In the Interest of C.C., a Child v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00004-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 6th District Court
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 92377

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Rambin
OPINION

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child, C.C.,1

who was nine years old when the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed

him from the home.2 The trial court found that the Department had proved four statutory

grounds that authorize termination of parental rights: ground D (endangering conditions or

surroundings), ground E (endangering conduct), ground I (disobeying order facilitating

investigation of abuse or neglect), and ground P (endangering use of controlled substance). See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (I), (P) (Supp.). The trial court also found that

termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(2) (Supp.).

Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support both

(1) termination under grounds D, E, and I and (2) the trial court’s finding that termination of

parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother does not challenge the trial court’s finding

under ground P.

On accelerated review,3 we find that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported

the trial court’s termination under grounds D and E, as well as the trial court’s best-interest

finding. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.

1
We use initials, pseudonyms, or descriptive terms such as Mother to protect the identity of the child. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8(b).
2
C.C.’s father is deceased.
3
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4; TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a); In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d
504, 512 (Tex. 2020) (“As we have long acknowledged, children’s lives cannot be ‘kept in limbo while judicial
2
I. Standard of Review

We begin with the statutory burden of proof in the trial court because “the burden of

proof at trial necessarily affects appellate review of the evidence.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

(Tex. 2002).

A. The Clear and Convincing Burden of Proof in Termination Cases

In the trial court, the party seeking termination of parental rights bears a clear and

convincing burden of proof. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (Supp.). “[C]lear and

convincing evidence . . . ‘will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d 370, 379

(Tex. 2023) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007). Here, the party seeking termination is

the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. In the trial court, the Department bore

the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence a statutory basis for termination.4 The

Department also bore the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination was

in the best interest of the child.5 The “factfinder,” in this instance the trial court, was tasked with

assessing whether the Department had carried its burdens: “[t]o terminate parental rights, the

factfinder must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one of the termination

grounds set forth in Section 161.001(b)(1) or other sections of the Texas Family Code applies,

processes crawl forward[.]’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003) (“In
termination cases, judicial economy is not just a policy—it is a statutory mandate.”))).
4
“To terminate parental rights, the Legislature requires the Department to establish by clear and convincing evidence
at least one of the predicate findings under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1).” In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 377;
see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.003(a)(1)–(4).
5
“[R]egardless of which predicate it asserts to justify termination, the Department must also prove by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 377; see also TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.003(a)(5).
3
and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex.

2024) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

B. “[W]ith a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake”

On appellate review, we are tasked with “undertak[ing] ‘an exacting review of the entire

record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d

498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26). Therefore, we examine the

constitutional foundation of the clear and convincing burden.

The clear and convincing burden of proof in termination cases has a foundation deeper

than statutory law—a constitutional foundation. In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020)

(per curiam).6 The statutory clear and convincing burden of proof in termination of parental

rights cases was created in 1983,7 after the Texas Supreme Court, in 1980,8 and the United States

Supreme Court, in 1982,9 held that the clear and convincing burden of proof is constitutionally

required in termination cases. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Consequently, the

6
“In parental termination cases, due process mandates a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.” In re
N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). “A parent’s ‘right to the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right.’” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d
624, 629–30 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982)). “[F]reedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 284 (Tex. 2024) (Blacklock, J., dissenting)
(citing In re A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25, 25 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J., concurring in denial)) (“Parents and their children
are ‘bound together by natural ties deeper and stronger than any law.’” (quoting In re A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25, 25 (Tex.
2019) (Blacklock, J., concurring in denial))); see also In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 302 (Tex. 2021) (Guzman, J.,
concurring, joined by Busby, J.) (“The parent-child relationship is so important and so precious that the highest
constitutional protection is afforded to the family decision-making process.”).
7
See Act of May 26, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 298, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1554, 1555 (former TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 11.15), recodified by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 161.001, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113,
212 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)).
8
See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).
9
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
4
“heightened standard of [appellate] review is mandated not only by the Family Code . . . but also

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545

(quoting In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012)).

1. The Constitutional Rights of Parents

Roughly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court described the parent-child

relationship as a fundamental liberty interest with a foundation deeper and older than the

Constitution. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (including, for Fourteenth

Amendment “liberty” purposes, the right to “bring up children,” among “those privileges long

recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”).10

The late Justice Scalia traced the rights of parents to the deepest of sources: “In my view,

a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with

which the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men . . . are endowed by their Creator.’”

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (plurality op.).

10
Long “recognized at common law” is a way of saying that the right was already recognized before the drafting of
the Constitution:

The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common
law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The
statemen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Convention of
the Thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and
thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent
and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them,
but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily
understood.

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09, 111 (1925) (orig. proceeding); see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children.”).
5
But Troxel brings us to a debate among constitutional scholars. There is no provision in

the Constitution that says, in so many words, “The rights of parents are as follows . . . .” See id.

at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“a Constitution that does not even mention them”).11 As a result,

prior to Troxel, “[t]he integrity of the family unit . . . found protection in the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

. . . and the Ninth Amendment.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).

In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court generally agreed that parents have constitutional

rights but differed on precisely where and how those rights are protected in and by the

Constitution. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 75 (Souter, J., concurring), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring), 81

(Stevens, J., dissenting), 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 94 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).

The Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is a debate about the source of

the parental rights but has held that the existence of those rights is beyond debate. Stary v.

Ethridge, 712 S.W.3d 584, 588 n.6 (Tex. 2025) (“Debates regarding the precise textual sources

of that well-recognized right are not at issue here.” (emphasis added)).

