Ronald Brooks Johnson and Debbie Lynn Johnson v. A-Anderson Air, Inc.

CourtListener 10349785Txctapp6Feb 26, 2025

Full text

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00088-CV

RONALD BROOKS JOHNSON AND DEBBIE LYNN JOHNSON, Appellants

V.

A-ANDERSON AIR, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 415th District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV23-0182

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Ronald Brooks Johnson and Debbie Lynn Johnson, appeal from the granting

of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, A-Anderson Air, Inc. In two issues, the Johnsons

assert that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment

because the Appellee failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed and

(2) “awarding damages in the amount of $92,087.48 and attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$24,563.08.”1

We find that there remain issues of material fact and reverse the judgment of the trial

court.

I. Background

The Johnsons own a home in Azle, Texas. According to Appellee’s petition, in 2018,

lightning struck the Johnsons’ property, causing damage to the property. The Johnsons hired

Appellee to perform repair work on their property, including repairing electrical wiring, devices,

fixtures, and built-in equipment damaged by the lightning strike. The parties agree that, during

the course of work, the Johnsons paid Appellee $23,228.80. Appellee sent an invoice dated

December 18, 2019, to the Johnsons seeking payment of $96,912.31. Appellee stated in its

petition that it credited the Johnsons $4,824.83 for outstanding work, leaving a balance of

$92,087.48. The Johnsons did not pay the outstanding balance.

1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
Appellee filed suit for breach of contract, violation of the prompt payment act, quantum meruit,

money had and received, and promissory estoppel. The Johnsons filed a general denial of the

allegations and asserted the following affirmative defenses: (1) that “a condition precedent ha[d]

either failed to occur or to be performed,” (2) that “the alleged contract failed to satisfy the

statute of frauds,” (3) that “the alleged contract was indefinite and unenforceable,” and (4) that

“the alleged contract lack[ed] adequate consideration.”

After conducting discovery, Appellee moved for summary judgment, asserting that no

genuine issue of material fact existed as to the breach of contract claim and seeking “$92,087.48,

plus pre- and post-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees and costs.” To its motion for summary

judgment, Appellee attached the affidavit of Jack Wallace, director of A-Anderson Air, Inc., the

unpaid invoice, the affidavit of attorney Alexander Iorio, Appellee’s pre-suit demand for

payment and notice of lien filing dated May 19, 2020, Appellee’s original petition, the Johnsons’

original answer, Appellee’s attorney fees statement, and Appellee’s proposed order granting its

motion for summary judgment. The trial court set the summary judgment motion for hearing.

The Johnsons then filed their response to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment,

arguing that Appellee’s evidence was insufficient to support summary judgment. The Johnsons

responded that there was no valid contract between the parties for the electrical work to be

performed. The Johnsons attached a “true and correct copy of the Parker County Appraisal

Report,” text exchanges between Debbie Johnson and a subcontractor for A-Anderson Air, a list

of “items that [had] not been completed,” totaling $16,309.98, and the affidavits of the Johnsons.

3
Appellee objected to the evidence offered by the Johnsons in their response. After a

hearing on Appellee’s motion for summary judgment,2 the trial court granted Appellee’s motion

and awarded damages in the amount of $92,087.48, attorney fees and costs in the amount of

$24,563.08, and pre- and post-judgment costs and interest. The Johnsons subsequently filed a

motion for new trial, which was denied. This appeal ensued.

II. Briefing

As an initial matter, we first address Appellee’s argument that the appeal should be

dismissed because of inadequate briefing and a disregard for the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Appellee complains of incorrect or improper assertions and statements of fact not

supported by the record or cited by reference in the Johnsons’ appellate brief. Appellee also

states that, in their brief, the Johnsons rely on information or evidence that was not presented

until after the summary judgment motion was granted and, thus, cannot be considered by this

Court. Furthermore, Appellee contends that this Court should dismiss the appeal because the

Johnsons disregarded a letter notice from this Court giving the Johnsons ten days to correct a

deficiency in their appellate brief, specifically that the Johnsons’ brief did not contain an

appendix pursuant to Rule 38.1(k) of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(k).

While the Johnsons’ brief did not contain an appendix, the record is small, and we

decline to dismiss this appeal pursuant to Rule 42.3(c) of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure.

2
The Johnsons did not request a copy of the reporter’s record to be included in the appellate record. Appellee
informs us that there is no record of that proceeding. Further, the official court reporter for the 415th Judicial
District Court informed us that no record was made of the June 21, 2024, proceeding.
4
See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). However, we will not consider information or evidence that was not

presented until after the summary judgment motion was granted in our review of the trial court’s

decision.

