Sammy Tawakkol v. Sheila Vasquez, in Her Official Capacity as Manager of the Texas Department of Public Safety- Criminal History Record Information Services Bureau; And Freeman F. Martin, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety

Affirmed, Motion for Rehearing Denied, Opinion Withdrawn and Substitute
Opinion filed January 20, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00009-CV

SAMMY TAWAKKOL, Appellant
V.
SHEILA VASQUEZ, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MANAGER OF
THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY- CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION SERVICES BUREAU; AND
FREEMAN F. MARTIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 200th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-001566

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

We deny Sammy Tawakkol’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior
opinion dated November 20, 2025, and substitute the following opinion of the Court.

Appellant Sammy Tawakkol appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his claims
filed against Appellees Sheila Vasquez and Freeman Martin 1 as officials of the
Department of Public Safety (DPS). In Tawakkol’s first two issues, he alleges that
his claims are not barred by either res judicata or collateral estoppel. In Tawakkol’s
third issue, he argues the trial court maintained jurisdiction over his ultra vires
claims. Concluding that Tawakkol did not plead a cognizable cause of action, we
affirm the judgment of dismissal.

BACKGROUND

I. Proceedings in Federal Court

When Tawakkol was a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy, he
pleaded guilty to violating Article 120c(a)(2) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. The Secretary of Defense designated Article 120c(a)(2) as an offense that
requires a convicted individual to register as a sex offender. 34 U.S.C.
§ 20911(5)(A)(iv). As a result of this conviction, Tawakkol was required to register
as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act. Id.
§ 20913(a).

Tawakkol later disenrolled from the Academy and moved to Houston, Texas.
Once there, DPS officials determined that Tawakkol would be required to register
as a sex offender under Texas’s sex offender registration system. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 62.001(10)(A)(ii) (defining an “[e]xtrajurisdictional registrant” as a
person who is required to register as a sex offender under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice). DPS officials concluded that Tawakkol’s status as a sex offender
under federal law rendered him an extrajurisdictional sex offender under state law—

1
Steven McCraw, who in his official capacity as Director of the Texas Department of
Public Safety was previously a named defendant in this case, was succeeded by Freeman F. Martin.
In accordance with Rule 7.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Director Martin has
been automatically substituted in Director McCraw’s place in this appeal. For clarity we refer to
actions by Director McCraw in this opinion.

2
in other words, his duty to register in Texas hinged solely on his duty to register
under the federal statute. See Tawakkol v. Vasquez, 87 F.4th 715, 717 (5th Cir. 2023).

When DPS officials notified Tawakkol of their determination, Tawakkol filed
suit in federal district court against two DPS employees, Vasquez, and McCraw (the
State Officials) under Sections 1983 and 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
Id. In his complaint, Tawakkol asserted that the State Officials’ registration
determination violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution because he had not committed a registrable
sex offense. Id.

After a bench trial, the federal district court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law determining that Tawakkol was entitled to injunctive relief.
Tawakkol v. Vasquez, No. 1:19-CV-513-LY, 2022 WL 20564755, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 29, 2022), vacated and remanded, 87 F.4th 715 (5th Cir. 2023) (Tawakkol I).
The district court concluded that the Secretary of Defense had exceeded the scope
of his authority in designating Article 120c(a)(2) as a sex offense. Id. at *4–5. The
court reasoned that the State Officials lacked any basis to classify Tawakkol as an
extrajurisdictional offender under state law because Tawakkol had no duty to
register under federal law. Id. at *5.

Based on these conclusions, the district court issued a final judgment (1)
declaring that Tawakkol was not required to register as a sex offender under federal
or military law, and (2) permanently enjoining the State Officials from requiring
Tawakkol to register in Texas. Id. The State Officials and Tawakkol appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.

On appeal, the State Officials alleged the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because Tawakkol’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity.
Tawakkol v. Vasquez, 87 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2023) (Tawakkol II). Tawakkol
3
asserted that the exception to sovereign immunity set out in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) applied to his case. Id. This exception allows a plaintiff to seek an
injunction in federal court to prevent state officials from enforcing state laws that
are contrary to federal law. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39
(2021) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60). Similar to the ultra vires
exception in Texas, for Young to apply, the plaintiff must (1) name individual state
officials as defendants in their official capacities; (2) allege an ongoing violation of
federal law; and (3) seek prospective injunctive relief. Green Valley Special Util.
Dist. v. City of Schertz, Tex., 969 F.3d 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2020); see City of El Paso
v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (determining that in order to fall
within ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must (1) sue
defendants in their official capacities; (2) allege the officer acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act; and (3) request prospective
injunctive relief).

