Jared Lee Newman v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00149-CR
___________________________

JARED LEE NEWMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 396th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1700311

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jared Lee Newman appeals his conviction for continuous sexual

abuse (CSA) of a young child, Fiona.1 See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b). Newman raises

five appellate points: the court’s charge failed to instruct the jury on the statutory

requirements of the predicate offenses for CSA, including the requisite mental states

(points one and two); the charge impermissibly allowed the jury to convict him of

CSA regardless of whether the predicate acts of abuse occurred at least 30 days apart

(point three); the charge improperly allowed the jury to find him guilty of separate

and distinct predicate offenses, violating the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity

requirement as interpreted by Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)

(point four); and the trial court erroneously allowed the State to display prejudicial

photographs during voir dire (point five). We will affirm.

I. Background2

Mother and Newman were married in 2007, and they had three children,

including Fiona, who was born in 2010. In 2018, Mother and Newman decided to

1
Because the victim was a minor when the alleged offenses occurred, we will
refer to her by using a pseudonym and to her family members by their relationships
to her. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10 (defining sensitive information).
2
Newman pleaded not guilty but does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. Indeed, a child victim’s testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient proof
of the offense of CSA. See Keith v. State, No. 02-24-00034-CR, 2024 WL 4899022, at
*5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1)). Accordingly, we
summarize the trial testimony relevant to Newman’s points.

2
divorce, and by January 2019, Newman had moved in with his mother and

stepfather. Fiona and her siblings stayed with Newman every other weekend. At

some point, Newman moved in with a girlfriend, and Fiona and her siblings would

stay with them.

In fall 2020, while Fiona was in the third grade, she participated in a school

program and learned about different forms of sexual abuse. Shortly before the

Thanksgiving break, she told Mother about Newman’s “confusing touch” of her.

When Mother asked for more details, Fiona disclosed that during summer 2018 and

again in early 2019, Newman had touched his penis to her vagina, including while

showing her pornography.

Mother called 911. After the police investigated the allegations and a sexual

assault nurse examiner (SANE) examined and treated Fiona, the State charged

Newman with three offenses: (1) CSA, (2) aggravated sexual assault of a child, and

(3) indecency with a child by sexual contact.

Because the testimony about Newman’s acts of abuse is pertinent to the

alleged charge error, we will summarize the testimony of Fiona, the SANE, and

Newman.

A. Fiona’s Testimony

At the time of trial, Fiona was 15 years old. She testified to events that

occurred in 2018 and 2019 when she was eight. Fiona testified that during the

summer of 2018, Newman took care of her while Mother worked. Fiona could not

3
recall every detail, but she estimated that from May to August 2018, Newman

touched the inside and outside of her vagina with his penis more than ten times. She

recalled more than one occasion when he moved her hand to his penis and “move[d]

it.” Often—she testified—Newman watched pornography while touching her.

Fiona further testified that Newman continued abusing her in 2019 after he

had moved in with his parents. She said that when she stayed at that residence, more

than once Newman touched the inside and outside of her vagina with his penis. But

unlike the 2018 incidents, Fiona testified that she did not touch his penis with her

hand or other body parts and did not recall him watching pornography.3

B. The SANE’s Testimony

The State also questioned the SANE who examined and treated Fiona. The

SANE testified that Fiona described multiple acts of abuse occurring between

summer 2018 and early 2019, including (1) penis-to-vagina contact, (2) penis-to-anus

contact, (3) Fiona’s oral contact with Newman’s genitals, and (4) Fiona’s

masturbation of and contact with Newman’s genitals causing his ejaculation.

C. Newman’s Testimony

Newman denied abusing Fiona. He testified that Fiona was lying about the

abuse because—starting when Fiona was ten in 2020—Mother had “probably

3
Concerning her testimony about the 2018–2019 abuse, Fiona recalled that
“nothing other than those things happened” and that no additional incidents
occurred after Newman moved in with his girlfriend.

4
coerced” her into lying “because she wanted [the children] for the holidays and

wanted [Newman] out of the picture.”

