Asha Ragazza Gleason v. Derek Wayne Heidemeyer

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00100-CV

Asha Ragazza Gleason, Appellant

v.

Derek Wayne Heidemeyer, Appellee

FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-23-003000, THE HONORABLE KARIN CRUMP, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Asha Ragazza Gleason challenges three provisions in the final decree

of divorce signed by the trial court. She asserts that the trial court erred by (1) naming appellee

Derek Wayne Heidemeyer as sole managing conservator of their two children, (2) requiring

Gleason to complete psychological testing, and (3) requiring Gleason’s visitation with the

children to be supervised. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Gleason and Heidemeyer married in October 2019. They have two children

together, a daughter and a son. At the time of trial, their daughter was almost five years old and

their son was three years old. Heidemeyer and Gleason separated in September 2022.
Initial temporary orders and appointment of guardian ad litem

In April 2023, Heidemeyer filed an “Original Petition for Divorce, Request for

Temporary Restraining Order, Request for Extraordinary Relief, and Request for Temporary

Orders.” He attached a supporting affidavit that described an assault by Gleason on him that

occurred in November 2022 in the presence of the children, who were ages one and three at the

time. That assault resulted in criminal charges against Gleason that were pending at the time

Heidemeyer filed his pleading. Heidemeyer also attested to an attempt in April 2023 by Gleason

to remove the children from their daycare that the daycare had reported to him. The daycare had

refused to release the children to Gleason and reported to Heidemeyer that they had to ask

Gleason to leave because of her loud and rude behavior. Heidemeyer further attested that the

next day, Gleason threatened Heidemeyer and his family by sending Heidemeyer’s mother a text

message stating, “Bitch you and yo family gone get shot up ho[]. Now ya’ll got prices on your

heads better watch out bitch. Your son is dead. Your going to die bitch and your husband will

die all of you are walking dead.” Based on the allegations in Heidemeyer’s affidavit, the trial

court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order against Gleason and set a hearing for

temporary orders.

After a contested hearing on the temporary orders in May 2023, at which both

Gleason and Heidemeyer were represented by counsel, the trial court appointed the parties

temporary joint managing conservators and appointed Heidemeyer as the conservator with the

exclusive right to determine the children’s primary residence. The trial court further ordered that

the children continue their enrollment at their daycare unless the parties jointly agreed to a

change and that each conservator ensure the children’s attendance at the daycare during their

periods of possession. The trial court also ordered that Gleason should have possession of the

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children under a standard possession order with exchanges at the children’s preschool, provided

that Gleason was residing with her parents. The trial court also required the parties to

communicate exclusively through AppClose and ordered them to each register and complete a

cooperative parenting program through the Travis County Domestic Relations Office. The trial

court also appointed the Travis County Domestic Relations Office as guardian ad litem to

investigate the allegations of family violence and give an opinion as to conservatorship and a

schedule for possession and access.

Agreed temporary orders for Gleason to have supervised possession

On September 1, 2023, less than four months after the guardian ad litem had been

appointed, because of additional concerns about Gleason that had developed, Heidemeyer filed a

“Request for Temporary Restraining Order, Request for Extraordinary Relief, Motion for Further

Temporary Orders, and Motion to Review Guardian Report.” In the motion, Heidemeyer sought

to have Gleason temporarily enjoined from exercising possession of or access to the children, or

in the alternative, temporarily enjoined from exercising unsupervised possession of or access to

the children. He also sought temporary orders ordering that all of Gleason’s periods of

possession of the children be continuously supervised and that he have the exclusive right to

make decisions regarding the children’s medical care and education. He further requested that

the court allow the guardian ad litem to make an interim report to the court recommending that

Gleason’s periods of possession be supervised.

Heidemeyer’s motion was supported by his own affidavit and an affidavit from

the guardian ad litem, Suzan Bayar. In Heidemeyer’s affidavit, he attested that Gleason had

exercised her right to visitation with the children only two or three times after the temporary

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orders were signed, and she had not seen the children in almost 90 days. Heidemeyer explained

that he had “concerns for the children’s safety due to [Gleason’s] behavior and mental health”

since her last visit, based on her communications with him and Bayar.

