C. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00465-CV

C. P., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-19-008360, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.P. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights

to her child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered

judgment finding by clear and convincing evidence that three statutory grounds existed for

terminating Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (2).1

Mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that her appeal is

frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in

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The trial court’s order specified that the findings as to the three predicate grounds had
been made by a prior trial court and were not challenged in a prior appeal; therefore, “no further
findings are required as to statutory grounds.” See N.N. v. C.P., No. 03-22-00705-CV, 2023 WL
3853627, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing and remanding
for new trial solely on best interest where Mother had not challenged predicate findings).
appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between

the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to

prosecute frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective &

Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying

Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Mother’s counsel certified to this Court that he

provided her with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of the entire appellate record and

informed her of her right to file a pro se brief. Mother subsequently filed a pro se brief.

We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). After reviewing the record, the Anders brief, and

Mother’s pro se brief, we find nothing in the record that would arguably support Mother’s

appeal. We agree with Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of Mother. We

deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.2

2
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination
of parental rights extends to “all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the
filing of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
Accordingly, counsel’s obligations to C.P. have not yet been discharged. See id. If after
consulting with counsel appellant desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely
file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an
Anders brief.” See id.
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__________________________________________
Karin Crump, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: September 23, 2025

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