III. Summary Judgment

“We review the trial court’s [granting of] summary judgment de novo” to determine

whether the movant established its right to judgment as a matter of law. Provident Life &

Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We apply the well-established

standard for reviewing traditional summary judgments. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sysco Food

Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing the summary judgment

record, “we indulge every reasonable inference” in favor of the nonmovant, resolving all doubts

in their favor, and “take as true all evidence” in the nonmovant’s favor. Provident Life, 128

S.W.3d at 215. The movant has the burden of establishing no genuine issues of material fact

exist and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

To obtain summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, Appellee needed to

conclusively establish the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid contract,

(2) performance or tendered performance by Appellee, (3) breach of the contract by the

Johnsons, and (4) damages resulting from the breach. See Pena v. Smith, 321 S.W.3d 755, 759

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing Cradle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied)).

5
A. Existence of a Valid Contract

A threshold issue in this summary judgment is whether Appellee demonstrated the

existence of a contract associated with its alleged damages. The Johnsons argue, “It is true that

the evidence shows that A-Anderson Air and the Johnsons entered into a contract for [Appellee]

to perform restoration work. But there is zero evidence that the contract was for the total

amount of $120,141.11.” The Johnsons claim that the only contracted-for services resulted in an

invoice for $5,227.00. An invoice in that amount appears in the record and is attached to

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment as an exhibit. That invoice purports to be for

installation of a new air conditioning unit and associated materials and services. That invoice

shows “Paid,” with a remaining balance of zero. That comports with the Johnsons’ response to

the motion for summary judgment, where they acknowledged the contract for replacement of an

air conditioner and associated electrical work. Referring to the charges that are the subject of the

summary judgment motion, the Johnsons then contended, “There is not a valid contract on the

homestead property and the invoice is erroneous,” and “there is not a valid contract.” Again,

referring to the invoice, the Johnsons argued, “This invoice does not discuss the rest of the

electrical in the home and is not a contract for that work.”

Appellee asserts that the trial court did not err in finding that a valid and enforceable

contract existed to support its claim for damages because it presented the affidavit of Wallace in

addition to an invoice detailing a remaining balance owed on the work performed. The affidavit

indicates that the Johnsons entered into a contract with Appellee to “replace and/or repair

damaged electrical wiring, devices, fixtures, [and] built in equipment . . . after the [p]roperty was

6
struck by lightning.” According to Wallace, the Johnsons retained A-Anderson, Inc., to restore

the Johnsons’ property “after it suffered a casualty loss in exchange for payment” that totaled

$120,141.11. Wallace further averred that, after payments and offsets, the Johnsons had an

“outstanding balance of $92,087.48.” Wallace attached the invoice to his affidavit, which

purported to document the work that had been performed and the price for labor and parts. But

there is nothing in the affidavit or invoice evidencing the parties’ agreement on the scope of or

price for the work done. See Parillo v. Kofahl Sheet Metal Works, Inc., No. 05-15-01037-CV,

2016 WL 3547965, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The invoice

provides an “OVERVIEW” of the completed work and even details numerous “complications”

that Appellee “overc[a]me” with “extensive materials and labor.” Even so, nowhere in the

invoice is there an indication that the Johnsons were privy to the complications, reached an

agreement, approved the scope of work, agreed to the terms of the invoice or charges, etc.

The Johnsons, in their brief on appeal and in their response to Appellee’s motion for

summary judgment, assert that they did not agree to the contract price as set forth in Wallace’s

affidavit, but instead assert that they verbally agreed to a price of “up to but no more than

$40,000.” The Johnsons further asserted that Appellee did not complete all of the work that was

billed in the invoice, and in support thereof, the Johnsons attached a “Painting estimate and

Expert Analysis of work to still be completed” to their response. The Johnsons argue that

“[t]here is at least $16,309.98 in work still to be done to complete the job that was supposed to

be completed by [Appellee].” We need not consider this evidence to resolve the Johnsons’ first

issue.

7
Appellee asserts that the Johnsons concede that a contract existed between the parties;

however, while the Johnsons do not dispute that they retained Appellee to complete work on

their property, there is a dispute as to the agreed upon, if any, scope of the work and price to be

paid for the work.

Under Texas law, the requirements of a valid contract are: (1) an offer; (2) an
acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the
minds; (4) each party’s consent to the terms; and (5) execution and delivery of the
contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding.

Hubbard v. Shankle, 138 S.W.3d 474, 481 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (citing

Labor Ready Cent. III, L.P. v. Gonzalez, 64 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2001, no pet.)). Thus, on this record, the evidence is insufficient to show the terms of

the offer, a meeting of the minds, or each party’s consent to the terms of the contract. See

Parillo, 2016 WL 3547965, at *2.

Because Appellee’s summary judgment evidence was insufficient to establish the

existence of a contract between the Johnsons and Appellee related to the claim for damages, a

necessary element of its breach of contract claim, the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s

summary judgment motion. See id.3

We sustain the Johnsons’ first issue.

3
The Johnsons present in their brief a second issue challenging the damages award; however, the Johnsons do not
present any argument for this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Even if the Johnsons had presented an argument as to
the damages awarded, having sustained the Johnsons’ first issue on appeal, which is dispositive, we need not reach
this issue. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
8
IV. Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: February 18, 2025
Date Decided: February 26, 2025

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