Demetrius Crockett v. Justice of the Peace, Precinct 5 - Judge Rick "Rico" Olivo

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00097-CV

Demetrius Crockett, Appellant

v.

Justice of the Peace, Precinct 5 - Judge Rick “Rico” Olivo, Appellee

FROM THE 98TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-GN-24-009515, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court dismissed Demetrius Crockett’s claims against Justice of the

Peace, Precinct 5—Judge Rick “Rico” Olivo. The court granted Olivo’s plea to the jurisdiction

and motion based on provisions allowing dismissal of frivolous or malicious claims filed by

parties who filed an affidavit of inability to pay. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 13.001.

Crockett reasserts and expands his claims that Olivo violated statutes and his constitutional

rights. We hold that the district court correctly concluded that Crockett’s claims are barred by

judicial immunity and affirm the dismissal of this cause.

BACKGROUND

Crockett alleged that Olivo, acting under color of state law as justice of the peace,

“unlawfully and unconstitutionally deprived [Crockett] of his constitutional rights by convicting

him of a crime that was never committed.” Crockett alleged that this directly and severely

impacted his financial well-being and ability to operate his self-owned business.
Crockett appears to refer to the justice court’s adjudication of his guilt for failure

to maintain financial responsibility—specifically, to have proof of liability insurance. Crockett

had obtained deferred adjudication of that offense. As a term of his deferred adjudication, he

was ordered to show proof of insurance until October 23, 2023. He showed proof of insurance

through September 15, 2023, but did not submit proof for the remainder of the period. JP court

staff did not review Crockett’s proof until July 16, 2024. The JP court mailed a show-cause

notice to Crockett to appear by video conference on August 8, 2024. He did not appear and was

adjudicated guilty in Cause No. J5-CR-23-001425 for failure to maintain financial responsibility.

Crockett later communicated with the JP court through email and supplied proof of his insurance

through the relevant period. But the conviction remained in place.

Crockett sought and obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the district court

vacating his conviction. The State agreed to that relief. Crockett claims this order found Olivo

“guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt of violating [his] constitutional rights.” Olivo vacated the

conviction but left the case pending and ordered Crockett to provide proof of an additional week

of insurance coverage.

Crockett filed this lawsuit claiming (1) abuse of official capacity, see Tex. Penal

Code § 39.02; (2) official oppression, see id. § 39.03; (3) contempt of court for failing to follow

orders from the district court; (4) federal civil rights violations including deprivations of

procedural and substantive due process, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) state civil rights violations, see

Tex. Const. art. 1, §§ 13, 19; (6) judicial misconduct; (7) criminal negligence; (8) deprivation of

due process by “[f]ailing to act on a lawful Order”; (9) cruel and unusual punishment; and (10)

defamation. Crockett also complained that Olivo had failed “to correct the Plaintiff’s DMV

record and reinstate his Texas driver’s license.” He sought compensatory damages from the

2
impingement on his ability to work, punitive damages, and injunctive relief to require Olivo to

cease unlawful actions against other innocent citizens.

Olivo filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign and judicial immunity

from suit and liability. He also sought to dismiss the case as frivolous. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code § 13.001. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Crockett contends that the trial court (1) erred by dismissing his case

despite valid claims under federal law and the state constitution, (2) urges that Olivo violated his

constitutional rights and caused him serious harm, (3) asserts that Olivo is in contempt of court

for ignoring the court’s order to rectify the wrongful conviction and adhere to expunction orders

following a March 28, 2025 expunction order, and (4) contends that multiple instances of judicial

misconduct obstructed and prolonged justice and worsened his financial hardships and

emotional distress.

We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. State

v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007) (citing Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife

v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004)). A plaintiff must allege facts that

affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.; City of Pasadena v. Kuhn,

260 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In determining whether the

plaintiff has satisfied this burden, we construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and

deny the plea if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27; Smith v. Galveston County, 326 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). A party may plead himself out of court, however, when he

3
pleads facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action. Texas Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring,

513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974); Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). We review the actions of the trial court based upon the

materials before it at the time it acted. Shahin v. Memorial Hermann Health Sys., 527 S.W.3d 484,

487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

Judges acting in their official judicial capacity are immune from liability and suit

for judicial acts performed within the scope of their jurisdiction. Twilligear v. Carrell,

148 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). This immunity

extends to actions that are done in error, maliciously, and even in excess of the judge’s authority.

Id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). Like other forms of official

immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of

damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 67 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). It is overcome only for actions that are

nonjudicial, i.e., not taken in the judge’s official capacity, or taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Twilligear, 148 S.W.3d at 504. Judicial acts include those performed by judges in

adjudicating, or otherwise exercising their judicial authority over, proceedings pending in their

courts. Id. at 505.

We consider the following factors in determining whether a judge’s acts are

judicial: (1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge; (2) whether the

act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers; (3)

whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the act

arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity. Hawkins v. Walvoord, 25 S.W.3d 882,

890 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied). These factors are broadly construed in favor of

4
immunity. Id. Immunity may exist even if three of the four factors are not met. Id. The factors

need not be given equal weight in all cases; rather, they should be weighed according to the facts

of the particular case. Id.

Reading the pleadings most liberally and favorably to Crockett, he did not plead

actions for which Olivo can be sued. Crockett complains about Olivo “acting under color of

state law as justice of the peace” and convicting him, then failing to “fix[] his records in totality.”

Crockett complains of the adjudication of guilt, the order vacating the adjudication, and failures

to take judicial actions Crockett asserts were required; he also complains of the financial and

other consequences of these actions and inactions. The acts by Olivo of which Crockett

complains are acts normally performed by a judge and center around a case pending before the

judge. They are judicial acts or omissions, and Olivo is protected by judicial immunity from suit

or liability for them. See Twilligear, 148 S.W.3d at 504; Hawkins, 25 S.W.3d at 890.

The alleged failure to correct records in the Department of Motor Vehicles and

reinstatement of his license are not within the scope of this appeal. This appeal challenges the

district court’s dismissal order, signed February 5, 2025. The expunction order that Crockett

complains Olivo has not followed was, according to Crockett, issued March 28, 2025—after this

case was dismissed in the trial court and this appeal was filed. As the expunction order was not

before the trial court in February 2025, it is not a basis for the trial court’s decision, is not part of

the clerk’s record, and is not part of our review of that decision. See Shahin, 527 S.W.3d at 487.

We note further that the expunction order Crockett attached to his filing here is addressed to

various federal, state, and local agencies and courts, not to Olivo. We also note that Olivo left

office as of the end of 2024 and, therefore, had and has no power to perform official duties such

5
as correcting records, so he could not have acted on a March 2025 order and did not err by

failing to do so.

Crockett’s complaint about judicial misconduct obstructing and delaying the fair

administration of justice does not appear to relate to the order granting the plea to the

jurisdiction, but to unspecified other acts. One specific act he cites is waiting since March 19,

2025, for this Court to vacate an order in a different appeal. That appeal has been dismissed.

See Crockett v. Eiserloh, No. 03-25-00207-CV, 2025 WL 2231774 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6,

2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Because we conclude that the trial court did not err by granting the plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissing this cause, we need not review its alternative grounds for dismissal

under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 13. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (courts

shall write opinions that are “as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and

necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).

CONCLUSION

Finding no reversible error presented, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing

this cause.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: August 27, 2025

6