One thing is certain, the right of parents to raise their children is “fundamental”:

A majority of the Troxel Court found protection for this fundamental right—
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court”—within the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties in this case do not
disavow that protection. And the justices in Troxel who might not root this right
in substantive-due-process jurisprudence nevertheless similarly recognized a
“fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.”

11
Justice Scalia would have used the Ninth Amendment as a bar to federal intrusion into this sphere and would have
entrusted the states to protect the rights of parents. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91–92; see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This area [of family law] has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not
without good reason.”).
6
In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (footnote omitted) (quoting

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 80).

Consequently, we are guided by the Texas Supreme Court’s summary of the parental

rights holdings of the United States Supreme Court:

The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Constitution “protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.” [(quoting Troxel, 500 U.S. at 66).] This recognition
stems from “a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children.” [(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).] The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence rejects “any notion that a child is ‘the mere
creature of the State,’” but instead holds “that parents generally ‘have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for
additional obligations.’” [(quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).] Accordingly, “the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.” [(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).]

In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 811–12 (third alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).12

Expressed succinctly, “[i]n the termination context, the United States Supreme Court has

described a parent’s private interest as a ‘commanding’ one because the government seeks to end

her exercise of a fundamental right.” Stary, 712 S.W.3d at 592 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

at 273 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759)).

Further, parents have rights under the “due course of the law” provision of the Texas

Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235 (“A parent may be denied

the fundamental liberty interest in parenting only after they have been provided due process and

due course of law . . . .”). “[W]hen the State seeks a parental termination order or other action

12
In re C.J.C. was not a termination case but instead dealt with a motion to modify custody brought by a
grandparent. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 820. Nonetheless, an examination of the constitutional rights of a fit
parent was necessary to the resolution of the case. Id. (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
7
that ‘permanently sunders those ties,’ those proceedings should be ‘strictly scrutinized.’” State v.

Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 228 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.

1976)).

2. Constitutional Balancing

As set forth above, In re C.J.C. held that the constitutional rights of parents to bring up

their children is “coupled with [a] high duty” from parent to child. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at

811–12. “While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it

is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child

relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed

merely to preserve that right.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (emphasis added). Therefore, “in

parental termination cases, the parents’ fundamental interest in maintaining custody and control

of their children is balanced against the State’s fundamental interest in protecting the welfare of

the child.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 505 (emphasis added).13

3. The Constitutional Interests of the Child and the State

“The purpose of terminating parental rights . . . is not to punish parents or deter their

‘bad’ conduct, but rather to protect the interests of the child.” Id. at 504. “Like their parents,

children have a compelling interest in finality and stability.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 512.

“Two state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae

interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative

“[C]ourts must not sacrifice a child’s emotional and physical well-being to preserve [parental] rights when their
13

corresponding obligations go unfulfilled for years.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 317 (Tex. 2021) (citing In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26); see Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“orderly pursuit of happiness” (emphasis added)).
8
interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. “The

State’s fundamental interest in parental-rights termination cases is to protect the best interest of

the child.” In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 548 (Tex. 2003). “This interest is aligned” with the

child’s “interest in a final decision on termination so that adoption to a stable home or return to

the parents is not unduly prolonged.” Id. “[T]he State’s interest in protecting the welfare of the

child must initially manifest itself by working toward preserving the familial bond, rather than

severing it.” Id. at 548 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67). “Once it is clear that the parent

cannot or will not provide a safe, stable family environment, then the State’s interest in

protecting the welfare of the child shifts to establishing that safe, stable, and permanent

environment for the child elsewhere.” Id. In sum, “[b]ut for the State’s fundamental interest in

the welfare of the child, termination would not be proper.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 505.

The interests of the child and the State are typically expressed as being an inherent part of

the analysis of the parent’s rights. See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 753 (Tex. 2022) (Young, J.,

concurring) (“[T]he very sanctity of the parent-child relationship entails the need for an escape

hatch if things go terribly wrong.”). Consequently, along with the parent’s rights, we likewise

consider the interests of the child and the State “with a healthy regard” as a matter of

constitutional import. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (“with a healthy regard for the

constitutional interests at stake” (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26) (emphasis added)).

9
C. The Constitutional Appellate Standard of Review

“[T]he appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is

such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the

State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25.

This appellate standard of review was shaped by the constitutional requirement of a clear

and convincing burden of proof at trial: “[a]s a matter of logic, a finding that must be based on

clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one that may be sustained

on a mere preponderance.” Id. Hence “[a] correspondingly searching standard of appellate

review is an essential procedural adjunct.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630.

The Texas Supreme Court adopted the “reasonably form a firm belief or conviction”

standard of review for factual sufficiency in 2002. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. The Texas

Supreme Court observed, “While G.M. and Santosky established that the burden of proof in

termination proceedings is clear and convincing evidence, neither decision indicated how

appellate courts are to review findings based on that burden of proof.” Id. at 23. Given the

higher burden of proof at trial, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the “reasonably form a firm

belief or conviction” standard for factual sufficiency review. Id. at 25.14 In doing so, the Texas

Supreme Court rejected the use of the “traditional” factual sufficiency standard, under which “a

court determines if a finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence

that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias.” Id. at 25, 26.

14
“We do not have jurisdiction to conduct a factual sufficiency review, but we may ensure that the courts of appeals
adhere to the proper legal standard of review.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a)
(providing that “the decision of said courts [of appeal] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before
them on appeal or error”).
10
On the other hand, “[a]n appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only

factfindings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

26.

