Mike Morath, in His Official Capacity as Texas Commissioner of Education and La Villa Independent School District v. Dr. Paz Elizondo

Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed November 25, 2025.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00024-CV

MIKE MORATH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS TEXAS
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION AND LA VILLA INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellants
V.

DR. PAZ ELIZONDO, Appellee

On Appeal from the 455th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-22-002025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The La Villa Independent School District terminated Dr. Paz Elizondo’s
probationary teacher contract for the 2021-2022 school year. Adhering to the
procedure provided by the Education Code, Elizondo filed a grievance with the
school board, appealed to the Commissioner of Education, and ultimately appealed
to the trial court. The District denied Elizondo’s grievance as untimely. Mike
Morath, the Commissioner of Education, affirmed the District’s decision. Elizondo
sought judicial review in the trial court, which reversed the Commissioner’s
decision. In a single issue on appeal the District and the Commissioner assert that
the trial court erred in reversing the Commissioner’s decision as it was supported by
substantial evidence. We conclude that the Commissioner’s decision that Elizondo’s
grievance was untimely is supported by substantial evidence, reverse the trial court’s
judgment, and render judgment that the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

On May 21, 2019, Elizondo signed a “First-Year Probationary Contract” with
La Villa Independent School District for the 2019-2020 school year. On April 22,
2020, Elizondo signed a “Second-Year Probationary Contract” with the District for
the 2020-2021 school year. The second-year probationary contract was designated
as such at the top of the front page in bold type:

Both contracts contained statements, immediately above Elizondo’s signatures that
the signer has “read this Contract and agree[s] to abide by its terms and conditions.”
Both contracts further provided:

Termination of Contract. This Contract will terminate, in accordance
with the procedures at Texas Education Code chapter 21, if the Board
determines that termination of your contract at the end of the contract
period will serve the best interests of the District, or if the Board
determines that good cause or a financial exigency exists. This Contract
will also terminate if you provide written notice of resignation before
the penalty-free resignation date (see Tex. Educ. Code § 21.105).
On April 26, 2021, the District sent notice to Elizondo that his probationary

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contract for the 2020-2021 school year would be terminated at the end of the contract
term, with employment ending June 25, 2021.

II. Procedural Background

On April 29, 2021, Elizondo filed a Level I Grievance with the District.
According to Elizondo, the District provided him with a second probationary
contract by mistake instead of a term contract for the 2020-2021 school year.
Elizondo’s grievance asserted:

I had been previously employed as a teacher in public education for at
least 5 of the 8 years preceding employment by La Villa Independent
School District. As per the Texas Education Code section 21.102, the
District is required to provide me with a term contract. 1

The District’s Chief Academic Officer dismissed Elizondo’s grievance as
untimely, citing the District’s local policy that required complaints to be “filed
within 15 days of the date the employee first knew, or with reasonable diligence
should have known, of the decision or action giving rise to the complaint or
grievance.” When Elizondo appealed the decision to the District’s Board, the Board
denied Elizondo’s complaint.

Pursuant to Section 7.057 of the Education Code Elizondo sought review of
the District’s decision before the Commissioner of Education. 2 Elizondo repeated
his assertion that the District was obligated under the Education Code to give him a
term contract rather than a probationary contract. The District responded,

1
Section 21.102(b) provides, “[t]he probationary contract may be renewed for two
additional one-year periods, for a maximum permissible probationary contract period of three
school years, except that the probationary period may not exceed one year for a person who has
been employed as a teacher in public education for at least five of the eight years preceding
employment by the district.”
2
Section 7.057 permits a person aggrieved by the action or decision of a school district to
appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Education. Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a)(2).

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recognizing the Commissioner’s jurisdiction over the dispute, but asserting that
Elizondo failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies at the local level. The
District argued that the Commissioner’s review was limited to the timeliness of
Elizondo’s grievance, and the merits of his complaint should not be reached.
Elizondo responded that his grievance was timely because he filed it within 15 days
of learning of the termination of his probationary contract.

The Commissioner determined that the timeline to file the grievance began
when Elizondo executed the second probationary contract. The Commissioner
affirmed the District’s decision finding that the record contained substantial
evidence that the District did not err in denying Elizondo’s grievance as untimely,
and that Elizondo waived his right to complain about the type of contract he received
by performing under the contract and accepting the benefits for a year before
complaining.

Elizondo appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the district court pursuant
to Section 21.307 of the Education Code. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.307 (permitting
appeal of Commissioner’s decision to district court). Elizondo sought reversal of the
Commissioner’s decision and reinstatement to his prior position with a term contract.
Elizondo also requested declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act (UDJA). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a). The
Commissioner and the District answered Elizondo’s appeal of the Commissioner’s
decision and asserted that sovereign immunity deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
over Elizondo’s claims under the UDJA.

