fire Station Project and cannot support the denial of its motion to

dismiss.

The Miramons argue they should not be held to a standard above what they

already provided because discovery has not taken place in this suit. CR 336–341.

Regardless of the lack of discovery before a lawsuit is filed, a plaintiff has the initial

burden to make a reasonable inquiry into their contentions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §10.001. This is especially true prior to suing a licensed

professional to determine the work that professional performed in the at-issue project

in order to present a certificate of merit by someone who meets the requirements of

Chapter 150. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002. In bringing a lawsuit against

licensed professionals, including firms like PGAL who employ professionals

licensed in several areas, the Miramons had the initial burden to determine which

type of service was performed. Id.

In this case, there were several ways that the Miramons could have resolved

any doubts about the services provided before filing suit. First, in the 18 months

between Miramons’ injury and filing suit, they or their attorneys could have simply

35
asked Miramon’s employer for a copy of the Agreement, which would have shown

which services that PGAL provided in the project. Second, they could have obtained

a copy of the agreement by making a Texas Public Information Act Request.

Contracts with the government are public because they involve spending public

funds. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.0222; 2261.253 (contracting information is public

information). Third, the Miramons could have filed a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

202 suit to determine who to sue and the practice area performed by each. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 202.1, 202.2. Finally, even if all these other methods failed them, the

Miramons could have taken the extra step of including a certificate of merit from an

architect.

Ultimately, the choice was simple. If the Miramons intended to sue for

negligence based on the provision of architectural services, then they should have

included a certificate of merit relating to those services. If, on the other hand, the

Miramons did not intend to sue for negligence based on the provision of architectural

services, then they erroneously sued PGAL. Both options require the same outcome

here. PGAL only provided architectural services in the Fire Station Project. The

Miramons did not timely provide a certificate of merit from a licensed architect.

Accordingly, the only option for the trial court was to grant the motion to dismiss. Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(e).

36
The Miramons instead decided a professional engineer was adequate. The

Miramons decided that, since PGAL had an engineering license, an engineer’s

certificate of merit was good enough. This assumption was incorrect and this is the

type of information that must be correct, or the certificate of merit is worthless.

In sum, due to the Miramons’ failure to identify the professional licensure of

the services provided by PGAL and claimed to be negligent, the trial court erred by

failing to view PGAL’s critical, threshold evidence. If the practice area is

challenged, and the trial court both excludes relevant evidence and based on that

exclusion denies the challenge, Chapter 150 has no guardrails and no meaning.

And, this exclusion was harmful error in this case, because the practice area

was questioned and Texas jurisprudence is replete with cases performing just such a

review under those circumstances.

IV. Under Chapter 150, an engineer’s certificate is the equivalent of no
certificate against an architect defendant.

The Miramons argue that a certificate of merit by an engineer is sufficient as

to PGAL’s architectural services, because Mr. Darville is a “similarly licensed

professional.” CR 331. That is in direct contravention of the statute, which requires

the same license. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.001(a)(2) (“holds the same

professional license …”).

They also allege that PGAL did not challenge Mr. Darville’s certificate of

merit. CR 333. That is plainly incorrect. PGAL asserted his engineer’s certificate did
37
not comply with section 150.002, and was equivalent to no certificate having been

filed, warranting dismissal. CR 113. PGAL alleged that, because the certificate was

based only on engineering standards, it was totally inapplicable to the work PGAL

did on the Fire Station Project.

The Miramons also argue that, because Section 1051.0016 of the Texas

Occupations Code lists services that can be performed by either an engineer or

architect, that Mr. Darville’s engineering license is good enough even though the

services were actually performed by an architect. That argument has no merit.

Section 1051.0016 does not mean that when a professional, who has been hired as

an architect and provides architecture services and is sued for those services, an

engineer’s certificate of merit can be considered.

In fact, the very same argument that the Miramons assert about section

1051.0016 of Occupations Code was found meritless in at least two cases. First, in

Gignac & Assocs., LLP v. Hernandez, No. 13-17-00336-CV, 2018 WL 898144, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), the

facts and arguments are virtually identical as here, involving an engineer’s certificate

pertaining to an architects’ services. The defendant architect (Gignac) moved to

dismiss based on non-compliance with Section 150.002(a), which was denied. On

appeal, the appellees (plaintiffs) argued that the court must review the Texas

Occupations Code (including section 1051.016) along with section 150.002 under

38
the rule of “in pari materia” because it (allegedly) “allows an engineer to provide a

certificate of merit against an architect.” Id. But the court held that because the

statutory language was clear, it need not apply in pari materia and resort to another

statute, the Occupations Code. Id. The language of section 150.002 (a)

“‘unambiguously provides that a certificate of merit must be authored by someone

holding the same professional license’ as the defendant.” Id. “Because [section

150.002(a)’s] language is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of

construction such as the principle of in pari materia.” Id. It further held, “[i]t is

undisputed that appellees’[plaintiffs’] expert does not hold a license as an architect.”