After considering all the evidence, the jury found Newman guilty of CSA and

thus did not reach the counts concerning the predicate offenses of aggravated sexual

assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact. Following the

sentencing phase, the jury assessed Newman’s punishment at 45 years’ confinement,

and the trial court sentenced him accordingly.

II. The Charge

Newman’s first four points concern alleged charge error. We will set out the

standard of review and then explain why he has not shown any reversible error.

A. Jury Charge Requirements and Standard of Review

“[T]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts” but is bound to and governed

by the law the trial court provides in its written charge to the jury. Alcoser v. State,

663 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

arts. 36.13, 36.14). The court’s charge “inform[s] the jury of the applicable law and

how to apply it to the facts of the case,” id. at 164–65, and must “set out all the

essential elements of the offense,” Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012).

Typically, the court’s charge contains abstract and application paragraphs.

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165; Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366–67. “The abstract paragraphs

serve as a glossary to help the jury understand the meaning of concepts and terms

5
used in the application paragraphs.” Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). The application paragraphs “explain[] to the jury, in concrete

terms, how to apply the law to the facts of the case,” Yzaguirre v. State, 394 S.W.3d

526, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), and are “the heart and soul of the jury charge,”

Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366. The application paragraphs—not the abstract

paragraphs—authorize conviction. Crenshaw, 378 S.W.3d at 466.

Article 36.14 governs the trial court’s delivering the jury charge but does not

specify how it must be internally organized See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. But

caselaw provides guidance. When a definition or instruction on a theory of law is

given in an abstract paragraph, the application paragraph must (1) specify all the

conditions to be met before a conviction under such a theory is authorized,

(2) authorize a conviction under conditions specified by other paragraphs of the

charge to which the application paragraph necessarily and unambiguously refers, or

(3) contain some logically consistent combination of such paragraphs. Vasquez,

389 S.W.3d at 367. “Thus, if the application paragraph necessarily and

unambiguously refers to another paragraph of the jury charge, then a conviction is

authorized, and the trial judge need not sua sponte cut and paste that definition into

the application paragraph.” Id. (citation modified).

As the court of criminal appeals has held,

[r]eversible error in the giving of an abstract instruction generally occurs
only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a
law that “the jury must understand in order to implement the

6
commands of the application paragraph,” and the “failure to give an
abstract instruction is reversible only when such an instruction is
necessary to a correct or complete understanding of concepts or terms
in the application part of the charge.”

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165 (quoting Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997)).

We review a complaint of jury-charge error under a two-step process,

considering first whether error exists. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). To this end, we consider “the charge as a whole instead of a series

of isolated and unrelated statements,” Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367 (citation modified),

and we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions in the manner

presented, Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.

ref’d) (citing Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Cochran, J.,

concurring) (“We must, however, presume that jurors, conscious of the gravity of

their tasks, attend closely to the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in

criminal cases and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions

given them.”) (citation modified)). We may abandon this presumption only if

evidence shows that the jury did not follow the court’s instructions. Id. (citing

Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

If we conclude that error exists in the charge, we then analyze that error for

harm under the procedural framework of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.

7
Crim. App. 1985), which turns on whether such error was preserved. Jordan v. State,

593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171);

Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Unpreserved charge

error is reversible only if it caused egregious harm. Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 346.

Preserved charge error is reversible if it caused “some harm.” Id.

B. The Charge in this Case

The trial court’s charge began with general legal principles and instructions. In

the charge’s “General Principles,” the court informed the jury, “You should give

terms their common meanings, unless I provide you a specific definition. If I provide

a definition for a term in this charge, you should use the meanings provided in these

instructions.”

Next, the charge contained seven “Definitions” pertinent to the three charged

offenses, including the following:

• A person acts “Intentionally ,” or with intent, with respect to the
nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct.

• A person acts “Knowingly ,” or with knowledge, with respect to the
nature of his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct.

• As it relates to the crime of indecency with a child, “Sexual Contact”
means any touching of any part of the body of a child, including
touching through clothing, with any part of the genitals of a person, if
committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person.

....

