Linda D. Tanner v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Julia Murray, Wendy Proctor, and Juan Rodriguez

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 24, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00008-CV

LINDA D. TANNER, Appellant

V.

TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, JULIA
MURRAY, WENDY PROCTOR, AND JUAN RODRIGUEZ, Appellees

On Appeal from the 459th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-002987

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Health and Human Services Commission (the Commission) denied
appellant Linda Tanner’s application for financial assistance under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. A hearing officer later affirmed
the Commission’s denial, and a reviewing attorney upheld the hearing officer’s
decision. Tanner sought judicial review of the decision in district court. In response,
the defendants—the Commission, the hearing officer, the hearings administrator,
and the reviewing attorney (collectively, the HHSC Parties)—filed a plea to the
jurisdiction arguing that Tanner’s petition was untimely and therefore the district
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her case. After conducting a hearing,
the district court granted the plea and dismissed Tanner’s case. Appearing pro se,
Tanner asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the plea. 1 We affirm
the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

BACKGROUND

TANF is a state-administered welfare program designed to provide financial
assistance and services to families with dependent children. Tex. Hum. Res. Code
§ 31.001; see 1 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 372.1–.1716 (Tex. Health & Human Servs.
Comm., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Programs). In 2023, Linda Tanner filed an application for TANF benefits
for her household, consisting of herself and her two children. See 1 Tex. Admin.
Code §§ 372.901–.906 (Application Process). The Commission found that Tanner’s
monthly income exceeded TANF’s recognizable needs test and, therefore, denied
her application. See id. § 372.408 (Determining Income Eligibility).

Tanner timely requested an administrative hearing, also known as a “fair
hearing,” to contest the Commission’s decision on her application. See id.
§ 372.1002 (providing for appeal of Commission’s decisions on TANF eligibility
under fair-hearing rules); see id. §§ 357.1–.703 (fair-hearing rules). The hearing
officer assigned to her case conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued an order
sustaining the Commission’s denial. Tanner then requested an administrative review
of the hearing officer’s decision. See former Tex. Gov’t Code § 531.019(g)

1
Tanner also appeared pro se in the proceedings below.

2
(Administrative and Judicial Review of Certain Decisions) 2; see 1 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 357.703(b) (explaining process for administrative review). On February 29, 2024,
the reviewing attorney designated by the Commission upheld the hearing officer’s
order. See 1 Tex. Admin Code § 357.703(b)(5) (“When an administrative review is
conducted, the attorney makes the final decision for the HHS system agency and its
designees.”).

Tanner then sought judicial review of the reviewing attorney’s final decision
in Travis County district court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 531.019(g) (providing that
judicial review “is instituted by filing a petition with the district court, as provided
by Subchapter G, Chapter 2001”). In response, the HHSC Parties filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing in part that Tanner had filed her petition more than 30 days after
she was notified of the reviewing attorney’s final decision and, therefore, she had
failed to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction. See id. § 2001.176(a) (requiring
petition for judicial review to be filed “not later than the 30th day after the date the
decision or order that is the subject of complaint is final and appealable”); id.
§ 531.019(e) (stating that decision is final and appealable on date that “hearing
officer . . . reaches a final decision . . . [and] the appropriate attorney completes an
administrative review of the decision and notifies the applicant or recipient in writing
of the result of that review”).

At the hearing on the plea, the HHSC Parties offered the administrative record
into evidence, which included a copy of the reviewing attorney’s final decision.
Tanner did not present any evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district

2
Although Texas Government Code Section 531.019 has since been repealed, it was in effect
when the district court dismissed Tanner’s suit and governs this dispute. See Act of May 17, 2023,
88th Leg., R.S., ch. 769, § 3.01(2), 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 2013, 2369 (partially recodified at Texas
Government Code §§ 545.0151–.0154). For purposes of this opinion, all citations to Section
531.019 refer to the now repealed statute.
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court judge announced that Tanner’s petition was untimely, granted the plea to the
jurisdiction, and dismissed her suit.

