In Re the Committment of Desiree Hamm v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00266-CV

In re The Committment of Desiree Hamm

FROM THE 466TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY
NO. C2023-2020E, THE HONORABLE STEPHANIE BASCON, JUDGE PRESIDING

OPINION

This appeal is from a civil-commitment proceeding in which the State petitioned

to have appellant Desiree Hamm declared a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Civil

Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act). See Tex. Health & Safety Code

§§ 841.001-.209. After a jury found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamm is

an SVP, the trial court rendered the final judgment and order of commitment that Hamm

challenges. This appeal is the first involving a female civilly committed as an SVP in Texas.

Hamm concedes that the State presented three qualified expert witnesses who

rendered relevant opinions based on the data in her case, the facts of her underlying crimes,

prison disciplinary conduct records, and her family history. But she contends that the trial court

abused its discretion by denying her pretrial motions to exclude the experts’ opinions as

unreliable because there is no research validating risk factors for sex offenders who are female;

and thus, there is insufficient empirical evidence for expert opinion about her recidivism risk.
She also contends that there is no evidence supporting the jury’s SVP finding. We will affirm

the trial court’s final judgment and order of commitment.

BACKGROUND

The SVP Act defines an SVP as a person who (1) is a repeat sexually violent

offender and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in

a predatory act of sexual violence. Id. § 841.003(a). A “behavioral abnormality” is “a

congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity,

predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person

becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2). The SVP Act’s

language makes no distinction between genders, and its provisions apply to any “person”

meeting the criteria for civil commitment as an SVP.

Hamm was convicted in 2011 of thirteen sexual offenses after pleading guilty to

all of them. Nine of those were for sexually violent offenses: two counts of aggravated

kidnapping with intent to violate sexually on February 12, 2010; three counts of sexual assault on

February 14, 2010; three counts of sexual assault on February 20, 2010; and one count of sexual

assault on March 13, 2010. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 20.04(a)(4), 22.011. Hamm was also

convicted of two counts of sexual performance by a child. See id. § 43.25(b). She received

deferred adjudication for two additional counts of sexual performance by a child. See id.

Hamm’s offenses were committed over a couple of months against two sisters,

who were sixteen and fifteen years old when they began interacting extensively with then

twenty-two-year-old Hamm through role-playing games online, instant messaging, phone calls,

and webcams. Hamm gave the girls gifts, including cell phones and laptops used to

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communicate with her that could not be easily monitored by their parents. Over time, Hamm

convinced the sisters that they were being physically and sexually abused by their father, that

they were being poisoned, and that they needed to get out of the house and run away because of

the sexual abuse. Hamm persuaded them to write letters to their teachers, family members, and

friends with the accusations against their father. Hamm convinced the sisters that they were in

love with each other, eventually getting them to have sex with each other while Hamm directed

their sexual conduct and watched on the webcam. Hamm later convinced the sisters that they

were pregnant and further convinced one sister that she had undergone an abortion.

With Hamm’s assistance, the girls ran away from home. She instructed them to

bring their passports, school records, and immunization records, and arranged for someone to

drive from San Diego to Comal County to get them and drive back with them in the trunk.

Before the girls arrived in California, their mother realized they were missing and called Hamm,

who lied about the girls’ location. Once the girls were in California, Hamm sexually assaulted

them multiple times. Hamm changed their appearance by cutting and coloring their hair, and she

placed them with a neighbor who lived in an apartment upstairs. When police arrived at

Hamm’s apartment to see if the girls were with her, she denied ever meeting them in person.

Hamm continued having sexual contact with the girls when she knew others were

looking for them. She compelled them to do as she told them. When they did not, Hamm would

shoot them with an airsoft gun or use finger-pricking devices on them. Another time, after

watching a pornographic movie with sadomasochistic sexual scenes of whipping and caning,

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Hamm had one of the sisters hit the other with a cane, leaving marks. And Hamm branded the

girls’ bodies with a homemade brand of a wolf paw print. 1

Hamm later moved the girls from San Diego to Fresno and misdirected their

family members’ efforts to find them. Hamm lied to the girls’ family members who flew to

California soon after the girls went missing and to the family’s attorney who met with her. She

told the family members to buy disposable phones to receive the girls’ calls and then had the

girls make calls to their family’s untraceable phones and lie to them. Other times, Hamm falsely

told the family that the girls were in Rochester, New York or elsewhere. She told one of the

girls’ aunts that while watching the webcam, she witnessed the girls’ father raping them. Once

reunited with their family, the girls denied that their father had sexually abused them.

Hamm engaged in similar conduct before. Around 2007, Hamm met a

sixteen-year-old girl from Georgia online, sent her a cell phone and gifts, told her she was being

sexually abused by her stepfather in her sleep, coerced her to run away when she was seventeen

to stay in California with Hamm, arranged for the trip, began having sex with the girl after she

arrived, and called the girl her wife. After police were notified, they investigated and questioned

Hamm for the offense of oral copulation with an underage person. 2 Before Hamm’s relationship

with that girl ended, Hamm began talking to one of the sisters in the Comal County case.