8
• “Act of Sexual Abuse [,”] for the purpose of Continuous Sexual Abuse
of a Young Child, means Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child and
Indecency with a Child if the actor committed the offense in a manner
other than touching, including touching through clothing, the breast of
a child.

The “Definitions,” however, did not define the capitalized terms “Continuous Sexual

Abuse of a Young Child,” “Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child,” or “Indecency

with a Child.” Instead, the charge continued with three sections—one for each

count—and in each section, the court provided an abstract statement of law defining

the particular offense, application paragraphs tying the offense to Newman, and a

unanimity instruction for the specific offense.

In the CSA section, the charge read,

Our law provides [that] a person commits the offense of Continuous
Sexual Abuse of a Young Child, if, during a period during a period [sic]
that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more
acts of sexual abuse, and at the time of the commission of each of the
acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim
is a child younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor
knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense.

Immediately following were paragraphs applying each CSA element to Newman.

Pertinent to this appeal, the CSA’s application paragraphs instructed the jury

to consider whether Newman committed “two or more acts of sexual abuse against a

child younger than 14 years of age, including an act constituting the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and/or indecency with a child against [Fiona].”

But the CSA’s application paragraph did not define those predicate acts. After

instructing the jury about unanimity on the CSA count, the charge included a

9
“Special Note as to Count One”—to either (1) proceed to Counts Two and Three if

the jury found Newman “Not Guilty” on Count One or (2) not address Counts Two

and Three upon a “Guilty” verdict to Count One.

In the next section of the charge—pertaining to Count Two—the trial court

abstractly defined aggravated sexual assault of a child:

Our law provides [that] a person commits the offense of Aggravated
Sexual Assault of a Child, regardless of whether the person knows the
age of the child at the time of the offense, if the person intentionally or
knowingly causes the sexual organ of a child to contact the sexual organ
of another person, including the actor, and the victim is under 14 years
of age.

Then—similar to the charge’s CSA section—the charge gave an application section

specific to the aggravated-sexual-assault count and a unanimity instruction for that

count.

Regarding Count Three, the charge abstractly defined indecency with a child

by sexual contact:

Our law provides [that] a person commits the offense of Indecency
with a Child by Sexual Contact, regardless of whether the person knows
the age of the child at the time of the offense, if the person, with the
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, causes a child
younger than seventeen years old to engage in sexual contact.

The charge likewise included an indecency-specific application section and unanimity

instruction.

Finally the charge contained deliberation rules, the trial court’s signature, and a

verdict form for each count. The trial court read the charge to the jury. During

10
deliberations, the jury sent two notes about the evidence; neither concerned the

charge. After deliberating, the jury answered “Guilty” on Count One and did not

address Counts Two or Three.

C. Point One: Defining the Predicate Offenses

In his first point, Newman argues that the “jury charge never defined []or

delineated any ‘acts that would constitute the offenses’ of aggravated sexual assault

and indecency for a CSA conviction.” Not so.

Newman is correct that the court’s charge needed to define the predicate acts.

As the Dallas Court of Appeals has recognized, “the individual acts of sexual abuse

listed in the [CSA] statute are not elements of the offense, but rather the manner and

means by which the actus reus element is committed.” Taylor v. State,

No. 05-22-00193-CR, 2023 WL 3991645, at *1–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 14, 2023,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citation modified). Because

definitions that affect the meaning of an offense’s element should be communicated

to the jury, for a jury to understand CSA’s acts-of-sexual-abuse element, the court’s

charge must define each alleged underlying act, such as sexual assault of a child,

aggravated sexual assault of a child, or indecency with a child by contact. Id.

Here, to make his argument, Newman narrowly focuses on—and

impermissibly isolates—the charge’s “Definitions” section and Count One’s specific

abstract and application paragraphs to assert that the charge “wholly omitted” and

“never stated” the acts of the underlying offenses upon which his CSA conviction

11
must be predicated. See Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367. To illustrate, Newman cites

Johnson v. State, in which the defendant was charged with CSA predicated on

aggravated sexual assault of a child or indecency with a child by contact.

No. 14-21-00597-CR, 2023 WL 2029099, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Feb. 16, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In that case,

because the charge defined only aggravated sexual assault and not indecency, the

court of appeals concluded that the charge was erroneous. Id.; see also Villarreal v.

