J.M.P., Jr. v. the State of Texas

Reversed and Rendered and Opinion Filed March 19, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00878-CV

IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST INTEREST
AND PROTECTION OF J.M.P. JR.

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MI-92-1623

OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Miskel
J.M.P. Jr. appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to remove his

firearms disability and restore his right to purchase and possess firearms. The Dallas

County District Attorney’s Office represented the State in opposing J.M.P. Jr.’s

petition.

J.M.P. Jr. is a prospective gun purchaser who, thirty years ago, before his

senior year of high school, was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility

for a week to ten days. Since that time, J.M.P. Jr. has been stable, married for over

fourteen years with three children, industrious in business, and involved in his
church and multiple local charities. J.M.P. Jr. learned of his firearms disability when

he attempted to purchase a hunting rifle. As a result, he filed a petition seeking relief

from his firearms disability and restoration of his right to purchase and possess

firearms under Texas Mental Health Code (TMHC)1 § 574.088. See TEX. HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 571.001, 574.088. The State opposed his petition.

On appeal, J.M.P. Jr. raises two issues arguing that: (1)(a) the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his petition, and (b) the federal and state relief-

from-disabilities statutes are unconstitutional as applied; and (2) the trial court erred

when it failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying J.M.P. Jr.’s

petition to remove his firearms disability, because J.M.P. Jr. conclusively

established every element required to show that he was entitled to relief under

§ 574.088 of the TMHC. We reverse the trial court’s order and render an order that:

(1) states that J.M.P. Jr. qualifies for relief from a firearms disability; (2) declares

that J.M.P. Jr. is not a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); and

(3) restores J.M.P. Jr.’s right to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms and

ammunition.

We publish this opinion because this case involves issues of first impression.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. Relief from a firearms disability involves the intersection

1
The THMC is Title 7, Subtitle C of the Texas Health and Safety Code, encompassing Chapters 571–
79 of that Code.
–2–
of federal and state laws and raises issues of first impression in this Court as well as

the State of Texas with respect to the proper application of § 574.088 of the TMHC

and related federal statutes.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts are based on the pleadings and the evidence adduced at

the hearing on J.M.P. Jr.’s petition.2

A. The 1992 Commitment

J.M.P. Jr. had always excelled in school and sports, but around age seventeen

in his junior year of high school, his personality changed. He started failing classes

and lost interest in things. J.M.P. Jr. went to outpatient counseling, but it did not

resolve his issues. In one incident where J.M.P. Jr. was not getting along with his

parents, he ran away from home and went to stay with a friend a mile away for a few

days. J.M.P. Jr. would not talk to his father about what had changed and would not

agree to a mental health evaluation. J.M.P. Sr. believed that J.M.P. Jr. needed to be

evaluated, and he was advised to obtain a court-ordered evaluation.

On August 12, 1992, J.M.P. Sr. completed an application to have J.M.P. Jr.

temporarily committed.3 The form came preprinted with allegations that the subject

2
The record in this case was filed under seal. We must hand down a public opinion explaining
our decisions based on the record, which we cannot do without mentioning certain specific facts. Kartsotis
v. Bloch, 503 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.3,
and TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.022(a)(12). We have nonetheless strived to preserve the confidentiality
of the materials by avoiding discussion of details where possible and making some portions deliberately
vague. See id.
3
None of the documents relating to the 1992 commitment were admitted into evidence at the 2022
hearing that is the basis of this appeal. We summarize the facts for narrative clarity only.
–3–
of the form—J.M.P. Jr.—was mentally ill and that as a result of mental illness, either

(1) was likely to cause serious harm to himself or others, or (2) would continue to

suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress and would

continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function independently. It also

included a preprinted request that J.M.P. Jr. be examined by two physicians. The

certificate stated that J.M.P. Jr. had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder,

his condition was deteriorating in outpatient treatment, he needed an intensive

inpatient evaluation, and he was likely to cause harm to himself, but not likely to

cause serious harm to others. The State also filed a motion seeking an order of

protective custody. A physician’s certificate of medical examination dated

August 11, 1992, was attached in support of the State’s motion.

On August 17, 1992, a second physician from the public mental health facility

submitted a certificate of medical examination. After evaluating J.M.P. Jr., both

physicians concluded that he was angry, defiant, and depressed, and he was a danger

to himself but not to others. They also diagnosed J.M.P. Jr. with “major depressive

disorder.” However, neither of the examining physicians concluded that J.M.P. Jr.’s

condition was expected to continue for more than 90 days.

On August 20, 1992, after a non-jury hearing, the trial judge signed a

judgment for court-ordered in-patient mental health services. The trial court found

that J.M.P. Jr. was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to himself but not to others

and, if not treated, he would continue to suffer and experience deterioration of his

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ability to function independently. However, the trial court also found that J.M.P. Jr.

was able to make a rational and informed decision as to whether to submit to

treatment. The trial court ordered that J.M.P. Jr. receive temporary in-patient mental

health services for a period not to exceed 90 days.

