Eric Garcia and Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, LLC D/B/A Martin Marietta v. Brenda Steele and Sierrah Walters

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00501-CV

Eric GARCIA and Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, LLC d/b/a Martin Marietta,
Appellants

v.

Brenda STEELE and Sierrah Walters,
Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2019CI02780
Honorable Nicole Garza, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 29, 2026

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellants Eric Garcia and Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, LLC, challenge a

judgement rendered on a jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle collision. They raise multiple

issues, including the trial court’s directed verdict on appellee Brenda Steele’s comparative

negligence, the exclusion of certain medical billing evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting damages. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in removing the issue of
04-24-00501-CV

Steele’s negligence from the jury when there was more than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact

issue on that question, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we

will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of this court’s decision and the

basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision occurring on a private roadway in a Walmart

parking area. The roadway was not marked with a center line or other lane stripes. Witnesses

described the area as a curved, or S-shaped, roadway. Traffic in the area was heavy and congested

with vehicles proceeding through the intersection in close proximity to one another. Appellant Eric

Garcia and appellee Brenda Steele approached the intersection from opposite directions. Both

drivers stopped at the stop sign and then proceeded into the curved portion of the roadway. As they

passed one another, their vehicles made contact.

The parties’ accounts of the collision share a central similarity and a critical conflict.

Neither driver testified to observing the precise position of the other vehicle at the moment of

impact. But each driver testified that he or she remained within the proper lane of travel—thereby

implying that the other did not.

Following the presentation of evidence, appellees moved for a directed verdict on the issue

of Steele’s comparative negligence, asserting that there was no evidence that Steele was

contributorily at fault in the collision. Appellants objected asserting that the best evidence was

Garcia’s testimony that he remained in his own lane of travel, which was some evidence that Steele

had departed her lane. The trial court granted the motion.

At the charge conference, appellants objected to the charge and again sought to add a

question on Steele’s comparative negligence. The trial court overruled this objection. The charge

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submitted to the jury asked only whether the negligence of Garcia and Martin Marietta proximately

caused the occurrence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees. Appellants filed post-trial

motions challenging, among other things, the directed verdict and the failure to submit a jury

instruction regarding comparative negligence. The trial court denied those motions and rendered

judgment on the verdict.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s grant of directed verdict de novo. City of Baytown v. Schrock,

645 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tex. 2022). A directed verdict may be proper in two situations. Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Services, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000). “First, a court may

direct a verdict when a [party] fails to present evidence raising a fact issue essential to the [party’s]

right of recovery.” Id. “Second, as other courts have held, a trial court may direct a verdict for the

defendant if the plaintiff admits or the evidence conclusively establishes a defense to the plaintiff's

cause of action.” Id.

In a challenge to a directed verdict granted on the first basis, we must determine whether

there is any evidence to raise a fact issue. Millan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 760,

767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied). Disregarding all contrary evidence and

inferences, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party suffering the adverse

judgment and determine whether there is any evidence to raise a fact issue. Szczepanik v. First S.

Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1994). “If the record contains any probative and conflicting

evidence on a material issue, then the jury should have resolved the issue.” Cortez ex rel. Estate

of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004),

aff’d, 159 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. 2005). If the directed verdict was granted in error, the case must be

reversed and remanded for a jury’s determination on that issue. Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649.

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ANALYSIS

In their first issue, appellants assert the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on

the issue of Steele’s contributory negligence. 1 We agree.

Relevant Law

To prevail on a negligence claim, a party must demonstrate “the existence of a legal duty,

a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach.” Tenaris Bay City Inc. v.

Ellisor, 718 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2025) (citation omitted). “Contributory negligence

contemplates an injured person’s failure to use ordinary care in regard to his or her own safety.”

Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. 2000). “This affirmative defense requires proof

that the plaintiff was negligent and that the plaintiff’s negligence proximately caused his or her

injuries.” Id. See also Alamo Motor Lines v. Maldonado, 271 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“[W]here a plaintiff fails to use any care for his own safety and it

is apparent that if he had used ordinary care the accident would not have happened, then he is

guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.”).

“It is well-established that drivers owe a common-law duty to act as a reasonably prudent

person toward others on the road.” Cantu v. Libson, No. 04-25-00040-CV, 2025 WL 3295337, at

*3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (cleaned up). “Drivers also have

the general duty to keep a proper lookout[.]” Id. “A proper lookout encompasses the duty to

observe, in a careful and intelligent manner, traffic and the general situation in the vicinity,

1
In this first issue, appellants also assert that the trial court erred by failing to include their charge question addressing
Steele’s negligence. These are related but distinct issues. See Gespa Nicaragua, S.A. v. Recom AG, 705 S.W.3d 362,
394 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, pet. denied) (“Charge error and directed verdict error are two separate issues triggered
by separate judicial rulings and reviewed under separate standards of review.”). However, because the trial court
granted Steele’s motion for a directed verdict, it eliminated appellants’ contributory negligence claim and therefore
had no duty to provide a jury charge on the claim. Id.; see also Dziedzic v. Stephanou, No. 14-97-00163-CV, 1999
WL 795994, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 1999, pet. denied) (“Because this case was decided by
directed verdict, any error in the charge could not have caused rendition of an improper judgment; therefore the alleged
error in the charge is moot.”).

