In Re Frank Jackson v. the State of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00235-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/5/2026 12:00 AM
No. 15-25-00235-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS

Austin, Texas AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/5/2026 12:00:00 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

IN RE FRANK JACKSON,
Relator

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
Texas Business Court, Eleventh Division, Houston, Texas
No. 25-BC11B-00032

REAL-PARTY-IN-INTEREST
NORMAN THOMAS BARRAS, JR.’S
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Anthony G. Buzbee David George
Texas Bar No. 24001820 Texas Bar No. 00793212
Thomas Colby Holler THE GEORGE APPELLATE LAW FIRM
Texas Bar No. 24126898 440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Mitchell W. Blasio Houston, Texas 77002
Texas Bar No. 24138469 Tel. (832) 850-1113
THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM dgeorge@georgeappeals.com
J.P. Morgan Chase Tower
600 Travis, Suite 7300
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel. (713) 223-5393
tbuzbee@txattorneys.com
choller@txattorneys.com
mblasio@txattorneys.com
www.txattorneys.com
IR

Counsel for Real-Party-in-Interest
Norman Thomas Barras, Jr.
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Parties Counsel

Relator/Defendant Gregg Costa
Frank Jackson Sydney A. Scott
Jack B. DiSorbo
Lloyd S. Marshall
Kohl V. Anderson
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
811 Main Street, Suite 3000
Houston, Texas 77002

Real-Party-in-Interest/ Anthony G. Buzbee
Plaintiff Norman Thomas Colby Holler
Thomas Barras, Jr.1 Mitchell W. Blasio
THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM
J.P. Morgan Chase Tower
600 Travis, Suite 7300
Houston, Texas 77002

David George
THE GEORGE APPELLATE LAW FIRM
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002

Respondent Honorable Grant Dorfman
Presiding Judge
Texas Business Court
Eleventh Division
301 Fannin Street
Houston, Texas 77002

1Incorrectly identified by Jackson as “Norman Thomas Barras, Sr.” Jackson
Mandamus Pet. at i.
iii
Other Parties David Genender
(Co-Defendants) Jordan Kazlow
Ruben C. Garza, III
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
845 Texas Avenue, Suite 4000
Houston, Texas 77002

Maria C. Rodriguez
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
2049 Century Park E., Suite 3200
Los Angeles, California 90067

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel ..................................................... iii
Table of Contents ............................................................................. v
Index of Authorities ...................................................................... vii
Statement of the Case.....................................................................ix
Issue Presented ...............................................................................ix
Statement of Facts ...........................................................................1
Jackson insinuated himself with Reynolds’ ultimate owner
Dorothy Brockman....................................................................2
Reynolds fired Barras ...............................................................7
Barras sued Jackson for tortious interference with his
Reynolds’ contract .....................................................................8
Mandamus Standard .......................................................................9
Argument ....................................................................................... 10
I. Standard for Rule 91a motions to dismiss ...................... 11
II. Jackson improperly relies on evidence outside of
Barras’ live petition ......................................................... 12
III. Jackson did not conclusively establish his attorney
immunity affirmative defense ......................................... 15
A. Attorney immunity................................................... 16
B. Jackson did not conclusively establish his
attorney immunity affirmative defense ................... 21
1. Jackson did not conclusively establish that
all of his challenged conduct was the provision
of legal services involving the unique office,
professional skill, training, and authority of
an attorney ........................................................ 22
2. Jackson did not conclusively establish that
all of his challenged conduct was within an

v
adversarial context in which Barras and
Jackson’s client did not share the same
interests ............................................................ 26
3. At minimum, Jackson did not conclusively
establish that attorney immunity applies
to all of his conduct at issue .............................. 29
C. Whether Barras was properly terminated for
cause is not at issue in his tortious interference
claim against Jackson .............................................. 31
Prayer............................................................................................. 32
Certificate of Service ...................................................................... 34
Certificate of Compliance............................................................... 34

vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.,
595 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2020) ....................................................... 10-15
Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015)..........17-19, 26
Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969) ............................ 31-32
Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, pet. denied).............................................................................12
Estate of De Chavez, No. 08-23-00072-CV, 2024 WL 3090531
(Tex. App.—El Paso June 21, 2024, pet. denied).............................14
Haynes & Boone v. NFTD, LLC,
631 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. 2021) .................................. 16-18, 20, 22, 26, 29
In re Fairway Methanol LLC, 515 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) .................................................. 9
In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2016) ............... 9-10
In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2016) ....................10
In re Methodist Primary Care Group, 14-18-00191-CV, 2018 WL
3061321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2018)
(orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) ...........................................................10
Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund,
631 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2021) ...............................................16-21, 28-29
McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests,
991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999) .............................................................27
McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) ................................................... 27-28
Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2000, pet.
denied) ....................................................................................... 17, 26

vii
Parker v. Ohio Development, LLC, No. 04-23-00069-CV, 2024 WL
1864756 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 30, 2024, no pet. h.)
(mem. op.) ........................................................................................14
Ron Carter, Inc. v. Kane, No. 01-10-00815-CV, 2011 WL 5100903
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, pet. denied) ..... 27-28
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989) ............... 31, 32
Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2022) ...................... 17-19, 26, 29
Valls v. Johanson & Fairless, L.L.P., 314 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) .................................................27
Washington Square Fin., LLC v. RSL Funding, LLC, 418 S.W.3d
761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ................32
Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2018) ..........................16, 18-19

Rules
TEX. R. CIV. P. 65 ............................................................................... 13-14
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1 ................................................................................11
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(a)............................................................................13
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b)...................................................................... 11, 13
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6 .....................................................................11, 13-14

viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Breach of contract and tortious interference with
the Case contract case. Mandamus petition challenging
trial court’s order denying Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 91a motion to dismiss based on the
attorney immunity affirmative defense.