Later in 2002, the Texas Supreme Court adopted “reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction” for use in legal sufficiency review as well: “legal sufficiency review . . . take[s] into

consideration whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief

or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of proof.” In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265–66. In doing so, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the traditional legal

sufficiency “no evidence” test for use in termination cases: “[r]equiring only ‘[a]nything more

than’ a mere scintilla of evidence does not equate to clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 265

(second alteration in original).

Thus, the “reasonably form a firm belief or conviction” standard cannot be so lax as to

permit affirmance of a termination merely because there is a scintilla of evidence (the rejected

legal sufficiency approach), or because the evidence clears the traditional factual sufficiency

hurdle (the rejected factual sufficiency approach). Id. at 264–65 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d

at 25). Nor is the standard so stringent as to require reversal unless there is proof beyond a

reasonable doubt (another rejected factual sufficiency benchmark). In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

This standard of appellate review announced in 2002 remains the law. In re R.R.A., 687

S.W.3d at 276 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25).

11
1. Legal Sufficiency

Though “reasonably form a firm belief or conviction” is the standard for both legal and

factual sufficiency review, there is a difference between legal and factual sufficiency. In re A.C.,

560 S.W.3d at 630–31. For legal sufficiency, the review is as follows:

In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could
have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give
appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court
conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have
been incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that
does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support
the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing
evidence.

If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a
court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must
conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

2. Factual Sufficiency

“The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed

evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630. “In

conducting a legal-sufficiency review, the reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence

12
contrary to the finding, but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor

of the finding.” Id. at 630–31 (emphasis added).15 By comparison:

Factual sufficiency . . . requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the
finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In a factual-sufficiency
review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence is such that a
reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding. Evidence
is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a
reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant
that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
finding was true.

Id. at 631 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).

Under this approach, “[t]he assumption that the factfinder resolved disputed evidence in

favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so remains.” In re Commitment of

Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. 2020).

However, rather than “disregard[ing]” disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding, the court must determine
whether, in light of the entire record, that evidence “is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction” that the
finding was true.”

Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

3. Deference to the Fact-Finder

Deference to the fact-finder is embedded in our review: “[w]e have . . . rejected

traditional formulations of legal- and factual-sufficiency standards in favor of standards that

honor not only the elevated burden of proof, but also the deference an appellate court must have

15
“Weighing conflicting evidence and inferences to determine whether a verdict should be vacated . . . is
appropriately a part only of the reviewing court’s factual sufficiency review . . . .” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336,
347 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis added). That is not to say that legal sufficiency review is entirely devoid of weighing:
“[d]isregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and
convincing evidence.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (emphasis added).
13
for the factfinder’s role.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630 (emphasis added). “[T]he trial court is

in the best position to ‘observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can “feel”

the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.’” In re

J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477

(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)).16 Little wonder then that deference for the fact-finder is a

matter of constitutional importance in termination cases: “We emphasize that, as appellate

courts apply the standard we announce today, they must maintain the respective constitutional

roles of juries and appellate courts.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

The Texas Supreme Court stated,

A factual sufficiency review pits two fundamental tenets of the Texas court
system against one another: the right to trial by jury[17] and the court of appeals’
exclusive [appellate] jurisdiction over questions of fact. And, in the context of
parental termination cases, a third interest must also be accounted for—that is,
parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning “the care, the custody,
and control of their children.”

In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 502 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at

65). “Indeed, our courts of appeals walk a very fine line in conducting an appropriate factual

sufficiency review.” Id. at 503. “Thus, in In re C.H., [the Texas Supreme Court] articulated a

16
In re J.J.R.S. was a conservatorship case involving review of a best-interest finding. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at
218.
17
When the trial court is the fact-finder, its determinations are likewise entitled to deference. In re J.F.-G., 627
S.W.3d at 317 (“That [legal sufficiency] standard requires us to defer to the trial court’s judgment of the credibility
of the witnesses in a bench trial, even in parental termination cases.”).
14
factual sufficiency standard to strike an appropriate balance between these competing

principles.” Id. at 502 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25).18

“Reviewing courts . . . must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and logical inferences

from the evidence.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279 n.50. “Such inferences must be reasonable

and based on other facts proved.” Id. “Our opinion does not render the clear-and-convincing-

evidence standard toothless; instead, it properly defers credibility determinations to factfinders at

the trial court level, who most closely interact with the witnesses.” Id. at 279.

18
In re Commitment of Stoddard sheds light on the operation of civil factual sufficiency review. In re Commitment
of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 675–76. Deference to the fact-finder is imbedded in civil factual sufficiency review, but
as the burden of proof in the trial court rises, “the possibility that the evidence in a particular case will be legally
sufficient but factually insufficient essentially decreases.” Id. at 676 (quoting In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d
193, 213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied)). That possibility, though, does not vanish. Id. In re
Commitment of Stoddard dealt with civil commitment based on a sexually violent predator finding, “the rare civil
case in which the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 668. “Drawing from” the standard in
termination cases, the court held that “a properly conducted factual-sufficiency review in an SVP case requires the
court of appeals to determine whether, on the entire record, a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is an SVP.” Id. For legal sufficiency purposes, this civil standard is “consistent with” the
criminal standard of “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 675 (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Factual sufficiency is another matter. For criminal cases, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has held that legal and factual sufficiency have merged. Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)). This is because factual sufficiency was done viewing the
evidence in a “neutral” light, which was in conflict with, and yielded to, deference to the role of the fact-finder: “the
required deference to jury determinations of weight and credibility” required the “‘eliminat[ion of] . . . viewing the
evidence in a ‘neutral light’ component of a factual-sufficiency standard,’ rendering it ‘indistinguishable’ from the
legal-sufficiency standard.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902). In contrast to the former “neutral light”
review of criminal cases, in civil factual sufficiency review, “[t]he assumption that the factfinder resolved disputed
evidence in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so remains.” Id. at 674 (citing In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 266). It is with this assumption still in place that a reviewing court of appeals “considers whether that
evidence, in light of the entire record, is so significant that the factfinder could not have determined beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were met.” Id. at 676 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). The court
therefore declined to merge civil legal and factual sufficiency: “we hold that the ‘right of courts of appeals to review
for factual insufficiency’ under the standard expressed herein ‘must continue undisturbed.’” Id. (quoting Pool v.
Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986)).
15
4. Detailed Appellate Opinions Because of Deference to Fact-Finders