Id. at *4 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a)(2)). “Gignac has

therefore shown that appellees did not comply with the statute’s plain requirements.”

Id. [internal citations omitted]. As a result, the court reversed and remanded.

Second, in Kayne Anderson Cap. Advisors, L.P. v. Hill & Frank, Inc., 570

S.W.3d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.), as here, the

plaintiff asserted that his engineer’s certificate of merit was sufficient to support

plaintiff’s claim against an architect defendant. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

disagreed. Id. The plaintiff in Kayne Anderson made the same argument the

Miramons make—that under the Occupations Code, some services can be handled

by both an architect and an engineer, and therefore an engineer’s certificate is

sufficient when an architect has been sued. But the court disagreed with that logic:

39
For the same reason, we reject Kayne Anderson’s argument
that the certificate of merit statute conflicts with the Occupations
Code statutes upon which it relies. The Occupations Code statutes
establish that engineers and architects are both qualified to perform
certain types of work and testify as experts about that work. Tex. Occ.
Code §§ 1001.0031(d)–(e), 1051.0016(b)–(c). The certificate of merit
statute provides that, in addition to being qualified to testify by
experience and training, an affiant for a certificate of merit must also
hold the same professional license or registration as the defendant. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)(2)–(3). There is no conflict
between a statute providing the topics about which a licensed
professional is qualified to testify as an expert and the certificate of
merit statute including an additional requirement to provide expert
testimony in that instance. See Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 838 (holding
courts must honor plain language of statute unless that interpretation
would lead to absurd results).

Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that “[a]n affiant for a certificate of merit

must hold the same professional license or registration as the defendant.” Id. (citing

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 150.002(a)(2). “There is no ambiguity in this

requirement.” Id. (citing Jennings, Hackler & Partners, Inc. v. N. Tex. Mun. Water

Dist., 471 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (“That statute

unambiguously provides that a certificate of merit must be authored by someone

holding the same professional license or registration as the defendant.”)).

As a result, it is required that an architect submit a certificate of merit against

an architect defendant such as PGAL, and because the Miramons failed to do so, the

trial court’s denial of PGAL’s motion to dismiss should be reversed.

40
V. The Miramons’ other arguments also fail.

The Miramons attempt three other arguments to escape the requirements of

Section 150.002. First, the Miramons use the Agreement which they assert should

not be reviewed to argue that the Agreement somehow requires PGAL to perform

engineering work, when the Agreement is very clear that it does not. CR 146. It

obligates PGAL to use subconsultants that are engineers who are liable under a

different standard—that of licensed engineers. CR 146.

Second, they argue that, because an exhibit to the Agreement “defines the

‘Design Consultant’ as a ‘qualified design professional or an entity employing or

consisting of a qualified, license professional,’” that PGAL actually performed

engineering services on the Fire Station Project instead of architectural services. CR

344-345. It does not, and PGAL did not.

Exhibit D to the Agreement is entitled “General Conditions of Design Build

Agreement.” CR 171. It states, in Article I, “Definitions,” that these definitions apply

“[u]nless otherwise stated in the Contract Documents, words which have well-

known technical or construction industry meanings are used in the Contract

Documents in accordance with such recognized meanings.” CR 171. The Contract

Documents, the Agreement here, conclusively prove that an architectural firm was

hired as the designer. CR 143, 144. The quote the Miramons cite does not dispute

that, or somehow modify the plain language of the Agreement into an agreement

41
hiring PGAL as an engineer or to perform engineering services in the Fire Station

Project. In fact, it reaffirms that the Design-Builder can—and did—hire an architect

who is a “qualified, licensed design professional.”

CR 173.

Third, the Miramons try to confuse the issues further by arguing that this is a

case where no certificate of merit is required to sue PGAL, like Marquez v. Calvo,

2019 WL 2998584, at *2 In Marquez, however, the court held that the architect sued

in that case was not actually being sued for the work he did as an architect on the

project—in part, because although “Calvo’s petition identified Marquez as the

architect in the Calvo Project [it] did not contract with Marquez to provide

architectural services.” Id. at *2. The situation here is the opposite—PGAL was

specifically hired to perform architectural services and performed only those

services. As a result, a certificate of merit by an architect was required.