Respondent Hon. Grant Dorfman
Texas Business Court, Eleventh Division
Houston, Texas

Respondent’s Defendant/Relator Frank Jackson filed a Rule
Actions from 91a motion to dismiss Plaintiff/Real-Party-in-
which Relator Interest Norman Thomas Barras, Jr.’s tortious
Seeks Relief interference claim against him.2 The trial court
denied the motion.3 Jackson seeks mandamus
review of the trial court’s order denying his Rule
91a motion to dismiss.

ISSUE PRESENTED
The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it

denied Jackson’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss.

2 MR0130 (Tab 4). “MR__” refers to the page in the Mandamus Record. “(Tab

__)” refers to the tab number in the Mandamus Record.
3 MR0333 (Tab 8).

ix
This Court should deny Jackson’s mandamus petition. The

trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied

Jackson’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss because he did not conclusively

establish his attorney-immunity affirmative defense.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Barras began working for Reynolds’ predecessor company

fifty years ago, when he was seventeen years old.4 Barras originally

worked for Universal Computer Systems (now known as Universal

Computer Systems Holding, Inc.) (“UCS”). In 2006, UCS bought

Reynolds, which was then a publicly traded company. 5 UCS is now

Reynolds’ parent company. 6 Barras rose through the ranks,

becoming Reynolds’ Chief Executive Officer and Chairman in

2020.7 Reynolds is now a multi-billion-dollar leader in the

automotive-dealership-technology industry.8

4 MR0074 (Tab 3) at ¶ 12. Defendant The Reynolds and Reynolds Company

will be referred to as “Reynolds.” Defendant Dorothy Brockman will be referred
to as “Brockman.” Her now-deceased husband Robert “Bob” Brockman will be
referred to as “Bob Brockman.”
5 MR0076 (Tab 3) at ¶ 18.

6 MR0076 (Tab 3) at ¶ 18.

7 MR0074 (Tab 3) at ¶ 12.

8 MR0074 (Tab 3) at ¶ 12.

1
Barras became Reynolds’ CEO when its prior CEO Bob

Brockman was indicted for tax evasion in 2020. 9 Bob Brockman

ultimately passed away in August 2022, while awaiting trial.10 His

wife, Defendant Dorothy Brockman, assumed control of Reynolds’

parent company.11

Jackson insinuated himself with Reynolds’ ultimate owner
Dorothy Brockman

Jackson served as legal counsel for Bob Brockman during the

government’s criminal tax-evasion case and also acted as a trustee

to the Brockman trust, which controls 99% of Reynolds.12 Following

Bob Brockman’s death, Jackson grew closer to Brockman.13 Jackson

began to exert influence over Brockman to the point that she hired

him and installed him at Reynold’s headquarters in Houston,

although Jackson was never employed by Reynolds.14

9 MR0076 (Tab 3) at ¶ 20. Throughout the federal government’s investigation

of Bob Brockman, Reynolds maintained that the allegations pertained to Bob
Brockman’s personal dealings and that the company itself had no involvement
and was not implicated. MR0076 (Tab 3) at ¶ 21.
10 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 23.

11 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 23.

12 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 24.

13 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 24.

14 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 24.

2
Despite Barras’ quantifiable success in managing Reynolds,

disagreements began to arise between Barras and Brockman in

October 2024.15 Many of these “disagreements” were made up from

whole cloth.16 Indeed, in most cases, the minor disputes consisted

of repeated efforts by Brockman’s newly installed lawyer, Jackson,

(and others) to undermine Barras’ authority as CEO.17 At some

point, Barras was asked to step down from the Board of UCS—with

no rational reason given.18 He did so without argument.19 The

Board of UCS, under the direction of Jackson and others, continued

to undermine Barras’ authority despite his measurable success in

making Reynolds the most profitable it has ever been.20

Barras renewed his written Employment Agreement with

Reynolds in January 2024.21 That renewal was approved by the

15 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 25.

16 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 25.

17 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 25.

18 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 25.

19 MR0077 (Tab 3) at ¶ 25.

20 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 26.

21 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 28; MR0091-MR0110 (Tab 3) (Employment Agreement).

3
Board.22 The Employment Agreement has a ten-year term and

provides yearly compensation that potentially exceeds $30 million

annually, due to base compensation and bonuses. 23 The

Employment Agreement guarantees this compensation package for

the full ten-year term, unless Barras is terminated “for cause.”24

By 2025, Jackson had immersed himself in all details of

Reynolds’ business, even though he had no position in Reynolds.25

His role by this point had little to nothing to do with providing legal

advice.26 It was clear that he was the eyes and ears of Brockman,

and she intended to find a way to push Barras out and likely install

Jackson in Barras’ place.27 Such a move would personally benefit

Brockman in her individual capacity and would also be a windfall

to Jackson.28

22 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 28.