After accepting Hamm’s pleas of guilty to all the offenses against the sisters, the

trial court assessed Hamm’s punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment on each of the nine

1
Hamm has a tattoo of a wolf paw print on her arm.
2
Among the records provided to the experts were the girl’s statement to police and her
recorded police interview.

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sexually violent offenses and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. 3 While serving

sentences for her crimes against the sisters, Hamm had sex with other inmates despite knowing

that such conduct violated prison rules. She received disciplinary action for having sex in a

prison bathroom stall. And she resumed her online role-playing games, now with inmates and

pen pals.

Before Hamm’s release from prison, the State petitioned the trial court for her

civil commitment as an SVP because she “is a repeat sexually violent offender who suffers from

a behavioral abnormality that makes her likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.”

See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(a). The State alleged that Hamm was pending entry

into the prison’s sex-offender-treatment program, which could result in her release on parole

before her discharge date. The trial court found Hamm indigent and appointed counsel for her.

Hamm filed pretrial motions to exclude opinions from the State’s expert

witnesses—psychiatrist Dr. Michael Arambula, and psychologists Dr. Jason Dunham and Dr.

Christine Reed—as unreliable. 4 The trial court denied the motions. Hamm presented no defense

witnesses at her civil-commitment trial. Her motion for directed verdict was denied. The jury

unanimously found that Hamm is an SVP. The trial court rendered a final judgment and order of

commitment on that verdict. See id. §§ 841.062(b) (addressing jury determination of person’s

status as SVP), .081 (addressing SVP civil-commitment order). Hamm appeals.

3
The trial court also assessed Hamm’s punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment on
two counts of sexual performance by a child. Upon her release from prison, Hamm would begin
two, ten-year-probated sentences under her order of deferred adjudication for the remaining two
counts of sexual performance by a child.
4
The testimony from the experts showed that the State Counsel for Offenders, which
represents Hamm, has requested expert opinions from each of them in other matters and
sometimes retained them as experts.
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DISCUSSION

Reliability of experts’ testimony

Hamm’s first issue contends that the experts’ opinions are unreliable and should

have been excluded before trial because there is no research validating the risk factors for sex

offenders who are female and because there is insufficient empirical evidence for the experts’

opinions about her recidivism risk. We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of

such evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re Commitment of Martin,

No. 03-23-00128-CV, 2023 WL 5597357, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard

for guiding rules or principles, or without supporting evidence. Id. Excluding relevant and

reliable evidence is an abuse of discretion. In re Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 307 (Tex. 2012).

A witness who is qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education” to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”

may testify as an expert. In re Commitment of Martin, 2023 WL 5597357, at *2 (quoting Tex. R.

Evid. 702). Expert opinions must have a reasoned basis. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 236

(Tex. 1999). Thus, an expert must connect his conclusions to the facts. Windrum v. Kareh,

581 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tex. 2019). An expert’s testimony is conclusory when “no basis for the

opinion is offered” or the “basis offered provides no support.” In re Commitment of Martin,

2023 WL 5597357, at *2 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818

(Tex. 2009)).

Evidence in SVP civil-commitment proceedings concerns the application of a

“soft” science, calling for the exercise of considerable intuitive judgment by experts with

specialized training. In re Commitment of Delarosa, No. 03-21-00541-CV, 2022 WL 3403347,

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at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Reliability of such soft-science

evidence in the SVP context may be established by showing that

(1) the field of expertise involved is a legitimate one,

(2) the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that field,
and

(3) the expert’s testimony properly relies on or utilizes the principles involved in
that field.

In re Commitment of R.E.A., No. 14-22-00742-CV, 2024 WL 807238, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re Commitment of Pipkin,

No. 07-22-00182-CV, 2023 WL 4345716, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 28, 2023, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); In re Commitment of Johnson, 613 S.W.3d 613, 620-21 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2020, pet. denied); In re Commitment of Mitchell, No. 09-12-00607-CV,

2013 WL 5658425, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 17, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

These three reliability factors, first listed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in

State v. Nenno, recognize that “soft science or non-scientific expert testimony is held to a less

rigorous standard than hard science expert testimony.” Allison v. State, 666 S.W.3d 750, 759

(Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Nenno, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled

in part on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). The

reliability standard for soft science expert testimony set forth in Nenno is distinct from the

standard for hard science expert testimony set forth in Kelly v. State because expert testimony

involving soft sciences and fields is “based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to

scientific methods.” Id. (distinguishing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)

from Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561). At the pretrial hearing on Hamm’s motion to exclude, the

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State argued that the proper reliability standard for these experts’ opinions is the three-factor test

derived from Nenno, while Hamm argued for the reliability standard in Kelly.

During the hearing, the experts testified about their experience, training, and

education, and their curricula vitae were admitted into evidence. Their opinions drew from,

among other things, the data in the case, the facts of Hamm’s crimes, her prison disciplinary

conduct records, and her family history. All three experts examined Hamm, worked with or

evaluated female sex offenders for risk assessments before this case, and explained their

conclusions that Hamm has a behavioral abnormality that makes her likely to engage in

predatory acts of sexual violence. Before addressing Hamm’s reliability challenges to the

experts’ opinions, we summarize their hearing testimony.

