Paul Johnson v. Bastrop Central Appraisal District

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00596-CV

Paul Johnson, Appellant

v.

Bastrop Central Appraisal District, Appellee

FROM THE 21ST DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY
NO. 989-21, THE HONORABLE J. D. LANGLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Paul Johnson filed a lawsuit challenging the Bastrop Central Appraisal District’s

(BCAD) determination that his property did not qualify for an open-space appraisal. See Tex.

Tax Code § 23.51(1) (defining “qualified open-space land”). The trial court granted BCAD’s

combined summary-judgment motion and plea to the jurisdiction, and Johnson appeals. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2018, Johnson applied for an open-space appraisal for his three contiguous

tracts of land, totaling 19.78 acres (the Properties), based on the grazing of seven horses. BCAD

denied his application. Johnson timely filed a protest with BCAD’s Appraisal Review Board

(ARB). See id. § 41.41(a)(5) (authorizing protest for determination that property does not

qualify for appraisal as provided by Chapter 23). On his “Notice of Protest” form, reproduced in
part below, Johnson checked only one box next to the “reason for protest”: “Ag-use, open-space

or other special appraisal was denied, modified or cancelled.” He did not check the box

corresponding to “Incorrect appraised (market) value.”

The ARB affirmed BCAD’s denial of the open-space application and determined that BCAD’s

appraised values for the Properties were correct and should not be changed.

Johnson then filed this lawsuit challenging the denial of his open-space

application, and the trial court ordered the case to nonbinding arbitration. See id. § 42.225(a)

(providing that trial court shall submit case to nonbinding arbitration on property owner’s

motion). The arbitrator determined that Johnson “should be entitled to an open-space valuation.”

BCAD disagreed with the arbitrator’s nonbinding determination, and the case proceeded before

the trial court. Johnson then filed a supplemental original petition, in which he added claims for

attorney’s fees, declaratory judgment, and the reduction of the Properties’ appraised values by

$275,244.75. BCAD filed the subject combined motion for summary judgment and plea to the

jurisdiction and, after the trial court granted that motion, Johnson perfected this appeal.

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DISCUSSION

In three issues, Johnson contends that the trial court erred in (1) granting BCAD’s

plea to the jurisdiction, (2) granting BCAD summary judgment, and (3) denying him an award of

attorney’s fees.1

Plea to the jurisdiction

Over five years after he filed his original petition, Johnson filed his original

supplemental petition, in which he purported to add a claim that BCAD’s appraised value of the

Properties was “excessive.” BCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction was addressed solely to this

purported new claim of excessive appraised value.2 BCAD argued in its plea to the jurisdiction

that Johnson did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claim for excessive appraised

value because he did not raise it in his protest filed with the ARB. We agree.

A property owner’s failure to protest an issue before the ARB deprives a trial

court of jurisdiction to consider that issue. Patel v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 434 S.W.3d

803, 812–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Johnson’s Notice of Protest

clearly specified that he was protesting only the denial of his open-space appraisal, and he cites

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We need not address BCAD’s jurisdictional argument in its appellee’s brief that
Johnson should have obtained permission from the local administrative judge to file this appeal
because Johnson filed the underlying lawsuit well before he was declared a vexatious litigant,
and appeals are not considered “new litigation” but a continuation of existing litigation. See
Serafine v. Crump, 691 S.W.3d 917, 921–22 (Tex. 2024); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 11.102 (requiring vexatious litigant to obtain local administrative judge’s permission
before filing “new litigation”). We also deny BCAD’s request in its brief for Rule 45 sanctions.
See Tex. R. App. P. 45.
2
Within this same issue, Johnson contends that the trial court erred in granting BCAD’s
plea to the jurisdiction on his “declaratory judgment action.” However, BCAD did not file its
plea as to that claim but, rather, moved for summary judgment on Johnson’s attempt to use the
UDJA solely as a vehicle to recover attorney’s fees. We therefore address Johnson’s UDJA
claim in the next section of our analysis reviewing the trial court’s grant of BCAD’s summary-
judgment motion.
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nothing else in the record supporting his contention that he exhausted his administrative

remedies by timely raising before the ARB the issue of BCAD’s allegedly “excessive” appraisal

of the market value of the Properties. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting

BCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction on Johnson’s claim that BCAD’s appraised value of the

Properties was excessive.

Summary judgment

Johnson argues that summary judgment for BCAD regarding his eligibility for an

open-space appraisal was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact about

whether the Properties met BCAD’s requirements for that type of appraisal. He also contends

that summary judgment for BCAD on his claim for declaratory judgment was improper because

he was challenging not only his eligibility for an open-space appraisal but also BCAD’s

valuation of the Properties, which “justified” a claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act (UDJA). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 37.001–.011. The standards for summary

judgments are well-established, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i), and we review de novo the trial

court’s summary-judgment ruling, Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,

215–16 (Tex. 2003).

