Ex Parte Ronderrick Johnson v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00242-CR
___________________________

Ex Parte Ronderrick Johnson

On Appeal from the 396th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. C-396-W012598-1763670-AP

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Appellant Ronderrick Johnson claims that his guilty plea was involuntary

because his trial counsel (Counsel) was ineffective. Johnson sought habeas relief from

his deferred adjudication community supervision order on this basis, identifying

Counsel’s two deficient actions as his failing to move for a speedy trial and to move

for recusal of the visiting trial court judge. A magistrate judge denied relief, and the

trial court adopted its actions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 8.

Johnson asserts that this denial of relief was erroneous because, according to

him, the trial court (1) could not refer the habeas proceeding to a magistrate judge

without Johnson’s express consent; (2) was unreasonable in its decision to believe

certain affiants over others; (3) neglected to address Counsel’s failure to subpoena

witnesses for trial; and (4) erred by holding that Counsel’s allegedly deficient actions

were not deficient. But (1) the referral to a magistrate judge was statutorily authorized

with or without Johnon’s consent; (2) the trial court, as the factfinder, had the

discretion to believe certain affiants over others; (3) Johnson did not raise his

subpoena-related allegations as grounds for habeas relief; and (4) even if Counsel’s

actions were deficient, Johnson did not show harm. In other words, we will affirm.

I. Background

In late 2019, Johnson was indicted for two counts of sexual assault and one

count of aggravated assault by choking, all three of which were committed against his

ex-girlfriend. The case went to trial more than three years later in February 2023.

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A visiting judge presided over the trial. After the State elicited testimony from

its first witness—the complainant—and after it presented photographic and audio

evidence of Johnson’s offenses, Johnson changed his pleas to guilty and entered into a

plea bargain. The State dismissed one count of sexual assault, and Johnson received

five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision on the two remaining

offenses.

Soon thereafter, Johnson hired new attorneys and moved for a new trial based

on Counsel’s alleged failure to subpoena witnesses for trial. The trial court denied the

motion.

Johnson raised Counsel’s ineffective assistance again a few years later, this time

in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson’s habeas application did not

rely on the subpoena-related allegations that he had raised in his motion for new trial,

though. Rather, Johnson asserted that his guilty plea had been involuntary, claiming

that he would not have pleaded guilty had Counsel moved (1) for a speedy trial or

(2) to recuse the visiting judge from the case.

The trial court signed an order referring the habeas proceeding to a magistrate

judge, and the magistrate requested a response from the State and affidavits from

Counsel and from the prosecutor who had worked on Johnson’s case. After receiving

the response and the affidavits, the magistrate judge denied relief and explained its

rationale in detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant here, the

magistrate found that key portions of Johnson’s affidavit were not credible, that

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neither a motion for speedy trial nor a motion to recuse the visiting judge would have

been meritorious, that Counsel’s failure to file such motions was not deficient, and

that there was no credible evidence that an earlier trial date or a different judge would

have affected Johnson’s decision to plead guilty. The trial court adopted the

magistrate judge’s actions, and Johnson appeals. See id.

II. Standard of Review

An individual may challenge the legal validity of an order imposing community

supervision by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus, just as Johnson did

here. See id. art. 11.072. In such cases, the applicant bears the burden of establishing

his right to habeas relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Martinez, 330

S.W.3d 891, 900–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

For the applicant “[t]o demonstrate that he is entitled to . . . relief on the basis

of ineffective assistance of counsel, [he] must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s

performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness[;] and (2) the applicant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s errors,”

meaning that “but for counsel’s errors, [the applicant] would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Uribe, 516 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d).

“[T]he trial judge is the sole finder of fact.” Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785,

787–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (distinguishing review of Article 11.072 habeas

proceeding from Article 11.07 habeas proceeding). On appeal, we afford almost total

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deference to the trial court’s findings of fact—particularly those based on credibility

and demeanor—as long as the findings are supported by the record. Guzman v. State,

955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788 (clarifying

that the Guzman standard of deference controls in Article 11.072 habeas cases). This

deference applies even when, as here, the witness testimony is submitted by affidavit.