1. Dr. Arambula

Dr. Michael Arambula testified that he is a medical doctor, board certified in

general psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, who has conducted behavioral-abnormality

evaluations using the terms and definitions in the SVP Act for over twenty years. He has

conducted over 300 such behavioral-abnormality evaluations, about twelve to fifteen of those on

female sex offenders who committed sex crimes against children. He conducted one prior

evaluation of a female sex offender for SVP civil commitment, concluding that the criteria for

having a behavioral abnormality were unmet.

In this case, using forensic-psychiatry principles, his education, training, and

experience, Dr. Arambula found that Hamm has a behavioral abnormality within the meaning of

the SVP Act that makes her likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. He consulted

the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition—an American

Psychiatric Association textbook containing symptomatic criteria for common mental conditions

8
that medical and mental-health professionals use in diagnostic decision-making—in determining

that Hamm has significant personality pathology. He diagnosed her as having “unspecified

personality disorder with borderline antisocial and histrionic features,” and sexual deviance in

the form of hebephilia. 5

Dr. Arambula testified about the basis for his opinion that Hamm has a behavioral

abnormality. He began by explaining the methodology for a sex-offender risk assessment, which

is gender neutral and involves (1) performing a general psychiatric exam in which he looks at the

individual’s history with family and peers, school and occupational functioning, mental illness or

substance abuse, personality pathology, and any medication issues that might contribute to the

sexual offenses; (2) considering forensic matters, including what the individual reports to him

about what led to the sexual offense, what occurred during and after the sexual offense, and why

it occurred again; and (3) considering the person’s adjustment to prison, including any activities

undertaken for self-improvement, any treatment they have had, and how successful treatment has

been for the person to understand the mechanisms or reasons why they offended so they can

manage and have better control once they are out in the community. Additionally, Dr. Arambula

considered records spanning Hamm’s entire life, which contained much information that was

inconsistent with what Hamm reported to him. Dr. Arambula testified that his methodology and

the type of records he reviewed are in accordance with his training and with accepted standards

in forensic psychiatry, and it is the same methodology and record review used by others with

forensic-fellowship training when conducting behavioral-abnormality evaluations. He noted that

no single test can be scored to determine whether a person has a behavioral abnormality.

5
Dr. Arambula later explained that the medical diagnosis of hebephilia is distinct from
pedophilia because hebephilia involves children beyond age thirteen.
9
In making his determination that Hamm has a behavioral abnormality, Dr.

Arambula considered research and literature as it relates and applies to her history. He

determined the extent and seriousness of the sexual deviance that prompted Hamm’s sexual

misconduct by seeking patterns of repeated behavior. He looked at the number of victims, the

extent of grooming that occurred, plus indications of sociopathy, mental illness, relationship

instability, and personality pathology. He testified that such considerations have been discussed

in literature on female sex offenders.

Dr. Arambula was already familiar with research on female sex offenders and had

evaluated female sex offenders before he interviewed and evaluated Hamm. Among other

sources, he was familiar with research or data from chapters on female sex offenders in Dr.

Barbara Schwartz’s textbooks; articles on female sex offenders by Canadian researcher Dr.

Michael Seto; a publication of a study by the Sex Offender Management Assessment and

Planning Initiative (SOMAPI) containing information on female sex offenders; and an article by

a California governmental agency titled State Authorized Risk Assessment Tools for Sex

Offenders (SARATSO). He had recently refamiliarized himself with many of these updated

publications when conducting another evaluation before Hamm’s.

Dr. Arambula is unaware of any research or articles stating that female sexual

offenders do not reoffend. There is research indicating that female sex offenders overall

recidivate at a lower rate than male sex offenders, but he denied that the rate is zero. Further, he

noted that the numbers relative to sex-offender recidivism are artificially underestimated. One

reason recidivism numbers skew lower is that the average risk is based on a large pool of female

sex offenders, and most of the women studied are first-time sex offenders who were caught after

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a one-time episode and had only one victim. 6 Dr. Arambula explained that the two largest

components in the pool of female sex offenders are the teacher-who-has-sex-with-her-student

type and the co-defendant type, who grooms and brings in young girls for a male perpetrator.

Dr. Arambula distinguished those kinds of sex offenses from Hamm’s. He pointed out that

sex-offender-recidivism research uniformly shows that repeat sex offenders, including women,

with more than one victim have more serious underlying sexual deviance and an increased

recidivism risk. He observed that here, Hamm had more than one victim.

Dr. Arambula is aware of a publication denying the existence of any standard of

care in evaluating female sex offenders, but he disagrees with its authors. He acknowledged that

research findings from male-sex-offender research cannot be translated literally to female sex

offenders because they differ in how they sexually exploit their victims and their motivational

factors. Thus, he explained that if a man carries a 15% average risk factor for recidivism, it

cannot be assumed that is the same for a woman. And he said it would be misleading to argue

that the percentage of risk found in the studies concluding women overall recidivate less often

necessarily represents Hamm’s specific risk to reoffend.

