James Alexander Stuart v. the State of Texas

Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed October 4, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-01282-CR

JAMES ALEXANDER STUART, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 074172

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
Opinion by Justice Miskel
James Alexander Stuart appeals the trial court’s final judgment convicting

him of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial judge found Stuart guilty,

that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, the

enhancements true, and assessed his punishment at twenty-six years of

imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Stuart argues the evidence is insufficient

to support the trial judge’s rejection of his self-defense claim. We conclude the

evidence is sufficient to support Stuart’s conviction and the trial judge’s rejection of
his deadly-force, self-defense claim. We also conclude the judgment contains errors.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
Stuart purchased an RV that he allowed his younger brother, John Stuart, to

live in. The RV was parked on property owned by another individual in exchange

for rent. Stuart also did some of his work at the property. John was out of work and

owed his brother money for various things including the rent that he sometimes paid

on his brother’s behalf. Stuart claimed that John was unemployed and using drugs.

The brothers had a volatile relationship. During one of their fights, Stuart

slashed the RV screen door with his knife. Then, at the end of July 2021, during

another fight, John hit Stuart with a crepe myrtle stick, resulting in Stuart’s ear being

partially severed from his head and having to be sewn back on at the hospital. Stuart

claimed that he told the attending physician the laceration occurred when a branch

fell off of a tree and hit him in the head because he was trying to protect his brother.

Seventeen days after Stuart’s ear was injured, while he was working at the

property, he had another argument with John over money. Stuart had been drinking

alcohol and was in his truck leaving the property while John was yelling at him.

Instead of driving away, Stuart backed up the truck and John grabbed a five-foot-

long crepe myrtle stick from inside or near the RV. Then, Stuart grabbed a machete

from his truck bed and chased John.

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Jason Weisz was returning home after attending a school event for his children

when he saw a man later identified as Stuart jump over a fence holding a machete

while chasing another man who was later identified as John who was holding a stick.

Weisz saw Stuart swinging the machete at John who was trying to run away and

yelling for Stuart to get away from him. A couple of times, John turned and swung

at or hit Stuart with the stick. Weisz called 911 and waited for the police to arrive.

When Stuart noticed Weisz, he put the machete away and walked toward Weisz’s

vehicle telling Weisz to get out and threatening to kill Weisz if he did not leave.

Weisz “lifted his foot off the brake” and Stuart chased after him. Weisz has a

personal security license and is a sworn peace officer so he told Stuart that he was

an “officer.” At that point, Stuart put his hands up and backed off.

When the police arrived, Stuart was in his truck trying to exit the driveway.

The police instructed Stuart to get out of the truck but Stuart did not comply. John

told his brother not to be ignorant and just step out of the truck. Ultimately, Stuart

got out of the truck and the police observed that he smelled of alcohol and gasoline.

The police also found a machete in the back of the truck.

Stuart was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. During a

bench trial, Stuart admitted that he chased John with the machete but denied

swinging it at him, and he raised a self-defense claim. The trial judge found Stuart

guilty and, during his oral rendition of judgment, expressly stated that he found the

facts of case did not support Stuart’s self-defense claim. Stuart also pleaded true to

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having been convicted of the two prior felony offenses alleged to enhance his

punishment, and the trial judge found them true and assessed Stuart’s punishment at

twenty-six years of imprisonment.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In issue one, Stuart argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

judge’s rejection of his self-defense claim. He contends both that the State failed to

meet its burden to disprove his self-defense claim and that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

The State responds that the evidence showed that Stuart had a verbal argument with

his brother that escalated to the point of Stuart chasing his brother while brandishing

a machete as his brother tried to flee while swinging a stick to keep Stuart away,

which is sufficient to support his conviction and the trial judge’s rejection of his self-

defense claim.

A. Standard of Review
Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal conviction must be based on legally

sufficient evidence. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979)). In assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, an appellate court

considers all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 607–08. Similarly,

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when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a self-defense issue,

an appellate court considers whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, a reasonable fact-finder could have both: (1) found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) found against

the defendant on the defensive issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton, 569

S.W.3d at 609. An appellate court does not look to whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to refute the defendant’s self-defense theory. See id.