Later that same day, Tanner filed a motion to reinstate, asserting that she had
complied with the 30-day filing deadline because she had electronically “submitted”
a petition for review to the Travis County district court clerk’s e-filing system before
the deadline. The following day, the district court signed a final judgment granting
the HHSC Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Tanner’s suit with
prejudice. Tanner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which included
the same arguments as her motion to reinstate. Tanner did not request a hearing on
either her motion to reinstate or her motion for reconsideration. The next day, she
filed a notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638
(Tex. 2004). We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.
Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021). A plea to the jurisdiction may
challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Texas Dep’t
of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 19 (Tex. 2024). When a plea to the jurisdiction
challenges the pleadings, we must determine if the pleader has alleged facts that
affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Texas Dep’t
of Crim. Just. v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020). When a plea to the
jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we look beyond the
pleading and consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary
to resolve the jurisdictional issue raised. Farmers Texas Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Beasley,

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598 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2020).

ANALYSIS

In her first issue on appeal, Tanner argues that the district court erred in
granting the HHSC Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction because the evidence establishes
that she filed her petition within 30 days of the reviewing attorney’s decision
becoming final and appealable.

Under Section 2001.176(a) of the Texas Government Code, a petition for
judicial review must be filed “not later than the 30th day after the date the decision
or order that is the subject of complaint is final and appealable.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 2001.176(a). A decision by a hearing officer related to public-assistance benefits,
including TANF benefits, is “final and appealable” when, after a hearing, the hearing
officer “reaches a final decision related to the [applicant’s] benefits” and the
reviewing attorney “completes an administrative review of the decision and notifies
the applicant or recipient in writing of the results of that review.” Id. § 531.019(e).
Compliance with Section 2001.176(a)’s 30-day filing deadline is a statutory
prerequisite to suit and a jurisdictional requirement. See id. § 311.034 (“Statutory
prerequisites to a suit . . . are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a
governmental entity.”); see also City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d 375, 379
(Tex. 2020) (holding that compliance with Texas Whistleblower Act’s 90-day filing
deadline is “a jurisdictional statutory prerequisite to suit”).

Here, the administrative record, which was admitted into evidence at the
hearing on the plea, shows that the reviewing attorney completed her administrative
review of the hearing officer’s decision and notified Tanner, via email, of the results
of that review on February 29, 2024. Based on that date, to invoke the district court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, Tanner had until March 30, 2024, to file her petition for
review. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.176(a). Tanner’s timestamped petition,
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however, establishes that she did not file her petition until May 13, 2024, 44 days
late. 3 See Dallas Cnty. v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 103–04 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, pet. denied) (noting that timestamp is “prima facie evidence of the date of
filing” (citing Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental & Sales, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 787 S.W.2d
371, 371–72 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam))).

Nevertheless, Tanner argues that the district court erred in dismissing her suit
because, in her view, the evidence shows that she “submitted” her petition before
the March 30, 2024, deadline. In support of this argument, Tanner relies on e-mail
correspondence with the district court clerk, which she attached to both her motion
to reinstate and her motion for reconsideration. According to the correspondence,
Tanner attempted to electronically file her petition on March 29, 2024, but the
district court clerk rejected and returned the petition for corrections and refiling.
Liberally construed, Tanner’s argument is that the evidence shows that she attempted
to file her petition on March 29 and that for purposes of determining compliance
with Section 2001.176(a)’s filing deadline, her May 13 filing should relate back to
that date.

Although we are sympathetic to Tanner’s argument, we need not decide
whether, as a legal proposition, a submitted but unfiled petition could, under any
circumstances, be considered timely under Section 2001.176(a), because Tanner
never presented this argument to the trial court prior to its jurisdictional ruling. In
reviewing a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we cannot consider evidence that
was not before the trial court at the time it made its ruling. See Univ. of Texas v.