Open-space appraisal

BCAD supported its summary-judgment motion on the issue of whether the

Properties qualified for an open-space appraisal with citations to recent caselaw determining this

same issue against Johnson and evidence including BCAD’s Ag-use Qualification Manual

(Manual), adopted in March 2018 by its Chief Appraiser. The Manual specifies minimum-

acreage and minimum-animal requirements (collectively, “Intensity Requirements”) for subject

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land to qualify for an open-space appraisal, depending on the quality of the land. The Intensity

Requirements require a minimum of 35 acres for property categorized as “Native Pasture Good”

and 56 acres for “Native Pasture Average.” It is undisputed that the Properties comprise only

19.87 acres of combined Native Pasture Good and Native Pasture Average.

To be eligible for open-space appraisal, Johnson had the burden to establish that

(1) the Properties are “currently devoted principally to agricultural use,” (2) the agricultural use

was “to the degree of intensity generally accepted in the area,” and (3) the Properties have “been

devoted principally to agricultural use or to production of timber or forest products for five of the

preceding seven years.” See Tex. Tax Code § 23.51(1). The Chief Appraiser has the authority to

create standards for assessing whether a property meets these criteria, including by promulgating

degree-of-intensity requirements, such as the Intensity Requirements outlined in BCAD’s

Manual. See Johnson v. Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 13-22-00031-CV, 2024 WL 269528,

at *2, 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 25, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Johnson

I); Moers v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 469 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2015, pet. denied). Degree-of-intensity requirements adopted by a Chief Appraiser are presumed

to be valid and may not be overturned unless “the Chief Appraiser acted contrary to the

authorizing statute.” See Moers, 469 S.W.3d at 664.

Despite the unambiguous Intensity Requirements specified in the Manual,

Johnson cites portions of the record that he claims either create a genuine issue of material fact

about whether the Properties qualify or preclude summary judgment for BCAD. He first cites

one sentence in isolation from the Manual: “A typical livestock operation to the degree of

intensity generally accepted in this area, such as grazing cattle or livestock is seven (7) animal

units year round.” But Johnson’s citation of this sentence ignores the almost immediate

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subsequent language stating, “The following typical acreages for the different land categories

listed below are intended to be used as general guidelines based upon typically [sic] stocking

rates.” Among the enumerated land categories are Native Pasture Good and Native Pasture

Average, as noted above. This isolated sentence does not create a genuine issue of material fact

or preclude summary judgment for BCAD.

Johnson next cites a comment BCAD made in a hearing before the trial court and

a response BCAD filed to a discovery motion filed by Johnson. But again, Johnson is selective

in his citation of those portions of the record and fails to provide the complete context. At the

hearing, BCAD explained that in an interrogatory response it had informed Johnson that “his

acreage is just too small to meet minimum acreage requirements but that the absolute minimum

number of horses that he needed to meet the degree of intensity was seven.” BCAD further

explained at the hearing that it had provided Johnson, per his discovery request, with an

interrogatory response specifying an intensity “ratio”—as depicted on page 10 of the Manual—

based on the type of land at issue: Native Pasture Average requires 8 to 12 acres per animal unit,

and Native Pasture Good requires 5 to 8 acres per animal unit. This statement is consistent with

the Intensity Requirements in the Manual. Similarly, BCAD’s full response to Johnson’s

discovery motion states that “by providing [to Johnson] the minimum number of horses that is

needed to meet the . . . level of intensity standards, 7 horses, Defendant complied with this

Court’s Order of March 20, 2019.” That statement does not mean that the only applicable

Intensity Requirement is the number of animal units; it merely states that BCAD complied with a

discovery order of the court. Neither of these record citations creates a genuine issue of material

fact or precludes summary judgment for BCAD.

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Johnson thirdly cites the arbitrator’s assertion in his ruling that the Chief

Appraiser was “imposing additional burdens in excess of the statute or guidelines promulgated

by the Comptroller.” But this nonbinding, advisory statement neither constitutes evidence

creating a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Properties meet the Intensity

Requirements nor preempts applicable caselaw establishing the opposite: the Chief Appraiser has

the authority to promulgate guidelines such as those here. See Johnson I, 2024 WL 269528, at

*2, 4; Moers, 469 S.W.3d at 664. The arbitrator’s determination does not create a genuine issue

of material fact or preclude summary judgment for BCAD.

Johnson next contends that BCAD’s letter denying his application did not

specifically mention the minimum-acreage component of the Intensity Requirements. See Tex.

Tax Code § 23.57(d) (requiring appraisal district’s notice denying application “must state and

fully explain each reason the chief appraiser denied the application”). Yet the letter clearly

stated, “[W]e do not feel that the above referenced property is currently devoted principally to

agricultural use to degree of intensity.” (Emphasis added.) The Manual unambiguously includes

as part of the Intensity Requirements both minimum-acreage requirements, based on the quality

of the land, and minimum number of livestock “units,” and Johnson has not disputed that the

Properties do not meet the minimum-acreage requirement. The denial letter neither creates a

genuine issue of material fact about whether the Properties met the Intensity Requirements, nor

does it preclude summary judgment for BCAD.