After receiving briefing and argument from Elizondo, the District, and the
Commissioner, the trial court signed a final judgment. The trial court subsequently
signed an amended final judgment because the date of the final judgment contained
a typographical error. In the amended final judgment, the trial court reversed the

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Commissioner’s decision and denied the Commissioner and District’s pleas to the
jurisdiction. On February 24, 2023, the Commissioner and the District timely
appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Third Court of Appeals.

On November 25, 2024, the Third Court of Appeals sent notice to the parties
that the “Court may lack jurisdiction over a portion” of the judgment. The Third
Court determined that the trial court’s Amended Final Judgment did not “specifically
address the merits of Elizondo’s UDJA action”; thus, that action was still pending.
Recognizing that the court had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s
interlocutory appeal of the denial of his plea to the jurisdiction, the Third Court
questioned whether it had interlocutory jurisdiction over the portion of the order
reversing the Commissioner’s administrative decision.

The Third Court abated the appeal on January 23, 2025, explaining the court
was “uncertain whether the trial court intended its Amended Final Judgment to
include a ruling on the merits of Elizondo’s UDJA action.” Morath v. Elizondo, No.
03-23-00125-CV, 2025 WL 270611, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 23, 2025, order).
The Third Court directed the trial court to submit a supplemental clerk’s record
containing a clarification of its intent. Id.

On February 12, 2025, the trial court signed a “Second Amended Final
Judgment” in which it (1) reversed the Commissioner’s administrative decision; (2)
granted the Defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction as to Elizondo’s UDJA claim; and
(3) dismissed Elizondo’s UDJA claim. The Commissioner and the District appealed
the trial court’s Second Amended Final Judgment to this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 22.220(d). Elizondo did not file a notice of appeal challenging the dismissal of his
declaratory-judgment claim. 3

3
Elizondo filed a motion to dismiss this appeal in favor of the appeal pending in the Third
Court of Appeals. Because this appeal was filed by the Commissioner of Education and it
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ANALYSIS

The Commissioner and the District each present one issue challenging the trial
court’s reversal of the Commissioner’s decision. We will address both appellants’
issues as one.

I. Standard of Review and Governing Law

The focus of this Court’s review, as in the district court, is the decision of the
Commissioner. See N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Riou, 598 S.W.3d 243, 251 (Tex. 2020);
Crowley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stoneham, 714 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. App.—15th Dist.
2025, no pet.). The Commissioner’s decision may only be reversed if the decision is
not supported by substantial evidence or the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are
erroneous. Tex. Educ. Code § 21.307(f).

We review the Commissioner’s evidentiary determinations under the
substantial-evidence standard. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174. “Review under the
substantial-evidence rule is highly deferential—the issue is not whether the agency’s
decision is correct, but whether the record demonstrates a reasonable basis for it.”
Stoneham, 714 S.W.3d at 875 (quoting Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251). Whether
substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision is a question of
law. Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex. 2000).

A district court applying the substantial evidence standard of review may not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency on weight of the evidence questions.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174; Dyer v. Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l Quality, 646

challenged a judgment signed after September 1, 2023, we treated Elizondo’s motion as a motion
to transfer the appeal to the Third Court of Appeals, which we denied. The Third Court of Appeals
agreed to transfer this appeal to this Court as being within the exclusive intermediate appellate
jurisdiction of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(d); Tex. R. App. P.
27a.

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S.W.3d 498, 514 (Tex. 2022); Hyde v. Harrison Cnty., 710 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex.
App.—15th Dist. 2025, no pet.). The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the
Commissioner’s decision was correct, but rather whether the record demonstrates
some reasonable basis for the Commissioner’s action. See Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251.

II. The Commissioner’s Decision Is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

In seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, Elizondo
challenged the Commissioner’s conclusions that Elizondo failed to timely file his
grievance with the District and that he waived his right to complain that the
probationary contract was erroneous. Elizondo also argues that the District’s policy
conflicts with Section 21.102 of the Education Code.

A. The Relevant Inquiry

On appeal from the District, the Commissioner reviewed the timeliness of
Elizondo’s grievance. The Commissioner did not address the merits of whether the
Education Code required the District to offer Elizondo a term contract. The
Education Code does not authorize the Commissioner to reach the merits of a
complainant’s argument if the school district dismissed the grievance as untimely.
Davis v. Morath, 624 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Tex. 2021) (“If the District was prohibited
by its internal procedures from reaching the merits of the grievance, the scope of the
Commissioner’s appellate review is likewise limited.”).

In our review of the trial court’s decision, we are likewise constrained by the
issues considered below. See Stoneham, 714 S.W.3d at 875. The Commissioner did
not consider Elizondo’s complaint that the District was required to give him a term
contract pursuant to Section 21.102 of the Education Code because the issue before
him was limited to the timeliness of Elizondo’s grievance. Accordingly, we consider
whether the Commissioner erred in concluding that Elizondo did not timely file his

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complaint.

