CourtListener 10729871•In the Interest of S.P., Child v. the State of Texas
In the Interest of S.P., Child v. the State of Texas
CourtListener 10729871Txctapp4Oct 29, 2025
Full text
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00412-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF S.P., a Child
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024PA01182
Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 29, 2025
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW DENIED
Appellant I.P.M. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child,
S.P. 1 Her court-appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a brief containing a
professional evaluation of the record, concluding there are no arguable grounds for reversal of the
termination order. The brief satisfies the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (recognizing that Anders
procedures apply in parental termination cases). Additionally, counsel represents that he provided
I.P.M. with a copy of the brief and the motion to withdraw, advised I.P.M. of her right to review
1
To protect the privacy of the minor child, we use initials or pseudonyms to refer to the child and his biological
mother. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
04-25-00412-CV
the record and file her own brief, and informed I.P.M. how to obtain a copy of the record, providing
her with a form motion for access to the appellate record. We issued an order setting a deadline
for I.P.M. to file a pro se brief. However, I.P.M. did not request the appellate record or file a pro
se brief.
After reviewing the appellate record and appointed counsel’s brief, we conclude no
plausible grounds exist for reversal of the termination order. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s termination order. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw because it does not show good
cause for withdrawal. See id. at 27 & n.7 (holding that counsel’s obligations in a parental
termination case extend through exhaustion or waiver of all appeals and that withdrawal should be
permitted by a court of appeals “only for good cause”).
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
-2-
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