VI. This court should reverse and remand for further proceedings.

PGAL asks this Court to reverse the trial court order sustaining the Miramons’

objections to PGAL’s relevant evidence, and reverse the trial court’s order denying

PGAL’s motion to dismiss. It should remand to the trial court with instructions for
42
the trial court to enter an order dismissing the Miramons’ claims against PGAL, Inc.,

and for further proceedings, including a determination of whether such dismissal is

to be with or without prejudice. See, Aran & Fraklin, 2022 WO 17844211, at *5;

JBS Carriers, Inc., 564 S.W.3d at 840; Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Terracon

Consultants, Inc., 2023 WL 2316351, at *7.

PRAYER

Based on the arguments above, Appellant, PGAL, Inc., asks this Court to (1)

reverse the trial court’s order sustaining the Miramons’ objections to PGAL’s

relevant evidence, (2) reverse the trial court’s order denying PGAL Inc.’s Motion to

Dismiss, (3) remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order dismissing

the Miramons’ claims against PGAL, Inc. and for further proceedings, including

whether to dismiss with prejudice, and (4) award appellate costs to PGAL, Inc., and

(5) for other relief to which PGAL, Inc. has shown itself entitled.

43
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Judith L. Ramsey
Judith L. Ramsey
State Bar No. 16519550
Derek Bauman
State Bar No. 24044475
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P.
jramsey@thompsoncoe.com
dbauman@thompsoncoe.com
4400 Post Oak Parkway, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77027
Telephone: 713.403.8210
Facsimile: 713.403.8299

Counsel for Appellant,
PGAL, Inc.

44
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft
Word and contains 8,778 words, as determined by the computer software’s word-
count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i).

/s/ Judith L. Ramsey
Judith L. Ramsey

45
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 19, 2025, a true and correct copy of this
Appellant’s Brief has been served by electronic case filing or e-mail to all counsel
of record in this case.

/s/ Judith L. Ramsey
Judith L. Ramsey

46
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix 1 ................................................... Order Granting Objections to Evidence

Appendix 2 ............................................................Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

Appendix 3 ....................................................................................... Notice of Appeal

47
Appendix 1

Order Granting Objections to Evidence

48
09/10/2025 03:20:58 PM
Velva L. Price
District Clerk
Travis County
D-1-GN-25-001130
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-001130

IAN MIRAMON AND § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
CAROLINE MIRAMON, §
Plaintiffs, §
§
VS. § TRAVIS COUNTY TEXAS
§
ENCOTECH ENGINEERING §
CONSULTANTS, INC., J. E. DUNN §
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, PGAL, §
INC., HARDESTY & HANOVER, LLC, §
HEAT TRANSFER SOLUTIONS, INC. §
D/B/A HTS TEXAS, P.E. §
STRUCTURAL CONSULTANTS, §
INC., BECKETT ELECTRICAL §
SERVICES, LLC, PAGE §
SOUTHERLAND PAGE, INC. A/K/A §
PAGE SOUTHERLAND PAGE AE, §
INC., PAGE SOUTHERLAND PAGE, §
L.L.P., PAGE SOUTHERLAND PAGE §
ENGINEERS, P.C., PAGE §
SOUTHERLAND PAGE, L.P., G4C §
ENTERPRISES, LLC, HAYNES- §
EAGLIN-WATERS, LLC, KEENAN, §
HOPKINS, SCHMIDT AND §
STOWELL CONTRACTORS, INC. § 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendants.

ORDER SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF IAN MIRAMON’S AND CAROLINE
MIRAMON’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT PGAL, INC.’S EVIDENCE
FILED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
CERTIFICATE OF MERIT
On August 26, 2025, the Court heard Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant PGAL, Inc.'s Evidence filed in support of Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Certificate of Merit.
Defendant PGAL, Inc. has filed a Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Certificate

of Merit which attached the following evidence:

Exhibit 1: Affidavit of Christopher Ruebush, AIA (July 29, 2025)

Exhibit 3: Design-Builder and Architect Agreement (November 5, 2019)

Plaintiffs Ian Miramon and Carolien Miramon have objected to this Court’s

consideration of Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 3 in deciding the Motion to Dismiss filed by

App. 1
Defendant PGAL, Inc.

This Court sustains Plaintiffs’ Objections and has not considered Exhibit 1

and Exhibit 3 in deciding Defendant PGAL, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Certificate of Merit.

