Troy Myers v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00184-CR

TROY MYERS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-2020-05635-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Troy Myers pled nolo contendre to interference with an emergency request for assistance,

a Class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.062(c). The trial court sentenced

Myers to 300 days’ confinement for each offense but suspended his sentence in favor of placing

him on community supervision for seventeen months. The State alleged that Myers violated the

terms and conditions of his community supervision by failing his drug test on several occasions,

among other things, and moved to revoke Myers’s community supervision. After a hearing in

which Myers pled true to the majority of the State’s allegations, the trial court revoked Myers’s

community supervision, sentenced him to 210 days’ confinement in the Denton County Jail, and

ordered him to pay $67.00 in restitution and $175.00 for “old atty fees.”1

On appeal, Myers’s appellate counsel filed a brief stating that she thoroughly reviewed

the record and found no nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal.2 The brief sets out

the procedural history of the case and summarizes the evidence elicited during the course of the

trial court proceedings. Since counsel provided a professional evaluation of the record

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the

requirements of Anders v. California. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State,

813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex.

1
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court
docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of
the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.
2
In our cause number 06-24-00183-CR, Myers appeals from his conviction for family violence assault causing
bodily injury.
2
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw

as counsel in this appeal.

On January 14, 2025, counsel mailed to Myers copies of the brief, the motion to

withdraw, and the appellate record. Myers was informed of his rights to review the record and

file a pro se response. By letter dated January 14, we informed Myers that his pro se response

was due on or before February 14. On February 26, this Court further informed Myers that the

case would be set for submission on the briefs on March 19. We received neither a pro se

response from Myers nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a

response.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and have independently determined that no

reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

However, consistent with the manner in which our sister court reviews Anders cases, non-

reversible error is found in the trial court’s order to pay attorney fees.

“A defendant who is determined by the [trial] court to be indigent is presumed to remain

indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the

defendant’s financial circumstances occurs.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p)

(Supp.). Here, the record demonstrates that Myers was and has remained indigent. As a result,

no attorney fees were assessed against him when he was placed on community supervision, and

there was no term or condition of his community supervision requiring him to pay attorney fees.

Even so, the trial court assessed $175.00 for “old atty fees.”

3
In Anders cases, appellate courts have the authority to modify judgments and affirm as

modified in cases where there is nonreversible error. See Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 730

(Tex. App—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (en banc). We have determined that the attorney fees

reflected in the judgment and corresponding bill of costs are unauthorized. As a result, we

modify the judgment and bill of costs by striking the $175.00 in attorney fees.

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.3

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: March 19, 2025
Date Decided: April 9, 2025

Do Not Publish

3
Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s
request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute
counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se
petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from
either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court,
see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P.
68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX.
R. APP. P. 68.4.
4