Keith L. Barnett A/K/A Keith L. Barnett Sr. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00106-CR
___________________________

KEITH L. BARNETT A/K/A KEITH L. BARNETT SR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1801605

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Appellant Keith L. Barnett a/k/a Keith L. Barnett Sr. on

three counts: (1) intentional or knowing possession of between four and 200 grams of

methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, see Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 481.112(a), (d); (2) intentional or knowing possession of between four and

200 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, see id.; and (3) possession of a firearm

after a felony conviction, see Tex. Penal Code § 46.04. The jury also made

deadly-weapon findings based on Barnett’s using or exhibiting a firearm during both

drug offenses. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b). After the punishment phase,

the trial court sentenced Barnett to three concurrent 48-year sentences in accordance

with the jury’s verdicts.

On appeal, Barnett raises two issues. First, he asserts that the trial court erred

by admitting DVR surveillance evidence from the trap house 1 where he was arrested

because the police delayed nearly five months between seizing and searching the DVR

system. Second, he challenges the evidence’s sufficiency to support his convictions

and the jury’s deadly-weapon findings. Because Barnett failed to meet his burden to

See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. 02-17-00388-CR, 2019 WL 2041831, at *2 n.4 (Tex.
1

App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“A ‘trap house’ is the same as a ‘dope house.’”); Gabriel v. State, 842 S.W.2d 328,
332 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (op. on. reh’g) (describing a “trap house” as “a facility
used exclusively for the sale of drugs”), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

2
establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trap house’s DVR

system and because the evidence is sufficient, we will affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2023, the police began investigating potential drug activity at a

house located at 4741 Crenshaw Avenue in Fort Worth, Texas. The police installed a

pole camera on a streetlight in front of the house, and as they began surveilling, they

observed an abnormal amount of short-term vehicle traffic at the house. One of the

vehicles was linked to Keith Barnett Jr. (Junior). Using a confidential informant, the

police conducted three “controlled buys” from the house. Twice, Junior sold drugs to

the informant, and the short-term traffic did not stop when Junior was not present.

The police then obtained a search warrant for the house targeting Junior and

served the warrant on November 1, 2023. Junior was not present, but Barnett and

another man—Donald Pilot—were. As the SWAT team arrived, Pilot surrendered to

the police. Barnett ran into the backyard but quickly gave himself up. On Barnett, the

police found $802 in mostly $5 and $20 bills, including a marked $20 bill an informant

had used to buy crack cocaine. The police arrested Junior elsewhere.

The police had suspected that the Crenshaw house was a trap house, which

their body-camera footage corroborated. The house had exterior surveillance cameras

near two exterior doors with a live feed directly into the living room so that the

individuals inside could monitor outside activity. Plastic covered the front door’s

windows.

3
The house contained little furniture: two couches and an ottoman in the living

room; several television monitors on the living-room floor; and air mattresses in each

bedroom. Minimal clothing and personal effects were in the two bedroom closets.

Nothing was on the walls. The kitchen appeared to be used for packaging narcotics

instead of preparing food, and the pantry, cabinets, and refrigerator contained little

food. The kitchen also contained a camera above the sink pointed at the front door

that could record activity in the kitchen and living room and anyone coming through

the front door or a side exterior door into the kitchen.

During the house search, the police found two loaded handguns and drugs—

including marijuana, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine. The police found drugs

and one of the handguns—a black Glock .22 pistol—together in the kitchen.

Additionally, the police found a digital scale with a powdery substance on it and

baking soda, which can be used to turn cocaine into crack cocaine. The police seized

the cameras around and inside the residence that recorded to a DVR system, which

they also seized.

On March 28, 2024—148 days after the initial search and seizure—the police

obtained a warrant to examine the seized DVR’s contents. 2 From the examination, the

police determined that the DVR system contained several hundred videos spanning

Although the parties both argue about the “149 days” between the November
2

1, 2023 seizure and the March 28, 2024 search of the DVR system, we calculate the
DVR search as happening 148 days after its seizure.

4
the two weeks before the house was searched. Among other things, video footage

from the kitchen camera showed Barnett handling drugs, cooking crack cocaine,

picking up the Glock from a kitchen drawer while making crack cocaine, holding the

Glock and placing drugs on the counter as a man enters the house, and opening the

kitchen drawer containing drugs and the Glock during a drug sale.

