In Re Frank Jackson v. the State of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00235-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/5/2026 5:56 PM
No. 15-25-00235-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK

In the Court of Appeals FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

for the Fifteenth Judicial District, 1/5/2026 5:56:10 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

Austin, Texas Clerk

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IN RE FRANK JACKSON,
Relator
—————————————————
Original Proceeding from Cause No. 25-BC11B-00032
Texas Business Court, Eleventh Division, Houston, Texas
—————————————————
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF
—————————————————
Gregg Costa
State Bar No. 24028160
Sydney A. Scott
State Bar No. 24088379
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
811 Main Street, Suite 3000
Houston, TX 77002
Tel.: (346) 718-6649
Fax: (346) 718-6967
gcosta@gibsondunn.com
sascott@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Relator
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF

Barras’s response to Jackson’s request for temporary relief fails to

identify any prejudice that would result from a brief stay while this Court

considers the mandamus petition. Nor does Barras deny that attorney

immunity is a true immunity from suit or that the immunity would ordi-

narily protect against the expedited discovery he seeks from Jackson. His

only response is to incorporate by reference the merits arguments offered

in opposition to the mandamus petition (Opp. at 1-2), and to suggest that

a stay, if issued, should be limited to Jackson (at 2). As explained below

and more fully in the forthcoming reply in support of the mandamus pe-

tition, Barras’s merits arguments are wrong. And, besides being unwork-

able, there is no precedent for issuing a partial, one-party stay in an im-

munity appeal. The Court should grant the motion for temporary relief.

I. Barras does not dispute that attorney immunity protects
against the rapid-fire discovery he seeks.

Attorney immunity protects lawyers “from civil suit.” Bethel v.

Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, PC, 595 S.W.3d 651, 658

(Tex. 2020); accord Troice v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341, 348 (5th

Cir. 2016) (explaining that “Texas courts seek to protect attorneys

against even defending a lawsuit” because attorney immunity is a “true

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immunity”). For this reason, when reviewing a denial of attorney im-

munity, appellate courts often stay trial court actions to protect the rela-

tor from being forced to defend against the plaintiff’s claims pending

mandamus review. See Stay Order, In re Sams, No. 05-22-150-CV (Tex.

App.—Dallas Mar. 8, 2022) (granting stay to review denial of 91a motion

asserting attorney immunity); Stay Order, In re Marshall, No. 24-1010

(Tex. Apr. 17, 2025) (granting stay to review denial of summary judgment

motion asserting attorney immunity).1 Notably, Barras identifies no case

denying a stay pending appellate review of an immunity defense.

There is a compelling need to stay the trial court proceedings while

this Court considers Jackson’s entitlement to immunity from suit. Bar-

ras has requested a trial date in August—just eight months away.

MR737. And he has demanded Jackson’s and many other witnesses’ dep-

ositions, even though Barras has not turned over his company computer

or otherwise produced any documents. MR742. Jackson’s burden of de-

fending against Barras’s claim is serious and ongoing.

1
Appellate courts also regularly issue stays pending review of other forms
of immunity. See, e.g., Stay Order, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 20-0434 (Tex. July
3, 2020) (statutory immunity); Stay Order, In re Griffith, No. 14-14-897-CV
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 11, 2014) (governmental immunity);
Stay Order, ERCOT v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, No. 05-
17-872-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas July 28, 2017) (sovereign immunity).

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In response, Barras denies none of this. He does not dispute that

attorney immunity protects lawyers from all the burdens of litigation and

does not deny that he has actively pursued discovery from Jackson. Nor

does Barras dispute or even respond to the wealth of authority showing

that appellate courts routinely stay trial court proceedings pending re-

view of a colorable immunity defense. Mot. at 2-4. And Barras does not

even try to identify any prejudice that would result from a brief stay

while the mandamus petition is pending. The Court should grant Jack-

son’s motion for temporary relief to prevent forfeiture of his right to be

immune from Barras’s claim for tortious interference with contract.

II. Jackson is entitled to attorney immunity.

Barras’s tortious-interference claim against Jackson is a down-the-

middle case for attorney immunity. The immunity covers all actions

taken by an attorney unless the conduct at issue “is not lawyerly work or

is entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer or falls outside the scope of

client representation.” Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2022)

(emphasis added). The “only facts required” for the immunity are “the

existence of an attorney-client relationship” and “the type of conduct.”

Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 681–82 (Tex. 2018). Here, Barras

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sued Jackson—the general counsel of Reynolds’s parent company, Uni-

versal Computer Systems Holding, Inc.—for Jackson’s actions, together

with outside counsel Jackson engaged, to investigate Barras for various

misconduct and advise on whether Barras could be terminated for cause.

That conduct “involve[s] the uniquely lawyerly capacity and the attor-

ney’s skills as an attorney,” Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 346, and it is the type

of work in-house and external employment lawyers do every day.

Rather that defend attorney immunity on the merits, Barras dedi-

cates three pages to emphasizing the standard of review for Rule 91a mo-

tions. Mandamus Opp. at 10-12. But if the pleadings, together with the

materials attached to them, “conclusively establish” that the defendant

is entitled to attorney immunity, the trial court must dismiss the claim.

Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. No special or heightened showing is required.

“If the defense of attorney immunity meets [the usual Rule 91a] stand-

ards, Rule 91a will support dismissal of the barred claims.” In re Sams,

No. 05-22-00150-CV, 2022 WL 3354137, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.

15, 2022, no pet.) (granting mandamus relief from denial of Rule 91a mo-

tion asserting attorney immunity) (quoting Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656);

id. (“That is enough for dismissal under Rule 91a.”). Because Barras’s

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claim challenges core attorney conduct, immunity is conclusively estab-

lished under Rule 91a—just as it has been in the many Texas cases en-

forcing attorney immunity from suit at the pleading stage. Mot. at 7-8.

A. Barras’s “business conduct” allegations are irrelevant.

Barras argues that attorney immunity does not apply because Jack-

son supposedly also had business responsibilities at UCSH. Mandamus

Opp. at 22-25. But as explained in Jackson’s mandamus petition (at 22),

the business responsibilities Barras cites—advising on board changes,

participating in technology meetings, discussing investment strategy—

have nothing to do with the conduct at issue in Barras’s claim. Tellingly,

the mandamus response is silent on the connection between the alleged

business conduct and the tortious interference claim. Barras has sued

Jackson for one thing: allegedly interfering with Barras’s employment

contract by causing him to be terminated for cause. The only conduct

relevant to that claim is Jackson’s role in investigating Barras and ad-

vising on Reynolds’s for-cause determination.

Those actions fit squarely within attorney immunity, and Barras’s

artful pleading cannot evade that conclusion. As Jackson’s mandamus

petition (at 19-22) explains, a plaintiff is not permitted to recast the

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nature of his claims by repleading. See In re Breviloba, LLC, 650 S.W.3d

508, 512 (Tex. 2022) (“We are guided by the ‘nature’ and ‘gravamen’ of a

claim, not how the claim is artfully pleaded or recast.”). Although Barras

deleted reference to Jackson as the UCSH general counsel and added

conclusory language about Jackson acting as a “business advisor,” MR77,

that gamesmanship does not change that Barras has sued a general

counsel over his role in advising his client on the investigation and for-

cause termination of its CEO. Moreover, Barras ignores that the

termination letter attached to Barras’s second amended petition—and

therefore part of the Rule 91a record—copies Jackson as “General

Counsel of the Company.” MR114. No matter how Barras dresses up the

conduct at issue in this case, it cannot be described as “entirely foreign to

the duties of a lawyer.” Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 646.

B. Jackson’s representation of Reynolds
was adversarial to Barras.

Barras also argues that Jackson’s representation of Reynolds in

connection with its termination of Barras was not “adversarial” as is

required for attorney immunity to attach. Mandamus Opp. at 26-28. But

it strains credulity to suggest that a company’s for-cause termination of

its CEO based on finding that he engaged in interested transactions and

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other misconduct—thereby (in Barras’s view) depriving that CEO of tens

of millions of dollars in severance—is somehow not adversarial. Indeed,

the termination letter is addressed to Barras’s counsel—because Barras

had already retained a law firm to represent him against Reynolds.

MR111. The letter further recognizes the adversarial nature of the termi-

nation decision by attaching a proposed separation agreement, through

which Barras would release any claims against Reynolds in exchange for

$20 million. MR115–27. And the existence of this contentious lawsuit

confirms the adversarial nature of the decision to terminate this CEO for

cause. In advising Reynolds on its investigation into and for-cause termi-

nation of Barras, Jackson’s representation was plainly adverse to Barras.

C. The cause determination is the crux of Barras’s case.

Finally, Barras’s position (asserted for the first time here) that his

cause termination is not relevant to his tortious-interference claim (Man-

damus Opp. at 31-32), contradicts the entire basis for that claim. The

only way for Barras to prevail on tortious interference is to show a breach

of contract that Jackson induced. See All Am. Tel., Inc. v. USLD Comms.,

Inc., 291 S.W.3d 518, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (“For

a plaintiff to maintain a tortious interference claim . . . [he] must present

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evidence that some obligatory provision of a contract has been

breached.”). And the only alleged breach anywhere in the petition in-

volves the for-cause termination provision. MR81 (“Defendant Reynolds

wrongfully terminated Barras. Contrary to the Employment Agreeme-

nt’s terms, Reynolds claims the termination was ‘for cause.’ This is a

breach.”). After all, Barras’s employment contract allowed him to be fired

at any time for any reason; the cause determination, with its substantial

financial implications, is what is being disputed. Mandamus Pet. at 7.

That is why the second amended petition devotes four pages to challeng-

ing the cause justifications in the termination letter. MR83–86. Barras’s

tortious-interference claim is derivative of his breach-of-contract claim,

and the only way for Barras to establish that Reynolds breached the con-

tract—and thus establish that Jackson is liable for inducing the breach

—is to show that Barras was not properly terminated for cause.