“A court of appeals should detail in its opinion why it has concluded that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited disputed evidence in favor of the finding.” In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266–67. “[T]he effort of detailing the evidence is required of the courts of appeals

when reversing a jury verdict to discourage the reviewing court from ‘merely substituting its

judgment for that of the jury.’” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting Ellis Cnty. State Bank v.

Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. 1994)). “This is not to suggest that courts of appeals should

not detail the evidence in their opinions affirming a jury’s decision to terminate. . . . But . . . we

decline to mandate that courts of appeals detail the evidence when affirming a jury verdict.” Id.

at 505 (citation omitted); see In re L.G., 596 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).

D. Constitutionally Mandated Considerations of Grounds D and E

In termination cases, the constitutional stakes impact not only our approach to appellate

review, but also which grounds for termination we review.

Generally, “[o]nly one predicate ground and a best interest finding are necessary for

termination, so ‘a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a

challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on more than one

ground.’” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.G., 577

S.W.3d at 232).

16
Grounds D and E deal with child endangerment. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 276–77.19

Termination on grounds D or E “has consequences for termination of parental rights as to

children in a future proceeding.” In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam);

see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (making it a ground for termination when a parent

“had his or her parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a

finding that the parent’s conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E) or substantially

equivalent provisions of the law of another state”).

Therefore, “due process and due course of law require that the court of appeals review the

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of termination under

Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when challenged on appeal.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at

704; In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748 (“[W]e may not bypass [Mother’s] evidentiary challenges to

Subsections (D) and (E), the so-called endangerment grounds.” (emphasis added)).

E. Holistic Review of Grounds D and E

Appellate review of termination on endangerment grounds must be conducted in a

“holistic” fashion. In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)

(“holistic endangerment review set forth in [In re] R.R.A.”); see In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278.

As used in the parental-rights termination statutes, “‘endanger’ means to expose to loss or

injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

“Although ‘“endanger” means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects

“A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s
19

physical or emotional well-being—the focus of grounds (D) and (E) . . . .” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting
Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. 1987)).
17
of a less-than-ideal family environment,’ it does not require that there be conduct ‘directed at the

child’ or that ‘the child actually suffer[] injury.’” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748 (alteration in

original) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).20

There are any number of considerations in the endangerment analysis. For example, drug

use or parental incarceration may play a part in endangerment. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278

(drug use); In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316 (incarceration). The question becomes how to

approach these myriad considerations.

Regarding drug use, the Texas Supreme Court has instructed:

While illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment, a
pattern of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to
the child can establish a substantial risk of harm. A reviewing court should not
evaluate drug-use evidence in isolation; rather, it should consider additional
evidence that a factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal
drug use presents a risk to the parent’s “ability to parent.”

In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (all but second emphasis added) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d at 345); In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d at 659.21

20
The meaning of endangerment has been the subject of several recent dissents in the Texas Supreme Court decrying
the “expansive approach to the pivotal statutory word ‘endangered.’” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 283–84
(Blacklock, J., dissenting, joined by Busby, J.); In re N.L.S., No. 23-0965, 2025 WL 1687924, at *5 (Tex. June 13,
2025) (Blacklock, C.J., joined by Devine, J., and Sullivan, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
21
In In re A.V., the Texas Supreme Court declined review (and thereby permitted endangerment termination to stand)
based on these facts:

The parents used drugs together during Mother’s pregnancy and while caring for Mother’s teenage
daughter. Mother tested positive for drugs three times during her pregnancy. Drug use during
pregnancy supports a finding of direct injury to the child. After the child in question was born, the
parents did not complete their court-ordered services, including drug testing and refraining from
drug use. Attendance at their two-hour weekly visitation with the child was sporadic. Father
testified that the best way for the parents to stop using drugs was to return the child to them. The
evidence supports a finding that the parents’ drug use continued despite their knowledge that their
parental rights were subject to termination for continued drug use.

18
The approach to endangerment review set forth in In re R.R.A. is not limited to drug use.

In re N.L.S., 2025 WL 1687924, at *3 (“Father argues that [In re] R.R.A. is limited to drug-use

cases. That is incorrect.”).

Consequently, we review endangerment findings considering the “aggregate weight” of

factors supported by the evidence. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (finding that termination on

grounds D and E was supported by “the aggregate weight of Father’s ongoing drug use,

homelessness, employment instability, and near-complete abandonment of his children for the

six months preceding trial”).22

F. Review of Best Interest

“In Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976), we gave a nonexhaustive list of

factors that should be considered when determining the best interest of a child.” In re A.A., 670

S.W.3d 520, 534 n.57 (Tex. 2023) (emphasis added). The listed factors are:

(1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now
and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in
the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals; (6) their plans for the child; (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the
parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper
one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Id. (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976)).

In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d at 659.

This appears to be a reference to the “aggregate weight” when conducting legal sufficiency review; In re R.R.A.
22

makes no mention of factual sufficiency. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281.
19
“[T]he inquiry is whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm

conviction or belief that termination of the parent’s rights would be in the child’s best interest

. . . .” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (emphasis added).