September 10 2025
Date: ____________, ________________________________
DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
The Honorable Laurie Eiserloh

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RAMSEY LAW GROUP

John C. Ramsey
State Bar No. 24027762
K. Grace Hooten
State Bar No. 24092980
Woodway Tower
6363 Woodway Drive, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77057
Telephone: (713) 489-7577
Facsimile: (888) 858-1452
john@ramseylawpc.com
grace@ramseylawpc.com
eservice@ramseylawpc.com

RICK FREEMAN, P.C.
Rick Freeman
State Bar No. 07428800
3660 Stoneridge Road, B-102
Austin, Texas 78746
Telephone: (512) 477-6111
Facsimile: (512) 473-2131
rick@rickfreemanlaw.com

PAUL WEBB, P.C.
Vincent L. Marable III
State Bar No. 12961600
2

App. 1
221 N. Houston Street
Wharton, Texas 77488
Telephone: (979) 532-5331
Facsimile: (979) 532-2902
tripp@paulwebbpc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS IAN
MIRAMON AND CAROLINE MIRAMON

3

App. 1
Appendix 2

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

49
09/10/2025 03:20:14 PM
Velva L. Price
District Clerk
Travis County
D-1-GN-25-001130
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-001130

IAN MIRAMON AND § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
CAROLINE MIRAMON, § OF
Plaintiffs, §
§
VS. §
§ TRAVIS COUNTY
ENCOTECH ENGINEERING § TEXAS
CONSULTANTS, INC., J. E. DUNN §
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, §
PGAL, INC., HARDESTY & §
HANOVER, LLC, HEAT TRANSFER §
SOLUTIONS, INC. D/B/A HTS §
TEXAS, P.E. STRUCTURAL §
CONSULTANTS, INC., BECKETT §
ELECTRICAL SERVICES, LLC, PAGE §
SOUTHERLAND PAGE, INC. A/K/A §
PAGE SOUTHERLAND PAGE AE, §
INC., PAGE SOUTHERLAND PAGE, §
L.L.P., PAGE SOUTHERLAND §
PAGE ENGINEERS, P.C., PAGE §
SOUTHERLAND PAGE, L.P., G4C §
ENTERPRISES, LLC, HAYNES- §
EAGLIN-WATERS, LLC, KEENAN, §
HOPKINS, SCHMIDT AND §
STOWELL CONTRACTORS, INC. §
Defendants. 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PGAL, INC.’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF CERTIFICATE OF MERIT

On August 26, 2025, Came on for consideration Defendant PGAL, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Certificate of Merit, and the Court having considered the motion and

Plaintiffs’ response has determined the motion should be denied.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant PGAL,

Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of Merit is denied.

September 10 2025
Date: ____________, ________________________________
DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
The Honorable Laurie Eiserloh

App. 2
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RAMSEY LAW GROUP

John C. Ramsey
State Bar No. 24027762
K. Grace Hooten
State Bar No. 24092980
Woodway Tower
6363 Woodway Drive, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77057
Telephone: (713) 489-7577
Facsimile: (888) 858-1452
john@ramseylawpc.com
grace@ramseylawpc.com
eservice@ramseylawpc.com

RICK FREEMAN, P.C.
Rick Freeman
State Bar No. 07428800
3660 Stoneridge Road, B-102
Austin, Texas 78746
Telephone: (512) 477-6111
Facsimile: (512) 473-2131
rick@rickfreemanlaw.com

PAUL WEBB, P.C.
Vincent L. Marable III
State Bar No. 12961600
221 N. Houston Street
Wharton, Texas 77488
Telephone: (979) 532-5331
Facsimile: (979) 532-2902
tripp@paulwebbpc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS IAN
MIRAMON AND CAROLINE MIRAMON

2

App. 2
Appendix 3

Notice of Appeal

50
9/26/2025 12:07 PM
Velva L. Price
District Clerk
Travis County
D-1-GN-25-001130
Rosa Oneal

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-001130
IAN MIRAMON AND CAROLINE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
MIRAMON §
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § 250th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
ENCOTECH ENGINEERING §
CONSULTANTS, INC., ENCOTECH §
ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, SA, §
INC., GARZA EMC, LLC, J. E. DUNN §
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, §
JQ+TSEN, LLC, PGAL, INC. §
Defendant. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANT, PGAL, INC’S, NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1, 26.1(b), Defendant, PGAL, Inc.

(“PGAL”) files this Notice of Interlocutory Appeal.

1. PGAL desires to appeal the denial of its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Certificate of Merit

pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 150.002(f) and the grant of Plaintiffs’

objections to PGAL’s evidence in this case.

2. The trial court signed both orders on September 10, 2025.

3. This appeal is taken to the Third Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas.

4. PGAL has not previously filed a related appeal or original proceeding in the Third Court

of Appeals.