Dr. Arambula testified that Hamm has significant personality pathology, and

personality pathology does not discriminate between men and women. Dr. Arambula testified

that “personality pathology, particularly when it involves the manipulation of other people for

the perpetrator’s own benefit, is an important parameter in looking at risk.” Unlike a caregiver

who might opportunistically exploit a child entrusted to them, Hamm is “a crossover type of sex

offender” who groomed her victims for an extended time online before committing

6
Dr. Arambula faulted the samples in other sex-offender-studies for their inclusion of
prostitutes, “a totally different type of individual compared to somebody who preys on minors.”
11
sexual-contact offenses. Dr. Arambula noted that the SOMAPI publication summarized studies

showing that sex offenders who first groom their victims online are particularly antisocial and

carry a high recidivism risk.

Dr. Arambula testified without objection that the field of forensic psychiatry is a

legitimate one, that the subject matter of his potential testimony to the jury was within the scope

of forensic psychiatry, and that he properly relied upon or utilized the principles involved in that

field when evaluating Hamm and arriving at his opinion.

2. Dr. Jason Dunham

Jason Dunham testified that he is a doctoral-level, fellowship-trained forensic

psychologist. Over the last twenty years, he has performed 346 behavioral-abnormality

evaluations, including six or seven on female sex offenders. When evaluating those other female

sex offenders for risk, he followed the same procedure and methodology that he did in this case.

Here, using forensic-psychology principles, his education, training, and experience, Dr. Dunham

found that Hamm has a behavioral abnormality and falls within the category of those that

would reoffend.

Dr. Dunham testified about the basis for his opinion that Hamm has a behavioral

abnormality. He explained that the primary components of his methodology for a sex-offender

risk assessment involve reviewing records and conducting a research-driven clinical interview.

He learned this methodology during his internship and fellowship, and it is a methodology that is

in accordance with accepted standards in the field of psychology and used by others who conduct

these evaluations. Dr. Dunham followed the same methodology when he evaluated Hamm.

Dr. Dunham was familiar with research and literature on female sex offenders

before his evaluation of Hamm, and he considered that research and literature in reaching his

12
opinion, including a textbook titled Evaluating Sex Offenders by Dennis Doren that compares

different evaluation methodologies. When evaluating female sex offenders, Dr. Dunham does

not score an actuarial instrument because of the lack of normative data for female offenders

behind those instruments. He acknowledged that there is not a lot of research on recidivistic,

sexually violent behavior among female sex offenders, and one article has found a lack of

consistency among the risk factors for females. He considered the cautions in the research when

forming his opinion about Hamm. However, none of the research indicates that female sex

offenders do not reoffend.

Dr. Dunham reviewed information in records spanning the duration of Hamm’s

life when conducting her risk assessment. He explained that the best way of estimating future

risk is by looking at past behavior and patterns of behavior, which involves looking at all

elements of the person’s life. He consulted the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in diagnosing

Hamm and determining that she met criteria for various personality orders. He noted that some

research estimates that between 1% and 3% of female sex offenders reoffend, and those

reoffenders are a mixed group. Only in severe cases, where extreme risk factors exist, can it be

said that the person would represent that small category of reoffenders. Having considered

Hamm and her case on an individual basis, Dr. Dunham opined that Hamm is within that

category of female sex offenders who would reoffend.

Dr. Dunham testified without objection that his intended testimony about Hamm

was within the scope of forensic psychology, and that he properly relied upon and utilized

forensic-psychology principles in his methodology, in evaluating Hamm, and in reaching

his opinion.

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3. Dr. Christine Reed

Dr. Christine Reed testified that she is a doctoral-level, fellowship-trained clinical and

forensic psychologist. She has conducted about 115 behavioral-abnormality evaluations since

2011 using the information and definitions in the SVP Act, and she has performed sex-offender-

risk assessments of males and females. Before evaluating Hamm, Dr. Reed evaluated six other

female sex offenders for behavioral abnormality. None of those women were exempt from a

behavioral-abnormality finding based on their gender.

In the present case, using forensic-psychology principles, her education, training, and

experience, Dr. Reed found that Hamm has a behavioral abnormality. Dr. Reed consulted the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in diagnosing Hamm as having “unspecified personality

disorder with borderline antisocial and histrionic features.” Dr. Reed also found Hamm

exhibited certain risk factors including sexual deviance, antisocial personality, psychological

coercion, minimization, and denial.

Dr. Reed testified about the basis for her opinion that Hamm has a behavioral

abnormality. She summarized her methodology, which included reviewing several of Hamm’s

records, conducting a clinical examination, administering the Hare Psychopathy Checklist and

the Level of Service Risk Needs Responsivity measures, and reviewing additional records

provided after the evaluation. Dr. Reed testified that the records spanned Hamm’s adult life and

that having such historical information assists in identifying patterns of behavior, revealing risk

factors in the nature of the offenses or personal characteristics, and making diagnoses of mental

illness or personality pathology. She stated that she does not look specifically for a personality

disorder, but for any signs of mental illness or pathology and relevant diagnostic possibilities.

Dr. Reed testified that the methodology she used and the interview she conducted with Hamm

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were in accordance with her training and with accepted standards in the forensic-psychology

field. She noted that there is no single test that can be scored or any one measure that can be

used to determine whether a person has a behavioral abnormality.