In other words, the Holley factors are not a checklist:

[W]e have never held that these considerations are exhaustive, or that all such
considerations must be proved as a condition precedent to parental termination.
The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a
factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination
is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the
parental relationship endangered the safety of the child. Other cases, however,
will present more complex facts in which paltry evidence relevant to each
consideration mentioned in Holley would not suffice to uphold the jury’s finding
that termination is required.

Id. at 27.

Consequently, the fact-finder may choose to give greater weight to one factor over others.

Id. (upholding the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interests where

five Holley factors were “lacking” in the view of the court of appeals, but there was “undisputed”

evidence of the father’s “historical deficiencies in parenting and current criminal proclivities”).

II. The Termination Findings

In her first issue, Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s findings terminating her parental rights under statutory grounds D and E.

In her second issue, Mother asserts the same with respect to ground I.

A. Endangerment Grounds D and E

Ground D permits termination of parental rights “if the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child

20
to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of

the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Ground E permits termination of parental

rights “if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in

conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers

the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

“The grounds for termination are not mutually exclusive; rather, the same conduct may

support multiple grounds . . . .” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 314.23

B. The Evidence

The evidence relevant to the trial court’s grounds D and E findings showed that the

Department became involved in this matter after a police raid in early fall of 2023 was

“conducted on the home due to a possible theft ring and guns in the home by other occupants of

the home.” Although an allegation of neglectful supervision was ruled out at that time, due to

noncompliance during the investigation, Mother was ordered to participate in Family Based

Safety Services (FBSS) on December 6, 2023.24 Mother was ordered to complete parenting

classes, counseling, a psychosocial evaluation, a substance-abuse assessment, and random drug

tests.

In early February 2024, the Department sought emergency removal of C.C. from the

home. The FBSS caseworker averred that Mother and C.C. had been moving between a home

23
The same evidence may also support “a finding that termination of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest.”
In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 314.
24
At the final hearing, the trial court, without objection, took judicial notice of all prior matters in the case, including
the FBSS matter. See In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.)
(concluding that the appellant waived its argument that the trial court could not take judicial notice of its file because
the appellant failed to object at trial), disapproved on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at n.39.
21
Mother and C.C. shared with a roommate, her roommate’s mothers house, and a motel. Mother

stated she and C.C. would soon be moving to Oklahoma. Although the Department visited

Mother and C.C. at their residence, Mother would not allow the Department to enter the home.

Mother admitted to smoking marihuana and signed an acknowledgment of use. Mother and C.C.

missed scheduled counseling appointments. Mother unenrolled C.C. from a school that would

have provided him with bus transportation and enrolled him instead in a school where Mother

was concerned “that he could not attend as she did not have transportation.” Mother also said

C.C. could not attend school because he had lice. The Department provided Mother with lice

kits, yet two weeks later, C.C. was still not in school. C.C. did not attend school from December

2023 to February 2024. The trial court determined the circumstances warranted emergency

removal, C.C. was removed from the home, and the Department was named temporary sole

managing conservator.

One month later, in March 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the Department’s

managing conservatorship of C.C.25 The Department, through the FBSS caseworker, expressed

concern for Mother’s slowness in working services and for marihuana use, C.C. not being in

school, and Mother’s failure to provide stable housing. Mother had tested positive for marihuana

the week before the hearing, and C.C. had not been allowed to see Mother since his removal due

to her marihuana use. C.C. was having “a hard time emotionally being away from her[,]” but

Mother was not to be allowed any in-person visits before she provided a clean urinalysis.

Mother testified C.C. had missed “a bunch” of school the previous year because they had been

25
At the final hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the conservatorship matter.
22
moving back and forth between two towns, and she held him back a year. At that time, Mother

and her roommate had just gotten a car, and Mother was working two jobs. Mother stated that,

although she was staying in a motel, she had money for a house, and she was looking for one.

The Department was appointed temporary managing conservator of C.C. on March 14, 2024.

The trial court held a status hearing on April 3, 2024. The Department’s representative

requested that Mother’s service plan be made an order of the court. The plan required Mother to

complete substance abuse screening, counseling, parenting classes, a psychological evaluation,

and random drug testing. The Department said Mother had been able to visit with C.C. over

FaceTime. The Department reported that Mother’s previous urinalysis showed a very low level

of marihuana. The Department expressed concerns about Mother’s roommate and the children in

the home where Mother had been staying. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)

volunteer further explained that she had visited the home during the school day, that underage

children were present, one being fourteen, and that one had a vape. The CASA volunteer said

she “kn[e]w one of the kids and they get in trouble a lot,” and she was “concerned if [C.C.]

[came] back that he [would] be running with this crowd.” The CASA volunteer said to her

knowledge the other children in the home had also been a concern at the beginning of this case.

At the April hearing, Mother testified that she had completed her substance abuse

assessment. Mother stated her roommate’s children who were home during the school day were

supposed to be working toward their GEDs and had “no connection to [her] child, as he [was]

nine years old and they [were] 16, not 14.” Mother expressed frustration with the Department,

stating that she had “spent all [her] money getting into this house[,]” that she couldn’t afford to

23
live by herself, and that, if she had known the other children had been a concern since the

beginning of the case, she would have tried to get her own house then.

The next hearing in the record, the termination hearing, took place on January 8, 2025.

At the termination hearing, the State represented that the Department had not had any contact

with Mother between the first hearing and December. The Department’s FBSS worker

recounted the initial allegations of noncompliance with an investigation that led to Mother’s

order to participate in FBSS. The FBSS caseworker testified that, of the required FBSS

services—“parenting, counseling, a drug and alcohol assessment, random drug screenings, and a

psychosocial”—Mother only set up an appointment for counseling, but she did not complete that.