State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (stating that “each statutory

definition that affects the meaning of an element of the offense must be

communicated to the jury”) (internal citation omitted).

But the case before us is not like Johnson, and Newman’s argument overlooks

other sections of the charge defining the predicate offenses. As we quoted above, the

charge’s CSA application paragraphs referred to “acts of sexual abuse,” which the

“Definitions” section defined as “Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child and

Indecency with a Child.” As we quoted above, the charge defined those capitalized

terms in the abstract sections preceding each lesser-included-offense’s application

paragraphs. The trial court could have helpfully used additional language—like “as

defined” or other similar signposting4—but in addition to using capitalized letters,

4
See, e.g., Chatman v. State, 846 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding
that application paragraph that incorporated the law of parties by stating that the
defendant either “acting alone or as a party, as that term has been defined” was not

12
the court’s charge instructed the jury that if the court “provide[d] a definition for a

term in this charge,” it “should use the meaning provided in these instructions .

[Emphasis added.]”

Despite primarily arguing that the charge “wholly omitted” and “never stated”

language that is fully included and plainly stated in the charge, Newman hedges and

in a footnote acknowledges the definitions’ inclusion: “[T]he lesser[-]included

offenses in counts two and three contained the elements of aggravated sexual assault

and indecency.” He directs us, however, to the court’s “Special Note” telling the jury

that they should not address Counts Two or Three if they found Newman “Guilty”

on Count One. He then urges us to presume that the jury followed this note and not

only did not address Counts Two and Three in the verdict form but also stopped

reading altogether and ignored the court’s definitions of the predicate offenses.

But “[w]e must assume that the jurors read and understood the charge as a

whole,” which the court read in its entirety to the jurors before their deliberations.

Branum v. State, 535 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (quoting

Martin v. State, 335 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d)); see Williams

v. State, No. 03-18-00267-CR, 2018 WL 3451635, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18,

erroneous); Love v. State, 706 S.W.3d 584, 600–04 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet.
ref’d) (considering the impact of charge language instructing the jury to “bear[] in
mind the foregoing instructions” to conclude there was no error when the charge
was read as a whole); Thompson v. State, No. 02-18-00084-CR, 2019 WL 3819265, at
*10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (collecting cases concerning self-referential language akin to “[n]ow
bearing in mind the foregoing instructions”).

13
2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that the trial

court’s reading of the entire jury charge made the jury “aware of the greater and

lesser offenses listed in the charge”). The jury charge twice included the “Special

Note”: first in the Count One specific section and again in Count One’s verdict

form. But such an instruction provided no new definitions or instructions about

using the charge’s defined terms and, importantly, did not override the court’s

specific instruction to follow the charge’s definitions. Rather, it was an instruction

designed only to direct the jury about which of the verdict forms it needed to address

and to avoid a potential double-jeopardy problem if the jury answered “Guilty” to all

three verdict forms. See, e.g., Diaz v. State, No. 13-22-00602-CR, 2024 WL 3818560, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 15, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s dual convictions violated double

jeopardy because the predicate child-sexual-abuse convictions “occurred during the

time period in which [CSA] offense was committed”); Ibenyenwa v. State, 367 S.W.3d

420, 426 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d); see also Ex parte Covarrubias,

665 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“An instruction that guides the jury on

when and how to consider a lesser-included offense is sometimes known as a

‘transitional instruction.’”).

No evidence suggests that the jury did not follow both of the court’s

instructions. That is, nothing suggests that the jury did not follow the charge’s

instruction to use the charge’s definitions, including those for the predicate acts.

14
Likewise, the charge affirmatively indicates that once the jury found Newman

“Guilty” of CSA, it followed the charge’s transitional instruction to not address the

verdict forms for the predicate offenses. In sum, the court’s charge presented a

logically consistent combination of paragraphs containing both abstract and

application paragraphs for the jury to follow, and the CSA application paragraphs

necessarily and unambiguously referred to the definitions the court had given,

including for the predicate acts. See Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 367.