Before trial, Barnett moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the

searched DVR system, asserting that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated

by the State’s 148-day delay between seizing and obtaining the warrant to search the

DVR equipment. The trial court initially denied the motion on the ground that

Barnett lacked standing. But during trial, the trial court reconsidered the issue,

determined that Barnett had standing, and then applied a balancing test to conclude

that the delay had not violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The jury thus heard

police testimony about what they found in the house, saw video evidence linking

Barnett to the drugs and the firearms, and convicted him of the drug- and

firearm-possession offenses.

II. Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Barnett complains that the trial court should have suppressed

the kitchen-camera footage from the trap house’s DVR system because the police’s

148-day delay in getting a warrant to search it was unreasonable and violated the

5
Fourth Amendment. 3 But because Barnett did not show that he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the DVR system, the trial court properly denied his motion

to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We

give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and

application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and

demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not

turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. (first quoting Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43,

48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); then citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997)). We also review questions of law de novo, including “whether particular

historical facts give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy,” see id. (citing State v.

Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)), and we may consider a ground

despite the trial court’s stating other bases for its suppression ruling, see Wilson v. State,

692 S.W.2d 661, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g).

3
Barnett’s motion to suppress invoked both the United States and Texas
Constitutions, but on appeal, he does not argue that the Texas Constitution provides
greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth
Amendment. We thus review only his federal constitutional arguments. See Morris v.
State, No. 02-24-00008-CR, 2025 WL 1840469, at *12 n.18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
July 3, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Welch v. State,
93 S.W.3d 50, 52 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

6
Generally, our review is limited to the record at the time of the suppression

hearing. Igboji v. State, 666 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). But when the

parties relitigate the suppression issue in the trial, our scope of review includes the

relevant suppression evidence admitted in both the suppression hearing and the trial.

Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), abrogated on other grounds

by Igboji, 666 S.W.3d at 615; Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996).

B. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30–

31, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1628 (1963); see Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004) (“Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence . . . must prove that he was a

victim of the unlawful search or seizure . . . [and cannot] complain about the invasion

of someone else’s personal rights.”) (citation modified). Thus, to claim the protection

of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant “must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment

interest” in the place or thing being searched—a concept known as “Fourth

Amendment standing.” Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025),

cert. denied, No. 25-6476, 2026 WL 795116 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2026) (quoting Byrd v. United

States, 584 U.S. 395, 410, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018)).

7
He must not only “claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation

of privacy” that the government has invaded, see id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland,

442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (1979) (citation modified)), but he must meet

that burden with evidence, see King v. State, 670 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023). A defendant “must demonstrate that: (1) by his conduct, he exhibited an actual

subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched, and (2) under the

circumstances, society is prepared to recognize his subjective expectation as

objectively reasonable.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 136–37 (first citing Smith, 442 U.S. at

740, 99 S. Ct. at 2577; then citing King, 670 S.W.3d at 656).

To determine whether a defendant met his burden, we examine the totality of a

search’s surrounding circumstances and are guided by several non-exhaustive factors:

(1) whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the
place or thing searched;

(2) whether he was legitimately in the place searched;

(3) whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to
exclude others;

(4) whether, before the intrusion, he took normal precautions
customarily taken by those seeking privacy;

(5) whether the place or thing was put to some private use; and

(6) whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of
privacy.

King, 670 S.W.3d at 657 (citing Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002)).

8
At the Fourth Amendment’s core stands “[t]he right of a man to retreat into his

own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Green v. State,

78 S.W.3d 604, 608–09 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (emphasis added)

(citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683 (1961)). Even an

“overnight guest” may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home.

Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Minnesota v. Olson,

495 U.S. 91, 98, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (1990)). But the legitimate privacy expectation

of an overnight guest does not extend to a casual visitor or a guest who is merely

present with the homeowner’s consent. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S. Ct.

469, 473 (1998); Black v. State, 776 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet.

ref’d).

Moreover, in contrast to residentially used property, “[p]roperty used for

commercial purposes is treated differently” under the Fourth Amendment. Wade v.