23 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 28; MR0093-MR0099 (Tab 3).

24 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 28; MR0094-MR0099 (Tab 3).

25 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29. To be clear: Jackson was never Reynolds’ general

counsel. He was the general counsel for UCS, Reynolds’ corporate parent.
MR0134 (Tab 4); MR0135 (Tab 4); MR0176 (Tab 6); MR0180 (Tab 6).
26 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

27 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

28 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

4
Both Jackson and Brockman described Jackson’s work

regarding Reynolds as being done in capacities other than as a

lawyer.29 Jackson told Barras that he was handling the changes to

the UCS and Reynolds boards in his “capacity as Director of

Spanish Step, the majority shareholder of UCS.”30 Dorothy

Brockman described Jackson as “the trustee for the Management

Trust” and stated that Jackson “works for me.”31

Jackson inserted himself into areas of Reynolds’ operations

far removed from legal issues.32 Jackson gave Barras instructions

regarding changes to the Reynolds and UCS boards.33 In response

to Jackson saying this, Barras responded that he did not need

Jackson’s involvement because his staff was able to handle changes

on their own.34 Jackson responded by emphasizing that Brockman

had asked him to be involved with the board changes. 35

29 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

30 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

31 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

32 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

33 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

34 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

35 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

5
Jackson was regularly involved in Reynolds activities that

were outside attorney-specific duties:

• In December 2024, Jackson and Brockman met
with numerous Reynolds employees on issues
involving technology, operations, and product
management.

• In April 2025, Brockman directed that Jackson
“be in all strategic type meetings” of Reynolds.

• In April 2025, Jackson was involved in
meetings regarding why Reynolds was having
difficulty getting business from publicly traded
auto dealerships.

• In April 2025, Jackson was working with
Brockman on Reynolds’ “strategy/goals/
direction/etc…”36

In his actions regarding Reynolds and Barras, Jackson was

not acting on behalf of his clients in the uniquely lawyerly capacity

of one who possesses the office, professional training, skill, and

authority of an attorney.37 Instead, these are actions of a general

business advisor who happened to have a law license.38 Jackson’s

involvement in Reynolds’ general business activities was so

extensive that in October 2024, Barras emailed Reynolds’ then-

36 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 32.

37 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 33.

38 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 33; MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 48.

6
general counsel Richard Rauch, saying “Guess we work for Frank

now,” referring to Frank Jackson.39

Reynolds fired Barras

On May 19, 2025, after Barras returned from lunch, Reynolds’

security escorted him from his office and told him he was fired.40 No

reason was given at the time.41 Despite his fifty years of service,

Barras was treated like a common criminal.42 Reynolds later gave

Barras a termination letter that stated his employment with

Reynolds was being terminated “for cause,” resulting from a

business transaction from 2021 that was part of an overall

transaction engineered by Bob Brockman beginning sometime

before.43 None of the details of the trumped-up cause termination

are true, and the stated reasons for Barras’ termination do not even

begin to approach the “cause” required by the Employment

Agreement terms.44

39 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 334 MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 48.

40 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 35.

41 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 35.

42 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 35.

43 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 35.

44 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 35.

7
Jackson—along with Brockman—intentionally and

knowingly interfered with Barras’ Employment Agreement with

Reynolds.45 The purpose of the interference was motivated by

animus towards Barras.46 Jackson acted in his own interests,

contrary to the interests of Plaintiff and Reynolds. 47 As a direct and

proximate result of Brockman and Jackson’s intentional actions,

Barras was wrongfully terminated from his position as Chairman

and CEO of Reynolds.48

Barras sued Jackson for tortious interference with his Reynolds’
contract

Barras sued Reynolds, Brockman, and Jackson in May 2025

in Harris County District Court.49 Barras sued Reynolds for breach

of contract and sued Brockman and Jackson for tortious

interference.50 Barras is also seeking a declaratory judgment that

45 MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 47.

46 MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 47.

47 MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 47.

48 MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 44.

49 MR0002 (Tab 1).

50 MR0009-MR0010 (Tab 1) at ¶¶ 34-42; MR0024-MR0025 (Tab 2) at ¶¶ 35-43;

MR0081-MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶¶ 40-49.

8
he did not breach his Employment Agreement.51 Reynolds,

Brockman, and Jackson removed this lawsuit to the Texas Business

Court in June 2025.52

Jackson filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss Barras’ tortious

interference claim against him.53 In response to that motion, Barras

amended his pleadings, filing his Second Amended Petition.54

Jackson chose not to amend his Rule 91a motion in response to

Barras’ amended petition. The trial court denied Jackson’s Rule 91a

motion.55

MANDAMUS STANDARD
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when the

relator shows that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and

that no adequate appellate remedy exists.56 A trial court abuses its

discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as

51 MR0083-MR0086 (Tab 3) at ¶¶ 50-62.

52 MR0780 (Tab. 31).

53 MR0130 (Tab 4).

54 MR0072 (Tab 3); MR0148 (Tab 5).

55 MR0334 (Tab 8).

56 In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016); In re Fairway

Methanol LLC, 515 S.W.3d 480, 486–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
no pet.).