Because we presume that the jury understood and followed the trial court’s

instructions—including the instruction to use the charge’s definitions—we conclude

that the trial court did not err by its manner of defining the predicate acts. See

Thompson, 2019 WL 3819265, at *10; Walker, 300 S.W.3d at 850. We overrule

Newman’s first point.

D. Point Two: Defining the Applicable Mental States

Newman’s second point is closely related to his first. In it, he contends that

“the charge failed to require any culpable mental state for conviction.” The crux of

his argument is that because the charge failed to define the predicate acts, the charge

did not require the jury to find their attendant mens rea elements. We disagree.

“[T]he CSA statute does not require general mental culpability beyond the

mental culpability required for its constituent offenses.” Williams v. State,

No. 02-20-00104-CR, 2021 WL 5227167, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Williams, for instance,

15
this court stated that “there is no error where the abstract portion of the charge

supplies a culpable mental state not specified in the application paragraph.” Id. at

*3 (citation modified).

As we quoted above, the “Definitions” section—in the charge’s abstract

paragraphs—defined when a person acts “intentionally” and “knowingly.”

Additionally, the charge’s definitions for both aggravated sexual assault of a child and

indecency with a child by contact included the mens rea elements applicable to each

predicate act. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.11, 22.021. So the charge’s abstract

paragraphs supplied the applicable mental states. See Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at

*3.

Simply put, the charge does not omit the applicable mens rea elements, and we

presume that the jury followed the charge’s instructions to use the provided

definitions. See Thompson, 2019 WL 3819265, at *10; Walker, 300 S.W.3d at 850. We

thus conclude that the trial court did not err by including the mens rea elements in

the charge’s abstract paragraphs. See Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at *3. We overrule

Newman’s second point.

E. Point Three: Instructing the Jury about CSA’s 30-Day-Duration Element

Newman complains in his third point about the following language in the CSA

section:

[A] person commits the offense of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a
Young Child, if, during a period . . . that is 30 or more days in duration,
the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse.

16
....

APPLICATION – COUNT ONE

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. The Defendant: Jared Lee Newman;

2. Committed the offense of: Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Young
Child;

3. On or about: June 1, 2018, through March 1, 2019, during a
period of time that is 30 days or more in duration;

....

then you will find the Defendant “Guilty” of the offense as charged in
the indictment.

....

With regard to element 3, the State is not required to prove that the
alleged offense happened on that exact date. It is sufficient if the
State proves that the offense was committed before February 7th,
2022, the date the indictment was filed. [Emphases added.]

Newman argues that the charge’s language “negates the 30-day requirement in two

distinct ways: it misdirects the 30 days as the time period alleged and it specifically

instructs that the only time requirement is that the offense occurred prior to

February 7th, 2022.” Neither argument provides a basis for reversal.

Before turning to Newman’s main argument, we briefly address his secondary

point concerning the charge’s instruction that “[i]t is sufficient if the State proves that

the offense was committed before February 7, 2022, the date the indictment was

17
filed.” Newman suggests that this instruction “negated” the CSA’s specific

instruction concerning CSA’s 30-day-duration element.

But far from negating the 30-day-duration instruction, the challenged language

simply informed the jury that the “State [was] not required to prove that the alleged

offense happened on that exact date.” This language is wholly consistent with the

Code of Criminal Procedure and well-settled precedent that the State is not required

to prove the exact date of an offense and need prove only that an offense occurred

before an indictment’s presentment and within any applicable limitations period. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.02(6); Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255–56 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997). We conclude that the charge’s instruction concerning the State’s

not being required to prove the exact date—so long as it proved pre-indictment

conduct—was not erroneous.