Near the end of the FBSS case, Mother scheduled a drug and alcohol assessment, which she

completed after the Department became managing conservator of C.C. Mother told the

caseworker that she was unable to complete services due to a lack of transportation and access to

a good phone. The FBSS caseworker testified that Mother did not work during the FBSS time

period.

The FBSS caseworker testified that the Department sought FBSS because parenting and

counseling had been discussed with Mother during the investigation, and though Mother agreed

to allow C.C. to participate in counseling through school, Mother “felt that counseling or

parenting was not needed for her.” The FBSS worker also testified that there was concern

because Mother had stated “those younger boys who were in the home during the raid would be

helping babysit [C.C.] while she went to work.” The FBSS worker stated that C.C. missed forty

days of school between December 2023 and February 2024.

24
A permanency specialist with 4Kids4Families26 testified that Mother had been asked to

complete “[c]ounseling, a psychological, drug testing, a drug assessment[,] and parenting

classes” during the conservatorship portion of the case. The caseworker testified Mother had

“completed nothing” and relayed the results of three drug tests to the court: in February and

March 2024, Mother tested positive for marihuana, and in April, positive for cocaine and

marihuana. Mother did not complete any drug tests after that time, even though tests were

requested of her in June, July, twice in August, October, November, and December. Mother

started parenting classes but did not complete them.

26
The State began adopting community-based services at the direction of the Texas Legislature:

In 2017, [the] Texas Legislature directed [the Department] to contract with community-based
nonprofit and local governmental entities that can provide child protection services. These
services must include direct case management to ensure child safety, permanency, and well-being
in accordance with state and federal child protection goals. . . . The intent of the legislation is not
to change the work done by caseworkers, but to shift from a state-run child protection system to a
community-based system with more flexibility to develop services that reflect the local
community and its needs.

TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., https://www.dfps.texas.gov/CBC/FAQ/default.asp (follow “Why is
Texas adopting Community-Based Care (CBC)?” hyperlink) (last visited July 24, 2025).

“On February 22, 2023, the Department . . . awarded a Community-Based Care contract in Piney
Woods (Region 4) to 4Kids4Families, a division of Arrow Child and Family Ministries.
Beginning March 1, 2023, the Office of Community-Based Care Transition, along with [the
Department] [began] preparations with 4Kids4Families for the transition to Community-Based
Care. . . . 4Kids4Families plan[ned] to receive its first child placement referral in early fall of
2023.”

TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., https://www.dfps.texas.gov/CBC/news-and-events/default.asp
(follow “News Archive” hyperlink; then scroll to “February 2023”) (last visited July 24, 2025).

On November 1, 2023, 4Kids4Families began Stage 1 of Community-Based Care in the Department’s Region 4. “In
Stage 1, 4Kids4Families . . . will continue to develop a service network in the community and provide foster care
placement services.” Id. (follow “New Archive” hyperlink; then scroll to November 2023) (last visited July 24,
2025).
25
The 4Kids4Families permanency specialist testified C.C. was removed from the home

because he was not going to school and Mother did not have stable housing. At the time of the

termination hearing, Mother still did not have stable housing, and she was not employed.

The CASA volunteer testified that she supported family reunification at the beginning of

the case because Mother “was working really hard[,]” but as the case progressed, Mother

“became less and less involved.” The CASA volunteer stated that it became harder to get ahold

of Mother, that Mother would not respond, and that Mother did not show an interest in or ask

about C.C. The CASA volunteer said CASA switched its position from reunification to

termination as Mother’s “involvement became less and less” and “C.C. [got] settled and start[ed]

thriving.”

The CASA volunteer said C.C. initially struggled because he had missed so much school

that he had huge gaps in his education. She said C.C. initially did not like school because he did

not like consistency or rules. The CASA volunteer had concerns early in the case due to the

other kids in the home, whom she thought had juvenile criminal allegations against them. She

said it was not a “safe, stable environment” for C.C. to return to.

The CASA volunteer said Mother never asked for help with transportation to services or

bus passes, though they had talked about the bus once, and Mother said she would figure it out.

She said they also tried to tell Mother how to get her Social Security card—the volunteer

testified that CASA “did due diligence on trying to help [Mother] with” any obstacle she raised

to completing her services. The CASA volunteer said Mother did not have her own stable

housing, did not have a phone number so she could be contacted, and did not have a job.

26
Ultimately, the CASA volunteer recommended termination of Mother’s parental rights and stated

termination was in C.C.’s best interest.

Mother testified at the termination hearing that she had been homeless for a little while

within the past year, but that she was staying with a friend. She had not worked since June,

when she lost the house where she was living with her roommate and the roommate’s children

due to conflict with her roommate. Mother said she got food from working DoorDash even

though she did not have a vehicle. Mother could not state an average income from the DoorDash

job, but that she got paid for each delivery and she could “make up to $60[.00] in one day or

more.” Mother testified she had “finished all but one parenting class” and “had been attending

counseling,” but in the six months prior to the hearing, all she had been doing was “trying to get

[her life] back together.” She stated she had done nothing on her service plan since July 1

because she had been “trying to figure out a place to live.” Mother claimed it had been months

since she had used any illegal drugs, and she said she had not used in November or December,

but she could not give an exact date that she had last used.

Mother stated that her “life ha[d] been falling apart,” and she was “just trying to figure

out how to get it back together.” She said, “[I]f you take [C.C.] then it’s not going to happen.”