Dr. Reed has reviewed research and literature on sexual reoffending and female

sex offending, and she considered those sources in reaching her opinion. Among the articles and

book chapters she reviewed were Insights on Female Sexual Offenders, Evaluating Female Sex

Offenders Without Prejudice, Female Sex Offender Recidivism-Empirical Analysis of

Registered Sex Offenders in California, and The Assessment of Female Sexual Offenders. She

acknowledged that there is more research on male sex offenders than on female sex offenders,

and that some articles suggest a lower risk for female reoffending. She noted that underreporting

is one reason the recidivism rates are lower, but that none of the research indicates female sex

offenders do not or are unlikely to reoffend.

Dr. Reed denied making a subjective judgment, and she denied taking risk factors

related to males and automatically applying them to Hamm. Instead, Dr. Reed took the

information from the research on female sex offenders and applied it to the case by looking at the

risk factors identified and matters discussed and how those might or might not relate to Hamm.

Dr. Reed explained that while the research informs her that women overall recidivate less often,

it does not necessarily provide a specific rate of Hamm’s risk of reoffending.

Hamm’s counsel, referencing a scientific method inapplicable to expert testimony

in soft sciences, asked Dr. Reed to identify research showing that a risk factor for women had

been validated in a “laboratory setting.” Dr. Reed replied that none of this research is done in a

laboratory. She explained that only field studies are used because “you can’t put people into a

lab and force them to sexually offend against people.” Dr. Reed testified without objection that

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she properly relied upon and utilized forensic-psychology principles in her methodology, in

evaluating Hamm, and in reaching her opinion.

Hamm’s pretrial motions challenging the reliability of all three of these experts’

opinions drew heavily from a Missouri decision, In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116 (Mo. Ct. App.

2003). In that case, an intermediate appellate court held that insufficient evidence supported

Angela Coffel’s civil commitment as an SVP and noted that one expert had never performed a

risk assessment under Missouri’s SVP statute,7 had no training in that area, and had never

examined Coffel; while another expert had never diagnosed or counseled any female sex

offenders and could not say whether characteristics in the studies she relied on were risk factors

for reoffending. Id. at 122, 123. Coffel is distinguishable because unlike the experts in that case,

Dr. Arambula, Dr. Dunham, and Dr. Reed each conducted behavioral-abnormality evaluations on

female sex offenders under the Texas SVP Act, completed training in that area, and examined

Hamm in reaching their opinions. Additionally, Coffel is immaterial to the reliability challenge

Hamm raises here because the Missouri Supreme Court underscored that the court of appeals’

7
Hamm’s counsel conceded during the pretrial hearing that the Missouri SVP statute is
distinct from the Texas SVP statute, and while Missouri made certain changes to its law, Texas
“so far has not followed suit.” The Missouri statute requires proof that the person sought to be
civilly committed as an SVP is “more likely than not” to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence, but the Texas statute requires a finding that the person is “likely” to engage in a
predatory act of sexual violence. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.480(5), with Tex. Health &
Safety Code § 841.003(a)(2). Texas courts have rejected arguments equating “likely” in the
Texas SVP statute with “more likely than not.” See, e.g., In re Commitment of Johnson,
No. 05-17-01171-CV, 2019 WL 364475, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (concluding that statutory use of “likely” should not be interpreted as “more likely than
not”); In re Commitment of Riojas, No. 04-17-00082-CV, 2017 WL 4938818, at *4 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting argument that meaning of “likely” is
equivalent to “more likely than not”); In re Commitment of Rushing, No. 09-11-00268-CV,
2012 WL 4466421, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Noticeably absent from the statute describing a sexually violent predator is any requirement
that the person’s behavioral abnormality make the person more likely than not to engage in a
predatory act of sexual violence.”).
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ultimate holding “did not speak to the sufficiency of the foundation of the expert testimony.”

Elliott v. State, 215 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Mo. 2007). The high court rejected the argument that under

Coffel expert testimony could be deemed inadmissible because it was not based on reliable

science or research and characterized such argument as an “exaggerated” reading of Coffel. Id.

Hamm’s citation to In re Commitment of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied), in support of her reliability challenge is equally

unpersuasive. In Winkle, a defense expert skipped examining the person sought to be civilly

committed as an SVP and opined, based only on the expert’s own unpublished research, that

actuarial studies are better than clinical judgments at predicting whether a sex offender might

reoffend. Id. at 306, 308. The expert failed to provide evidence of his methodology or a copy of

any article he authored on sex-offender-recidivism risks and did not show that his opinion about

the claimed superiority of actuarial studies in predicting sex-offender recidivism was one

generally accepted in his field of psychology. Id. at 309. Thus, the Beaumont Court of Appeals

affirmed the exclusion of the expert’s unreliable testimony as the mere ipse dixit of that witness.

Id. at 310. By contrast here, the trial court was provided with evidence of all three experts’

methodology, that such methodology is in accordance with accepted standards in their respective

fields of psychiatry and psychology, that they considered research and literature on female sex

offending, and that they each examined Hamm in reaching their opinions.