The Fifth Circuit held that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply to
Tawakkol’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief because the district court’s
decision did not enjoin the State Officials from enforcing a state law that violated a
federal law. Tawakkol II, 87 F.4th at 719. The court determined that the relief issued
by the district court invalidated only federal law and prohibited the State Officials
from enforcing a state law merely because it was consistent with federal law. Id. The
Fifth Circuit then vacated the district court’s decision and remanded to that court
with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 720–21.

II. Proceedings in Texas

After the federal district court dismissed Tawakkol’s claims, he filed a petition
in Texas arising from the same transaction alleged in his federal complaint.
Tawakkol invoked Article 62.003 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and

4
Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief reversing the State Officials’ determination that he was required to
register as a sex offender in Texas.

Tawakkol alleged the State Officials acted without authority when they
determined that Tawakkol was required to register as a sex offender in Texas as an
extrajurisdictional registrant in a letter sent to Tawakkol’s attorney:

Thank you for your inquiry regarding Mr. Tawokkol’s duty to register
as a sex offender in Texas. Neither offense cited in your letter is
considered substantially similar to a reportable offense in Texas.
Therefore, the Texas offense is not a “reportable conviction or
adjudication” requiring registration under CCP Chapter 62. However,
pursuant to CCP Art. 62.001(10), the offense under Art. 120c(a)(2) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires Mr. Tawokkol to register
as an extrajurisdictional registrant in Texas.

Tawakkol asked the trial court to reverse the determination made by the State
Officials “as authorized by Article 62.003(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, wherein Defendants erroneously determined Plaintiff is an
‘extrajurisdictional registrant’ as defined by Article 62.001(10) of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure.” Tawakkol further sought a declaratory judgment declaring
that he is not an extrajurisdictional registrant as defined by Article 62.001(10).

The State Officials filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in which
they alleged that Tawakkol’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The State Officials also alleged that Tawakkol failed to plead a cognizable
cause of action under Article 62.003 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
because Article 62.003 applies only to determinations of whether an offense under
laws of other jurisdictions is substantially similar to the elements of an offense in
Texas. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissed Tawakkol’s claims, finding his claims were barred by the

5
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and finding Tawakkol lacked any
cognizable cause of action under Texas law. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In Tawakkol’s first two issues, he challenges the trial court’s dismissal on the
grounds that his claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. In
Tawakkol’s third issue he challenges the trial court’s dismissal on the ground that
he did not allege a cognizable ultra vires cause of action.

I. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo
review. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849,
855 (Tex. 2002). Generally, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction
over a lawsuit in which a party has sued the State or a state agency unless the
Legislature has consented to suit. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d
692, 696 (Tex. 2003).

When considering a plea to the jurisdiction, our analysis begins with the live
pleadings. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). We first
determine whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the
court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Dep’t. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally in
favor of the plaintiff, and unless challenged with evidence, we accept all allegations
as true. Id. at 226–28. The plea must be granted if the plaintiff’s pleadings
affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction or if the defendant presents
undisputed evidence that negates the existence of the court’s jurisdiction. Heckman,
369 S.W.3d at 150.

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II. Res Judicata Is an Affirmative Defense Rather than a Jurisdictional Bar
to Suit.

Tawakkol first challenges the trial court’s dismissal on the grounds that his
claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. In the trial court, the State
Officials filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in which they asserted, as
applicable here, that the doctrine of res judicata deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction. Specifically, the State Officials argued that the claims raised by
Tawakkol in state court were fully and finally adjudicated in federal court. The State
Officials further alleged that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited Tawakkol
from re-litigating the issue that the officials committed ultra vires acts when they
determined he was required to register as a sex offender in Texas. The trial court
found that Tawakkol’s claims were barred by both doctrines.

Res judicata requires proof of: “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them;
and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been
raised in the first action.” Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212,
225 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.
1996)). On appeal, Tawakkol argues that the res judicata doctrine does not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction because the federal court’s dismissal of his claim is not
a “final judgment on the merits.” The State Officials respond that the federal court
reached the merits of Tawakkol’s claim because it found it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the claims. Because the federal court found Tawakkol’s claims were barred by
sovereign immunity, the State Officials argue that Tawakkol is barred from asserting
claims against the State Officials in state court. We need not resolve this dispute
because the doctrine of res judicata acts as a plea in bar and does not deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction.