When asked if she could take care of C.C., she said, “I’m not asking for him to be given to me

today to go home with me. I’m just asking for another chance to work it through.”

The attorney ad litem for C.C. recommended that Mother’s parental rights be terminated

and stated that termination was in C.C.’s best interest.

27
The trial court granted termination of Mother’s parental rights to C.C. on statutory

grounds D, E, I, and P.

C. Analysis

In light of an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the

constitutional interests at stake, we find that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm

belief or conviction that the grounds D and E findings are true under the legal, factual, and

holistic review principles set forth above. Regarding factual sufficiency, the disputed evidence

contrary to termination—including evidence regarding the extent of the mother’s drug usage, the

involvement of unsuitable influences in the child’s life, and the ability of the mother to provide a

stable environment—is not so significant that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief

or conviction in the truth of the Department’s allegations regarding termination on grounds D

and E. We set forth the following evidence that supports this conclusion.

Ground D focuses on evidence related to endangering factors in the child’s environment.

See In re R.W., 627 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.); TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The evidence before the trial court indicates that Mother failed to

provide C.C. with or to obtain stable housing for the duration of the FBSS proceeding and the

removal. After C.C. was removed from Mother, Mother chose a living situation that included

older children, with whom C.C. had occasionally lived prior to his removal. Those older

children did not regularly attend school. Mother admitted those children had been babysitters for

C.C. when she was at work. Mother did not express concern about C.C. spending time with

those children; instead, she testified that the children were supposed to be getting their GEDs and

28
expressed frustration that the Department did not tell her beforehand that C.C.’s exposure to

those children was a matter of concern to the Department. Mother lost that housing due to

“conflict,” and her unstable housing situation persisted.

At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was living in a friend’s house. However,

Mother’s refusal to remain in contact with the Department resulted in the Department’s inability

to determine whether Mother’s friend’s house would provide a safe and stable environment for

C.C.

Ground E examines endangering conduct by the parent or others. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Here, the evidence demonstrates that Mother failed to complete any of

the required services under the FBSS service plan during the applicable two-month period. In

addition, although Mother initially worked, Mother lost her job, and at the termination hearing,

she reported only working sporadically for DoorDash, even though she did not have her own car.

Mother’s failure to establish safe and stable housing and her failure to secure an adequate income

to support C.C. over a one-year span after his removal demonstrate a voluntary, deliberate, and

conscious course of conduct and omissions that endangered C.C.

Mother testified she had held C.C. back a year in school, the year prior to the

investigation, due to the number of days of school he missed. Mother attributed that situation to

“moving back and forth from Blossom to Paris.” The following school year, during the FBSS

period, C.C. missed at least forty days of school in a three-month period. Mother said C.C. could

not attend school because he had lice, but after she received treatment kits, C.C. still did not go

to school. And rather than assisting C.C. in attending school, Mother transferred C.C. from a

29
school that would have provided bus transportation to a school she said he could not attend

because she did not have transportation. Mother’s failure to have C.C. educated also shows a

voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct and omissions that endangered C.C. See

T.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d 901, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024,

no pet.) (citing C.M.M. v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., Nos. 14-21-00702-CV & 14-21-

00730-CV, 2022 WL 1789925, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.)).

Mother initially admitted to using marihuana, which she tested positive for, and later she

tested positive for marihuana and cocaine. Then she stopped complying with the Department’s

requests for drug tests altogether.27 While Mother’s illegal drug use alone does not suffice to

show endangerment, her continued illegal drug use,28 accompanied by the lack of safe, stable

housing; the failure to secure income adequate to support C.C.; and the failure to consistently

have C.C. attend school, establish a substantial risk of harm to C.C. It is apparent from these

circumstances that Mother’s continued drug use presented a risk to her ability to parent. See

In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278.

After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the grounds D and E

findings, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or

conviction that the Department proved the requisites for terminating Mother’s parental rights

under statutory grounds D and E. We further conclude that any disputed evidence, viewed in

27
See In re of R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (“Father had refused drug testing for nearly a year.”).
28
A fact-finder can reasonably infer that a parent is using drugs from that parent’s refusal to submit to drug tests.
See In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d at 659
(termination supported by factors including continued drug use despite the pendency of termination proceedings).
30
light of the entire record, could have been reconciled in favor of the trial court’s findings on

these grounds or was not so significant that the trial court could not reasonably have formed a

firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights under these grounds was

appropriate.

We overrule Mother’s first issue.

Having made this determination as to grounds D and E, we need not review the trial

court’s findings under grounds I and P, see In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 314. Therefore, we do not

address Mother’s second issue.

III. The Best-Interest Finding

In her third issue, Mother challenges “[w]hether the Department presented legally and

factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in C.C.’s

best interest.”

Even when the evidence supports termination on endangerment grounds, the outcome of

the best-interest inquiry is not a foregone conclusion. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281.

There, the court upheld termination on endangerment grounds, but then held, “Whether Father’s

bond with the children warrants further work toward reunification is most appropriately

addressed in a best-interest determination.” Id. However, though proof of statutory termination

grounds “does not relieve the petitioner from proving the best interest of the child, the same

evidence may be probative of both issues.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see In re J.W., 645

S.W.3d at 747–48.

31
The first Holley factor requires that “the desires of the child” be taken into consideration.

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. At the termination hearing, the 4Kids4Families permanency

specialist testified that C.C. did not want Mother to be out of his life. The 4Kids4Families

permanency specialist further agreed that it was in C.C.’s best interest to not be with Mother at

that time, but she did not think it was in his best interest to “just completely obliterate[] [Mother]

from his life.” We find that this factor does not support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

The second and third Holley factors center around “the emotional and physical needs of

the child” and “the emotional and physical danger to the child” both “now and in the future.” Id.