State, No. 2-02-241-CR, 2004 WL 1416111, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 24,

2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Carter, 525 U.S. at

90, 119 S. Ct. at 474). For example, in Carter, the United States Supreme Court

explained that visitors packaging drugs in an apartment “were essentially present for a

business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours.” 525 U.S. at 86, 90,

119 S. Ct. at 471, 473–74. For them, such an apartment was “simply a place to do

business,” and unlike their own residences, they had no legitimate privacy expectation.

Id. at 90, 119 S. Ct. at 474. When a “home is converted into a commercial center to

9
which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that

business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage,

a car, or on the street.” Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S. Ct. 424,

427 (1966); Kizziar v. State, 628 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, pet.

ref’d).

C. Analysis

Both during the initial suppression hearing and when Barnett raised the

suppression issue again in trial, he offered no evidence connecting him to the

Crenshaw house and simply questioned the police officers who worked on the case.

The State introduced the search-warrant affidavit, which provided some context for

each person observed at the house.

The officer who drafted the search-warrant affidavit averred that Barnett had

not wanted to speak with the police. The officer also averred that Junior had said that

he was at the Crenshaw house merely to wash his clothes and refused to speak further

with the police.

On the other hand, the officer noted that Pilot had told them that he had come

over to mow the lawn, but he later admitted that he was homeless and “was paid to be

allowed to stay” at the Crenshaw house for about a week. Pilot did not identify who

had paid him. He initially claimed that he would open the door for people coming

inside and did not know why they were there because he would close his eyes when

they entered. But he later admitted to selling crack cocaine.

10
Importantly, Barnett did not show that he owned, leased, or ever stayed

overnight at the Crenshaw house—with or without the owner’s authorization to be

there. Nor did Barnett offer any evidence that he had a key to the property.4 In fact,

multiple officers testified that they did not know who owned or leased the house.

Thus, it is unclear whether the Crenshaw house’s owner even knew that anyone,

including Barnett, was using it to make and sell drugs.

In contrast, the record definitively showed that the Crenshaw house was not

Barnett’s primary residence. An officer testified that after they arrested Barnett, he

told them that he lived at 4209 Carmel Avenue, and the police went to that location to

continue their investigation and spoke there with his father. The Carmel address is

identified in the Clerk’s Record as Barnett’s address, which the trial court judicially

noticed.

The police officers testified that instead of being anyone’s primary residence,

the Crenshaw house was being used as a trap house. Describing a trap house, one

officer testified that it is “a residence that is used commonly to store, distribute, or use

narcotics in. And, typically, it’s not the main seller’s primary residence.” He instead

“attribute[d] it to, like, their office.” This is so because “[t]hey live somewhere else,

they come to the office, sell drugs, and then they go back home.”

The police found a key in a red jacket in the living room, but no one testified
4

to what lock the key opened.

11
As we have described above, the evidence corroborated the police’s belief that

the property was being used as a trap house. The police found sparse clothing in the

bedroom closets. Yet no one testified whose clothes were present or specifically

linked them to Barnett, as opposed to Junior, Pilot, or the other people seen coming

and going from the house.

An officer acknowledged that the presence of sparse clothing and blow-up

mattresses could show that the residents were simply impoverished. But he testified

that based on the totality of the circumstances—the interior and exterior cameras, the

covered windows, the lack of food and barren kitchen cabinets, the lack of wall

hangings, and the like—the Crenshaw house was “just solely being used for a place to

distribute narcotics from.”

Because the State had charged Barnett with drug- and firearm-possession

crimes, it needed to link him to the drugs and firearms that the police had found in

the house, and Barnett points to that testimony to make his standing argument.

Concerning one officer’s testimony describing what a trap house is and what the

officers found—including the seized drugs and firearms—Barnett’s counsel asked

whether the officer believed that Barnett was “in possession of those items.” The

officer agreed that “Barnett had access to those items and care or custody of their

control.”

Counsel then asked the officer whether he thought that Barnett was also in

possession of the DVR system that day, and the officer again agreed that “Barnett had

12
access and care or custody of control of that DVR.” When asked to clarify whether it

was his position that Barnett possessed the DVR system, the officer testified, “Not

physically. It was not on his person, but . . . Barnett resided there with the DVR,

correct.” The State then objected as Barnett’s counsel asked whether the officer

thought that Barnett “had a possessory interest in it,” and the officer never answered

that question.