J.M.P. Jr. was hospitalized for a week to ten days. At the 2022 hearing,

J.M.P. Jr. testified that he did not recall having been placed on any medication during

his 1992 hospitalization, and the physicians’ certificates do not reflect that he was

prescribed medication. It is undisputed that J.M.P. Jr. was completely discharged

from court-ordered mental health treatment in 1992 and that there was no

recommendation or requirement that he continue to receive mental health treatment.

B. History Between 1992–2022

Soon after his discharge, J.M.P. Jr. began and completed his senior year of

high school without incident. He attended university and, after graduating, worked

for a real estate developer for nine years. At some point, he changed companies and

was eventually promoted to chief operating officer (COO) and was made part owner.

Later, the board of directors promoted him to president and chief executive officer

(CEO). In approximately 2020, he purchased the other owners’ interest in the

company and became the sole owner of the business. He currently employs

approximately forty-five people.

J.M.P. Jr. prospered in his personal life as well. He has been married for over

fourteen years, has three children, and has been involved in extended family life with

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his father, his siblings, and their children. He has volunteered with his church and

multiple charities, and he coached his children’s youth sports teams.

In 2021, approximately thirty years after he was involuntarily committed,

J.M.P. Jr. attempted to purchase a hunting rifle, in part to hunt wild hogs on his ranch,

but he was denied. He investigated the reason for his denial and learned from the

Federal Bureau of Investigation that he matched a prohibiting record under

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) as a person who was adjudicated mentally defective or who

had been committed to a mental institution and was therefore prohibited from

possessing a firearm or ammunition. In compliance with the law, J.M.P. Jr gave his

firearms—a Beretta twin-gauge semiautomatic shotgun for duck and quail hunting,

a 12-gauge Remington 1100 shotgun for duck and turkey hunting, and a 243-caliber

Ruger M-77 rifle for deer hunting—back to J.M.P. Sr. who had purchased them for

J.M.P. Jr. when he was fifteen years old. J.M.P. Jr. had passed a hunter safety class

when he was in his twenties and had been hunting for a major part of his life—he

owns hunting dogs, it was a big part of his social relationships, and he wanted to

teach his son.

C. The 2022 Petition for Relief from Firearms Disability

In 2022, J.M.P. Jr. filed a petition with the probate court that had entered the

original involuntary commitment order to lift his firearms disability and restore his

right to purchase and possess firearms. The State filed an answer requesting that the

trial court deny J.M.P. Jr.’s claim for relief from his firearms disability.

–6–
During the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from J.M.P. Sr., a licensed

professional counselor, and J.M.P. Jr. The trial court admitted two letters from

friends of J.M.P. Jr. attesting to his good reputation. The evidence admitted showed

that following his involuntary commitment, J.M.P. Jr. has been an upstanding

citizen; his mental health and criminal history has been spotless for thirty years; and

his father and two friends attested to his sterling reputation, good character, and

positive involvement in family, business, and community affairs. The State offered

no exhibits and called no witnesses during the trial. Instead, the State asked the trial

court to take judicial notice of the documents associated with the 1992 involuntary

commitment, including the application form completed by J.M.P. Sr. and the

certificates of mental health examination. The trial court took judicial notice of the

documents but did not admit them into evidence. The State cross-examined

witnesses with quotations from these documents and their allegations that J.M.P. Jr.

ran away from home and had problems with his siblings and parents as a youth.

After hearing the evidence, the trial judge denied J.M.P. Jr.’s petition and

explained her reasons for doing so. The trial judge stated that the 1992 involuntary-

commitment documents, which were not in evidence, led her to believe that

J.M.P. Jr. was unable at that time to make rational decisions due to depression.4

4
This contradicts an express finding in the 1992 order that J.M.P. Jr. was able to make a rational and
informed decision about his treatment.
–7–
Then, based on no evidence within the record, the trial judge further expressed her

personal belief that no one can ever recover from a mental health condition:5

Trial Judge: I have done mental health for a long time, over
20 years, and I have never heard of someone
being healed of a mental illness. Never.
J.M.P. Jr.’s Counsel: I’m sorry?

Trial Judge: I said I have never heard of anyone being healed
of a mental illness. It is treatable, but to be cured
of it and then not to receive treatment afterwards,
I don’t understand how that happened when
someone is having a depression.
On the same day as the hearing, the trial judge also signed an order denying

J.M.P. Jr.’s petition as follows:

[J.M.P. Jr.’s] Petition should be denied as removal of the firearms
disability is not in the public interest.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Petition for Relief from Firearms Disability filed by [J.M.P. Jr.] is
hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), [J.M.P. Jr.] IS NO LONGER ELIGIBLE TO
PURCHASE OR POSSESS A FIREARM OR AMMUNITION.
The trial court’s order does not state that J.M.P. Jr.’s petition should be denied on the

basis that he is likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety.