Heidemeyer described how Gleason repeatedly deleted the AppClose phone app

and continued to attempt to call and text him on his cell phone, despite the trial court’s order that

the parties were to communicate exclusively through AppClose. He described a threatening

phone call and harassing text messages he received from Gleason. Those messages included

threats that she planned to take the children and not return them for a month and that she planned

to take the children from daycare outside of her period of possession. He was concerned that

Gleason planned to kidnap the children because she had stated to Bayar that she would not return

the children the following week after her period of possession. Heidemeyer also expressed his

concern that Gleason was not living with her parents as the trial court had ordered as a condition

of her possession of the children because Gleason had continually refused to allow Bayar to visit

her parents’ home. In her supporting affidavit, Bayar stated her support for the relief requested

by Heidemeyer in his motion. She attested that she had “concerns about the safety and wellbeing

of the children in Ms. Gleason’s care if her periods of possession are not supervised.” She

further stated her intent to file a report recommending supervised possession before a

temporary-orders hearing.

The trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order and order setting a

hearing for further temporary orders on the day Gleason filed the motion. After Gleason was

served with that order, the parties agreed to terms for “Agreed Further Temporary Orders,”

which were later incorporated into an order signed by the trial court on November 1, 2023. As

part of the Agreed Further Temporary Orders, Heidemeyer was appointed temporary sole

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managing conservator and Gleason was appointed temporary possessory conservator. The

Agreed Further Temporary Orders ordered that Gleason would have four three-hour visits

supervised by a Domestic Relations Office provider on four specified dates, with the time to be

set by the supervisor and a subsequent assessment and recommendations to be made by Bayar

about Gleason’s future periods of possession. Gleason agreed and was ordered to complete a

psychological evaluation within 60 days of the court’s signing of the order. The court again

ordered the parties to communicate exclusively through AppClose and enjoined Gleason from

communicating with Heidemeyer through phone calls or text messages, absent an emergency

when she was in possession of the children. Gleason signed the Agreed Further

Temporary Orders.

Guardian ad litem’s child-custody evaluation

Eleven months later, in October 2024, Bayar filed her child-custody evaluation a

few days before the final trial. In the child-custody evaluation, Bayar set forth her concerns

about Gleason’s “behavior, responsiveness to Mr. Heidemeyer, and lack of contact with the

children,” and about Gleason’s “untreated mental health issues.”

Bayar stated that “Gleason reported struggling with depression after she had [their

older child].” Although Gleason was put on medication for depression, she reported that it made

her feel suicidal so she stopped taking it. Bayar noted that Gleason had never completed the

court-ordered psychological evaluation, even after Bayar had provided the names of alternative

providers for a regular psychological evaluation due to the expense of forensic psychological

evaluations. Bayar explained that she continued to have the same concerns that she had at the

hearing the prior year on the second temporary orders: “[Gleason] has not seen the children for

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an extended period; she has been aggressive with Mr. Heidemeyer on at least two occasions; and

. . . she does not feel she needs to follow court orders.” Bayar stated that she is unclear whether

Gleason does not follow court orders or rules because she “just didn’t understand them or if this

is a manifestation of mental health issues.” Bayar provided specific examples of Gleason’s

issues with following court orders and rules related to the visitations.

Bayar also reported that Gleason had not seen the children consistently over the

summer of 2023. She did not see the children at all in July 2023 but called Heidemeyer and

wanted them the whole month of August. Bayar explained, “[o]nce the visits became supervised

the plan was to assess her interactions with the children after she re-established her relationship

with them.” Bayar also described Gleason’s behavior at the supervised visits. She would not

bring a diaper bag to the visits, despite being instructed to do so by the visit supervisor. Gleason

“was consistently late to visits,” would attempt to change the visit location after making

arrangements with the visit supervisor about a location, and left two of the visits to go to the

store to get diapers and cake, leaving the children with other family members who were present.

She was not home at the beginning of a third visit because she went to get a cake; she was gone

for an hour and a half and missed half of the visit. Because of Gleason’s inconsistency with the

visits, she never got to the point where Bayar could recommend unsupervised visits. The last

time that Gleason had a visit with the children was December 23, 2023.