9
to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails

to analyze the law correctly or apply the law correctly to the facts.57

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “mandamus review

is not—and should not be—an easily wielded tool.”58 To be entitled

to mandamus relief, the relator “must establish that the trial court

could have reasonably reached only one conclusion.”59

ARGUMENT
Jackson’s Rule 91a motion did not conclusively establish his

attorney-immunity affirmative defense.60 So the trial court did not

clearly abuse its discretion when it denied Jackson’s Rule 91a

motion to dismiss. This Court, therefore, should deny Jackson’s

mandamus petition.

Because Barras amended his tortious-interference cause of

action a week before the hearing when he filed his Second Amended

57 In re Methodist Primary Care Group, 14-18-00191-CV, 2018 WL 3061321, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2018) (orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.).
58 In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 299 (Tex. 2016).

59 In re H.E.B. Grocery, 492 S.W.3d at 302.

60 Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d

651, 654 (Tex. 2020).

10
Petition, this Court will base its review on that petition.61

I. Standard for Rule 91a motions to dismiss

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that a party “may

move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis

in law or fact.”62 “A cause of action has no basis in law if the

allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably

drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.”63

“A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could

believe the facts pleaded.”64

In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a court “may not consider

evidence ... and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading

of the cause of action.”65 The Texas Supreme Court, therefore, has

held that Rule 91a “limits a court’s factual inquiry to the plaintiff’s

pleadings.”66

61 CR0072 (Tab 3); TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b) (“In ruling on the motion, the court

must not consider a nonsuit or amendment not filed as permitted by
paragraphs (a) or (b).”); see § II below.
62 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654.

66 Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

11
“Attorney immunity is an affirmative defense.”67 A Rule 91a

motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense can be granted

only if the affirmative defense can “be conclusively established by

the facts in a plaintiff’s petition.”68 If an affirmative defense cannot

“be conclusively established by the facts in a plaintiff's petition” it

is “not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss.”69

A court deciding a Rule 91a motion must “construe the

pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s

intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings.”70

II. Jackson improperly relies on evidence outside of Barras’
live petition

Jackson improperly bases much of his argument on evidence

from Barras’ First Amended Petition, which was superseded by his

live Second Amended Petition.71 This Court should ignore Jackson’s

arguments based on this improper evidence that the Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure exclude from consideration when deciding Rule 91a

67 Id. at 654.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,

pet. denied).
71 Jackson Mandamus Pet. at 18-23 (§ II(B)).

12
motions to dismiss.

In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a court “must decide the

motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action.”72 The

Texas Supreme Court, therefore, has held that Rule 91a “limits a

court’s factual inquiry to the plaintiff’s pleadings.”73

When faced with a Rule 91a motion, a plaintiff may file an

amended petition at least three days before the hearing.74 That new

petition becomes the live petition that the trial court considers

when ruling on the Rule 91a motion.75 That is what Barras did, so

Barras’ Second Amended Petition is the live petition for the Rule

91a motion.76

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that when a

pleading has been amended, the prior pleading that was amended

“shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record

72 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654.

73 Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

74 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(a).

75 TEX. R. CIV. P. 65; TEX . R. CIV. P. 91a.5(a). When, like here, a plaintiff amends

in response to a Rule 91a motion, the defendant can withdraw its motion, file
an amended motion (resetting deadlines), or stand on its original motion. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b). Jackson did not file an amended Rule 91a motion and,
instead, stood on his original motion.
76 MR0072 (Tab 3); MR0148-MR0149 (Tab 5).

13
of the cause.”77 Therefore, after Barras filed his Second Amended

Petition, his First Amended Petition ceased to be “a part of the

pleading in the record of the cause.”78 So Barras’ First Amended

Petition could not be considered when deciding Jackson’s Rule 91a

motion because it was no longer a “pleading of the cause of action.”79

The prohibition applies equally to this Court. 80

Much of Jackson’s argument is based on what Barras alleged

in his First Amended Petition versus in his live Second Amended

Petition. Jackson devotes five pages of his seventeen-page

77 TEX. R. CIV. P. 65 (“Unless the substituted instrument shall be set aside on

exceptions, the instrument for which it is substituted shall no longer be
regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of the cause, unless some error
of the court in deciding upon the necessity of the amendment, or otherwise in
superseding it, be complained of, and exception be taken to the action of the
court, or unless it be necessary to look to the superseded pleading upon a
question of limitation.”).
78 Id.; MR0072 (Tab 3) (Barras’ Second Amended Petition).

79 TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Estate of De Chavez, No. 08-23-00072-CV, 2024 WL

3090531, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 21, 2024, pet. denied). There is an
exception that allows the trial court to consider documents attached to the
petition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 59. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. There is
also an exception that allows the trial court to consider other pleadings in the
case, but only “if doing so is necessary to make the legal determination of
whether an affirmative defense is properly before the court.” Bethel, 595
S.W.3d at 656. That does not apply here because Jackson is attempting to use
statements in Barras’ earlier, superseded First Amended Petition as part of
the “court’s factual inquiry.”
80 Estate of De Chavez, 2024 WL 3090531, at *5; Parker v. Ohio Development,

LLC, No. 04-23-00069-CV, 2024 WL 1864756, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Apr. 30, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

14
argument to the fact Barras made new allegations in his Second

Amended Petition in response to Jackson’s Rule 91a motion.81 This

Court should ignore Jackson’s arguments based on facts alleged in

Barras’ now superseded First Amended Petition.