5
Our system of justice does not allow courts to make decisions based solely on the personal opinions
of a judicial officer, entirely unsupported by evidence. “[C]itizens should be governed by clear laws
consistently applied, not personal whims.” In re State, 489 S.W.3d 454, 454 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
The integrity of our constitutional system of government relies on society believing that bedrock principles
are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals. See Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254,
265 (1986). We are a government of laws, not of men. See Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex.
2021); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

–8–
J.M.P. Jr. timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and timely

filed a notice of past due findings and conclusions to which the trial court did not

respond. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 297. He also filed a motion for new trial, which the

trial court denied by written order without a hearing on August 2, 2022.6

II. It Was an Abuse of Discretion to Deny the Petition for Relief from a
Firearms Disability
In the first part of issue one, J.M.P. Jr. argues the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied his petition to remove his firearms disability. He makes

three arguments in support of his contention: (1) under federal statutory law, which

has been incorporated into § 574.088(a) of the TMHC, he is no longer disqualified

from possessing or purchasing a firearm; (2) under a legal sufficiency standard of

review, the undisputed evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in

support of his petition; and (3) under a factual sufficiency standard, trial court’s

adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The State responds that it does not dispute much of the evidence submitted by

J.M.P. Jr. concerning what occurred in his life after his involuntary civil

commitment. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because

6
Attached to his motion for new trial was a letter from a psychiatrist that appears to have been an
attempt to respond to the personal beliefs announced by the trial judge when rendering her decision. The
letter was from a psychiatrist who evaluated J.M.P. Jr. after the trial judge’s comments, concluding that
J.M.P. Jr. “has good insight, is well-adjusted, and displays no impairment due to any mental health issues.”
The psychiatrist also stated in part that “it is not uncommon for a person who may have had mental health
issues as a teenager to recover from or mature out of such issues as an adult.” However, that letter was not
admitted into evidence during the trial, and there was no hearing on J.M.P. Jr.’s motion for new trial.

–9–
J.M.P. Jr. failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence7 that the removal of

his firearms disability is in the public interest; he admitted only evidence of his

personal reasons for wanting his firearms disability removed. Also, the State

maintains that J.M.P. Jr.’s contested evidence was inconsistent and not credible.

A. Standard of Review

The general test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without

regard to any guiding rules or principles. See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835,

838–39 (Tex. 2004). This occurs when either: (1) the trial court fails to analyze or

apply the law correctly; or (2) with regard to factual issues or matters committed to

its discretion, the trial court could reasonably reach only one decision and failed to

do so. See VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd. v. Gross, No. 05-19-00217-CV, 2020 WL

3248481, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Another way

of stating the test is whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v.

Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). Under an abuse of

discretion standard, an appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual

determinations if they are supported by evidence, but it reviews the trial court’s legal

determinations de novo. Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. 2011).

7
The statute does not impose a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. “Only in extraordinary
circumstances, such as when we have been mandated to impose a more onerous burden, has this Court
abandoned the well established preponderance of the evidence standard.” Ellis Cnty. State Bank v. Keever,
888 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1994). The State has not supported its proposed heightened evidentiary standard
with analysis or with citations to authority.
–10–
Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, legal and factual sufficiency

claims are not independent, reversible grounds of error, but rather merely factors to

consider in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Beaumont

Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); IKB Indus. Ltd. v. Pro-Line

Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997) (Baker, J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety v. Randolph, No. 02-13-00025-CV, 2014 WL 1875826, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth May 8, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g) (concluding evidence was

sufficient to establish applicant was not disqualified under federal law from

purchasing handgun based on mental health adjudication). For both legal and factual

sufficiency challenges, an appellate court ordinarily defers to the fact-finder’s

determination regarding the witnesses’ credibility and the weight accorded their

testimony. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (legal

sufficiency); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.

2003) (factual sufficiency). If there are conflicts in the testimony, an appellate court

must presume the fact-finder resolved them in favor of the ruling if reasonable

human beings could do so. See Jackson v. Axelrad, 221 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2007)

(citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819). Of course, the fact-finder’s decisions

regarding credibility must be reasonable. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820. A fact-

finder cannot ignore undisputed testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise

credible, free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily

–11–
controverted, and a fact-finder is not free to believe testimony that is conclusively

negated by undisputed facts. Id.

When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it

had the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence

conclusively establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. See

Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). An

appellate court conducting a legal sufficiency review cannot disregard undisputed

evidence that allows only one logical inference. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 814.

The fact-finder is not free to reach a verdict contrary to such evidence. Id. The

reviewing court must otherwise assume the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in

favor of the finding. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018). In

reviewing a “matter of law” challenge, the reviewing court must first examine the

record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the

contrary. See Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241. If there is no evidence to support the

finding, the reviewing court will then examine the entire record to determine if the

contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. The issue should be

sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Id.

When there are no findings of fact despite a timely request, an appellate court

presumes that a trial court made all the findings necessary to support its judgment.

See Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Tex. 2017). A party may

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rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the record evidence does not support a

presumed finding. Id.

B. Applicable Law

The State has not identified any basis under Texas state law for imposing a

firearms disability on J.M.P. Jr. The pleadings, the trial court’s order, Texas law,8

and the briefing all point to federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) as being the sole

source of J.M.P. Jr.’s firearms disability.