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“Res judicata is a generic term for the related concepts of claim preclusion
(res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Town Park Ctr., LLC v.
City of Sealy, 639 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.).
In the trial court, the State Officials argued that res judicata deprived the trial court
of subject matter jurisdiction because Tawakkol’s claims had previously been
disposed in federal court. Res judicata, however, is not a plea to the jurisdiction, but
an affirmative defense, which is a plea in bar. Id. As a plea in bar, the doctrine of res
judicata does not provide justification for summary dismissal on the pleadings. Id.
“An ‘affirmative defense’ like res judicata ‘should be raised through a motion for
summary judgment or proven at trial.’” Id. (quoting Reyes v. Thrifty Motors, Inc.,
No. 01-15-00699-CV, 2016 WL 3571101, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

Because a plea in bar challenges the plaintiff’s right to recover and reaches
the merits of a case, the matter is typically disposed of following a trial, not in a
preliminary hearing. Kelley v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 309 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tex. 1958).
If a plea in bar is sustained, the trial court can enter a judgment finally disposing of
the controversy for the defendant. Id. In contrast, a plea to the jurisdiction is a
challenge to the court’s power to hear the suit, which, if sustained, requires dismissal
of the case. See Tex. Hwy. Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967).

“Nevertheless, a ‘speedy and final judgment may be obtained on the basis of
matters in bar and without the formality of a trial on the merits, if the parties so agree
or if recourse is had to the process of summary judgment where contested fact issues
are not present.’” Town Park Ctr., 639 S.W.3d at 183 (quoting Kelley, 309 S.W.2d
at 214.).

Here, there is no agreement between the parties. In such circumstances, courts
have reviewed the record to determine whether the proceeding, though misnamed,

8
can be characterized as a true summary judgment proceeding. See Town Park Ctr.,
639 S.W.3d at 183 (collecting cases). In this case, however, we need not determine
whether the proceeding in the trial court carried the hallmarks of a true summary
judgment proceeding because the trial court sustained the motion to dismiss on the
alternative ground that Tawakkol had not alleged a cognizable cause of action under
Article 62.003 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

We conclude the trial court’s dismissal cannot be upheld on res judicata
grounds.

III. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply to Deprive the Trial Court of
Jurisdiction over Tawakkol’s Ultra Vires Claim.

In the trial court the State Officials argued that Tawakkol’s ultra vires claims
were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. To prevail under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, a party must show that (1) the issue as to which it seeks to estop
relitigation is the identical issue in the other case; (2) the facts in the current suit
were fully and fairly litigated in the earlier action; (3) the same facts were essential
to the judgment in the first suit; and (4) the parties were cast as adversaries in the
first action. First Sabrepoint Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc., 712
S.W.3d 75, 85–86 (Tex. 2025).

Tawakkol argues that because dismissal of his federal claim was limited to a
determination that his claims were barred by federal sovereign immunity, and
because federal sovereign immunity differs from sovereign immunity under Texas
law, which encompasses the ultra vires exception, collateral estoppel did not bar his
claims. The State Officials respond that issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel,
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over Tawakkol’s claim.

Collateral estoppel, like res judicata, is an affirmative defense that acts as a
plea in bar, not as a plea to the jurisdiction. Town Park Ctr., 639 S.W.3d at 182–83;

9
Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. The trial court’s dismissal, therefore cannot be upheld under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. We turn to the alternative ground upon which the trial
court dismissed Tawakkol’s claims—the failure to assert a cognizable cause of
action under Article 62.003 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IV. The Trial Court did not Err in Granting the State Officials’ Motion to
Dismiss Because Tawakkol did not Plead a Cognizable Cause of Action.
In Tawakkol’s third issue he challenges the trial court’s finding that he failed
to plead a cognizable cause of action under Texas law. In the trial court, Tawakkol
alleged that the State Officials erred in determining that he was required to register
as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that such
error constituted an ultra vires act. In addition to injunctive relief, Tawakkol asked
the trial court to reverse the State Officials’ determination “as authorized by Article
62.003(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure” that Tawakkol is an
extrajurisdictional registrant. Tawakkol also sought a declaratory judgment that he
is not an extrajurisdictional registrant as defined by Article 62.001(10) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. In their motion to dismiss, the State Officials alleged that
Tawakkol lacked a cognizable cause of action under Article 62.003 because that
article applies to determinations of whether an offense under laws other than Texas
laws was substantially similar to the elements of an offense under the laws of Texas.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 62.003.

The Declaratory Judgments Act provides only a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for challenges to the validity of an ordinance or statute. Morath v.
Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 710 S.W.3d 918, 929 (Tex. App.—15 Dist. 2025, no
pet.). Tawakkol does not challenge the validity of an ordinance or statute; therefore,
the Declaratory Judgments Act does not waive sovereign immunity. Id.