III. Jackson did not conclusively establish his attorney
immunity affirmative defense

The trial court did not abuse its discretion—let alone clearly

abuse its discretion—when it denied Jackson’s Rule 91a motion

because he had not “conclusively established” his attorney-

immunity affirmative defense.82 Because Jackson’s affirmative

defense was not conclusively established, it is “not a proper basis

for a motion to dismiss.”83 This Court should, therefore, deny

Jackson’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on attorney immunity.

Jackson ignores his heavy burden. He does not even recognize

that a Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense

can be granted only if the affirmative defense is conclusively

established.84 And Jackson does not show that he conclusively

81 Jackson Mandamus Pet. at 18-23 (§ II(B)).

82 Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654.

83 Id.

84 Id.

15
established his attorney immunity affirmative defense. This Court,

therefore, should deny Jackson’s mandamus petition.

A. Attorney immunity

Lawyers do not have immunity for every action they take on

behalf of a client. The Texas Supreme Court has made clear that

“[s]ome conduct by attorneys remains actionable ‘even if done on

behalf of a client.’”85 Attorney immunity has traditionally been

understood in the context of litigation. It was only in 2021 that the

Supreme Court recognized that attorney immunity could apply

outside of litigation.86

The attorney-immunity affirmative defense “applies to

lawyerly work in ‘all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has

a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client’ but only when the

claim against the attorney is based on ‘the kind of conduct’

attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to

85 Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 52 (Tex. 2021)

(quoting Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 683 (Tex. 2018)).
86 Haynes & Boone v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. 2021) (“Today we

confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the
litigation context, so long as the conduct is the ‘kind’ of conduct we have
described above.”).

16
a client.”87 The attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure

“loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys

employed as advocates.”88 So “if an attorney engages in conduct that

is not ‘lawyerly work’ or is ‘entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer’

or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-

immunity defense does not apply.89

The Texas Supreme Court has held that attorney immunity is

decided on a conduct-by-conduct basis.90 So an attorney might have

immunity for some actions during the representation, but not

others.91

“In determining whether conduct is ‘the kind’ immunity

protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather

than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct.”92 The Supreme

87 Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Haynes & Boone,

631 S.W.3d at 79).
88 Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (quoting
Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2000, pet. denied)
Mitchell).
89 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646 (quoting Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 51-53).

90 Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 51-52.

91 Id.

92 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646 (quoting Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 47).

17
Court has emphasized that when deciding if an attorney’s conduct

was “‘the kind of conduct’ attorneys undertake while discharging

their professional duties to a client” the question is not if this is an

activity an attorney regularly perform on client’s behalf.93 Instead,

the attorney’s “conduct must involve ‘the uniquely

lawyerly capacity” and the attorney'’ skills as an attorney.’”94

“Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging ‘lawyerly’

duties,” but an attorney has no immunity for actions that could

have been performed by non-lawyers.95

The Supreme Court has held that there is no immunity for

conduct that is “foreign to the duties of a lawyer.”96 But it made

clear that the term “foreign to the duties of a lawyer” “does not

mean something a good attorney should not do.”97 Instead, it means

that the attorney is acting outside their capacity and function as an

93 Id. 646 (quoting Haynes & Boone, LLP, 631 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. 2021)).

94 Id. (quoting Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 51-53) (emphasis in original in Taylor).

95 Id.

96 Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 684; Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 648.

97 Taylor, 644S.W.3d at 646 (citing Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 681; Cantey
Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 482, 487).

18
attorney.98 So “a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the

press and on social media on a client’s behalf” is engaging in

conduct “foreign to the duties of a lawyer”—meaning there is no

immunity—even though there is nothing inherently improper in an

attorney making publicity statements on a client’s behalf.99

In Landry’s Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, the Texas

Supreme Court held that “attorneys are not protected from liability

to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as ‘the kind

of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his

duties to his client.’”100 In that case, Landry’s sued lawyers who had

threatened to sue it regarding treatment of the white tigers at the

Houston Aquarium.101 The lawyers had sent statutory notice letters

to Landry’s detailing the allegations, as required by the federal

environmental laws they were suing under.102 The lawyers also

made statements to the press and on social media regarding their

98 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646; Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 681; Cantey Hanger,

467 S.W.3d at 482, 487.
99 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646.

100 Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 47.

101 Id. at 45.

102 Id.

19
allegations against Landry’s.103 The Supreme Court held that while

attorney immunity applied to the statutory notice letter, it did not

apply to the lawyers’ statements to the press and on social media.104

It held that immunity did not apply because an “‘attorney who

repeats his client’s allegations to the media or the public for

publicity purposes is not acting in the unique, lawyerly capacity to

which Texas law affords the strong protection of immunity.’”105

The Supreme Court recognized that the lawyers’ statements

to the press and on social media were made in the course of their

representation of their clients.106 The Supreme Court also

recognized that the lawyers made these statements to the press and

on social media in an effort to further their clients’ legal cases. 107

Despite this, the Supreme Court held that the lawyers’ statements

to the press and on social media were not entitled to attorney

103 Id. at 52.

104 Id.

105 Haynes & Boone, LLP, 631 S.W.3d at 77–78 (quoting Landry’s, Inc., 631

S.W.3d at 44).
106 Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 52.