The law relating to relief from a federal firearms disability involves the

intersection of federal and state laws, including:

(1) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (firearms—unlawful acts);
(2) 34 U.S.C. § 40911(c)(2)(B) (enhancement of requirement that
federal departments and agencies provide relevant information to
national instant criminal background check system);
(3) 34 U.S.C. § 40913 (implementation assistance to the states);
(4) 34 U.S.C. § 40915 (relief from disabilities program required as
condition for participation in grant programs);
(5) TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15-a (commitment of persons of unsound
mind); and

(6) TMHC § 574.088 (relief from disabilities in mental health cases).

1. Texas Law Relating to Mental Health Commitments

A mental-health facility’s authority to detain a patient against his will is

subject to constitutional limitations. Loya v. Hickory Trail Hosp., L.P., 673 S.W.3d

8
See HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(1).
–13–
1, 12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.). Each person in Texas has a federal and

state constitutional right not to be involuntarily committed except upon sufficient

evidence. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15-a (“No person shall be committed as a person

of unsound mind except on competent medical or psychiatric testimony.”). To

safeguard these rights while also ensuring that those with severe mental illness have

access to humane care, the legislature enacted the TMHC. Loya, 673 S.W.3d at 12;

HEALTH & SAFETY § 571.002 (stating purpose of TMHC).

The facility administrator of a facility to which a patient was committed or

from which a patient was required to receive temporary or extended inpatient or

outpatient mental health services shall discharge the patient when the court order

expires. HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.085. However, under § 574.086 of the TMHC, a

patient committed for court-ordered mental health services may be discharged at any

time before the expiration of the court order if the “facility administrator or person

determines that the patient no longer meets the criteria for court-ordered mental

health services” and such a discharge terminates the court order and the discharged

person may not be required to submit to further involuntary mental health services

unless a new court order is entered. Id. § 574.086(a), (c); Randolph, 2014 WL

1875826, at *5. The facility administrator of a facility to which the patient was

involuntarily committed for inpatient mental health services shall consider before

discharging the patient whether the patient should receive outpatient court-ordered

mental health services in accordance with: (1) a furlough under § 574.082 or (2) a

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modified order under § 574.061 that directs the patient to participate in outpatient

mental health services. HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.086(b). The facility administrator

or the person responsible for outpatient care who discharges a patient shall prepare

a discharge certificate and file it with the court that entered the order requiring mental

health services. Id. § 574.087.

2. Federal Law Imposing Firearms Disability

The duties pertaining to the sale of a firearm are regulated by the Gun Control

Act of 1968, as amended by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993

(“Brady Act”). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–34; Reyna v. Academy Ltd., No. 01-15-00988-

CV, 2017 WL 3483217, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op.). Before a federally licensed firearms dealer may sell a firearm, the

would-be purchaser must provide certain personal information, show photo

identification, and pass a background check. Reyna, 2017 WL 3483217, at *5.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), certain classes of people, including the mentally

ill, are disqualified from purchasing or possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4);

Reyna, 2017 WL 3483217, at *5; accord Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169,

172 (2014). Section 922(g)(4) states as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to a mental institution to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
–15–
“Committed to a mental institution” means “a formal commitment to a mental

institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority.” 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.11. The term includes commitment to a mental institution involuntarily, but it

does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary

admission to a mental institution. Id.

3. Relief from Federal Firearms Disability

However, federal law also includes a process through which individuals who

have been involuntarily committed can restore their rights under the National Instant

Criminal Background Check System Improvement Amendments Act (NIAA).

34 U.S.C. § 40911. The NIAA specifically cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)

and:

(1) requires federal agencies that impose mental health adjudications
or involuntary commitments to provide a process for relief from
the disabilities described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), and
(2) provides grant money to states that implement a disability relief
program under 34 U.S.C. § 40915.

34 U.S.C. §§ 40911(c)(2), 40913(c); see also Randolph, 2014 WL 1875826, at *3

(noting Congress passed amendment that allows states to establish their own

programs to provide relief from firearm disabilities).

–16–
4. Texas State Law for Relief from Federal Firearms Disability

Texas has further adopted a state program to provide relief from federal

firearms disabilities. The program Texas adopted appears in § 574.088 of the

TMHC. Randolph, 2014 WL 1875826, at *3. That section provides as follows:

(a) A person who is furloughed or discharged from court-ordered
mental health services may petition the court that entered the
commitment order for an order stating that the person qualifies for
relief from a firearms disability.

(b) In determining whether to grant relief, the court must hear and
consider evidence about:
(1) the circumstances that led to imposition of the firearms
disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4);
(2) the person’s mental history;
(3) the person’s criminal history; and

(4) the person’s reputation.

(c) A court may not grant relief unless it makes and enters in the
record the following affirmative findings:
(1) the person is no longer likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety; and

(2) removing the person’s disability to purchase a firearm is in
the public interest.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088.