In this analysis, the trial court could consider the evidence regarding grounds D and E set forth

above. That evidence establishes that Mother was not meeting the emotional and physical needs

of C.C. and that she was exposing him to conduct of herself and others that placed him in

emotional and physical danger.

Conversely, testimony indicated C.C., ten years old at the time of termination, was in a

foster placement in which he was “doing really well.” All his needs were being met, and the

placement was safe and appropriate. The foster parents wanted to adopt him. C.C. was regularly

attending school and making good grades. The CASA volunteer testified that C.C. had

transformed throughout the course of the case due to consistency and stability. She said C.C.’s

“face is more relaxed. He’s calmer. . . . He’s learning how to be 10.”

Although Mother argues there is no evidence that she “would be totally unable to ensure

that C.C. regularly attended school in the future[,]” there is also no evidence that she would. Nor

is there evidence that she would be able to refrain from putting C.C. in emotional or physical

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danger or meet C.C.’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future. Taking into account

all the evidence cited above with respect to the second and third Holley factors, the record

supports the trial court’s determination as to best interest.

The fourth Holley factor regards “the parental abilit[y] of the [person] seeking custody,”

id., and “we [may] consider Mother’s past ability to care for [C.C.] as an indicator of future

actions,” In re B.B., No. 06-24-00047-CV, 2024 WL 4448690, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Oct. 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). As noted above, Mother had held C.C. behind in school

because he had missed so much the year preceding the Department’s involvement. Then, during

the investigation, C.C. continued to miss school for the entirety of almost a three-month period

during FBSS. Mother did not complete the parenting classes required through her service plan.

And even though Mother expressed desire to have contact with C.C., due to her positive drug

tests and refusal to submit drug tests, Mother had no contact with C.C., other than through

FaceTime, after he was removed. The record reflects Mother’s long and persistent inability to

parent. The evidence of this fourth Holley factor supports the trial court’s determination

regarding C.C.’s best interests.

Likewise, the fifth and sixth Holley factors—the “programs available to assist” persons

seeking custody and their “plans for the child”—support the trial court’s determination. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d 372. Although Mother’s caseworker testified that Mother was court-ordered

to complete substance abuse screening, counseling, parenting classes, a psychological evaluation,

and random drug testing, Mother completed only the substance abuse screening that was ordered

during FBSS —and then not until the conservatorship portion of the case. Mother started but did

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not complete counseling and parenting classes and did not receive the benefit of any

psychological services that might have been available to her because she did not complete the

evaluation. Similarly, the record contains a paucity of evidence that Mother had any future plans

for the child. She expressed only that she was willing to have someone else continue to care for

C.C. while she continued to attempt to get her life back together.

The evidence of the seventh Holley factor—“stability of the home or proposed

placement”—has been stated in part above, as Mother’s job and home situation were unstable

throughout the case. See id. Mother’s drug use continued. The foster home where C.C. was

placed, on the other hand, was meeting C.C.’s needs and provided no safety concerns, and the

family wanted to adopt him. This evidence supports the trial court’s determination regarding

best interest.29

The eighth Holley factor examines whether the “existing parent-child relationship [was]

. . . a proper one.” Id. As outlined above, Mother had a history of failing to keep C.C. in school,

and she allowed him to be watched at home by older children who themselves did not have a

track record of diligent school attendance. Mother was unable to meet C.C.’s needs by securing

a stable home or a job, and she admitted to drug use while C.C. was still in her custody. The

testimony also establishes that, during the pendency of the case, Mother had no in-person visits

with C.C., meaning by the time of the termination, she had not seen him in person in over a year.

The evidence of this factor supports the trial court’s best-interest determination.

29
This is not to say that the Holley analysis can be collapsed into whether a potential alternative placement, in a
momentary snapshot of time, appears in that moment to be preferable. As noted above, termination proceedings are
permanent. Stary, 712 S.W.3d at 592 (“[T]he government seeks to end her exercise of a fundamental right.”).
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Finally, the ninth Holley factor includes a consideration of whether there is an excuse for

Mother’s acts or omissions. See id. Though testimony indicated Mother was initially “working

really hard[,]” it also indicated that “as the case progressed . . . her involvement became less and

less.” Mother testified that she lost her job because she lost her housing due to the “[c]onflict

with the mother that [she] was living with.” When asked how she lived though she was not

working, Mother responded simply, “I don’t know.” Mother further stated that she had done

nothing on her service plan “because [she had] been trying to figure out a place to live.” Asked

to explain to the trial court why her rights to C.C. should not be terminated, Mother said, “[M]y

life has been falling apart. I’m just trying to figure out how to get it back together. And if you

take him then it’s not going to happen.” (Emphasis added). This aspect of Mother’s testimony is

similar to the testimony in In re A.V., where the “[f]ather testified that the best way for the

parents to stop using drugs was to return the child to them.” See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d at 659.

This ninth factor also supports the trial court’s best-interest determination.

Having discussed the Holley factors in order, we conclude by noting that not all factors

must be present. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

After an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional

interests at stake, we find that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in C.C.’s best interest under the legal

and factual review principles set forth above. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Regarding

factual sufficiency, the disputed evidence contrary to the best-interest finding—including

Mother’s ability to provide a stable environment—is not so significant that the trial court could

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not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental

rights was in C.C.’s best interest. See id. at 266–67. Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(2).

We overrule Mother’s third issue.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights.

Jeff Rambin
Justice

Date Submitted: April 16, 2025
Date Decided: July 30, 2025

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