Turning back to Newman’s primary argument concerning the 30-day-duration

element, Newman does not complain that the charge language incorrectly presents

the CSA’s statutory elements. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b)(1) (“A person commits

an offense if . . . during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person

commits two or more acts of sexual abuse . . . .”); see Tidbeaux v. State,

No. 02-24-00429-CR, 2025 WL 2736519, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 25,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Although the exact dates

of the acts of sexual abuse need not be proven, the offense of [CSA] does require

proof that one act of sexual abuse occurred on at least the 29th day after the day of

18
another act of sexual abuse.” (quoting Lawson v. State, No. 02-17-00201-CR,

2018 WL 1192478, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 8, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam)

(mem. op., not designated for publication)). Instead, he argues that by linking the

indictment’s “on or about June 1, 2018, through March 1, 2019” language to the

statute’s “30 days or more in duration” requirement, the charge confused the jury and

allowed a conviction based on acts occurring within less than 30 days, rather than

acts at least 30 days apart. In other words, Newman complains of a latent ambiguity

in the charge’s duration language. See Cisnerosmartinez v. State, No. 02-24-00144-CR,

2025 WL 1840568, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication).

Both sides observe that the courts of appeals have not uniformly resolved

whether similar charge language is error and that the Court of Criminal Appeals has

not resolved the issue. See id. at *9–10 (discussing split). And so far, when addressing

this unobjected-to charge error, this court has assumed without deciding error and

proceeded to analyze harm. See Tidbeaux, 2025 WL 2736519, at *4–6; Cisnerosmartinez,

2025 WL 1840568, at *9–11; Stevens v. State, No. 02-23-00122-CR, 2024 WL 3978169,

at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at *7.

We have considered the State’s request that we modify our approach and

address whether error has occurred. But in the interest of consistency and

expediency, we again assume without deciding that the charge’s duration language

19
was erroneous because Newman has not shown that any such assumed charge error

resulted in egregious harm. See Tidbeaux, 2025 WL 2736519, at *4–6; Cisnerosmartinez,

2025 WL 1840568, at *9–11; Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at *9–10; Williams,

2021 WL 5227167, at *7; see also Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999) (assuming charge error and addressing harm).

To assess harm, we consider (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the

evidence, including the contested issues and weight of the probative evidence; (3) the

argument of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information in the record as a whole.

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165. A finding of egregious harm must be based on actual

rather than theoretical harm. Id. Egregious harm is a difficult standard to meet and

requires a fact-specific analysis. Id. Jury-charge error causes egregious harm if it

affects the very basis of the case, deprives the accused of a valuable right, or vitally

affects a defensive theory. Id.

Reviewing the whole charge—similar to that in Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at

*14—the CSA’s application paragraph included the “on or about” language from the

indictment that is not in the statute, and the CSA’s specific abstract paragraph

materially tracked the CSA statute. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b)(1). The abstract

paragraph’s language “mitigates any harm that may have occurred from the

application paragraph’s language.” Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at *14 (citing Williams,

2021 WL 5227167, at *6). So too did Count One’s unanimity instruction stating that

“[t]he jury must agree unanimously that the Defendant, during a period that is 30 or

20
more days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.” See id. Thus, a

view of the entire charge does not weigh in favor of egregious harm. See id.

Regarding the trial evidence, Fiona, Mother, and the SANE established that

Newman committed acts of abuse in the summer of 2018 and again in early 2019.

Thus, there was ample evidence that Newman, during a period that was 30 or more

days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against Fiona. See Tex.

Penal Code § 21.02(b). This factor does not weigh in favor of egregious harm. See

Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at *14.

Concerning the argument of counsel, the State mentioned the duration

element throughout its opening statements and closing arguments. For example, the

State argued that Fiona “was molested by her father over an entire summer[,] and it

continued on into January of the following year, and that is more than 30 days apart.”

The State further argued that “[n]o one is debating that the time frame here is

between June 1st, 2018, and March 1st, 2019,” and it urged the jury to find Newman

guilty of CSA.