C. J.M.P. Jr. Conclusively Established All Vital Facts in Support of His Petition

J.M.P. Jr. argues that the trial court abused its discretion because (1) under a

legal sufficiency standard of review, the undisputed evidence establishes, as a matter

of law, all vital facts in support of his petition, and alternatively (2) under a factual

–17–
sufficiency standard, the trial court’s adverse finding is against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence. Here, J.M.P. Jr. had the burden of proof on his

petition to remove his firearms disability and restore his right to purchase and

possess firearms.

1. Lack of Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Findings

We begin with J.M.P. Jr.’s legal sufficiency challenge by examining the record

for evidence that supports the trial court’s implied findings, while ignoring all

evidence to the contrary. See Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241.

In adjudicating a petition under § 574.088 of the TMHC, the trial court must

hear and consider the evidence described by (b)(1)–(4). HEALTH &

SAFETY § 574.088. Then, to grant relief under the statute, the trial court must make

two statutory findings: (c)(1) the person is no longer likely to act in a manner

dangerous to public safety; and (c)(2) removing the person’s disability to purchase

a firearm is in the public interest. Id. In denying J.M.P. Jr.’s petition, the trial court

did not make any findings relating to the evidence presented pursuant to (b)(1)–(4)

and did not find that J.M.P. Jr. is likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety,

but it expressly found that “[J.M.P. Jr.’s] Petition should be denied as removal of the

firearms disability is not in the public interest.”

During the trial, the State offered no evidence and called no witnesses. The

State did request, and the trial court agreed to take, judicial notice of the documents

associated with the 1992 involuntary commitment, including the application form

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filled out by J.M.P. Sr. and the certificates of mental health examination.9 A court

may take judicial notice that pleadings have been filed. See Gruber v. CACV of

Colo., LLC, No. 05-07-00379-CV, 2008 WL 867459, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr.

2, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). But the trial court may not take judicial notice of the

truth of factual statements and allegations contained in the pleadings, affidavits, or

other documents in the file, nor may it take the pleadings to be true, absent testimony,

other proof, or admissions by the other party. See O’Donnell v. Vargo, No. 05-14-

00404-CV, 2015 WL 4722459, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Gruber, 2008 WL 867459, at *2. The court taking judicial notice of the

contents of its file does not elevate those averments into proof. See Gruber, 2008

WL 867459, at *2 (citing two cases which held that judicial notice of pleadings was

legally insufficient evidence to support an element of a claim). Generally, pleadings

and affidavits filed with the court cannot be considered as evidence unless they are

admitted into evidence. Tex. Health Res. v. Pham, No. 05-15-01283-CV, 2016 WL

4205732, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). And

documents attached to pleadings are not evidence. Gruber, 2008 WL 867459, at *2.

9
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 201, if a fact is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is
generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction, or (2) can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, then a court may take judicial
notice of it. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b).
–19–
On appeal, the State “does not dispute much of the evidence submitted by

[J.M.P. Jr.] concerning what occurred in his life after the civil commitment” and

agrees that the following specific facts are not in dispute:

 J.M.P. Sr. applied to have his son involuntarily committed for
treatment of mental illness when J.M.P. Jr. was seventeen years of
age.

 On August 20, 1992, J.M.P. Jr. was civilly, involuntarily committed
for a period not to exceed 90 days.

 J.M.P. Jr was unable to purchase a rifle because of a firearms
disability due to his involuntary commitment in 1992 for mental
illness.

 On March 31, 2022, J.M.P. Jr filed a petition pursuant to § 574.088
of the TMHC seeking to have his firearms disability removed.

 On June 16, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on J.M.P. Jr.’s
petition for relief from his firearms disability and signed an order
denying the petition on the same day.

 There was no evidence of J.M.P. Jr. receiving any mental illness
treatment subsequent to his release from his involuntary
commitment in 1992.

 There was no evidence that J.M.P. Jr. has a criminal history.

 The only reputation evidence admitted during the hearing were the
two character letters offered by J.M.P. Jr.

The State has expressly conceded a lack of controverting evidence against J.M.P. Jr.

with respect to § 574.088(b)(2)–(4) of the TMHC. The record further contains no

evidence to support the trial court’s express finding that removing J.M.P. Jr.’s

disability to purchase a firearm is not in the public interest. See HEALTH & SAFETY

§ 574.088(c)(2).

–20–
2. Review of Entire Record to Determine if Contrary Proposition Was
Established as a Matter of Law

Next, because there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding, we

examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a

matter of law. See Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241. In determining whether to grant

J.M.P. Jr. relief, the trial court was required to hear and consider evidence about the

following:

(1) the circumstances that led to the imposition of J.M.P. Jr.’s firearms
disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4);
(2) J.M.P. Jr.’s mental history;
(3) J.M.P. Jr.’s criminal history; and
(4) J.M.P. Jr.’s reputation.

See HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b).

First, we review the evidence regarding the circumstances that led to the

imposition of J.M.P. Jr.’s firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). See

HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(1). The evidence established that the initial, limited

commitment when J.M.P. Jr. was a teenager resulted from a behavioral aberration.

