Raymond Lin v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00011-CR

RAYMOND LIN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 485th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1745025

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial on punishment, a Tarrant County1 judge convicted Raymond Lin of

second-degree felony sexual assault of a child under seventeen years old and sentenced him to

thirteen years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2) (Supp.). After

pleading guilty, Lin admitted, during the punishment trial, to sexually assaulting Mary Booth2

while she was at a church conference in Tarrant County and again when they returned to

Pennsylvania, where they both lived. Lin argues that (1) his appeal may proceed because the

trial court permitted him to appeal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him, in

his testimony, from responding to testimony from the victim’s mother that the victim was a

virgin at the time of the assault; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a bad act; and

(4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony about his then-current relationship. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

Lin pled guilty to count one and pled in bar to counts two through four. 3 See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 12.45(a).

1
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court
docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of
the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.
2
We use pseudonyms and initials to protect the identity of the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10; TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 30(a)(1) (conferring crime victims with “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect to the victim’s
dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
3
A plea in bar “permits a defendant (with the prosecutor’s consent) to admit guilt of an unadjudicated extraneous
offense, have that offense taken into account by the trial court in sentencing on the primary offense, and thereafter
bar any future prosecution for that extraneous offense.” Lopez v. State, 253 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Lin was originally indicted on four counts against Mary: two counts of sexual assault of a child under
2
At the punishment trial, Mary’s mother described a trip to a church conference Mary took

from her home in Pennsylvania to Dallas, Texas, in December 2021.4 Mary’s mother testified

that she was told that all the children would be supervised “at all times.”

Lin testified to events at the conference and thereafter. Lin met Mary at the conference

and spent a lot of time with her during the trip. At the time, Mary was fifteen years old, and Lin

was twenty-one years old. Mary was at the conference for high schoolers, and Lin was at a

corresponding conference in the same hotel for college students. One night, Lin took Mary and

several others to an expensive dinner in downtown Dallas. Afterward, Lin convinced a patron of

a nearby hotel to let them into the rooftop swimming pool, where they swam in their underwear.

The next night, Lin, Mary, and several others left the conference hotel and went to downtown

Dallas again. The third night, Mary and her friend met Lin and his friend in Lin’s room at the

conference hotel. When Mary’s friend and Lin’s friend left to get food, Lin had oral sex with

Mary.

Penny was another attendee at the church conference. She knew Lin. Lin testified to his

prior relationship with Penny and to her interactions with Mary (which Lin learned of via his

electronic message exchanges with Mary). When Lin was eleven and Penny was seven, he

touched Penny in ways Lin described as childish curiosity, but Penny and her family considered

seventeen years old and two counts of indecency by sexual contact of a child under seventeen years old. The record
does not indicate the substance of the plea in bar, but the State recommended in the written plea admonishments an
open plea with a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) on count one and a plea in bar for counts two, three, and four.
During sentencing, the trial court recognized this was a plea bargain that contained a plea in bar and explicitly
granted Lin the right to appeal.
4
Being from Pennsylvania, the witnesses testified generally to the church conference being in Dallas. More
precisely, the conference was at a Dallas-Fort Worth Airport hotel in Tarrant County.
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the acts molestation. During the outings in Dallas described above, Mary posted to social media.

Apparently, Penny saw the posts or otherwise learned that Lin was spending time with Mary.

Penny reached out to Mary and told Mary about her dealings with Lin. Penny urged Mary to

pursue a “lawsuit” against Lin. While still at the conference, Lin made plans to see Mary once

the conference was over. He wanted to stay in touch with Mary to “change her mind on

[Penny’s] interaction with her, threatening -- telling -- making her pursue a lawsuit on [him].”

After the conference ended, Mary went back to Pennsylvania. Less than a week later, Lin

went from the city in Pennsylvania where he lived to the city where Mary lived, took Mary

shopping, and then took Mary to a hotel and had sex with her.

Following the punishment trial, the trial court considered both the testimony at trial and a

PSI report before imposing the sentence. The trial court imposed a thirteen-year sentence and

certified Lin’s right to appeal by checking the box stating, “[This] is a plea-bargain case, but the

trial court has given permission to appeal, and the defendant has the right of appeal.” See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Lin appeals.5

II. No Preservation About the Child Victim’s Virginity

The State admitted testimony from Mary’s mother stating that Mary was a virgin at the

time Lin sexually assaulted her. In Lin’s second point of error, he argues that the trial court

improperly restricted him from giving his opinion about Mary’s mother’s testimony because his

5
In Lin’s first point of error, he argues that even if the case involved a charge bargain, his appeal may proceed
because the trial court granted him permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 44.02. Since the State does not challenge Lin’s right to an appeal, no controversy remains. See Shankle v.
State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
4
testimony would have been admissible for the motive or bias exception under Rule 412.6 The

State argues that Lin did not preserve the issue because he failed to make an offer of proof

regarding the excluded testimony.