Bayar explained that although Gleason at first was cooperative and would call

her, Gleason became “frustrated with the process and with supervised visits.” By mid-August

2023, Gleason had emailed Bayar to tell her she had deleted AppClose and that she was “not

going along with any of this im done” and that she was no longer available for the home visit or

“for any of this.” She also reported to Bayar that “she was going to get her children and keep

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them, and that she didn’t care what anyone has to say anymore.” However, after that, Gleason

emailed her again and they attempted to schedule a home visit. After Bayar had to reschedule,

she never received a response from Gleason verifying the day or time for the rescheduled visit.

In September 2024, Bayar again attempted to schedule a home visit and asked if Gleason had

engaged in services. More than two weeks later, Gleason responded, “asking why I wanted to do

a home visit or need information.”

In contrast, Bayar reported that Heidemeyer “is cooperative with the process and

provided any information requested. He has met the children’s physical and emotional needs.”

Bayar stated that he was also cooperative with the visitation supervisor in arranging for Gleason

to have visitation.

Bayar also described each party’s criminal history. Heidemeyer does not have a

criminal history. In addition to Gleason’s November 2022 assault on Heidemeyer, the police had

been called out to Gleason’s parents’ home at least ten times because of incidents between

Gleason and her sister. In April 2023, a report was received about abuse of 911, and Gleason

was the suspect. She had called 911 asserting that she had heard shots and seen a flash of gunfire

inside Heidemeyer’s home, but when the police arrived, they saw no indication of gunfire.

Bayar recommended that Heidemeyer be named sole managing conservator,

Gleason be named the possessory conservator, and Heidemeyer be given the right to determine

the children’s primary residence within Travis County and Williamson County. Bayar

recommended that Gleason have a step-up possession schedule with a five-step plan, starting

with supervised possession and ending with a standard possession order. As the first step of that

plan, Bayar recommended that Gleason complete a psychological evaluation, sign HIPAA

releases so that Heidemeyer could obtain the recommendations from the evaluation, and attend at

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least 90% of the visits in a six-month period to progress to the next step. Bayar also

recommended that Gleason participate in therapy until successfully discharged and that

Heidemeyer be able to request up to six alcohol and drug tests in a year, with testing to be

discontinued if Gleason is negative for a year.

Final trial

The trial court conducted a bench trial in October 2024 at which the parties and

several witnesses testified. In addition to Heidemeyer and Gleason, the court heard testimony

from the owner of the third-party company that supervised the possession periods, Gleason’s

parents and sister, Heidemeyer’s mother, and Bayar. Bayar testified to the matters reported in

her child-custody evaluation, including her concerns about Gleason’s mental health and her

inability to parent the children alone as demonstrated by her behavior at the few supervised

visits. The trial court heard testimony from Heidemeyer about Gleason’s November 2022 assault

on Heidemeyer and two other incidents in July 2022 and September 2023 when Gleason

physically assaulted him, threatening messages Gleason sent him, and his knowledge of her drug

and alcohol use. He also testified that he had concerns about her mental health because Gleason

told him that she had attempted suicide by overdosing on medication during an episode of

postpartum depression before he knew her. 1 She also had once grabbed a gun and threatened

suicide in his presence.

After the close of the evidence, after discussing with Gleason the importance of

her having a psychological evaluation done so that the trial court could see the results of the

1
Gleason has an older son who has a different father. Bayar reported in the
child-custody evaluation that it is unclear how often that child is with Gleason and whether he is
living with her full time. Gleason reported to Bayar that she had custody of him but his father
had taken him.
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evaluation to make some decisions about supervised visitation, the trial court initially indicated

that the parties would be named joint managing conservators. The trial court admonished

Gleason as follows:

[B]ut Ms. Gleason, you’re going to need to do a lot of work, okay. I’m granting
you joint managing conservator because I think that’s in the best interest of your
kids, and because your kids need you in their life, but there is going to be a long
period of time before you have kind of regular visits that you probably are
looking for.

We’re going to have to work because your kids haven’t seen you in so long, and
you’re going to have to be willing to do that work.

Are you willing to do that work?