The trial court ultimately described this DVR-possession testimony as “rank

speculation.” And indeed, given that the record showed where Barnett actually

resided—Carmel Avenue—and the utter lack of any evidence linking him to the

owner of the Crenshaw property, the trial court correctly questioned the officer’s

characterization of Barnett’s relationship to the DVR system and his expectation of

privacy in the Crenshaw house and its DVR system.

But other evidence similarly pointed to Barnett’s not having an expectation of

privacy in the house’s DVR system. For example, an officer testified that the DVR

system was password protected. Barnett, however, offered no evidence that he knew

the password or had access to the footage being recorded. That a camera connected

to the DVR system was present in the Crenshaw kitchen while Barnett also was—and

was within physical reach, like the drugs and firearm in the kitchen—did not indicate

that Barnett owned, had access to, or controlled the DVR system giving rise to a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the video footage.

13
In sum, Barnett—who lived elsewhere—did not show that he owned the

Crenshaw home, was an overnight guest, had the owner’s consent to be present, or

even maintained any clothes or belongings in the property. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90,

119 S. Ct. at 473; Black, 776 S.W.2d at 701 (holding that individual with no possessory

or proprietary interest in premises, who has no clothes or other belongings in a house,

has no legitimate privacy interest in the premises). He did not show that he had a key

to the property or the password to the DVR system; rather, the evidence showed that

Barnett and others used the Crenshaw property to make and sell drugs. See Windom v.

State, 379 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.) (“[A] visitor who

did not stay the night, had no control over the apartment, and was there temporarily

for a business transaction, may have had no legitimate privacy interest in the premises

searched.” (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)));

McDaniel v. State, No. 11-05-00276-CR, 2007 WL 1705704, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Eastland June 14, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating

that “[t]he lack of furniture and the frequent drug transactions indicate that

appellant . . . [was] using the residence for illegal drug activity”—a use that did not

meet the Granados factors); Wade, 2004 WL 1416111, at *4 (holding that a defendant

who had a key to—but who did not own, lease, or live in—his brother’s tin-walled

shop building lacked standing to contest evidence seized from the building).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that Barnett

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trap house’s DVR system. See Carter,

14
525 U.S. at 90, 119 S. Ct. at 474; Windom, 379 S.W.3d at 468; McDaniel,

2007 WL 1705704, at *4; Wade, 2004 WL 1416111, at *4. Because Barnett failed to

establish his Fourth Amendment standing, he failed to demonstrate that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to suppress.5 We overrule Barnett’s first issue.

III. The Evidentiary Sufficiency

In his second issue, Barnett argues that with or without such video evidence,

the evidence was insufficient to support his drug-possession convictions and the jury’s

related deadly-weapon findings and his firearm-possession conviction. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review of the elements of an offense, we view all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any

rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);

Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full

play to the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021).

5
We need not reach Barnett’s argument concerning whether the 148-day delay
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

15
The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our

judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,

232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not

engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all

the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting

inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton,

569 S.W.3d at 608.

To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,

622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,

572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by

state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which

the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the

16
indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging

instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

B. The Drug-Possession Convictions

Here, Barnett was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to

deliver two controlled substances—methamphetamine and cocaine. Section

481.112 of the Texas Health and Safety Code states that “a person commits an

offense if the person knowingly . . . possesses with intent to deliver a controlled

substance listed in Penalty Group 1” and that “[a]n offense . . . is a felony of the first

degree if the amount of the controlled substance to which the offense applies is, by

aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, four grams or more but less than

200 grams.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a), (d); see also Kibble v. State,

340 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“To

demonstrate possession of cocaine [or methamphetamine] with intent to deliver, the

State is required to show that (1) appellant knowingly or intentionally, (2) possessed,

(3) cocaine [or methamphetamine], (4) in an amount of greater than four but less than

two hundred grams, (5) with the intent to deliver the cocaine [or

methamphetamine].”). 6

6
Barnett does not challenge the amount of the substances recovered, the
intent-to-deliver element, or that the substances were controlled substances. Thus, we
need focus only on the possession element. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.3d 300,
307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

17
Barnett’s sufficiency challenge focuses on whether he possessed the substances.

Both the Texas Health and Safety Code and the Texas Penal Code provide the same

definition for “possession”: “actual care, custody, control, or management.” See Tex.