Rule 412 of the Texas Rules of Evidence generally prohibits the introduction of

reputation or opinion evidence, or specific instances of a victim’s past sexual behavior, except

for limited exceptions like motive or bias. See TEX. R. EVID. 412(a), (b)(2)(C). Rule 412 “is not

limited in its applicability to only the guilt/innocence phase of trial.” Eaves v. State, 141 S.W.3d

686, 693 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d).

On the State’s direct examination of Mary’s mother, she stated:

[Mary] is upset that she -- because she was a virgin, so she was very upset
that that took place and that he would not, basically, be with her long term. Since
then, I’ve talked to her multiple times about developing a healthy relationship
with a partner and the steps in doing that and to -- sometimes people say things
that they don’t mean.

Later, during Lin’s direct examination, he attempted to respond to what Mary’s mother said

about Mary’s virginity. The State objected on a general relevance ground. The trial court

initially overruled the State’s objection but then sustained it after noting its consideration of Rule

412 in the State’s relevance objection.

Lin’s issue was not preserved for several reasons. First, an appellant is “responsible for

preserving the error he sought to raise on appeal by specifically articulating the legal basis for his

proffer at trial.” Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); White v. State, 549 S.W.3d 146, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“[O]nce the

6
Rule 412 of the Texas Rules of Evidence was repealed and replaced effective September 1, 2025. All citations to
Rule 412 in this opinion are to the previous version of the rule.
5
party opposing the admission of evidence satisfies their burden of properly objecting, the

proponent of the evidence must show, or must have satisfactorily shown, that they have carried

their burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence is

admissible.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).

Here, Lin never requested a Rule 412 hearing or informed the trial court that he

challenged its ruling based specifically on motive and bias. See Eaves, 141 S.W.3d at 693

(“Although Eaves claims on appeal that his proffered testimony was admissible pursuant to one

of the exceptions provided for in [Rule 412], . . . he never raised that argument before the trial

court and therefore failed to preserve it for our review.”); Cloffey v. State, No. 01-94-00200-CR,

1994 WL 719771, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 1994, pet. ref’d) (not

designated for publication) (“Appellant’s argument that the evidence was admissible under rule

412(b)(2)(A) and (E) was not raised in the trial court and thus is not preserved on appeal.”); see

also Ellison v. State, 165 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005), aff’d, 201 S.W.3d

714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[B]efore evidence of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior may be

admitted under Rule 412, a defendant must first establish the relevancy of the evidence to a

material issue in the case.”). Neither did Lin object to the lack of a Rule 412 hearing. Even

though the State had already introduced testimony about Mary’s virginity, Lin never informed

the trial court what exactly he intended to say about Mary’s virginity. The potential testimony

could have been inadmissible. Jones v. State, No. 01-22-00172-CR, 2023 WL 4239873, at *5

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

6
publication) (“Jones failed to establish what J.J.’s testimony would have been had he been

permitted to testify on the issue.”).

Second, Lin failed to carry the “burden to demonstrate a nexus or logical connection

between the [evidence sought to be admitted] and . . . [Mary’s] potential motive to testify against

him.” Smith v. State, 352 S.W.3d 55, 67 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.).

Third, Lin did not demonstrate how “the probative value of the evidence outweighs the

danger of unfair prejudice” under Rule 412(b)(3). TEX. R. EVID. 412(b)(3). “[U]nlike Rule 403

of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which embodies a presumption of admissibility of relevant

evidence even if it has some potential to be unfairly prejudicial, . . . Rule 412(b)(3) tips the scale

against admissibility of such evidence.” Faglie v. State, No. 03-17-00281-CR, 2019 WL

847812, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citations omitted). “Under Rule 412, the proponent of evidence bears the burden of

establishing that the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at *5.

Therefore, Lin did not preserve the issue for appeal. As a result, we overrule Lin’s

second point of error.

III. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Extraneous Acts During Punishment

In the third point of error, Lin argues the trial court erred by admitting testimony about

Lin sneaking Mary and other underaged girls into a swimming pool at another hotel.