Although Gleason answered, “Yes,” she then proceeded to repeatedly question

and challenge the trial court’s rulings. The trial court spent over an hour stating its rulings and

explaining to Gleason the importance of getting the psychological evaluation and the ways in

which Gleason had not complied with the temporary orders, as well as explaining to the parties

the modifications the court was making to the step-up possession schedule recommended by

Bayar, the details of how the step-up possession schedule would work, and the order enjoining

both parents from consuming alcohol or illegal drugs while in possession of the children. During

portions of the trial court’s explanations, Gleason repeatedly questioned why the trial court was

ruling against her, and the trial court explained several times that the rulings were based on the

evidence that the court had heard and considered, including all of the testimony and admitted

exhibits. Towards the end of the trial court’s statement of its rulings, when the trial court was

ruling on who Gleason should use for the psychological evaluation, Gleason became

argumentative with the court, stating, “I can find my own. I don’t want to be anywhere [Bayar]

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recommends. I will not do a psych evaluation with any doctor she recommends.” The trial court

proceeded with its ruling on the practice that Gleason was to use for the psychological

evaluation. Gleason again became argumentative with the court while the court was ruling that

Gleason would be required to provide to Heidemeyer through AppClose 24-hour advance

confirmation of her intent to exercise her scheduled possession. Gleason stated, “I’m not going

to communicate with him” and argued with the court about whether she should have to text him

to confirm visits. After the court stated, “These two parents have to communicate because these

children have to grow up under court orders and so if Ms. Gleason cannot provide the courtesy of

a 24-hour notice that she’s going to exercise visitation, then she does not get the visitation,” and

Gleason’s mother began speaking, there was a disturbance in the courtroom. The court’s deputy

asked for “[q]uiet in the courtroom,” and both the trial court and the deputy asked someone to sit

down. The trial court continued stating its ruling on the visit-confirmation process and a 15-

minute grace period for the exchanges, and it appears from the record that Gleason remained in

the courtroom at that time.

However, as the trial court moved on to ruling on the permanent injunction, the

court stated,

I’m going to note for the record Ms. Gleason has walked out of the courtroom,
and I am -- I think given the fact Ms. Gleason has left the courtroom, I don’t see
why the order awarding sole managing conservatorship for Mr. Heidemeyer
should not be granted, and I am doing that. Everything else remains the same.
The visits shall be the same, but I am granting Mr. Heidemeyer sole managing
conservatorship.

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On November 13, 2024, the trial court signed the Final Decree that incorporated the rulings

made on the record after the close of evidence, including the ruling appointing Heidemeyer as

sole managing conservator.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In one issue, Gleason asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by

(1) naming Heidemeyer as sole managing conservator, (2) requiring Gleason to complete

psychological testing, and (3) requiring Gleason’s visitation with the children to be supervised.

Standard of review

Gleason challenges trial-court rulings related to conservatorship and possession.

We review this type of challenge to the final decree under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See

Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) (reviewing trial court’s appointment of

father as managing conservator). “A trial court’s determination of what is in the child’s best

interest, specifically the establishment of terms and conditions of conservatorship, is a

discretionary function.” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021). “The trial court’s

judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that the court has

abused its discretion.” Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

“without reference to any guiding rules or principles,” or in other words, if it acts in an arbitrary

or unreasonable manner. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218 (quoting Worford v. Stamper,

801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).

“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the

court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”

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Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002. Rulings on conservatorship and possession issues are “intensely fact

driven.” Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002). Accordingly, “[t]he trial court is in the

best position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces,

powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.” Echols

v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

In family-law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with traditional

standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d

582, 587-88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). Consequently, legal and factual

insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether

the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 587. To determine whether the trial court has abused

its discretion, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry, analyzing whether (1) the trial court had

sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) the trial court erred in its

application of that discretion. Id. at 588. Traditional standards for legal- and factual-sufficiency

review come into play with regard to the first question. Id.

Under the legal-sufficiency standard, when the appellant attacks the legal

sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, she must

demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp.

v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We credit all evidence and

inferences favorable to the trial court’s decision if a reasonable factfinder could, and we

disregard all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller

v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is legally sufficient if it “would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. Evidence is legally

insufficient when (1) there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) rules of law or evidence

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preclude giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered

to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the

opposite of the vital fact. See id. at 810, 815-16. Under the factual-sufficiency standard, when

the appellant attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the

burden of proof, we consider and weigh all the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding to

determine if the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside. Crosstex N. Tex.

Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016).

Because the trial court acts as the factfinder in a bench trial, the trial court is the

“sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”

McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). The trial court does not abuse its

discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence or when evidence of a probative or

substantive character exists to support the decision. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587. “The mere

fact that a trial court decided an issue in a manner differently than an appellate court would under

similar circumstances does not establish an abuse of discretion.” Id.