Newman did not contest the duration element. See Lane v. State, 957 S.W.2d

584, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d) (concluding that omission from charge

of element of offense did not cause egregious harm in part because element was not

contested at trial). Rather, he wanted the jury to find him not guilty because of

“credibility issues,” arguing that Fiona could not remember every detail and that he

had been “falsely accused.” In rebuttal, the State again argued about Fiona’s “liv[ing]

21
in a hellscape for 90 days at least, all summer long” and “then going into the next

year.” Examining all the arguments, the State’s attorney clearly explained that the jury

had to find that Newman had committed two acts of sexual abuse that were

separated by at least 30 days. See Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at *14 (citing Williams,

2021 WL 5227167, at *6). This factor does not weigh in favor of egregious harm.

Finally, concerning other relevant trial information, the State explained the

CSA offense to the jury during voir dire:

In our indictment we have aggravated sexual assault of a child, and we
have indecency with a child by contact. . . . It has to be something
different for it to make continuous. And I’m going to break those
offenses down for you, but just for purposes of time, that’s what we’re
doing. Those two acts have to be 30 or more days apart. The idea is that
it’s not just a kind of one-off short period of time. It is an ongoing
thing. So we have -- that’s why dates are important here.

Even Newman’s trial counsel acknowledged that the State had explained the duration

element:

[W]hat the law says is that there have to be, as the State said, two or
more events that are 30 or more days apart. That’s the minimum length
of time, can’t say anything else about it. So you know it’s at least 30 days
that those things were separated. Knowing that there are at least two
things that are 30 or more days apart, that’s what the child has come in
and said has happened that led to an arrest, a charge, and an indictment.

The record indicates that during voir dire, both the State and defense counsel helped

the jury to understand the CSA duration element. So this factor does not weigh in

favor of egregious harm.

22
Accordingly, based on our review of the Almanza factors, we cannot say that

the assumed error egregiously harmed Newman. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171;

Cisnerosmartinez, 2025 WL 1840568, at *11. We overrule his third point.

F. Point Four: The Charge’s CSA Unanimity Instruction

In his fourth point, Newman argues that under Ramos, 590 U.S. at 93,

140 S. Ct. at 1397, the trial court erred by not requiring the jury’s unanimity on the

predicate acts of sexual abuse underlying its decision of guilt on the CSA offense.

Specifically, Newman objected to the following instruction concerning the CSA

offense:

With regard to element 5,[5] members of the jury are not required to
agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were
committed by the Defendant or the exact date when those acts were
committed. The jury must agree unanimously that the Defendant,
during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, committed two or
more acts of sexual abuse.

But as the State points out—and as even Newman acknowledges—we have

repeatedly rejected the unanimity argument that Newman is making in his fourth

5
Element five concerned the jury’s finding the following: “To-wit, the
Defendant: Did commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against a child younger
than 14 years of age, including an act constituting the offense of aggravated sexual
assault of a child and/or indecency with a child against [Fiona] . . . .”

23
issue.6 See Cisnerosmartinez, 2025 WL 1840568, at *12; Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at

*15; Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at *7.

In addressing the identical complaint in Stevens and Cisnerosmartinez—both of

which addressed Ramos—this court “st[ood] by [its] reasoning . . . and h[e]ld that the

trial court did not err in instructing the jury that it did not need to unanimously agree

about the underlying acts of sexual abuse to find [the defendant] guilty under the

CSA statute.” Stevens, 2024 WL 3948169, at *15; Cisnerosmartinez, 2025 WL 1840568,

at *12 (“[W]e continue to stand by this reasoning.”). Applying this court’s precedent

to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury

that it did not need to unanimously agree about the underlying acts of sexual abuse to

find Newman guilty of CSA. See Cisnerosmartinez, 2025 WL 1840568, at *12; Stevens,

2024 WL 3978169, at *15; Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at *7. We overrule Newman’s

fourth point.

III. Voir Dire

Finally, in his fifth point, Newman complains about the State’s displaying

during voir dire what he contends were “highly prejudicial” photos in its PowerPoint

slide:

Newman presents no argument on why we should abandon our prior
6

holdings and concedes that he is raising the issue to preserve it for further review.

24
We conclude that Newman has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing the State to display the slide.

Voir dire examination permits the parties to assess prospective jurors’

desirability and to select a “competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury[.]” Staley

v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citation omitted). Questions

during voir dire are generally proper if they seek to discover a juror’s views on an

issue applicable to the case. 7 Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

Parties may not ask improper commitment questions—“those that commit a
7

prospective juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a certain way after

25
(citing Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)); see also Tobar v.