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including speed and proximity of other vehicles as well as rules of the road and common

experience.” Montes v. Pendergrass, 61 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.)

(cleaned up).

It is undisputed that the accident occurred on a private roadway that, despite lacking a

center line or other lane stripes, was wide enough for two cars traveling in opposite directions to

pass each other safely. At trial, Garcia repeatedly testified that he had stayed in his lane throughout

the incident. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer from Garcia’s testimony that Steele did not remain

in her lane (i.e., on her side of the road). See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012) (stating

that a trier of fact is permitted to draw reasonable and logical inferences); City of Keller v. Wilson,

168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005) (“[I]f the evidence allows of only one inference, neither jurors

nor the reviewing court may disregard it.”); Garcia v. State, No. 04-18-00027-CR, 2018 WL

6624891, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (“[J]urors are called

upon to use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in

ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence.”) (cleaned up).

Disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, Garcia’s testimony provides evidence

of a probative nature that Steele failed to observe the rules of the road by departing from her side

of the road while she and Garcia were passing each other. 2 Because this is some evidence that

Steele breached her common-law duty to keep a proper lookout, and that this breach was a cause

of the accident, it was error for the trial court to grant the directed verdict on the issue of her

contributory negligence. Cortez, 131 S.W.3d at 120 (“If the record contains any probative and

conflicting evidence on a material issue, then the jury should have resolved the issue.”).

2
See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.051(a) (“An operator on a roadway of sufficient width shall drive on the right
half of the roadway[.]”); id., at § 545.052(1) (“An operator moving in the opposite direction of the movement of
another operator shall: move to or remain to the right[.]”).

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Though we are to disregard all contrary evidence and inferences, even if we consider

Steele’s testimony that she remained on her side of the road—along with Garcia’s testimony that

he did as well—this merely establishes “conflicting evidence of probative nature” and, as such,

the “determination of [that] issue is for the jury.” See White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Inc.,

651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 1983); Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1985) (where

evidence was conflicting, it is error to refuse submission of contributory negligence issues).

Because this issue involves conflicting testimony from the two drivers, the determination

of that question will likely turn on the credibility of the witnesses. Under this record, the trial court

should have left this fact issue and credibility determinations for the jury’s resolution. See City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (“Jurors are the sole judges of the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony.”); Alamo Motor Lines v. Maldonado, 271

S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“It is well settled law in this

State that, as a general rule, the question of whether a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence

is usually a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”) (collecting cases).

APPELLANTS’ REMAINING ISSUES

Appellants have also raised the following issues in this appeal:

• The trial court erred by excluding evidence of amounts received by Steele’s medical
providers;
• The trial court erred by admitting plaintiff’s expert opinions concerning medical
charges;
• Whether the jury’s award of future medical expenses is supported by sufficient
evidence; and
• Whether the jury’s award of noneconomic damages are excessive or supported by
sufficient evidence.

For several reasons, we decline to reach these remaining issues.

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“The current appellate rules are written to discourage appellate courts from addressing

much beyond what is “necessary” in opinions.” In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 57 (Tex. App.—Waco

2008, no pet.). Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 addresses the scope of appellate court opinions,

providing, “The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable

but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.1. See also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“If the issues are settled, the court should write a brief

memorandum opinion no longer than necessary to advise the parties of the court’s decision and

the basic reasons for it.”). And there is the settled principle that courts should exercise restraint

when deciding cases. See Builder Recovery Services, LLC v. Town of Westlake, 650 S.W.3d 499,

508 (Tex. 2022) (“Judicial restraint counsels against deciding unnecessary issues.”) (cleaned up).

CONCLUSION

Based on this record, we conclude that Garcia’s testimony supports the reasonable

inference that Steele’s failure to keep a proper lookout contributed to the accident and her alleged

harm. See Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. 2004)

(“[W]e give the losing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences created by the evidence.”). We

therefore conclude the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict because the record contains

more than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue regarding Steele’s contributory negligence.

Id. (“If the evidence . . . rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to

differ in their conclusions, it constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence and the case must be

reversed and remanded for a jury determination.”). Point of error number one is sustained and we

decline to address appellants’ remaining issues. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is

reversed and the cause is remanded for new trial.

H. Todd McCray, Justice

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