Challenging the cause determination, and Jackson’s role in advis-

ing Reynolds to make that determination, is the whole point of this case.

III. A partial stay is unworkable and has no basis in law.

Barras also suggests that if the Court issues a stay, it should be

“limited solely to Barras’s claims against Jackson.” Opp. at 3. But he

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offers no authority for the proposition that a one-party stay is appropriate

in this situation, nor is undersigned counsel aware of any. In fact, the

authority cuts the other way. In cases where one defendant asserts at-

torney immunity, but other codefendants do not, appellate courts stay

the entire trial proceeding until the immunity is resolved. See Stay Or-

der, In re Sams, No. 05-22-150-CV (staying trial court proceedings to re-

view one codefendant’s Rule 91a motion asserting attorney immunity);

Stay Order, In re Marshall, No. 24-1010 (same as to summary judgment).

There are good reasons why courts of appeals do not issue one-party

stays—the dual-track discovery that could result would be an adminis-

trative nightmare and severely prejudice Jackson. If the depositions

Barras is demanding go forward during a limited stay, they would have

to be taken again to allow Jackson’s counsel to ask questions in the event

the mandamus petition is denied. It makes no sense to risk that highly

inefficient situation. And what would happen to the discovery and trial

schedule if a partial stay is later lifted? Is the schedule continued? Or is

Jackson forced to pursue his own discovery on a compressed timeline

before trial? A stay is designed to uphold Jackson’s right to immunity

from suit, but a partial stay would put Jackson in a worse position. The

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Court can and should avoid these issues by rejecting Barras’s argument

for an unprecedented partial stay.

* * *
The balance of interests is lopsided in favor of a stay. Absent a stay,

Jackson will irreparably lose his immunity from suit and incur the

expense and inconvenience of imminent discovery. On the other side of

the equation, Barras has not articulated any prejudice whatsoever from

a brief stay while this Court resolves the petition.

PRAYER

Frank Jackson respectfully requests that the Court grant his mo-

tion for temporary relief and stay proceedings in the trial court pending

resolution of the petition for writ of mandamus.

Dated: January 5, 2026 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregg Costa
Gregg Costa
State Bar No. 24028160
Sydney A. Scott
State Bar No. 24088379
Jack B. DiSorbo
State Bar No. 24120804
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
811 Main Street, Suite 3000
Houston, TX 77002
Tel.: (346) 718-6649
Fax: (346) 718-6967

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gcosta@gibsondunn.com
sascott@gibsondunn.com
jdisorbo@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Relator

RULE 9.4(i) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), I certify that this brief contains

2,008 words, excluding the portions exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Gregg Costa
Gregg Costa

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on January 5, 2026, true and correct copies of this

filing were served via electronic service on the following parties.

/s/ Gregg Costa
Gregg Costa

Honorable Grant Dorfman David Genender
Judge, Texas Business Court Jordan Kazlow
Eleventh Division Ruben C. Garza, III
301 Fannin Street MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
Houston, Texas 77002 845 Texas Avenue, Suite 4000
BCDivision11B@txcourts.gov Houston, TX 77002
Tel.: (713) 982-5638
Respondent Fax: (972) 232-3098
dgenender@mwe.com
Anthony G. Buzbee jkazlow@mwe.com
Thomas Colby Holler rgarza@mwe.com

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Mitchell W. Blasio
THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM Maria C. Rodriguez (Pro Hac Vice)
J.P. Morgan Chase Tower MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
600 Travis, Suite 7500 2049 Century Park E., Suite 3200
Houston, Texas 77002 Los Angeles, CA 90067
Tel.: (713) 223-5393 Tel.: (310) 277-4110
Fax: (713) 223-5909 Fax: (310) 277-4730
tbuzbee@txattorneys.com mcrodriguez@mwe.com
choller@txattorneys.com
mblasio@txattorneys.com Counsel for Defendants The
Reynolds and Reynolds Company
David George and Dorothy Brockman
THE GEORGE APPELLATE LAW FIRM
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel.: (832) 850-1113
dgeorge@georgeappeals.com

Counsel for Real Party in Interest

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Automated Certificate of eService
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Jeanine Broyles on behalf of Gregg Costa
Bar No. 24028160
JBroyles@gibsondunn.com
Envelope ID: 109678723
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: Reply in Support of Motion for Temporary Relief
Status as of 1/6/2026 7:04 AM CST

Associated Case Party: The Reynolds and Reynolds Company

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Thomas Holler 24126898 choller@txattorneys.com 1/5/2026 5:56:10 PM SENT

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Associated Case Party: Frank Jackson

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Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Jeanine Broyles on behalf of Gregg Costa
Bar No. 24028160
JBroyles@gibsondunn.com
Envelope ID: 109678723
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: Reply in Support of Motion for Temporary Relief
Status as of 1/6/2026 7:04 AM CST

Associated Case Party: Frank Jackson

Sydney Scott SAScott@gibsondunn.com 1/5/2026 5:56:10 PM SENT

Jack DiSorbo JDiSorbo@gibsondunn.com 1/5/2026 5:56:10 PM SENT

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Case Contacts

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