State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte Juara, 643

S.W.3d 702, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d).

III. Discussion

Johnson claims that the trial court erred by (1) referring the habeas proceeding

to a magistrate judge without his consent; (2) crediting Counsel’s and the prosecutor’s

averments; (3) failing to make findings regarding Johnson’s subpoena-related

allegations; and (4) finding that speedy trial and recusal motions would not have

prevailed, so Counsel was not deficient for failing to file them.1

A. Referral to Magistrate: The referral did not require Johnson’s consent.

First, Johnson asserts that the trial court lacked the authority to refer his habeas

application to a magistrate judge without his express consent. But the referral was

statutorily authorized and did not require Johnson’s consent.

The Government Code permits a Tarrant County criminal court to refer

“proceedings involving . . . a writ of habeas corpus” to a magistrate via an order of

1
Johnson lists five appellate issues, but we reorder and condense them for
organizational purposes.

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referral. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.656(a)(4), 54.657. This is precisely what the trial

court did; it signed an order referring Johnson’s habeas proceeding to a magistrate

judge as statutorily authorized. The statute says nothing about needing a party’s

consent. See id. And to the extent that Johnson objected to the referral, he failed to

preserve that objection by raising it in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)

(requiring a party to raise a timely and specific trial court objection “[a]s a prerequisite

to presenting [the] complaint for appellate review”); Nash v. State, 123 S.W.3d 534,

536–37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[t]his court

has . . . previously held that in order to challenge the trial court’s referral of voir dire

to a magistrate, the appellant must have preserved error in the trial court”); see also

Guerrero v. State, No. 02-13-00611-CR, 2015 WL 1407748, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing and

following Nash but noting sister court’s contrary rule).

We overrule Johnson’s first issue.

B. Credibility Determinations: We defer to the factfinder.

Johnson next challenges the trial court’s fact findings. He argues that it was

unreasonable for the trial court to credit Counsel’s “deceptive” and “misleading”

averments, to believe the prosecutor’s averments about pretrial delays and events,2 to

Johnson further asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case.
2

These accusations were not raised as a basis for relief below, and on appeal, they
appear to be lodged in an attempt to impeach the prosecutor’s credibility. As we have
already noted, the trial court was free to believe the prosecutor’s averments. See

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accept the disputed averments without requiring corroborating documentation, and to

adopt the State’s “selective view of the record” in rejecting his speedy trial complaint.3

But “the trial judge is the sole finder of fact.” Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788. The

trial court had the discretion to “believe any or all of [the] witness[es’] testimony” or

averments. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 583 (noting that rule applies even when “all of the

evidence is submitted through affidavits, depositions, or interrogatories”). And

although Johnson questions the trial court’s decision to believe Counsel’s and the

prosecutor’s averments, in doing so he indirectly acknowledges that such averments

were indeed evidence before the trial court that it could have believed. These

credibility determinations were within the trial court’s discretion, and because they are

supported by the record—namely, by the affidavits themselves—we must defer to

Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788; Ex parte Salim, 595 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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Johnson repeatedly criticizes the trial court’s “adopt[ing] the State’s [proposed]
findings wholesale,” claiming that “courts have repeatedly held that such uncritical
adoption . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.” But the case law he cites for this
purported rule holds no such thing. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S.
564, 572, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1510–11 (1985) (noting that Court has “criticized courts for
their verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties” but stating
that, “even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are
those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous”); Garcia, 353 S.W.3d
at 787–88 (distinguishing between Article 11.07 habeas proceeding and Article 11.072
habeas proceeding and emphasizing that, in review of the latter, “the trial judge is the
sole finder of fact” and “there is less leeway . . . to disregard the findings of a trial
court”). Plus, in the context of Article 11.07 habeas proceedings in particular, the
legislature expressly contemplated and authorized the trial court to “require the
prevailing party to submit a proposed order” that “includ[es proposed] findings of
fact and conclusions of law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 7(a).