With this standard of review in mind, we turn to Gleason’s challenge to the trial

court’s rulings. Gleason, who is represented by counsel on appeal, argues that the facts relevant

to her appeal are cumulative and “no one factor or ruling by itself would justify any relief under

an abuse of discretion standard of review.” She does not point to any evidence that shows that

the trial court either lacked sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion or that it

erred in its application of that discretion. Instead, in her statement of facts, she attempts to

minimize the evidence that supports the trial court’s rulings and to emphasize evidence that she

asserts favors her contentions that both parties should be named joint managing conservators and

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that she should not be required to complete a psychological evaluation or to have her possession

of the children supervised. Her sole argument is that the trial court “gave too much importance

to the very contentious relationship between [Heidemeyer] and [Gleason] in this case.”

I. Evidence supporting the appointment of Heidemeyer as sole managing conservator

A. Gleason’s intentional use of abusive physical force against Heidemeyer

As explained above, when ruling on issues of conservatorship, possession, and

access, the trial court’s primary consideration is the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code

§ 153.002; see also Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (enumerating non-

exhaustive list of factors that courts consider when “ascertaining the best interest of the child”).

The Family Code establishes a “rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a

child as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code

§ 153.131(b). In addition, the Family Code mandates as follows:

In determining whether to appoint a party as a sole or joint managing conservator,
the court shall consider evidence of the intentional use of abusive physical force,
or evidence of sexual abuse, by a party directed against the party’s spouse, a
parent of the child, or any person younger than 18 years of age committed within
a two-year period preceding the filing of the suit or during the pendency of
the suit.

Id. § 153.004(a). The record contains evidence of at least three times that Gleason used abusive

physical force against Heidemeyer.

Although Gleason acknowledges that the Family Code requires courts to consider

whether family violence has occurred, she contends that her November 2022 arrest for assault

causing bodily injury to a family member was “a minor incident that took place at the residence

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of Mr. Heidemeyer and his family,” and she implies that it should not have been considered by

the trial court because Heidemeyer paid the bond for Gleason to be released and continued to

share parenting time with her after the assault. However, Heidemeyer disputed at trial that he

continued to share parenting time with Gleason during the time period between her arrest and his

filing for divorce in April 2023. He testified that he “did vouch for her,” when her counsel asked

whether he bailed or bonded her out, and added “[t]hat was solely for the fact that, you know,

the children.”

The incident that Gleason characterizes as “minor” was described by Heidemeyer

in his affidavit as follows:

On November 3, 2022, while [I was] at my mother’s residence with the children,
[Gleason] arrived at around 6:00 a.m. to retrieve the children during my period of
possession, which period of possession had been previously agreed to by
[Gleason]. She was honking her horn and flashing her headlights. She then called
law enforcement and left the residence. The police arrived and instructed me to
call 911 if she came back to the house. Shortly after, [Gleason] arrived again and
banged on the front door until she cracked the glass. I opened the front door to
prevent further damage and stood in the doorway to stop [Gleason] from gaining
entry. [Gleason] began pushing me, striking me with her elbow repeatedly, and
throwing items at me. She threw a clay lawn decoration, which struck my elbow
causing me to bleed. [Gleason] attempted to physically attack my sister, and l
remained in the doorway to prevent her from harming my sister. The children
were upstairs in the home during this incident. My sister called 911, and law
enforcement arrived on the scene. This incident resulted in a pending criminal
case against [Gleason] in the County Court at Law Number 4, Cause Number C-l-
CR-22-501592, in Travis County, Texas, for Assault Causes Bodily Injury to a
Family Member.

(Emphases omitted.) Heidemeyer also testified to these details at the hearing and added that

during the altercation, Gleason also threw a rock through the front door that hit the back of

the house.

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Heidemeyer also testified that another altercation had occurred on July 15, 2022.

The trial court admitted photographs dated July 15, 2022, of injuries to Heidemeyer including

bite marks, scratch marks, and a bruise on the back of the head. Heidemeyer testified that

Gleason hit him with a bottle on the back of the head. He further testified that there were “quite

a few times” that Gleason was violent towards him during their relationship and that he had

never physically harmed her.