The 1992 trial court found that J.M.P. Jr. was mentally ill and likely to cause harm

to himself but not to others and, if not treated, he would continue to suffer and

experience deterioration of his ability to function independently. J.M.P. Jr. testified

that he did not recall being prescribed any medication for a mental-health condition

–21–
while he was involuntarily committed.10 J.M.P. Sr. testified that neither he nor

anyone at the hospital had observed anything to suggest his son had violent

tendencies. Rather, according to J.M.P. Sr., the allegation in his 1992 application

that J.M.P. Jr. was likely to harm himself or others was simply part of the form’s

preprinted, boilerplate language, and he had signed it only in order to force his son

to undergo an evaluation. J.M.P Sr. was cross-examined by the State about some of

the statements made in the two examining physicians’ reports from 1992, the

accuracy of which J.M.P. Sr. disputed. One of the examining physicians had

reported that J.M.P. Jr. had hit his siblings when he was angry, but the report also

stated he was not likely to harm others, and J.M.P. Sr. testified that he has never seen

J.M.P. Jr. hit anyone in anger or abuse his siblings. While both of the 1992

examining physicians reported that J.M.P. Jr. was continuing to deteriorate despite

intensive outpatient therapy, J.M.P. Sr. testified that he had no recollection of

J.M.P. Jr. ever receiving intensive outpatient treatment.

Second, we review the evidence related to J.M.P. Jr.’s mental history. See

HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(2). The evidence admitted showed that during the

thirty years following his involuntary commitment, J.M.P. Jr. has not been treated

for mental health issues. J.M.P. Jr. testified that it was not recommended he continue

nor did he receive mental health treatment or medication for a mental health

10
Nothing in the record controverted this testimony, even including the older commitment records that
were judicially noticed but not admitted into evidence.
–22–
condition after he was discharged. And nothing in the record indicates further

treatment was recommended. See, e.g., HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.081. J.M.P. Sr.

stated that his son did not receive any mental health treatment after he was

discharged. J.M.P. Sr. also testified that he had no concern that J.M.P. Jr. posed a

danger to anyone due to his decades-long track record of safety and stability.

Further, the licensed professional counselor who evaluated J.M.P. Jr. testified

that she concluded there were no indications of mental instability, nor were there any

mental health concerns reported or identified that should prevent J.M.P. Jr. from

owning a firearm.11 J.M.P. Jr. told the licensed professional counselor that, to his

knowledge, he was not diagnosed with or prescribed medication for a mental health

concern when he was temporarily committed as a teenager. Since that time, he has

not been diagnosed or treated for any type of mental health issues or prescribed any

medication for any mental health concerns. The licensed professional counselor

described J.M.P. Jr. as “high functioning and accomplished.” She stated there are no

indications of addictive behaviors, he has no learning differences, and he is not

experiencing extraordinary stress or crisis; there are no physical health issues that

might affect his mental health.

11
Although the State did not object to the licensed professional counselor’s testimony or the admission
of her report into evidence, the trial judge sua sponte concluded that “[the licensed professional counselor]
was not qualified as an expert in evaluations for psychiatric purposes, and the Best Evidence Rule requires
us to look at the whole circumstance surrounding this.” As a result, the trial judge stated that she was
looking at only what J.M.P. Sr. attested to and what the physicians wrote in their reports in 1992.
–23–
In addition, the State did not dispute at trial that that there was no continuing

care plan and that J.M.P. Jr. had not had any mental health treatment in the thirty

years since his temporary, involuntary commitment in 1992. And, on appeal, the

State concedes there was no evidence of J.M.P. Jr. receiving any mental health

treatment after his release from his involuntary commitment in 1992.

Third, we consider the evidence related to J.M.P. Jr.’s criminal history. See

HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(3). During the hearing, the assistant district

attorney acknowledged that he had “reviewed a clear report from [J.M.P. Jr.]’s

attorney that shows [he] did not have any arrests or criminal history” and J.M.P. Jr.

confirmed that was correct. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge also

noted that the State had agreed that J.M.P. Jr. did not have a criminal history. And,

on appeal, the State again concedes there was no evidence that J.M.P. Jr. has a

criminal history.

Fourth, we analyze the evidence concerning J.M.P. Jr.’s reputation. See

HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(4). J.M.P. Sr. described J.M.P. Jr. as “a great model

for his kids,” “active in everything,” “a successful businessman,” a “wonderful

individual,” and “a safe person who cares about people.” Ultimately, J.M.P. Sr.

stated that he trusted his son with his life and believed J.M.P. Jr. to be “the safest

person that I have ever seen with a firearm.”

–24–
J.M.P. Jr. testified about his life in the decades following the temporary,

involuntary commitment, including that he had finished college, had a productive

career, was married with children, and active in his church and the community.