State, 874 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1994, pet. ref’d)

(“Voir dire questions are relevant if they involve issues in the case, are necessary to

the intelligent use of peremptory challenges, or are relevant to challenges for cause.”).

Parties may also inquire into a venire member’s general background or philosophical

outlook. Davis v. State, 349 S.W.3d 517, 518–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Sells v.

State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 756 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

During voir dire, trial courts have broad discretion to determine the propriety

of a particular question. Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38. Accordingly, an appellate court

should not disturb a trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

Here, when the State showed the challenged slide, it asked, “[W]ho here has --

recognizes the three people here on the right?” At that point, Newman’s counsel

requested a bench conference and objected to the State’s implied comparison

between Newman and Jared Fogle, John Wayne Gacy, and Woody Allen. Newman

argued that the State was “casting a bias against” him and denying his right to a fair

trial.

In response, the State explained that it was merely “seek[ing] out known biases

against people’s ideas of what sex offenders are, people who sexually abuse, . . . [and]

what they see on TV versus reality.” The trial court overruled Newman’s objection

learning a particular fact.” Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001). Although Newman cites Standefer concerning a judge’s discretion, he does not
argue that the State asked any improper commitment questions.

26
and gave him a running objection, after which the State asked a particular venire

member if he recognized any of the three persons. The venire member identified all

three, and the State followed up, “All three different -- pretty different types of guys,

right?” He agreed.

Newman’s counsel then asked for another bench conference and obtained a

running objection to the State’s questioning the panel about the persons in the

PowerPoint slide, which the court granted. The State then asked, “So they are all

known in the media for different types of child sexual abuse convicted [sic]; is that

correct? A venire member answered, “I don’t know if Woody Allen was convicted”

or accused, and the State agreed that Allen had only been accused.

The State then asked the panel a broad question: “If anybody wants to

volunteer, what do you think a sex offender, you know, or somebody who is accused

of sexual assault, their relationship to victim is? Is it always a stranger like stranger

danger, or is it oftentimes somebody in their family or someone that they know?”

The State continued questioning the panel on such broad topics for approximately

17 or 18 minutes—without again referencing the photos—before switching slides, at

which point Newman’s counsel reurged his objection, pointing out that the slide had

been physically displayed directly behind Newman. The trial court overruled this

objection.

On appeal, Newman argues that the State’s questions about the photos had no

relevance, and the State argues that it simply used the photos to “illustrate and spark

27
conversation with the jurors about what a sex offender might look like, nothing

more.” We agree that the questions were relevant.

The State’s slide—including the listed questions—demonstrates that the State

was attempting to inquire about the potential jurors’ thoughts and biases on a variety

of topics related to the issues in the case, including who may sexually abuse someone,

the relationships between victims and their abusers, who can become a victim,

whether people are motivated to make false reports, and their own personal

experiences with sexual abuse. In light of Fiona’s trial testimony that Newman had

abused her, and his testimony accusing Fiona of lying at Mother’s behest, the State’s

questions about the slide—including asking general questions about the photos with

no direct comparison to Newman—were relevant to the issues in the case. See Davis,

349 S.W.3d at 518–19; Barajas, 93 S.W.3d at 38; Tobar, 874 S.W.2d at 89. Thus, on

this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling

Newman’s objections. 8 We thus overrule Newman’s fifth point.

8
Even if we reached the issue of harm, we do not agree with Newman’s
argument that “[b]y showing the photographs, a bias was created that cannot be
reversed.” For one thing, he cites no binding authority for his proposed
presumed-harm rule. But more fundamentally, nothing in the record indicates that
the State’s complained-of questions and its display of the photos resulted in a biased
person’s selection for the jury that then denied Newman a fair trial. See, e.g., McQueen
v. State, No. 11-21-00098-CR, 2022 WL 16984292, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Nov. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Villegas v. State,
Nos. 04-07-00109-CR, 04-07-00110-CR, 04-07-00111-CR, 2008 WL 441755, at *2–
3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); cf. Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 712–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

28
IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Newman’s five points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 7, 2026

(requiring an appellate court to assess if an improper commitment question
“poisoned” the jury or any juror).

29