B. Timeliness of Grievance

The Education Code authorizes school boards to adopt rules and procedures
for hearing complaints from teachers and others. Tex. Educ. Code § 11.1511(b)(13).
The District’s rules provide that complaint forms must be filed “[w]ithin 15 days of
the date the employee first knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known,
of the decision or action giving rise to the complaint or grievance.” Elizondo does
not dispute that he must follow this rule, nor does he dispute that the Commissioner
may consider whether the appeal should be denied due to the failure to comply with
the District’s grievance procedures, including the 15-day deadline. Elizondo argues,
however, that the triggering event for the 15-day period was the District’s notice that
it was terminating the contract. The District argues that the triggering event was the
District’s offer of the second-year probationary contract. The Commissioner agreed
with the District.

The Commissioner found that Elizondo’s grievance complained about the
District’s offer of a probationary contract by mistake instead of a term contract for
the 2020-2021 school year. The Commissioner discussed the differences between
probationary and term contracts, notably that probationary contract termination is
not appealable. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.103(a). Term contracts, by contrast,
include the right to a hearing by the school board or an independent hearing examiner
and the right to appeal the board’s decision to the Commissioner. See id. §§ 21.206
–.301.

The Commissioner found that Elizondo signed the probationary contract on
April 22, 2020, but did not file a grievance until April 29, 2021. The record,
therefore, supported the District’s finding that Elizondo “knew or should have
known that he had a probationary contract when he signed a contract plainly
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reflecting that in its title.” The Commissioner also found that Elizondo waived his
right to complain about the type of contract that the District issued “when he
performed under that contract for a year and accepted its salary and benefits.”

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Morath, Elizondo argued
that he was not required to file his grievance until he received notice of his
termination. Elizondo’s reliance on Davis is misplaced. In Davis, the Dallas
Independent School District adopted a new teacher evaluation initiative that
involved evaluating teachers on “scorecards” issued at the end of the school year.
Davis, 624 S.W.3d at 218. The scorecard initiative was adopted in 2014 to be
implemented in the 2014-2015 school year. Id. Pursuant to that initiative, teachers
would not receive their scorecards until after the school year ended. Id. When the
scorecards were distributed on September 18, 2015, some teachers were unhappy
with their scores and filed a grievance within ten days as was required by the Dallas
School District. Id. at 218–19. A District grievance hearing officer dismissed the
teachers’ grievance as untimely, finding that the teachers were aware of the
scorecard initiative when it was adopted in May 2014 and should have filed their
grievances at that time. Id. at 219. The teachers appealed to the Commissioner, who
also found that the grievances were not timely filed. Id. at 219–20. The Texas
Supreme Court held that the teachers’ grievances were timely because they
complained about the distribution of scorecards, not the implementation of the
scorecard initiative, and their grievances were filed within ten days of receiving the
scorecards. Id. at 225–26.

Elizondo argues that, like the teachers in Davis, he was not aware of his
grievance until April 2021, when the District terminated his contract. But, the record
does not support Elizondo’s argument. Elizondo’s grievance did not complain about
termination of his contract in 2021, but about issuance of a probationary contract in

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2020. Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision that Elizondo’s
grievance was untimely. The probationary contract was titled “Second-Year
Probationary Contract.” The probationary contract contained termination language
that only applied to probationary contracts, which permitted the District to terminate
the contract at the conclusion of its term. Finally, just above Elizondo’s signature,
there was a statement averring that “I have read this Contract and agree to abide by
its terms and conditions.” The record contains no evidence that Elizondo filed a
complaint asserting his right to a term contract until his probationary contract was
terminated.

Because the Commissioner’s decision that Elizondo’s grievance was untimely
was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, the trial court erred in reversing
the Commissioner’s decision. See Mireles v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d
128, 131 (Tex. 1999) (courts are required to affirm an agency’s decision if there is
more than a scintilla of evidence to support it). We sustain the District and the
Commissioner’s issues on appeal.4 Accordingly, we affirm.5

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred by substituting its judgment in place of the
Commissioner’s decision, which was supported by substantial evidence. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that the order

4
Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, we
need not address the District and Commissioner’s waiver arguments.
5
Elizondo has not filed a cross appeal, but he argues in his appellate brief that the trial
court properly denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the District and the Commissioner with
respect to his declaratory-judgment claims. Elizondo is correct that the First Amended Final
Judgment that Elizondo appealed to the Third Court of Appeals denied the pleas to the jurisdiction
and left Elizondo’s declaratory-judgment claim unresolved. The Third Court abated that appeal,
directing the trial court to clarify its intent as to the declaratory-judgment claim. The trial court
subsequently signed a Second Amended Final Judgment, which granted the pleas to the
jurisdiction, and Elizondo has not challenged the trial court’s grant of those pleas.

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of the Commissioner is affirmed.

/s/ April Farris
April Farris
Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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