Health & Safety Code § 481.002(38); Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(39). Thus, “[t]o prove

unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that[ ] (1) the

accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the

accused knew the matter possessed was contraband.” Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d

402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), abrogated by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 &

n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Barnett does not contend that the evidence is

insufficient to prove that he knew the substances were contraband; he limits his attack

to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his control and management of the

substances because, in his view, “[t]he evidence fails to establish any meaningful link

between [him] and the narcotics found at 4741 Crenshaw Avenue.”

A person’s “fortuitous proximity” to drugs is not sufficient to establish

possession; there must be an affirmative link between the defendant and the

substances:

The “affirmative links rule” is designed to protect the innocent
bystander from conviction based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to
someone else’s drugs. This rule simply restates the common-sense
notion that a person—such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or
friend—may jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily
jointly possess the contraband found in that house. Thus, we have
formulated the rule that “[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive
possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be
concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the

18
contraband unless there are additional independent facts and
circumstances [that] affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.”

Id. at 406 (citations omitted).

As with any other element of an offense, the affirmative link may be

established by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158,

162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“However, presence or proximity, when combined with

other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g., “links”), may well be sufficient to

establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

The courts have formulated a nonexclusive list of factors to examine in

determining whether the necessary links exist:

(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the
influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant
possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the
defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the
defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive
gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether
other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the
defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs
were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was
enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of
cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a
consciousness of guilt.

Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d

at 162 n.12).

As the court of criminal appeals notes, “Although these factors can help guide

a court’s analysis, ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the

19
combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences

therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?”

Id. (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S. Ct. at 2789). When analyzing the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the element of possession, we cannot focus our

analysis on “each circumstance of guilt in isolation without considering the cumulative

force of all of the evidence.” Id. at 417. Our review based on this cumulative view of

the evidence requires that “the logical force of all of the admitted evidence must be

considered in the light most favorable to the conviction, meaning that all reasonable

inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury’s guilty verdict.” Id.

Although we consider the above factors, we need not mechanically check off

those that are present, but we instead examine the cumulative force of the evidence in

the light most favorable to the conviction to determine whether it supports a

reasonable inference of possession. Here, it does.

The record contains the following evidence supporting such an inference:

• One of the officers who arrested Barnett in the Crenshaw’s house’s backyard
identified him at trial.

• As the videos played for the jury, another officer identified Barnett in the
videos, stating among other things, “The Defendant here is reaching into the
cabinet where the majority of the drugs were located, and in the cabinet you
can see the plastic bags containing different types of narcotics.”

• Barnett, Junior, and Pilot can be seen in the house on the videos in a period
spanning more than two weeks before the search.

• Barnett was at the house alone, with Junior or Pilot individually, or with both
Junior and Pilot. He repeatedly went into the kitchen drawer and kitchen

20
cabinets where drugs were located. A firearm was also clearly visible in the
drawer.

• Barnett removed a bag of marijuana from a kitchen drawer and weighed it on
the scale. He handed a bag of marijuana to a drug customer and received
payment in cash.

• One time, when Barnett was not in the kitchen but on the living-room couch,
he reached under the living-room ottoman into a concealed, zippered area and
removed what a police officer believed was a bag of narcotics.

• In another video, Barnett grabbed a scale and packaged something that a police
officer testified was likely narcotics.

• Video also showed Barnett cooking crack cocaine, including weighing the
cocaine and baking soda. In the process of cooking the crack cocaine, he
opened a kitchen drawer in which a firearm can be seen.

• An officer testified that he had interviewed a woman who was seen on the
video. She told the officer she was there to purchase cocaine. The officer
explained to the jury when the video showed “the Defendant . . . , again,
opening the drawer” containing the narcotics and the “black handgun” and
Barnett’s holding a “baggy that appears to contain a white powdery substance.”

• At another point, the officer explained that Barnett was seen “placing cocaine
on a scale and measuring it.”

• Barnett fled into the backyard during the police raid, and the video shows him
being arrested.

• The police found the marked money on Barnett that had been used by a police
informant in a controlled drug buy. They also found a THC vape on him.

• Controlled substances, including marijuana, methamphetamine, and crack
cocaine, were found in the house when the SWAT team entered. A plastic bag
containing a white powdery substance sat next to a digital scale with a white
powdery substance on it openly displayed on the counter.