Heidemeyer also testified that Gleason hit him in the face in front of their son and

Heidemeyer’s 15-year-old nephew in the parking lot of the children’s daycare in September 2023

on the day that the trial court signed the second ex parte temporary restraining order. He testified

that he filed a police report about this incident, too.

B. Gleason’s failure to regularly exercise her periods of possession

As Heidemeyer points out, in addition to this evidence of family violence against

him that occurred in the two years before the divorce proceeding, he presented other evidence to

the trial court that supports his appointment as sole managing conservator, including evidence

that Gleason failed to regularly exercise her periods of possession. During the period between

May 2023 through September 2023, when the parties were temporary joint managing

conservators and Gleason was awarded possession under the standard possession order on the

condition that she reside with her parents, she testified that she saw the children only three times

for unsupervised periods of possession. After Heidemeyer sought in September 2023 to have

Gleason’s possession supervised, and Gleason agreed to the Agreed Further Temporary Orders,

under which she was to have four three-hour supervised periods of possession to be followed by

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an assessment and recommendation by Bayar, Gleason attended only four periods of supervised

possession between October 2023 and late December 2023, “around New Year’s.”

Amy Burkholder, the owner of the third-party company that supervised the

possession periods testified that those visits were difficult to set up with Gleason and it “wasn’t

always easy to set up visitations, work within her parameters,” regarding “the date, the times,

locations, preferences.” Gleason argued with Burkholder when Burkholder told her that she

could not change the location of Gleason’s visits. In her child-custody evaluation, Bayar

explained that she had concerns about Gleason’s ability to follow the rules about visitations,

including the requirement to bring a diaper bag, the need for the visit to occur in one location,

showing up on time for the visitations, and leaving during the visits, once for an hour and a half

(although other of Gleason’s family members remained).

Burkholder testified that Gleason stopped visitation because she repeatedly told

Burkholder that she was no longer under an order requiring supervised visitation, but that

Burkholder’s understanding from Bayar was that Gleason’s visitation still was required to be

supervised. Bayar testified that because of Gleason’s inconsistency with the visits, she never got

to the point where Bayar could recommend unsupervised visits. Burkholder testified that after

she attempted about once a month for five or six months to reach out to Gleason to schedule

further supervised visits, in May, Gleason asked Burkholder to stop communicating with her, and

Burkholder complied with that request.

Bayar testified that neither she nor Heidemeyer had prevented Gleason from

seeing the children.

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C. Gleason’s inability to effectively communicate with Heidemeyer about
the children

Another factor that implicates Gleason’s parental abilities is the evidence that she

was unable to effectively communicate with Heidemeyer about decisions for the children. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Heidemeyer testified about and also introduced evidence of the

parties’ communications on AppClose, the app that the trial court had ordered them to use

exclusively to communicate with each other about “matters pertaining to the best interest of the

child.” Heidemeyer testified that Gleason deleted AppClose three times and that when she

deleted the app, he was unable to communicate with her on it about the children. The AppClose

messages introduced into evidence show that Gleason’s communications with Heidemeyer

involved abusive language and threats about not returning the children. She also made

threatening phone calls and text messages to Heidemeyer outside of AppClose.

Bayar testified that although she normally prefers to recommend joint managing

conservatorship, she recommended sole managing conservatorship because “in this case, I think

that due to the parents’ current relationship with each other, it makes it very difficult for them to

communicate.” In particular, Bayar referenced the fact that the children’s daycare had made a

recommendation (also testified to by Heidemeyer) that the parties’ son needed a more one-on-

one environment and therefore needed to change daycares, but Gleason would not work with

Heidemeyer to agree on a new childcare provider. Because the court orders required the parties

to agree on any change to the children’s daycare, and Heidemeyer did not want to violate the

orders, he ultimately quit his job so that he could stay with the children. Bayar testified that “in

reading the AppClose messages, they just didn’t get any response regarding changing the

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daycare, so I do worry that if they are joint managing conservatorship and conservators in this

case, that the children’s needs won’t be met.”

Gleason argues that Bayar was too focused on the interactions between her and

Heidemeyer instead of the relationship that Gleason has with the children. However, Gleason’s

inconsistency with exercising her periods of possession and her failure to continue participating

in supervised visitation did not provide a basis for Bayar to determine that Gleason’s relationship

with the children negated her unreliability in exercising possession and her antagonistic

relationship with Heidemeyer, which prevented the two from effectively coparenting. See Tex.