Within her challenge to the reliability of the experts’ opinions, Hamm contends

that the experts provided insufficient empirical evidence supporting their opinions about her

recidivism risk. No aspect of the soft-sciences standard or the SVP Act requires such evidence.

Rather, the record establishes that all three experts were experienced and licensed in their

respective fields of psychiatry and psychology, which are legitimate fields of study, and the

17
subject matter of their testimony was within the scope of their respective fields. Further, their

testimony properly relied on or utilized the principles involved in their fields of psychiatry and

psychology in evaluating Hamm and reaching their opinions. They each examined Hamm,

reviewed records typically relied upon by experts in their fields, including records spanning

Hamm’s lifetime, for the most comprehensive information. They conducted their assessments in

accordance with the accepted standards within their fields, and each expert’s methodology was

consistent with that of their colleagues. They testified about patterns of behavior that were

significant in their assessment, and about the research and literature they reviewed and were

familiar with concerning female sex offenders. They consulted the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual, an authoritative medical text, in diagnosing Hamm with personality disorders. In sum,

the record shows that Dr. Arambula’s, Dr. Dunham’s, and Dr. Reed’s expert opinions met the

soft-sciences standard set by Texas courts for reliability. See Allison, 666 S.W.3d at 759; In re

Commitment of R.E.A., 2024 WL 807238, at *8; In re Commitment of Pipkin, 2023 WL 4345716,

at *3; In re Commitment of Johnson, 613 S.W.3d at 620-21; In re Commitment of Mitchell,

2013 WL 5658425, at *1.

The SVP Act “merely establishes what the State must prove, not how the State

must go about proving it.” In re Commitment of Dever, 521 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2017, no pet.). An expert’s experience alone may provide some of the requisite basis for

their opinion and proffering medical or academic literature is not always necessary. In re

Commitment of Owensby, No. 07-24-00216-CV, 2024 WL 4549271, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Oct. 22, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Windrum, 581 S.W.3d at 769). The trial court here

heard the experts’ testimony that studies about recidivism rates in female sexual offenders are

ongoing, few, and flawed. As the gatekeeper, the trial court determined how to assess the

18
reliability of the experts’ testimony. In re Commitment of Martinez, No. 09-05-493-CV,

2006 WL 2439752, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 24, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In an analogous case, an Illinois court of appeals concluded that a trial court did

not abuse its discretion by considering a sex-offender evaluation of a female when the court was

made aware of the limitations as to the available research regarding female juvenile sex

offenders and weighted the evidence accordingly. See In re Vianca J., 2019 WL 5295072, at *15

(Il. App. Ct. 2019). Making an argument similar to Hamm’s, Vianca J.—a female charged with

aggravated sexual criminal assault, criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual abuse and

sentenced to the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice for an indeterminate term—contended

that a sex-offender evaluation of her was faulty because there was no “empirical basis applicable

to female juvenile sex offenders to draw the conclusions that were in the sex offender

evaluation.” Id. at *1, 14. Rejecting that argument, the appellate court noted that the licensed

clinical social worker who had completed the sex-offender evaluation reviewed several types of

documentary evidence (including court documents, police reports, and a social-history

investigation), met with Vianca J., concluded that she was at high risk to reoffend, and

acknowledged the lack of research on the level of sexual or general recidivism among female

adolescent sexual offenders. Id. at *15. The trial court was thus aware of the limitations as to

the available research regarding female juvenile sex offenders and presumptively accorded the

sex-offender evaluation of Vianca J. its proper weight. Id. The trial court here could have done

the same in assessing the reliability of the experts’ opinions about Hamm.

Moreover, if we accepted the argument that currently no expert may reliably

testify in an SVP case that a female has a condition making her likely to commit another sexual

assault or sexually violent offense, then females would be categorically exempt from civil

19
commitment under the SVP Act. Such a gender exemption would be contrary to the plain

wording of the SVP Act, which refers only to a “person,” and would produce an absurd result

that the Legislature did not intend. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(a); In re

Commitment of Gipson, 580 S.W.3d 476, 482 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (recognizing

that words in SVP statute are construed using their plain and common meaning unless contrary

intention is apparent from context or unless such construction leads to absurd results). On this

record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Hamm’s

reliability objections to the State’s three experts’ opinions. Hamm’s first issue is overruled.

Legal-sufficiency of evidence

Hamm’s second issue challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the jury’s SVP finding. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person it seeks

to civilly commit is an SVP as defined in the SVP Act. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.062.

When reviewing a legal-sufficiency challenge to the evidence in an SVP case, we assess all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational jury could

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements that the State must prove to support a

judgment of civil commitment. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex.

2020); In re Commitment of Hill, No. 03-25-00138-CV, 2026 WL 110729, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Austin Jan. 15, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

As noted, an SVP is defined as a person who (1) is a repeat sexually violent

offender and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in

a predatory act of sexual violence. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(a). The first element is

uncontested. The State proved that Hamm is a repeat sexually violent offender, as established by

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her nine convictions for sexually violent offenses, consisting of sexual assaults and aggravated

kidnappings with intent to violate sexually. Hamm testified on her own behalf at trial but

presented no other defense witness.