The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be

afforded their testimony. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App.

21
2013); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Clayton v. State,

235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We thus defer to the jury’s credibility

and evidentiary-weight determinations and give due deference to their resolution of

any conflicts in the testimony, the weight the jury gave the evidence, and the

reasonable inferences they drew from the testimony and evidence. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Based on our reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,

we conclude that sufficient evidence exists from which a rational jury could have

found that Barnett possessed the methamphetamine and cocaine that the police seized

from the Crenshaw property. The cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances supports the jury’s findings on the drug-possession offenses.

C. The Firearm-Possession Conviction

Concerning Barnett’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a

felon, we analyze evidentiary sufficiency under the same rules adopted for determining

evidentiary sufficiency in cases of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 7

Robinson v. State, Nos. 02-15-00039-CR, 02-15-00040-CR, 2016 WL 2766746, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).

Thus, the State was required to prove, among other things, that the accused exercised

7
Barnett did not challenge any other element of his firearm-possession
conviction.

22
actual care, custody, or control of the firearm. Robinson, 2016 WL 2766746, at *2;

Bates, 155 S.W.3d at 216; see Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(a).

We detail the pertinent evidence:

• The police found one of the firearms—the Glock—loaded, in the top kitchen
drawer, directly below where the scale and bag of powdered substances were
located, and they found another firearm underneath a couch cushion in the
living room.

• Video evidence showed Barnett—while cooking the crack cocaine—pick up
the Glock that was in the kitchen counter drawer and hold it at his side as he
looked toward the side door and at an unidentified woman standing behind
him. He then returned the firearm to the drawer.

• Another video showed him open the drawer containing the drugs and the
Glock as a man came inside and bought drugs. With the drawer pulled out,
Barnett exhibited the Glock to anyone looking in the drawer and had it within
reach.

In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that the evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to find that Barnett

possessed the firearms that the police seized from the Crenshaw property. The

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances suffices to support the jury’s

finding on the firearm-possession offense.

D. The Deadly-Weapon Findings

Relatedly, Barnett challenges the deadly-weapon findings the jury made

concerning the two drug offenses. A deadly-weapon finding is proper if the defendant

used or exhibited a deadly-weapon during the commission of a felony offense or

during immediate flight therefrom. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b). The

23
term “use,” in the context of a deadly-weapon finding, means “‘any employment of a

deadly weapon, even simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated

felony.’” Coleman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting

Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). The term “exhibit”

requires a weapon to be “consciously shown, displayed, or presented to be viewed.”

Id. (quoting Patterson, 769 S.W.2d at 941).

In determining whether a weapon was used as a deadly weapon in furtherance

of possessing a controlled substance, we consider the cumulative effect of several

factors, including: (1) the type of gun involved; (2) whether it was loaded; (3) whether

the gun was stolen; (4) the proximity of the gun to the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or

drug manufacturing materials; (5) the accessibility of the gun to the person’s

controlling the premises; (6) the quantity of drugs involved; and (7) any evidence that

might demonstrate an alternative purpose for the gun’s presence. Id. at 658–

60 (Cochran, J., concurring); see Escobedo v. State, Nos. 2-09-00348-CR, 2-09-00349-CR,

2-09-00350-CR, 2010 WL 4924982, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 2, 2010, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reciting Coleman factors). We focus

on the proximity of the firearm to the drugs, not to the defendant. Coleman,

145 S.W.3d at 654–55.

As we have detailed above, the kitchen-video footage showed Barnett’s picking

up the Glock from a kitchen drawer while making crack cocaine, holding the Glock

and placing drugs on the counter as a man enters the house, and opening the kitchen

24
drawer containing drugs and the Glock during a drug sale. After police raided the

house, they found drugs and the Glock together in the kitchen.

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding and

taking all the relevant factors into consideration, we conclude that a rational

fact-finder could determine that Barnett used at least the Glock pistol shown in the

video to protect the drugs and cash and hence to facilitate his possession and delivery

of methamphetamine and cocaine. See Castillo v. State, 426 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Escobedo, 2010 WL 4924982, at *4–5. The

evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s deadly-weapon findings concerning the

drug offenses. We overrule Barnett’s second issue.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Barnett’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 21, 2026

25