107 Id.

20
immunity.108 It held that attorney immunity did not apply because

“[t]here is nothing particular to the office, professional training,

skill, and authority of an attorney about sending out press releases

or disseminating potentially defamatory allegations through the

media.”109

The Supreme Court emphasized the fact that “[a]nyone—

including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no

particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s

allegations to the media.”33 Immunity attaches only if the attorney

is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his client.34

B. Jackson did not conclusively establish his attorney
immunity affirmative defense based solely on Barras’

The trial court correctly denied Jackson’s Rule 91a motion to

dismiss Barras’ claims based on his attorney-immunity affirmative

defense because:

• Jackson did not conclusively establish that all of
his challenged conduct was the provision of
legal services involving the unique office,
professional skill, training, and authority of an
attorney; and

108 Id.

109 Id. (internal quotation omitted).

21
• Jackson did not conclusively establish that all of
his challenged conduct was within an
adversarial context in which Barras and
Jackson’s client did not share the same
interests

Each of these provides an independent ground to deny

Jackson’s motion to dismiss. Jackson’s failure to conclusively

establish either ground is fatal to his attorney-immunity

affirmative defense.110 Jackson failed to establish even one ground.

1. Jackson did not conclusively establish that all of
his challenged conduct was the provision of legal
services involving the unique office, professional
skill, training, and authority of an attorney

Jackson has not conclusively established that all of the

conduct he is sued for “constitute[d] the provision of ‘legal’ services

involving the unique office, professional skill, training, and

authority of an attorney,” as opposed to conduct that—while it may

properly be performed by an attorney—could also be performed by

non-lawyers.111 That alone is fatal to his contention that Barras’

claim against him should be dismissed at the pleading stage based

110 Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 81 (as the Supreme Court’s use of “and” in

italics makes clear, the requirement is in the conjunctive, so both elements
must be met for attorney immunity to apply).
111 Id. (emphasis in original).

22
on his attorney-immunity affirmative defense. This Court can deny

Jackson’s mandamus petition on that basis alone.

Barras’ Second Amended Petition alleges facts showing that

Jackson’s conduct at issue in this case had little to nothing to do

with providing legal advice.112 Instead, these are actions of a

general business advisor who happened to have a law license.113

Jackson, therefore, cannot conclusively establish his attorney-

immunity affirmative defense.

By 2025, Jackson had immersed himself in all details of

Reynolds’s business, even though he held no position with

Reynolds.114 His role by this point had little to nothing to do with

providing legal advice.115 Both Jackson and Brockman described

Jackson’s work regarding Reynolds as being done in capacities

other than as a lawyer.116 Jackson told Barras that he was handling

the changes to the UCS and Reynolds boards in his “capacity as

112 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

113 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 33; MR0082 (Tab 3) at 48.

114 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

115 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29.

116 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

23
Director of Spanish Step, the majority shareholder of UCS.” 117

Brockman described Jackson as “the trustee for the Management

Trust” and stated that Jackson “works for me.”118

Jackson inserted himself into areas of Reynolds’ operations

far removed from legal issues.119 Jackson gave Barras instructions

regarding changes to the Reynolds and UCS boards.120 In response

to Jackson saying this, Barras responded that he did not need

Jackson’s involvement because his staff was able to handle changes

on their own.121 Jackson responded by emphasizing that Brockman

had asked him to be involved with the board changes. 122

Jackson was regularly involved in Reynolds activities that

were outside attorney-specific duties:

• In December 2024, Jackson and Brockman met
with numerous Reynolds employees on issues
involving technology, operations, and product
management.

117 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

118 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 30.

119 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

120 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

121 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

122 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 31.

24
• In April 2025, Brockman directed that Jackson
“be in all strategic type meetings” of Reynolds.

• In April 2025, Jackson was involved in
meetings regarding why Reynolds was having
difficulty getting business from publicly traded
auto dealerships.123

• In April 2025, Jackson was working with
Brockman on Reynolds’ “strategy/goals/
direction/etc…”124

Jackson’s involvement in Reynolds’ general business

activities was so extensive that in October 2024, Barras emailed

Reynolds’ then-general counsel Richard Rauch, saying “Guess we

work for Frank now,” referring to Frank Jackson. 125

Jackson did not conclusively establish that he was acting on

behalf of his clients in the uniquely lawyerly capacity of one who

possesses the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an

attorney.126 Instead, these are actions of a general business advisor

who happened to have a law license.127 The trial court, therefore,

did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied Jackson’s Rule

123 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 32.

124 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 32.

125 MR0080 (Tab 3) at ¶ 34; MR0082 (Tab 3) at 48.

126 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 33; MR0130 (Tab 4); MR0175 (Tab 5).

127 MR0079 (Tab 3) at ¶ 33; MR0082 (Tab 3) at 48.

25
91a motion based on his attorney-immunity affirmative defense.

2. Jackson did not conclusively establish that all of
his challenged conduct was within an adversarial
context in which Barras and Jackson’s client did
not share the same interests

The attorney-immunity affirmative defense is intended to

ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys

employed as advocates.”128 While attorney immunity can apply

outside of litigation, it applies only “to lawyerly work” in

“adversarial contexts.”129 Jackson did not conclusively establish

that the conduct he is sued for involved “representing the client

within an adversarial context in which the client and the non-client

do not share the same interests.”130 Instead, most of Jackson’s

conduct was in the context of a company owner’s representative

interacting with the company’s CEO. 131 That is not an adversarial

context.