An appellate court will consider all evidence when reviewing the sufficiency

of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted,

or submitted by the prosecution or defense. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Further, an appellate court is required to defer to the fact-

finder’s credibility and weight determinations because the fact-finder is the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight assigned to their testimony.

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. Although the

parties may disagree about the logical inferences that flow from undisputed facts,

where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.

B. Applicable Law
A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined

in § 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code and either causes serious bodily injury to another,

or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. TEX.

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PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a). A person commits assault under § 22.01 if the person:

(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;

(2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly threatens another with imminent bodily

injury; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when

the person knows or reasonably believes that the other will regard the contact as

offensive or provocative. Id. § 22.01(a).

A “deadly weapon” is defined to include (1) a firearm or anything manifestly

designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily

injury, or (2) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of

causing death or serious bodily injury. Id. § 1.07(a)(17). A machete is a kind of

knife. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 500 S.W.2d 510, 511-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

A knife is not a deadly weapon per se. Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986). However, in determining whether a weapon is deadly in its

manner of use or intended manner of use, the defendant need not have actually

inflicted harm on the victim. Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017). Instead, consideration is given to the words and other threatening

actions by the defendant, including the defendant’s proximity to the victim; the

weapon’s ability to inflict serious bodily injury or death, including the size, shape,

and sharpness of the weapon; and the manner in which the defendant used the

weapon. Id.

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“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of

death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. PENAL § 1.07(a)(46);

Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “Bodily injury”

means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

PENAL § 1.07(a)(8); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762.

Self-defense is a justification in defense to prosecution under § 2.03 of the

Texas Penal Code. See PENAL §§ 2.03, 9.02, 9.31, 9.32. A person is justified in

using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the

force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or

attempted use of unlawful force. Id. § 9.31(a). A “reasonable belief” is one that an

ordinary and prudent man would hold in the same circumstances as the actor.

Id. § 1.07(a)(42). The actor’s belief that the force was immediately necessary is

presumed to be reasonable if the actor did not provoke the person against whom the

force was used and was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity. See

Id. § 9.31(a)(2). But the use of force is not justified against another in response to

verbal provocation alone. See id. § 9.31(b)(1).

A defendant has the initial burden to adduce some evidence that would support

a rational finding in his favor on the defensive issue. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.

If the defendant produces some evidence, the State has the burden of persuasion to

disprove the raised defense. Id. This burden does not require the State to produce

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evidence refuting the self-defense claim; rather, the burden requires the State to

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Self-defense is an issue of fact to be

determined by the fact-finder. Id. at 609. A verdict of guilty is an implicit finding

rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory. Id. Defensive evidence that is merely

consistent with the physical evidence at the scene of the alleged offense will not

render the State’s evidence insufficient because credibility determinations are solely

within the fact-finder’s province and the fact-finder is free to accept or reject the

defensive evidence. Id.

C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Stuart’s Conviction and the
Trial Judge’s Rejection of His Self-Defense Claim.
First, we review whether a reasonable fact-finder could have found the

essential elements of assault beyond a reasonable doubt. The record shows that in

response to John yelling at him, Stuart backed up his truck, got out of the vehicle,

grabbed a machete from the truck bed, and chased John while swinging the machete

at him while John was trying to run away and yelling for Stuart to get away from

him. Weisz testified that Stuart was approximately a foot away from John when

Stuart was swinging the machete at John while Stuart claimed that he was

approximately five to six feet away from John at the time. Johnson, 509 S.W.3d

at 323 (noting courts may consider defendant’s proximity to victim when

determining whether knife is deadly in its manner of use or intended manner of use).

To the extent Weisz’s and Stuart’s testimony differed, we must defer to the trial

judge’s credibility and weight determinations. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326;
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Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. We conclude a rational fact-finder could have found

that Stuart committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, we review whether a reasonable fact-finder could have found against

Stuart on his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Stuart acknowledges

that there is inconsistency in the testimony about who was the initial aggressor—

Stuart claimed that his brother got the stick before he grabbed the machete and John

claimed that he grabbed the stick after Stuart got the machete. He also argues that

the evidence shows he acted reasonably because John had previously injured him

with a stick, and it was undisputed that John suffered from mental health issues, and

he often engaged in altercations with his brother who was usually the first aggressor.