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them. See id.; Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We overrule his

second issue.

C. Subpoena-Related Complaint: Findings were not necessary.

Johnson next asserts that the trial court erred by “failing to investigate and

make findings as to whether [Counsel] had in fact subpoenaed and secured the

attendance of defense witnesses” at trial. He claims that Counsel failed to subpoena

any defense witnesses, that this failure constituted deficient performance, and that the

trial court was required to make findings on the issue.

But while Johnson raised his subpoena-related complaint in his motion for new

trial, he did not raise it as a ground for relief in his habeas application. Johnson’s

habeas application alleged ineffective assistance based on two other deficiencies:

Counsel’s failure (1) to file a motion for speedy trial and (2) to move to recuse the

visiting judge. Because Johnson’s subpoena-related complaint was not a basis for his

requested habeas relief, the trial court did not need to address this issue to resolve

Johnson’s habeas petition. See Ex parte Reyes, 474 S.W.3d 677, 680–81 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015) (recognizing that “the principle that a court may decline to address issues

that are not necessary to the court’s disposition applies equally to the Article 11.072

habeas context,” applying rule to trial court’s order granting relief, and clarifying that

trial court could grant relief on one ground without addressing other grounds that

were not dispositive). We overrule his third issue.

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D. Deficiency Findings: Regardless, Johnson did not show prejudice.

In his final appellate issue, Johnson challenges the trial court’s findings

regarding the motions that he claims Counsel should have filed, i.e., the trial court’s

findings that motions for a speedy trial and recusal would have been fruitless. But the

challenged findings relate to the first prong of ineffective assistance—whether

Counsel performed deficiently. See Uribe, 516 S.W.3d at 666 (listing prongs). Even if

Counsel’s performance had been deficient, Johnson did not show the second prong

of ineffective assistance—that Counsel’s failure to file the relevant motions

contributed to Johnson’s guilty plea. See id.

A habeas applicant asserting ineffective assistance must demonstrate not only

that his counsel’s performance was deficient but also that the “ineffective

performance affected the outcome of the plea process” such that “but for counsel’s

errors, [the applicant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).

Here, the trial court found that the relevant motions would not have affected

Johnson’s guilty pleas. And the record supports this finding.

The record confirms that Johnson—with knowledge of the trial’s date and the

visiting judge’s identity—proceeded to trial and entered pleas of not guilty in open

court. Johnson did not change his pleas to guilty until later—after the parties had

presented opening statements, the State had elicited testimony from the complaining

witness, the trial court had admitted photographic evidence of the complainant’s

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injuries and of her text-message conversations with Johnson, and the jury had heard

audio recordings of the complainant’s 911 call and of Johnson’s calls to the

complainant after the assaults. This timing supports a finding that neither the trial’s

date nor the visiting judge’s identity was a catalyst for Johnson’s guilty pleas; had the

trial date or judge’s identity been a determinative factor, Johnson would not have

proceeded to trial in front of the visiting judge in the first place. Cf. Tulk v. State, No.

02-24-00432-CR, 2025 WL 2088266, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2025, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding no harm from denial of

continuance when defendant changed his plea after voir dire and noting that “[i]f the

trial court’s denial of [the] . . . continuance was, as [the defendant] argue[d], influential

in his decision to plea[d guilty], he would have [presumably] pleaded guilty at an

earl[ier] stage of the proceedings”); Milem v. State, No. 02-24-00201-CR, 2025 WL

1536399, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 29, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (similar).

Because the record supports the trial court’s findings that Counsel’s alleged

deficiencies did not affect Johnson’s changed pleas, we need not address whether

Counsel’s actions were, in fact, deficient. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule this

final issue.

IV. Conclusion

Johnson has not shown that the trial court erred in its handling of the habeas

proceeding, nor has he shown that the order imposing deferred adjudication

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community supervision is invalid. Having overruled his four appellate issues, we

affirm the trial court’s order denying habeas relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). All

pending motions are denied.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 25, 2025

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