The Texas Supreme Court has held that whether a

128 Cantey Hanger, LLP, 467 S.W.3d at 481 (quoting Mitchell, 10 S.W.3d at

812).
129 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646; Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 79.

130 Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 81.

131 MR0074-MR0081 (Tab 3) at ¶¶ 12-39.

26
relationship is “adversarial” or “nonadversarial” is determined by

“the extent to which the interests of the client and the third party

are consistent with each other.”132 This test “is not categorical, but

fact-specific.”133 A business negotiation that involves “an arms-

length transaction in which both sides were represented and

advised by their own counsel” is an adversarial context.134 But

people working together in a business who do not have ongoing

“grievances” and “hostilities” do not have an adversarial

relationship.135 So when the parties “were ostensibly working

towards the same goal of a successful business venture,” whether

their relationship was adversarial is “not established as a matter of

132 McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d

787, 794 (Tex. 1999); McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 497 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“not every situation outside of
litigation is clearly defined as adversarial or nonadversarial, and consequently,
we examine the extent to which the interests of the client and the third party
are consistent with one another”).
133 Ron Carter, Inc. v. Kane, No. 01-10-00815-CV, 2011 WL 5100903, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, pet. denied).
134 Valls v. Johanson & Fairless, L.L.P., 314 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
135 Id. (“Admittedly, the parties later set aside their grievances, at least
temporarily until the distribution of settlement proceeds prompted a renewal
of hostilities. However, at the time the Settlement Agreement was drafted, the
parties’ relationship was adversarial. Therefore, appellant was not justified in
relying on statements made by opposing counsel during that time period.”).

27
law but would be a fact question.”136

Barras was CEO of Reynolds, of which Brockman was the

ultimate primary owner. Jackson was Brockman’s business advisor

and the general counsel of Reynolds’ parent company. So Barras

and Jackson were “ostensibly working towards the same goal of a

successful business venture.”137 Jackson, therefore, has not

conclusively established that he and Barras had an adversarial

relationship regarding all allegations against him.138 Jackson does

not discharge his requirement by identifying an adversarial

relationship regarding some actions. Instead, Jackson must

conclusively establish an adversarial relationship regarding all of

his actions at issue in Barras’ tortious interference claim against

him.139

The trial court, therefore, did not clearly abuse its discretion

when it denied Jackson’s Rule 91a motion based on his attorney-

136 Ron Carter, Inc. v. Kane, 2011 WL 5100903, at *6; see also McMahan, 108

S.W.3d at 497.
137 Ron Carter, 2011 WL 5100903, at *6; see also McMahan, 108 S.W.3d at 497.

138 Ron Carter, 2011 WL 5100903, at *6; see also McMahan, 108 S.W.3d at 497.

139 Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 52.

28
immunity affirmative defense because Jackson did not conclusively

establish that all of his alleged conduct was “lawyerly work” in

“adversarial contexts.”140

3. At minimum, Jackson did not conclusively
establish that attorney immunity applies to all of
his conduct at issue

The Texas Supreme Court has held that attorney immunity is

decided on a conduct-by-conduct basis.141 So an attorney might have

immunity for some actions during the representation, but not

others.142 Jackson has not met his heavy burden of conclusively

establishing that attorney immunity applies to all of the actions for

which Barras is suing him.

Even if this Court were to determine that some of Jackson’s

actions were entitled to attorney immunity, it should not grant

mandamus ordering the trial court to grant the Rule 91a motion in

its entirety. Instead, it should limit any order to only those actions

that Jackson conclusively established were barred by attorney

immunity.

140 Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646; Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 79.

141 Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 51-52.

142 Id.

29
As explained above, Jackson did not conclusively establish his

attorney immunity affirmative defense regarding any of his actions

at issue. So this Court should deny Jackson’s mandamus petition in

its entirety. But if this Court were to determine that Jackson met

his burden as to some—but not all—of his actions, that does not bar

Barras’ claim in its entirety.

For example, even if this Court were to hold that Jackson had

attorney immunity for advice he gave Reynolds regarding whether

to fire Barras, Barras’ tortious interference claim would still

remain. As Barras explains below, the issue of whether he was

properly fired for cause—while relevant to his breach of contract

claim against Reynolds—is irrelevant to his tortious interference

claim against Jackson.143 Barras is not suing Jackson because of the

advice he gave to Reynolds’ regarding whether it had cause to fire

him. Instead, Barras is suing Jackson because he—together with

Brockman—interfered with his contract as Reynolds’ CEO.144

143 See § III(B) below.

144 MR0078 (Tab 3) at ¶ 29; MR0082 (Tab 3) at ¶ 47.

30
C. Whether Barras was properly terminated for cause is
not at issue in his tortious interference claim against
Jackson

Jackson bases his mandamus petition on his allegation that

Barras’ tortious interference claim is really a challenge to the legal

advice he gave his client.145 Jackson contends that Barras’ tortious

interference claim is based on “whether the investigation” that

Jackson conducted “supports for-cause termination” of Barras’

employment as CEO.146

Jackson is wrong. Whether Barras was fired for cause is

irrelevant to his tortious interference claim against Jackson.