Sovereign immunity, however, does not bar a suit that seeks to bring

10
government officials into compliance with statutory or constitutional provisions.
Chambers-Liberty Ctys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. 2019).
Such claims, known as ultra vires claims, must be brought against government
officials in their official capacity and may only seek prospective injunctive remedies.
Id. Tawakkol asserts the trial court has jurisdiction over the State Officials pursuant
to the ultra vires exception because the State Officials failed to comply with Article
62.003 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

To fall within the ultra vires exception, a suit “must allege, and ultimately
prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely
ministerial act.” See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. A government official acts
without legal authority if he or she exceeds the bounds of the granted authority or if
his or her acts conflict with the law itself. See Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City
of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016).

Tawakkol asserts that the State Officials committed ultra vires acts by
determining that he was required to register as a sex offender with an
extrajurisdictional conviction under Article 62.003 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The State Officials respond that Article 62.003(c) does not provide
Tawakkol with a cognizable claim because it exclusively applies to determinations
of whether an offense under laws other than Texas’s laws are “substantially similar
to the elements of an offense under the laws of this state.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc art.
62.003. In addressing Tawakkol’s issue, we begin with an overview of the sex-
offender registration schemes in the federal and state statutes.

A. The Federal Statutory Scheme

At the federal level, the Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (Federal
Act) sets out a comprehensive national system for sex offender registration. 34
U.S.C. § 20901. Under the Federal Act, those who have been convicted of certain
11
sex crimes in any state or federal jurisdiction are required to provide local
authorities—in whatever state where they reside—with their names and other
identifiers for inclusion in updated state and federal sex offender registries. Id.
§ 20913. Under the Federal Act, the failure to register with the appropriate state
authorities when one travels to a different state is a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2250.

B. The Texas Statutory Scheme

Texas’s sex offender registration statutes are codified in Chapter 62 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Chapter 62 defines the scope of Texas’s sex
offender registration program and delineates the legal duties of those who administer
it and those subject to its requirements. Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). Under Article 62.001(5)(H), a “reportable conviction” may be “a
violation of the laws of another state, federal law, the laws of a foreign country, or
the Uniform Code of Military Justice for or based on the violation of an offense
containing elements that are substantially similar to the elements of” an enumerated
Texas sex offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.001(5)(H). Under that statute,
Texas compares the elements of its sex offenses to the elements of the
extrajurisdictional conviction. If those elements are substantially similar, then the
offender is subject to the requirements of Chapter 62, the Texas Sex Offender
Registration Program. Id. Article 62.003(c) provides that an appeal of a
determination made under that article “shall be brought in a district court in Travis
County.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 62.003(c).

Under Article 62.052, however, even if the elements of the out-of-state
conviction are not substantially similar to the elements of a Texas offense, that
person may still be subject to the registration requirements of the Texas Sex Offender
Registration Program. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.052 (“An extrajurisdictional
registrant is required to comply with the annual verification requirements of Article

12
62.058 in the same manner as a person who is required to verify registration on the
basis of a reportable conviction or adjudication.”). Under Article 62.052, the duty to
register does not expire until the duty to register would expire under the laws of
another state, foreign country, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. art.
62.052(b). DPS and another jurisdiction may enter into a reciprocal registration
agreement that requires the out-of-state sex offender to register in Texas to prevent
offenders “from frustrating the public purpose of the registration of sex offenders by
moving from one state to the other.” Id. art. 62.052(c). Thus, Texas defers to the
convicting jurisdiction and requires such offenders to register in Texas for the time
period prescribed by the convicting jurisdiction’s registration scheme.

Under the Texas statutory scheme, a convicted sex offender who moves to
Texas will be required to register in Texas if (a) the elements of the prior offense are
“substantially similar” to those of a reportable Texas sex offense; or (b) the person
is required to register as a sex offender under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
or federal or foreign law, or the laws of another state with which Texas has a
reciprocal registration agreement. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Anonymous Adult
Tex. Resident, 382 S.W.3d 531, 533 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.)
(recognizing that individual can be required to register as a sex offender under the
laws of another state with which DPS has entered into a reciprocal registration
agreement); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.001(10) (defining
“extrajurisdictional registrant”), .052 (imposing registration requirement for
extrajurisdictional registrants).