Fam. Code § 153.134(a) (enumerating factors trial court must consider when appointing parents

joint managing conservators, including “the ability of the parents to give first priority to the

welfare of the child and reach shared decisions in the child’s best interest”).

D. Gleason’s behavior and demeanor in open court

Gleason contends that the trial court abused its discretion by changing its ruling

about conservatorship after the court initially indicated that it would name the parties joint

managing conservators. Gleason acknowledges that she became “very upset at the ruling the

court made and left the court room,” but nevertheless argues that Family Code Section 153.005,

which requires the court to consider whether a party engaged in a history or pattern of family

violence or child abuse or neglect, somehow makes the court’s change in conservatorship a clear

abuse of discretion. Gleason fails to provide any argument explaining why Section 153.005

would require us to find that the trial court’s change in ruling is a clear abuse of discretion.

We conclude that Heidemeyer rebutted the presumption that joint managing

conservatorship would be in the children’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. As

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outlined above, the trial court had before it sufficient evidence to conclude that appointing

Heidemeyer as sole managing conservator was in the best interest of the children, including the

evidence of Gleason’s use of abusive physical force against Heidemeyer, Gleason’s inconsistent

possession of the children and refusal to participate in supervised visitation, and Gleason’s

inability to effectively communicate with Heidemeyer about the children’s needs. When the trial

court initially indicated its intent to appoint the parties as joint managing conservators, it

admonished Gleason that she would have to do a lot of work to re-establish her relationship with

her children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by viewing Gleason’s subsequent

argumentativeness with the trial court, followed by her abrupt departure from the courtroom

before the end of the proceedings, as indicative of her inability to be an effective joint

managing conservator.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Heidemeyer

sole managing conservator.

II. Evidence supporting the trial court’s order that Gleason complete a psychological
evaluation

Although Gleason asserts that the trial court should not require her to complete a

psychological evaluation, she offers no argument and points to no evidence that suggests that the

trial court abused its discretion by including this requirement as part of the step-up possession

schedule in the final divorce decree. Instead, the evidence shows that Gleason had never

submitted to a psychological evaluation as she had agreed to in the Agreed Further Temporary

orders. Also, both Heidemeyer and Bayar testified to concerns about Gleason’s mental health.

Heidemeyer testified that Gleason told him that she had attempted suicide by overdosing on

medication during an episode of postpartum depression before he knew her and that she had once

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grabbed a gun and threatened suicide in his presence. Bayar testified that she recommended that

Gleason be evaluated in part because Bayar was concerned that Gleason’s failure to follow court

orders might be indicative of mental-health issues.

We hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its

discretion and that it did not err in the application of that discretion when it ordered Gleason to

complete a psychological evaluation.

III. Evidence supporting the trial court’s order that Gleason’s possession periods must
be supervised until she completes the requirements of the step-up possession plan

Gleason also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring that

her visitation with the children be supervised. Again, she offers no argument and points to no

evidence that suggests that the trial court abused its discretion by including this requirement as

part of the step-up possession schedule in the final divorce decree. The trial court had ample

evidence before it to order supervised visitation as part of a step-up plan of possession.

At the time of the final hearing, Gleason had not had unsupervised possession of

the children in over a year. As described above, Gleason had a limited number of supervised

visits, and during those visits, she did not parent alone and left during the visits and left the

children with family members. Bayar testified that she recommended supervised visitation as

part of a step-up possession plan. In part, her recommendation was based on Gleason’s criminal

history, including a number of law-enforcement calls to Gleason’s home involving incidents

between Gleason and her family members. Her recommendation was also based on the ages of

the children and their need for consistency and on her concern that at the supervised visits,

Gleason “was not the primary parent.”

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We hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its

discretion and that it did not err in the application of that discretion when it ordered Gleason to

have supervised visitation of the children as part of a step-up plan of possession.

We overrule Gleason’s sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Gleason’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the challenged

portions of the trial court’s judgment. All provisions of the trial court’s order not specifically

challenged on appeal and addressed in this opinion shall remain in full force and effect.

__________________________________________
Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: October 24, 2025

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