Tortious interference is not legal when a contracting party has

the right to terminate the contract. The Texas Supreme Court has

long held that “the unenforceability of the contract is no defense to

an action for tortious interference with its performance.”147 So

“third persons are not free to interfere tortiously with performance

of the contract before it is avoided.”148 That is why the Supreme

145 Jackson Mandamus Pet. at 22.

146 Id.

147 Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1969).

148 Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1989).

31
Court has long recognized that “a cause of action exists for tortious

interference with a contract of employment terminable at will.”149

Barras is suing Jackson for tortiously interfering with his

contract with Reynolds.150 Whether Reynolds properly fired Barras

for cause will be determined in Barras’ breach of contract and

declaratory judgment claims against Reynolds.151 Whether

Reynolds properly fired Barras for cause will not be an issue in

Barras’ tortious interference claim against Jackson.

This Court, therefore, should reject Jackson’s argument that

whether Barras was properly fired for cause is part of Barras’

tortious interference claim.

PRAYER
The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it

denied Jackson’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss because Jackson did not

149 Id. The only exception to this rule is if the contract is unenforceable on

public policy grounds, such as illegality or unreasonable restraint of trade.
Clements, 437 S.W.2d at 821; Washington Square Fin., LLC v. RSL Funding,
LLC, 418 S.W.3d 761, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
That is not at issue regarding Barras’ contract with Reynolds. MR0091-
MR0110 (Tab 3).
150 MR0082 (Tab 3) (tortious interference).

151 MR0081-MR0082 (Tab 3) (breach of contract); MR0082-MR0086
(declaratory judgment).

32
conclusively establish his attorney-immunity affirmative defense.

This Court, therefore, should deny Jackson’s mandamus petition in

its entirety.

If this Court determines that Jackson has conclusively

established his attorney-immunity affirmative defense regarding

some—but not all—of the actions for which he is being sued, it

should limit its mandamus relief to those actions where the

affirmative defense was conclusively-established.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David George
Anthony G. Buzbee David George
Texas Bar No. 24001820 Texas Bar No. 00793212
Thomas Colby Holler THE GEORGE APPELLATE LAW FIRM
Texas Bar No. 24126898 440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Mitchell W. Blasio Houston, Texas 77002
Texas Bar No. 24138469 Tel. (832) 850-1113
THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM dgeorge@georgeappeals.com
J.P. Morgan Chase Tower
600 Travis, Suite 7300
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel. (713) 223-5393
tbuzbee@txattorneys.com
choller@txattorneys.com
mblasio@txattorneys.com
www.txattorneys.com
Counsel for Real-Party-in-Interest
Norman Thomas Barras, Jr.

33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on January 4, 2026, I served a copy of the
foregoing document upon the following counsel of record via
electronic filing:

Gregg Costa
Sydney A. Scott
Jack B. DiSorbo
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
811 Main Street, Suite 3000
Houston, Texas 77002
Counsel for Defendant/Relator Frank Jackson

Honorable Grant Dorfman
Presiding Judge
Texas Business Court
Eleventh Division
301 Fannin Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Respondent

/s/ David George
David George

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This mandamus response contains 6,104 words, excluding the
caption, signature blocks, and certificates. This motion was
prepared using Microsoft Word for Mac version 16.90.22016 in 14
point (12 point in footnotes) Century Schoolbook (Arial headings)
font.
/s/ David George
David George

34
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

David George on behalf of David George
Bar No. 793212
6226d830-c50e-4ea2-8bb1-c71ad4164354@us.efiling.clio.com
Envelope ID: 109627216
Filing Code Description: Original Proceeding Response
Filing Description: Real Party in Interest Norman Barras Response to
Mandamus Petition
Status as of 1/5/2026 7:06 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

David George dgeorge@georgeappeals.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: The Reynolds and Reynolds Company

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Jordan Kazlow 24101994 jkazlow@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Ruben Garza 24127735 rgarza@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

David Genender dgenender@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Maria C.Rodriguez mcrodriguez@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Dorothy Brockman

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Jordan Kazlow 24101994 jkazlow@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Ruben Garza 24127735 rgarza@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Maria C.Rodriguez mcrodriguez@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

David Genender dgenender@mwe.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: NormanThomasBarras, Jr.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Anthony Buzbee 24001820 tbuzbee@txattorneys.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Thomas Holler 24126898 choller@txattorneys.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

David George on behalf of David George
Bar No. 793212
6226d830-c50e-4ea2-8bb1-c71ad4164354@us.efiling.clio.com
Envelope ID: 109627216
Filing Code Description: Original Proceeding Response
Filing Description: Real Party in Interest Norman Barras Response to
Mandamus Petition
Status as of 1/5/2026 7:06 AM CST

Associated Case Party: NormanThomasBarras, Jr.

Thomas Holler 24126898 choller@txattorneys.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Mitchell Blasio 24138469 mblasio@txattorneys.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Frank Jackson

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Sydney Scott SAScott@gibsondunn.com 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT

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Associated Case Party: Honorable Grant Dorfman

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Jackie Struss Jackie.Struss@txcourts.gov 1/4/2026 12:13:42 PM SENT