Under Article 62.052, as opposed to Article 62.003, the duty to register and
the duration of that duty are determined by the law of the convicting jurisdiction, not
by a Texas statute. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 62.052(b). Article 62.052 requires
all extrajurisdictional registrants who are required by the Federal Act to register in

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Texas to do so even if the elements of their out-of-state offenses are not
“substantially similar” to an analogous Texas offense. See Anonymous Adult Tex.
Resident, 382 S.W.3d at 534 n.2.

C. Tawakkol’s Claims in the Trial Court

In the trial court Tawakkol asked the court to “[r]everse the determination
made by Defendants . . . as authorized by Article 62.003(c) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, wherein Defendants erroneously determined Plaintiff is an
‘extrajurisdictional registrant’ as defined by Article 62.001(10) of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure.” As noted above, Article 62.003, by its plain language,
applies to determinations of whether an offense under laws other than Texas laws
“contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an offense under
the laws of this state.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 62.003(a). However, Tawakkol was
not required to register pursuant to Article 62.003, but rather pursuant to Article
62.052, which does not provide for a determination by DPS or an appeal to Travis
County district court. Compare id. art. 62.003(c) (permitting appeal of decision to a
district court in Travis County) with art. 62.052 (providing no discretion to DPS or
appeal). Likewise, Article 62.001(10), which defines an “extrajurisdictional
registrant” as a person who is required to register as a sex offender under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice or federal law, does not give DPS the authority to second
guess the propriety of the Secretary of Defense’s designation or provide for an appeal
to Travis County district court. Because the State Officials did not make a
determination under Article 62.003(a), the trial court lacked jurisdiction under
Section 62.003(c).

In response to the State Officials’ motion to dismiss, Tawakkol argued that
even if Article 62.003 did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction to review the State
Officials’ decision, the court had jurisdiction to review Tawakkol’s claims that the

14
State Officials acted outside their authority and thus committed ultra vires acts. The
State Officials respond by asserting they had no discretion in determining whether
Tawakkol was required to register as an extrajurisdictional registrant. That decision
was made by federal authorities under federal law. We agree with the State Officials.

In the trial court, Tawakkol argued that the State Officials’ discretion to
classify a person as an extrajurisdictional registrant was limited to those who were
convicted of a “federally defined” sex offense who were not otherwise required to
register under Texas law. In claiming the State Officials acted without legal
authority, Tawakkol relied on the federal district court decision that the Secretary of
Defense had exceeded the scope of his authority in designating Article 120c(a)(2) as
a sex offense. Tawakkol I, 2022 WL 20564755, at *4–5. The State Officials,
however, were not bound by the district court’s decision as it was vacated in
Tawakkol II. 87 F.4th at 720.

On appeal, Tawakkol first asserts that the State Officials’ actions were taken
without legal authority because any legal duty the State Officials held to follow
federal law arose under the “Spending Clause” of the U.S. Constitution and an
agreement between the State and the federal government. Tawakkol asserts that “by
its nature such an agreement, had it been in effect when [the State Officials] acted,
would have been ‘voluntary’ and therefore ‘discretionary’ on the part of the State of
Texas.” Second, Tawakkol asserts that the State opted out of its agreement with the
federal government. In that regard, Tawakkol argues the State Officials “can hardly
argue persuasively that they were ‘compelled’ to comply with ultra vires
interpretations of federal law made by the U.S. Secretary of Defense . . . .”

Neither of Tawakkol’s arguments addresses Article 62.052 and its direction
that the State Officials require all extrajurisdictional registrants who are required by
federal law to register in Texas to do so even if the elements of their out-of-state

15
offenses are not “substantially similar” to an analogous Texas offense. The Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure removes all discretion from the State Officials sued by
Tawakkol in this action. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc art. 62.052. Once the federal
government determined that Tawakkol was required to register as a sex offender, the
State Officials had no discretion under Texas law but to require his registration. Id.
Tawakkol’s complaint is properly brought to the Secretary of Defense who classified
his offense as one requiring registration, not DPS officials following Texas statutes.

The Texas Supreme Court “described the ultra vires doctrine as limited to
those claims where the government official acted ‘without state authority’ by
exceeding ‘the bounds of his granted authority.’” Chambers-Liberty Ctys., 575
S.W.3d at 354 (quoting Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 234, 238 (Tex. 2017)).
Tawakkol failed to plead a claim under Article 62.003 or that the State Officials
acted outside of their legal authority.2 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
granting the plea to the jurisdiction. We overrule Tawakkol’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal.

/s/ April Farris
April Farris
Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

2
In a reply brief, Tawakkol argues he asserted an “equitable” claim that the State Officials
acted ultra vires. Tawakkol, however, did not allege that the State Officials acted outside of their
authority beyond that required by Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

16