The record shows that Stuart was in his truck leaving the property but, instead

of driving away when John was yelling at him, backed up his truck, grabbed a

machete from his truck bed, and chased John while swinging the machete at him.

See PENAL § 9.31(b)(1) (use of force is not justified against another in response to

verbal provocation alone). Also, Weisz testified that he saw Stuart was chasing John

with the machete, but he did not see John chase Stuart with the stick. Although there

was conflicting testimony as to whether Stuart grabbed the machete or John grabbed

the stick first, we again note that we must defer to the trial judge’s credibility and

weight determinations. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Braughton, 569 S.W.3d

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at 608. We conclude a rational fact-finder could have rejected Stuart’s self-defense

claim.

We conclude a rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon were proved beyond a reasonable doubt

and also could have found against Stuart on his self-defense theory. Accordingly,

we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support Stuart’s aggravated assault

conviction and the trial judge’s rejection of his self-defense claim.

Issue one is decided against Stuart.

III. Modification of the Judgment
Although neither party raises the issue, we observe that the record reveals

errors in the judgment with respect to the statute for the offense and the availability

of diligent participation credit under article 42A.559 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. An appellate court has the authority to modify an incorrect judgment to

make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary information to do so.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992) (adopting the reasoning in Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc)).

The judgment incorrectly lists the statute for the offense as “22.02(2)(B).”

The record shows that Stuart was indicted for the offense of aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon which is second-degree felony under § 22.02(a)(2), (b) of the Texas

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Penal Code. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s judgment should be

modified to state the correct statute—TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b).

The judgment incorrectly states that Stuart is eligible for diligent participation

credit under article 42A.559 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Stuart was

convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon which is a second-degree

felony. See PENAL § 22.02(b). Article 42A.559 applies to state jail felonies.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s judgment should be modified to state that

this statutory provision is not applicable to Stuart.

IV. Conclusion
The evidence was sufficient to support Stuart’s conviction and the trial judge’s

rejection of his self-defense claim. Also, the trial judge erred when he signed a

judgment with errors in it.

We modify the trial court’s judgment as follows:

• “Statute for Offense: 22.02(2)(B)” is modified to read “Statute
for Offense: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b).”

• (FOR STATE JAIL FELONY OFFENSES ONLY) Is
Defendant presumptively entitled to diligent participation credit
in accordance with Article 42A.559, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.?
YES” is modified to read “(FOR STATE JAIL FELONY
OFFENSES ONLY) Is Defendant presumptively entitled to
diligent participation credit in accordance with Article 42A.559,
Tex. Code Crim. Proc.? N/A.”

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 43.2(b).

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The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects the

modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment in this case. See Shumate

v. State, 649 S.W.3d 240, 244–45 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).

The trial judge is also directed: (1) to order the district clerk to prepare and

file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the corrected judgment with this Court;

(2) to provide the corrected judgment to the parties; and (3) to send the corrected

judgment to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

221282f.u05 /Emily Miskel/
Do Not Publish EMILY A. MISKEL
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 JUSTICE

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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JAMES ALEXANDER STUART, On Appeal from the 397th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Grayson County,
Texas
No. 05-22-01282-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 074172.
Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Nowell and Kennedy
participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

• “Statute for Offense: 22.02(2)(B)” is modified to read “Statute
for Offense: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b).”
• (FOR STATE JAIL FELONY OFFENSES ONLY) Is
Defendant presumptively entitled to diligent participation credit
in accordance with Article 42A.559, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.?
YES” is modified to read “(FOR STATE JAIL FELONY
OFFENSES ONLY) Is Defendant presumptively entitled to
diligent participation credit in accordance with Article 42A.559,
Tex. Code Crim. Proc.? N/A.”

As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

The trial court is DIRECTED to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects
the modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment in this case.

The trial judge is also DIRECTED: (1) to order the district clerk to prepare
and file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the corrected judgment with this
Court; (2) to provide the corrected judgment to the parties; and (3) to send the
corrected judgment to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

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Judgment entered this 4th day of October, 2024.

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