The trial court also admitted two letters attesting to J.M.P. Jr.’s good

reputation. One letter was authored by a close friend who had known J.M.P. Jr. since

elementary school. The letter noted J.M.P. Jr.’s involvement in church and multiple

local charities, and described him as a loving husband and father, a successful

businessman, and an upstanding member of the community. The second letter

described J.M.P. Jr. as a friend who had become like a member of the author’s

extended family to whom he had entrusted the care of his children, and he praised

J.M.P. Jr.’s positive attitude and his “solid character.” On appeal, the State concedes

this was the only reputation evidence admitted at trial. The State did not controvert

J.M.P. Jr.’s reputation evidence.

3. Trial Court’s Credibility Determinations

The State argues that the trial court impliedly found the witnesses and

documentary evidence were not credible and argues that there were many

inconsistencies and credibility issues with the witnesses and evidence submitted by

J.M.P. Jr. With respect to the credibility of J.M.P. Jr. and his witnesses, the State

maintains the following contradictions create credibility issues:

 Although J.M.P. Sr. had been an OB/GYN for fifteen years at the
time of his application to involuntarily commit J.M.P. Jr., he
claimed that he had no training in evaluating a person’s mental
state.
–25–
 Although J.M.P. Sr. swore under oath in 1992 that J.M.P. Jr. was
mentally ill and likely to cause serious harm to himself,
J.M.P. Sr. testified that friends suggested he have J.M.P. Jr.
evaluated, he had no concern J.M.P. Jr. would harm himself or
others, he never saw any evidence that J.M.P. Jr. was violent
toward anyone, and his main concern was to determine if
J.M.P. Jr. was depressed.12

Both of these “contradictions” relate to § 574.088(b)(1) of the TMHC, the

circumstances that led to the involuntary commitment. If there are conflicts in the

testimony, we must presume the fact-finder resolved them in favor of the ruling if

reasonable human beings could do so. See Jackson, 221 S.W.3d at 653. However,

these alleged contradictions identified by the State do not affect the result. Whether

or not an OB/GYN in 1992 was trained in evaluating a person’s mental state is not

relevant or dispositive to the trial court’s statutory findings under § 574.088. Also,

even if his father filed a boilerplate petition that alleged that J.M.P. Jr. was likely to

harm himself or others, the 1992 trial court did not find that J.M.P. Jr. was a danger

to others. Resolving these conflicts in favor of the judgment—that J.M.P. Jr. did

meet the criteria for commitment in 1992—does not resolve the issue to be

determined under § 574.088 of the TMHC: whether any such past concerns have

been alleviated. Ultimately, the purpose of the firearm disability relief program is to

evaluate whether the past concerns that led to an involuntary commitment are

currently present.

12
The State also points to other documents associated with the 1992 involuntary commitment, but we
have already determined that the factual statements in those documents do not constitute evidence in this
case.
–26–
The record contains uncontroverted evidence concerning J.M.P. Jr.’s good

mental health following his involuntary commitment as a minor, his lack of a

criminal history, and his good reputation. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(2)–

(4). Further, the State concedes that there was no evidence of J.M.P. Jr. requiring

any mental-health treatment after his involuntary commitment in 1992, that there

was no evidence that J.M.P. Jr. has a criminal history, and that the only reputation

evidence was J.M.P. Jr.’s. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b)(2)–(4).

A fact-finder’s decisions regarding credibility must be reasonable. City of

Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820. A fact-finder cannot ignore undisputed testimony that is

clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free from contradictions and

inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted. Id. Based on the record

in this case, we cannot ignore the lack of evidence supporting any implied credibility

findings and the conclusive evidence that rebuts those findings.

4. Removing J.M.P. Jr.’s Firearms Disability Is in the Public Interest

The State maintains that J.M.P. Jr. was required to prove both that (1) he was

no longer likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and (2) that removing

his disability to purchase a firearm is in the public interest. See HEALTH & SAFETY

§ 574.088(c). The State contends that J.M.P Jr. admitted evidence only of his

personal reasons for wanting his firearms disability removed—that he hunts and

wants to teach his son to hunt—which do not address the public interest.

–27–
Before the trial court could grant J.M.P. Jr.’s petition, the trial court was

required to find (1) J.M.P. Jr. is no longer likely to act in a manner dangerous to

public safety, and (2) removing J.M.P. Jr.’s disability to purchase a firearm is in the

public interest. See id. In determining whether to make those findings and grant

J.M.P. Jr. relief, the trial court was required to hear and consider the following four

categories of evidence:

(1) the circumstances that led to imposition of J.M.P. Jr.’s firearms
disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4);
(2) J.M.P. Jr.’s mental history;

(3) J.M.P. Jr.’s criminal history; and
(4) J.M.P. Jr.’s reputation.

See HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(b). The statute requires the trial court to consider

those four categories in determining whether to find that a petitioner is dangerous

and whether to find that relief from the disability is in the public interest. For

example, if a petitioner were impaired by ongoing mental illness or had a dangerous

criminal history, then evidence under (b)(2) or (b)(3) would support a finding that

removal of the firearms disability would not be in the public interest. Even if a

petitioner had problematic behavior that had not risen to the level of an adjudication,

such evidence under (b)(4) could support a finding that removal of the disability

would not be in the public interest.