Hamm challenges only the second element in the SVP statutory definition,

contending that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that she suffers

from a behavioral abnormality that makes her likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual

violence. See id. § 841.003(a)(2). She contends specifically that Dr. Arambula, Dr. Dunham,

Dr. Reed, and Jennifer Deyne, the deputy director of sex-offender programs for the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, provided testimony that was conclusory.

We have already determined that the expert witnesses’ opinions met the

soft-sciences standard set by Texas courts for reliability and that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Hamm’s motions to exclude them. During trial, the experts testified that

Hamm has a behavioral abnormality within the meaning of the SVP Act that makes her likely to

engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, and they linked their conclusions to the facts in

greater detail.

Dr. Arambula told the jury that he used the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in

diagnosing Hamm with an unspecified paraphilic disorder—which is a chronic condition “when

there are multiple victims and it’s persisted over time”—as well as persistent depressive disorder,

and unspecified personality disorder with histrionic, antisocial and borderline features. He

determined that Hamm is not a typical sex offender. He found the predatory nature of her

behavior, her extensive grooming of the sisters, her online solicitation, and her eventually

deleting—“the modern term nowadays is ghosting”—the sisters’ online history especially

concerning and dangerous because “these victims are lost unless something happens.” Equally

21
concerning to him was that Hamm’s role playing, which she said led her to being with the sisters

on her webcam and eventually arranging for them to join her in California, has continued and is a

driving part of her sexual deviance. He noted that Hamm used violence in her crimes against the

girls, including beatings, biting during sexual activity, use of an air gun, finger pricks, and

branding of the girls’ bodies that resulted in complications from their burns. He explained to the

jury that physical violence is a dynamic risk factor that adds to the overall seriousness of the

psychological damage from being sexually exploited. And Hamm’s family seemed unaware of

the severity of Hamm’s offenses against the girls, indicating that the quality of the family’s

support is enabling her. Dr. Arambula testified that when he met with Hamm, she identified

herself as a male named Tristan. He recalled that during her deposition, Hamm claimed she was

on the prison’s gender-dysphoria caseload so that she could skip her periods. 8 He found that

Hamm’s predatory history resembles that of a male sex offender. He testified that research

shows when a female has more features of antisocial personality pathology, including multiple

victims, and is predatory, those risk factors for recidivism resemble the risk factors for males,

taking that female out of the traditional type of female offender, for example, the one-time

offender who is a teacher or day-care worker. Such circumstances involve a different type of sex

offender that resembles a male, and while the recidivism risk does not translate literally to male

risk characteristics, it approaches that level. The specific antisocial-personality-disorder features

he observed were Hamm’s lack of responsibility, disregard for her victims, disregard for rules

and expectations, and blaming the girls as the reason she did all these things. Similarly, Hamm’s

psychopathic traits were her callousness, her exploitation and disregard for the safety of others,

8
Dr. Arambula testified that gender dysphoria involves a person being uncomfortable
with some of their gender characteristics.
22
and her varying responses when it came to accepting responsibility for her offenses. Dr.

Arambula testified that Hamm is still at risk of reoffending since she does not understand the

condition that drove her behavior. And although some research regarding female sex offenders

indicates that their overall risk of recidivism is lower than for male sex offenders, Dr. Arambula

opined that Hamm’s risk is higher compared to the average risk for females because of the

elements in her history, particularly the predatory component, her number of victims, her

repeated acts, her use of physical violence, and her significant antisocial personality pathology.

The jury also heard from Dr. Dunham, who told them that he used the Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition in diagnosing Hamm with narcissistic

personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder. He noted that sexual deviance is part of

Hamm’s personality disorders, which are lifelong and chronic in nature. He said that this case

was an outlier because Hamm is like a “cult leader,” a manipulative person who preys on

vulnerable teenage girls, and her personality disorder is what drives her condition and makes her

likely to reoffend. Hamm’s behavioral abnormality comes from her ability, excitement, and

enjoyment of conning people and playing games, and the gratification she gets from this conduct

extends to sexual things. Hamm used her gender and sexuality to manipulate situations or

people, sometimes referring to herself as a man named Tristan, sometimes referring to herself as

female, and sometimes wanting to be transgender and having testosterone hormone therapy. She

has a fixation with wanting children and trying to get others to become pregnant for her, going so

far as to post Craigslist ads for people to have sex with girls that were in her household. Hamm

blamed the role-playing game for the sexual contact she orchestrated between the sisters; she

claimed that running away was the sisters’ idea; and she told Dr. Dunham that none of this was

her fault. Dr. Dunham testified that Hamm’s narcissistic personality disorder presents itself

23
through her interpersonally exploitive conduct, her taking advantage of others for her own ends,

her lack of empathy, and her display of arrogant attitudes or behaviors. He testified that Hamm’s

histrionic personality disorder presents itself through her excessive need for attention, her

inappropriately sexually seductive or provocative behavior, her drawing attention to herself

through her physical appearance, and her consideration of relationships to be more intimate than

they are. He determined that Hamm’s personality disorder affected her emotional or volitional

capacity to the extent that she has reoffended and that she is a menace to the health and safety of

another person. Dr. Dunham expressed particular concern about parallels between Hamm’s

activity and behaviors with the Georgia girl that resembled Hamm’s later offenses against the

Texas sisters.