5. This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) and Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §150.002(f) of a denial of a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Certificate of Merit; it is not a parental-termination or child-protection case or an appeal

from an order certifying a child to stand trial as an adult, as defined in Tex. R. App. P. 28.4.

1|Page

App. 3
Respectfully submitted,

THOMPSON, COE, COUSINS & IRONS, LLP

By: /s/ Judith L. Ramsey
Judith L. Ramsey
State Bar No. 16519550
Derek D. Bauman
State Bar No. 24044475
Cory S. Reed
State Bar No. 24076640
Alissa Vasquez
State Bar No. 24144133
4400 Post Oak Parkway, Suite 1000
Houston, TX 77027
Telephone: (713) 403-8213
Telecopy: (713) 403-8299
Email: jramsey@thompsoncoe.com
Email: dbauman@thompsoncoe.com
Email: creed@thompsoncoe.com
Email: avasquez@thompsoncoe.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PGAL, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this 26th day of
September, 2025 via e-service and/or e-mail all counsel of record.

/s/ Judith L. Ramsey
Judith L. Ramsey

2|Page

App. 3
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Crystal Carrier on behalf of Cory Reed
Bar No. 24076640
ccarrier@thompsoncoe.com
Envelope ID: 106129710
Filing Code Description: Notice
Filing Description: DEFENDANT, PGAL, INC'S NOTICE OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Status as of 9/30/2025 3:45 PM CST

Associated Case Party: HEAT TRANSFER SOLUTIONS, INC

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Associated Case Party: IAN MIRAMON

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Associated Case Party: PGAL, INC

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Associated Case Party: J.E. DUNN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Jacqulyn Jandrucko jjandrucko@cokinoslaw.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

App. 3
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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Crystal Carrier on behalf of Cory Reed
Bar No. 24076640
ccarrier@thompsoncoe.com
Envelope ID: 106129710
Filing Code Description: Notice
Filing Description: DEFENDANT, PGAL, INC'S NOTICE OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Status as of 9/30/2025 3:45 PM CST

Associated Case Party: J.E. DUNN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Jacqulyn Jandrucko jjandrucko@cokinoslaw.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

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Associated Case Party: ENCOTECH ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michelle Koledi 24072189 mconner@wslawpc.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

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Associated Case Party: KEENAN, HOPKINS, SCHMIDT & STOWELL
CONTRACTORS, INC
App. 3
Automated Certificate of eService
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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Crystal Carrier on behalf of Cory Reed
Bar No. 24076640
ccarrier@thompsoncoe.com
Envelope ID: 106129710
Filing Code Description: Notice
Filing Description: DEFENDANT, PGAL, INC'S NOTICE OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Status as of 9/30/2025 3:45 PM CST

Associated Case Party: KEENAN, HOPKINS, SCHMIDT & STOWELL
CONTRACTORS, INC

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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Crystal Carrier on behalf of Cory Reed
Bar No. 24076640
ccarrier@thompsoncoe.com
Envelope ID: 106129710
Filing Code Description: Notice
Filing Description: DEFENDANT, PGAL, INC'S NOTICE OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Status as of 9/30/2025 3:45 PM CST

Associated Case Party: P.E. STRUCTURAL CONSULTANTS, INC.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Paige Wenner pwenner@grsm.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

Christopher Ege cege@grsm.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

Robin Phillips rlphillips@grsm.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

Adrienne Stonecypher astonecypher@grsm.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: CAROLINE MIRAMON

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Rick Freeman rick@rickfreemanlaw.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

John Ramsey john@ramseylawpc.com 9/26/2025 12:07:39 PM SENT

App. 3
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Laura McCarty on behalf of Judith Ramsey
Bar No. 16519550
lmccarty@thompsoncoe.com
Envelope ID: 108211772
Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Status as of 11/19/2025 8:46 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michelle Koledi 24072189 mconner@wslawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Vincent Marable 12961600 tripp@paulwebbpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Nicholas Scott 24093965 nscott@wslawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Rick Freeman 7428800 rick@rickfreemanlaw.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

John Ramsey 24027762 john@ramseylawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Michael Waddell 24042106 bwaddell@wslawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

John Nugent 24116840 eservice@ramseylawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Jeniffer Mendez jmendez@thompsoncoe.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Judith Ramsey Jramsey@thompsoncoe.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Derek Bauman Dbauman@thompsoncoe.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT

Grace Hooten grace@ramseylawpc.com 11/19/2025 8:41:05 AM SENT