However, as previously outlined in this opinion, J.M.P. Jr. presented positive

evidence related to each of these four statutory factors, which was uncontroverted

–28–
by the State. The State admitted no evidence relating to any of the four statutory

factors that would contradict a finding that removing the disability is in the public

interest. If the trial court’s decisions were founded in the law, rather than the

personal opinions of the judicial officer, the trial court could reasonably reach only

one decision.

Further, the public policy underlying the TMHC is “to provide to each person

having severe mental illness access to humane care and treatment.” HEALTH &

SAFETY § 571.002. We must be mindful that, as a matter of public policy and safety,

we do not want to discourage parents from seeking mental health care for their minor

children by overreading statutes to create permanent, life-long disabilities that

cannot be removed. In a situation, like here, where:

 a father sought to have his minor son’s mental health evaluated,

 his minor son was involuntarily committed but then discharged
without the need for medication or further treatment, and then,

 thirty years later, despite a clean bill of health and being an
upstanding and productive member of society, his adult son finds
himself unable to exercise his constitutional liberty to possess a
firearm,

these long-term consequences could cause other parents to hesitate or refrain from

seeking help for their minor children. Rather, as a matter of public interest, public

policy should encourage parents to err on the side of caution and seek mental health

evaluation and treatment for their children when they have concerns.

–29–
It was undisputed that J.M.P. Jr. had owned firearms virtually his whole life

and he had not had any mental health treatment or trouble with the law in the thirty

years since his temporary, involuntary commitment in 1992. And, again, the licensed

professional counselor stated that after evaluating J.M.P. Jr., she found no cause for

concern with the prospect of his firearm rights being restored. She testified that he

presented as high-functioning with no traces of depression or deception and he had

a record of safety and stability without any red flags over the last thirty years. The

licensed professional counselor’s written evaluation reiterating her belief that

J.M.P. Jr. posed no danger was admitted into evidence. There has never been a

finding that J.M.P. Jr. has been a danger to others, meaning the public.13 There is no

evidence from which the trial court could conclude that granting J.M.P. Jr.’s petition

would be anything other than in the public interest.

5. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion and the Evidence Was Legally
Sufficient

Accordingly, we conclude that J.M.P. Jr. conclusively established, as a matter

of law, all vital facts in support of his petition. As a result, the trial court abused its

discretion because it failed to correctly analyze and apply the law and, based on the

conclusive evidence, it could have reached only one decision but failed to do so.

13
Although not in evidence, even if we were to consider the judicially-noticed medical reports and
other documents related to J.M.P. Jr.’s 1992 involuntary commitment, we note that those documents stated
that J.M.P. Jr. was not a danger to others.
–30–
There has never been any evidence or finding that J.M.P. Jr. was likely to act

in a manner dangerous to public safety; rather, the original 1992 order contains a

findings that J.M.P. Jr. was not a danger to others. There was no evidence that

removing J.M.P. Jr.’s disability to purchase a firearm was not in the public interest,

and there was uncontroverted positive evidence of each factor listed in the statute

showing that removing his disability would be in the public interest. Based on the

evidence admitted at trial, the trial court could reasonably only reach one decision

in making the findings described by § 574.088(c) of the TMHC and granting relief

under the statute, and it failed to do so.

The first part of issue one is decided in favor of J.M.P. Jr. Based on our

resolution of this issue, we need not address the second part of issue one or issue

two.

III. Conclusion
The trial court acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, and it abused its discretion

when it denied J.M.P. Jr.’s petition to remove his firearms disability. We conclude

the evidence conclusively established that J.M.P. Jr. is not likely to act in a manner

dangerous to public safety and that removing J.M.P. Jr.’s disability to purchase a

firearm is in the public interest. We reverse the trial court’s order and render an

order that:

(1) states that, under HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(a), J.M.P. Jr.
qualifies for relief from a firearms disability;

–31–
(2) declares that J.M.P. Jr. is not a prohibited person under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); and

(3) restores J.M.P. Jr.’s right to ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms and ammunition.

/Emily A. Miskel/
220878f.p05 EMILY A. MISKEL
Miskel, J., concurring JUSTICE
Partida-Kipness, J., dissenting

–32–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the Probate Court
FOR THE BEST INTERESTAND No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
PROTECTION OF J.M.P. JR., Trial Court Cause No. MI-92-1623.
Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
No. 05-22-00878-CV Justices Partida-Kipness and Reichek
participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that:

(1) states that, under HEALTH & SAFETY § 574.088(a), J.M.P. Jr.
qualifies for relief from a firearms disability;
(2) declares that J.M.P. Jr. is not a prohibited person under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); and
(3) restores J.M.P. Jr.’s right to ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms and ammunition.

It is ORDERED that appellant J.M.P. JR. recover his costs of this appeal from
appellee THE STATE OF TEXAS.

Judgment entered this 19th day of March, 2024.

–33–