James Audie Sexton v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00317-CR
___________________________

JAMES AUDIE SEXTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1837516

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant James Audie Sexton appeals his conviction for online solicitation of

a minor younger than 14 years of age, a second-degree offense, see Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 33.021(b)(1), (f), enhanced by a habitual-offender paragraph, for which the jury

assessed his punishment at 65 years’ imprisonment, see id. § 12.42(d). In one issue,

Sexton contends that insufficient evidence shows that his text messages were

“sexually explicit,” as required by Section 33.021(b)(1) and as defined by Sections

33.021(a)(3) and 43.25(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. See id. §§ 33.021(a)(3),

43.25(a)(2). We hold that the evidence was sufficient, overrule Sexton’s issue, and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

Because Sexton limits his argument to whether sufficient evidence supports the

finding that his text messages were sexually explicit, we limit our review to that

contention.

A. Definition of “Sexually Explicit”

In the context of online solicitation of a minor, see id. § 33.021(b)(1), “‘[s]exually

explicit’ means any communication, language, or material, including a photographic or

video image, that relates to or describes sexual conduct, as defined by Section 43.25.”

Id. § 33.021(a)(3). In turn, “‘[s]exual conduct’ means sexual contact, actual or

simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality,

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masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals, the anus, or

any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola.” Id. § 43.25(a)(2).

B. The Texts and Testimony

Below is a sampling of the texts that Sexton sent the complainant and of some

of the complainant’s responses:

• “You know. [Y]ou are now in my dreams. I am dreaming of you. What do
we do about that? How about you? Thinking of you is both excruciating
and exhilarating! I know it’s wrong but I still want to ravish you.”

• “You are sooo delectable. Yummy!”

• “[P]lease send me some revealing pics. I hope I can stand it. But, if you
can[.]”

• “About to kill me thinking of you. I told you that you are a Hottie!”

• “Just looking at you. It drive[s me] crazy. Only being able to look. God I
want you.”

• The complainant answered, “I know[.] I love a lot and I care about you[,]
but you know I can’t do that because my dad will kill me if he finds
out[.]”

• “I love you. I hunger for you.”

• “Do you have any idea what I want to do to you?”

• “God, I want you so bad. Do you know what I mean?” and “I want to
ravish you.”

• The complainant replied, “[Y]es[,] I know what you mean[.] I have
dreams about escap[]ing and go[ing] to your place[.]”

• “I found a gal who looks like you on xnxx.com. [K]ind of fulfilling of my
fantasies. But not as good as you. Just wishful thinking. No one is a
beautiful as you. No one.”

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• The complainant responded, “I can’t even go into it because my dad set
my account on kid.”

• “I want to kiss you. I mean really kiss you. And more. But . . . .”

• The complainant remarked, “I want to also.”

• “Please send me pics of you. Maybe before or after a shower or bath.
Please! Okay?”

At trial, the complainant testified, without elaboration, that she thought that

some of Sexton’s text messages were sexual. Sexton testified at trial, too, but denied

having meant anything sexual in his texts.

According to Sexton, the complainant made advances toward him, and he tried

to discourage her. He explained, “[S]he had . . . an idea that shocked me, but flattered

me too. And -- but I told her, as soon as I heard about . . . it, I told her, ‘What you’re

thinking about can’t happen. It can never be.’” Sexton stated that he advised the

complainant to stop: “Stop and think about what you’re -- you know, what you’re

saying, what you’re doing. And like I said, then I was a 65-year-old man, and you’re a

13-year-old girl.” He summarized his position: “I did not solicit anything. I didn’t

want to have sex with her. I didn’t solicit sex with her. That’s it.”

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

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307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our

judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,

232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not

engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all

the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting

inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton,

569 S.W.3d at 608. Jurors may choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of

the evidence presented. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

B. Discussion

We hold that a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

that Sexton’s text messages to the complainant related to sexual conduct as required

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by Section 33.021(a)(3) and as defined by Section 43.25(a)(2). The text messages

evinced Sexton’s wish to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the

complainant1 and his desire to see lewd or licentious photographs of her and were

thus sexually explicit.2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 33.021(a)(3), 43.25(a)(2); see also

Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. See generally Gess v. State, No. 07-24-00097-CR,

2024 WL 4599402, at 1 n.1, *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (finding a Section 33.021(b)(1) violation with a

record containing, among more descriptive sexual texts, texts reading, “I would go

slow with you,” “I want to introduce you to everything,” and “I want to be your first

for everything.”). Although Sexton denied having had any sexual intentions, the jury

did not have to believe him. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.

We overrule Sexton’s sole issue.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled Sexton’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1
The parties dispute what Sexton meant by “ravish” in two of his texts.
Regardless of how the jury understood Sexton’s use of the word, it had many other
texts to consider, and nothing in Sexton’s use of the word “ravish” would have likely
disabused the jury of Sexton’s overall intent.
2
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor asserted, “I believe . . . it
will be clear the nature of these text messages. While he does never come out and say,
‘I want to have sex with you,’ I believe you will understand in the full context of the
conversation what he meant when he was communicating with [the complainant].”

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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 14, 2025

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