The jury heard Dr. Reed testify that she used the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual in diagnosing Hamm as having an unspecified personality disorder with histrionic

borderline and antisocial features. The main reasons she found Hamm had a behavior

abnormality within the meaning of the SVP Act were Hamm’s sexual deviance in combination

with her significant personality pathology. Dr. Reed explained that by its nature, a personality

disorder is a long-standing pervasive pattern of how a person behaves, sees themselves, and

interacts with others, so it is a chronic condition. Dr. Reed noted that Hamm had a “pattern of

preying on or seeking out relationships or sexual relationships, in particular with underage

females,” and had a personality pathology that involved “conning, manipulation, pathological

lying, using and exploiting others.” The sexual-deviance determination Dr. Reed made was

based on the totality of the circumstances: the predatory manner in which Hamm was finding

these teenage females online, getting them to leave home, having someone pick them up to take

them to another state, hiding them there, committing sexual acts immediately upon their arrival,

24
and the indication that she was involved in some sadomasochistic activities. Dr. Reed noted that

Hamm used physical coercion and physical force as punishment if certain things were not done,

including engaging in sexual acts. Dr. Reed was concerned about the pattern of behavior and the

similarity shown in Hamm’s prior interaction with the Georgia girl and Hamm’s current

convictions. Dr. Reed pointed out that when the offenses involving the sisters occurred, Hamm

had already had formal contact with law enforcement and been told that her conduct was

unacceptable. Yet she committed these subsequent offenses against victims who were even

younger and presented a greater age gap between them and Hamm. Dr. Reed noted that there is

some overlap between male and female sex offenders in the risk factors for recidivism. Sexual

deviance is a major risk factor for sexual reoffending that applies to both males and females. Dr.

Reed testified about the Level of Service Risk Needs Responsivity (LSR&R) measure she used

to identify Hamm’s risk factors, noting that some research suggests criminal recidivism is related

to sexual recidivism in females. She stated that, in the absence of specific measures for sexual

recidivism in females, the LSR&R measure provides some information about general criminal

offending or risk for recidivism and has been noted in literature as helpful in providing an

additional piece of data. This measure indicated that Hamm had high-risk needs, which would

make her more likely to reoffend or have problems with supervision in the community. Dr. Reed

also administered the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R), which may be administered to

females but not for assessing reoffending risk. Dr. Reed used the PCL-R to score certain traits of

Hamm’s personality pathology, including manipulation, conning, callousness, and lack of

empathy. Hamm’s score on this measure indicated that she had a high level of psychopathic

traits. Dr. Reed testified that Hamm’s personality disorders have negatively impacted her

emotional and volitional capacity, noting that Hamm failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing and

25
blamed other factors or people for what happened. Because Hamm has never completed any

sex-offender-treatment program, and because of Hamm’s lack of self-awareness, Dr. Reed

opined that Hamm is a menace to the health and safety of others.

The evidence from these three expert witnesses, viewed in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict, is legally sufficient to support the jury’s SVP finding, even

without delving into Deyne’s testimony about Hamm’s “alarming” behavior compared to that of

sex offenders in other cases. As we have stated, the legal-sufficiency test is not so stringent as to

require citations to books, articles, journals, or other experts. In re Commitment of Delarosa,

2022 WL 3403347, at *7; see In re Commitment of Owensby, 2024 WL 4549271, at *1 (noting

that expert’s experience alone may provide some basis for opinion and that proffering medical or

academic literature is not necessary in every case). Instead, what is needed is the basis for the

testifying expert’s opinions, which may include the review of records, an interview or

examination of the person being evaluated, the expert’s own background and experiences, and

support for how the bases connect to the opinions. In re Commitment of Delarosa, 2022 WL

3403347, at *7.

Further, Hamm told the jury that she is a sexual predator:

Q. Do you believe that you are a sexual predator?

A. Yes.

When asked whether she believed she would ever again sexually assault anyone, Hamm testified

in her deposition, “No, but I can’t predict the future.” At trial, she told the jury that she was

“misspeaking” when she made this statement during her deposition, but she also acknowledged

that she has called herself a compulsive liar and that she lies as a defense mechanism to protect

26
herself. Hamm’s cited authorities indicate that a female sex offender’s own statements about her

intent to reoffend are a risk factor for recidivism.9

Applying the appropriate standard of review set forth above, we conclude that the

experts’ trial testimony, which was not conclusory, and the exhibits admitted into evidence

allowed a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamm has a behavioral

abnormality that makes her likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Accordingly,

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Hamm is an SVP within the

meaning of the SVP Act. We overrule Hamm’s second and final issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s final judgment and order of commitment.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: February 6, 2026

9
Hamm’s brief and her trial-court argument quote an article noting that a female sex
offender’s statement of intent to reoffend is an exception to the authors’ recommendation that
female sex offenders in California should generally be considered low risk because it is “prima
facie compelling evidence to the contrary.”
27