Johnson lastly argues that the primary case on which BCAD relied in its

summary-judgment motion—Johnson I, 2024 WL 269528, at *2, 4—“was called into question”

by this Court’s recent opinion discussing another of Johnson’s tax-appraisal cases: Johnson v.

Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 03-23-00354-CV, 2024 WL 3073766 (Tex. App.—Austin

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June 21, 2024, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (Johnson II). But not only does Johnson II not mention

Johnson I, it also does not address the validity of BCAD’s Intensity Requirements but instead

addresses the unrelated issue of the trial court’s order declaring Johnson a vexatious litigant. See

id. at *6. We hold that Johnson has not identified any evidence creating a genuine issue of

material fact on the question of whether the Properties met the Intensity Requirements, nor has

he identified anything in the record or the law precluding BCAD’s entitlement to summary

judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Johnson’s entitlement to an open-space appraisal.

Declaratory judgment

In his supplemental original petition, Johnson for the first time requested under

the UDJA a determination by the court “reducing the 2018 Tax appraisal value” of the Properties

by over $275,000; a declaration that his open-space application “be granted”; and an award of

attorney’s fees. In its summary-judgment motion, BCAD argued that Johnson’s claims under the

UDJA are duplicative of his claims under Chapter 42 of the Tax Code and that he was attempting

to use the UDJA as a mere vehicle to obtain attorney’s fees. See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann,

359 S.W.3d 620, 624–25 (Tex. 2011) (acknowledging that “simply repleading a claim as one

for declaratory judgment cannot serve as a basis for attorney’s fees” and that declaratory relief

is improper when requested declarations “add nothing to what would be implicit or express in

a final judgment for the other remedies sought in the same action”); see also Tex. Tax Code

§§ 41.41 (providing property owner right to protest before ARB various actions taken by taxing

authority, including appraised or market value of property and determination that land does not

qualify for open-space appraisal), 42.01 (providing property owner right to appeal order of ARB

determining “a protest by the property owner as provided by” Chapter 41), 42.21 (providing

property owner right to appeal appraisal district’s final order to district court).
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BCAD correctly argued in its summary-judgment motion that the redundant-

remedies doctrine prevents Johnson from obtaining a declaratory judgment (and attorney’s fees

under the UDJA) because he has a statutory remedy providing the same relief. See Patel v.

Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015) (“Under the redundant

remedies doctrine, courts will not entertain an action brought under the UDJA when the same

claim could be pursued through different channels.”); Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal

Dist., 212 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (“When a statute provides an

avenue for attacking an agency order, a declaratory judgment action will not lie to provide

redundant remedies.”). Because the Tax Code provides Johnson a remedy for the challenges he

makes to BCAD’s valuation of the Properties, he may not pursue a claim under the UDJA, and

the trial court properly granted BCAD summary judgment on Johnson’s UDJA claim.3

Attorney’s fees

In his last issue, Johnson argues that Tax Code Section 42.225 mandates an award

of attorney’s fees because he prevailed in arbitration and the appraised value of the Properties

“remained unchanged” following the litigation. That section provides,

The court shall award the property owner reasonable attorney’s fees if the trial
was not requested by the property owner and the determination of the appeal
results in an appraised value for the owner’s property that is equal to or less than
the appraised value under the arbitration award or finding.

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In his reply brief, Johnson rejoins that he is not seeking a redundant remedy because his
declaratory-judgment claim is actually a request for the court to declare “the appropriate
productivity value” for the Properties, an issue he contends the Tax Code does not address.
However, he did not plead his declaratory-judgment claim in such a way, does not provide
substantive argument explaining the term “productivity value,” and does not cite any authority
supporting his contention that “productivity value” is a concept that is relevant or determinative
of the property taxes he owes.
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Tex. Tax Code § 42.225(a).

Johnson misconstrues this provision because it does not provide for attorney’s

fees when the appraised value after litigation “remains unchanged or decreases” from that which

the ARB assigned, but for when the appraised value after litigation is equal to or less than the

appraised value that the arbitrator awarded or found to be correct. See id. Essentially, the

provision shifts the burden of a property owner’s attorney’s fees to the appraisal district when the

appraisal district fails to accept an arbitrator’s award or findings and requires that the dispute

nonetheless continue to trial, after which the trial court affirms or decreases the appraised value

determined by the arbitrator. This is not what occurred here. Rather, the trial court determined,

contrary to the arbitrator’s finding, that the Property is not entitled to an open-space appraisal.

Therefore, the appraised value after determination of the appeal by the trial court was not equal

to or less than the appraised value under the arbitration award or finding but, rather, higher than

such value. Section 42.225 therefore does not apply here. We overrule Johnson’s final issue and

hold that the trial court did not err in failing to award attorney’s fees to Johnson.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Johnson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment.

__________________________________________
Karin Crump, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump

Affirmed

Filed: October 24, 2025

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