3
At the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, Tanner stated that she was unable to file her petition
earlier because she was homeless and did not receive actual notice of the reviewing attorney’s final
decision until March 19, 2024, when she accessed her email. We need not decide whether the
reviewing attorney’s final decision became final and appealable when Tanner received actual
notice of it rather than when the reviewing attorney sent her email, because Tanner’s petition would
still be untimely even if the deadline for filing her petition did not begin to run until March 19.
6
Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961) (noting that an abuse of discretion is
generally determined from record and circumstances existing at time of trial court’s
decision); In re C.J.S., 702 S.W.3d 573, 591–92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2024, no pet.) (holding that appellate court conducting de novo review of trial court’s
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction “may consider only those facts that were before
the trial court when it made its jurisdictional ruling”). Here, the district court orally
rendered judgment dismissing Tanner’s suit at the conclusion of the hearing on the
HHSC Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction. See Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002) (“[A] judgment is rendered when the decision
is officially announced in open court . . . .”). Tanner, however, did not offer any
evidence of her March 29 attempted filing at that hearing.

Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, pro se litigants are held to the
same standards and rules as litigants represented by counsel. Mansfield State Bank
v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). Otherwise, pro se litigants would be
given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel. Id. at 185.
Therefore, for us to consider the documents attached to her post-judgment motions,
Tanner, like other litigants, needed to present that evidence to the district court
before it dismissed her case. See Morris, 344 S.W.2d at 429. Because she did not,
we cannot consider that evidence in determining whether the district court’s
jurisdictional ruling is supported by sufficient evidence. 4 See In re M–I L.L.C., 505

4
We do not construe Tanner’s briefs as arguing that the district court abused its discretion in failing
to rule on her motion for reconsideration. But that argument would fail even if we construed her
briefs as raising it, because there is no evidence that she attempted to present and obtain a hearing
on the motion before it was overruled by operation of law, or that she used diligence in attempting
to do so. See Capitol State Mortg. Corp. v. Northstar Mortg. Corp., No. 05-04-01140-CV, 2006
WL 531278, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Fluty v. Simmons
Co., 835 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ)). Without such a showing, “the trial
court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to entertain the motion during the court’s remaining
plenary power.” Weiss v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 05-06-00940-CV, 2007 WL 2069627,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 666).
7
S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016) (“In determining whether a trial court abused its
discretion, a reviewing court is generally bound by the record before the trial court
at the time its decision was made.” (citing Morris, 344 S.W.2d at 429)); Perry Homes
v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 596 n.89 (Tex. 2008) (“Because we limit our review to the
record before the trial judge, we do not consider the Defendants’ additional seven
volumes of discovery exhibits filed after the arbitration award.”); Maximum Med.
Improvement, Inc. v. Cnty. of Dallas, 272 S.W.3d 832, 834 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2008, no pet.) (holding that reviewing court “will only consider the evidence before
the trial court when it rendered its judgment”). Based on the undisputed evidence
that was before the district court at the time of its jurisdictional ruling, we conclude
that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s determination that Tanner’s
petition was untimely under Section 2001.176(a).

The district court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over
Tanner’s suit for judicial review and in granting the HHSC parties’ plea to the
jurisdiction. Therefore, we overrule Tanner’s first issue on appeal. 5

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Tanner’s suit for lack of
jurisdiction.

/s/ Scott K. Field ___________
Scott K. Field
Justice

5
In her remaining issues on appeal, Tanner asserts that (1) the HHSC Parties violated her
constitutional due-process rights in denying her TANF application; (2) the HHSC Parties lack
sovereign immunity; (3) the HHSC Parties used incorrect grant calculations in determining her
TANF eligibility; (4) HHSC failed to update its rules to reflect current poverty guidelines; and (5)
the HHSC Parties disregarded applicable legal provisions during the administrative hearing
process. Because we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Tanner’s suit on jurisdictional grounds,
we decline to address Tanner’s remaining issues, all of which concern the merits of her claims.
8
Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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