A. Standard of Review

“[A] trial court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence is reviewed on appeal for abuse

of discretion.” Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “[T]he trial

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court’s ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any

theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. at 418. The trial court abuses its discretion only when

the decision lies “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d

204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005).

B. Applicable Law

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.07, Section 3(a), “governs the admissibility

of evidence during the punishment phase of a non-capital trial.” Sanders v. State, 422 S.W.3d

809, 813 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (quoting Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 491

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Under this Article, at punishment, “a trial court may admit evidence of

‘any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing,’ including . . . an extraneous crime or bad act

that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by the defendant.” Id. (quoting

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1)). As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

explained,

What is “relevant” to the punishment determination is simply that which will
assist the fact finder in deciding the appropriate sentence in a particular case.
When the jury assesses punishment, it must be able to tailor the sentence to the
particular defendant, and relevance is simply “a question of what is helpful to the
jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a
particular case.”

Id. at 814 (quoting Sims v. State, 273 S.W.3d 291, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

C. Analysis

During the punishment trial, Lin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination, Lin

testified about taking Mary and the others swimming at the hotel across the street from where
8
they had dinner. However, during his cross-examination, the State asked how they accessed a

rooftop hotel pool where they were not staying. Lin admitted to sneaking into the nearby hotel’s

pool via a hotel guest’s key fob. Lin objected to relevance, and the trial court overruled the

objection.

Article 37.07 explicitly allows evidence about “the circumstances of the offense for

which [the defendant] is being tried.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (Supp.).

That event happened to Mary shortly after meeting Lin and would be considered background

contextual evidence because it was part of the events that led up to the sexual assault, even

though the contextual act occurred two nights before. See Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 85

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Moreover, even if it were not a circumstance around the offense, it is relevant to

determining the appropriate sentence. Tow v. State, 953 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1).

Though the conduct might be minor (i.e., gaining unauthorized entry to the hotel pool), the

evidence was relevant and helpful to assess Lin’s character and credibility for determining the

extent of the planning and predatory nature of his offense, which is relevant to sentencing.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence during the

punishment phase. As a result, we overrule Lin’s third point of error.

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IV. No Error by Admitting Testimony About Lin’s Then-Current Relationship

In the last point of error, Lin argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

testimony about Lin’s then-current relationship with a woman, arguing the evidence was

irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

A. Applicable Law

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.07, Section 3(a), “governs the admissibility

of evidence during the punishment phase.” Ellison v. State, 165 S.W.3d at 775.

Article 37.07, Section 3(a)(1), states,

[E]vidence may be offered by the [S]tate and the defendant as to any matter the
court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal
record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding
his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and . . .
any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for
which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has
previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). “When a defendant requests community

supervision . . . a trial court may reasonably deem any character trait that pertains to the

defendant’s suitability for community supervision to be a relevant matter for the sentencer to

consider.” Pantoja v. State, 496 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d).

“The jury is concerned at the punishment phase hearing with evaluating a defendant’s

background and character independent of the commission of the crime on trial.” Thompson v.

State, 33 S.W.3d 847, 853 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. ref’d).

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B. Analysis

On cross-examination, the State asked Lin about his then-current relationship. After Lin

stated that he had broken off the relationship, Lin objected based on relevance. On appeal, Lin

argues the trial court erred based on Rules 401 and 404.7

Lin requested that the trial court consider community supervision. “[W]hen a defendant

applies for community supervision . . . , the trial court may reasonably deem any character trait

that pertains to the defendant’s suitability for community supervision to be a relevant matter for

the sentencer to consider.” Sims, 273 S.W.3d at 295; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

37.07, § 3(a)(1). “[G]iven that the appellant applied for community supervision, any information

about h[is] character that was relevant to h[is] suitability for community supervision was

admissible.” Sims, 273 S.W.3d at 296; see Pantoja, 496 S.W.3d at 192 (noting that sentencer

would want to consider defendant’s character “in determining an appropriate punishment for

Pantoja and whether Pantoja could adequately complete the demands of community

supervision”).

Here, evidence regarding Lin’s plans during the potential period of community

supervision was relevant to the trial court’s decision whether to grant community supervision.

Also, evidence regarding Lin’s truthfulness and behavior in relationships was relevant at

punishment to assess character and suitability for community supervision. The relationship

evidence contextualized prior conduct and then-current character and supported the State’s

7
To the extent Lin argues Rule 404, we overrule the issue. Lin did not object at trial based on Rule 404. A party’s
objection must state the grounds for the objection with “sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the
complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
11
sentencing theory that Lin was not a suitable candidate for community supervision. See Sims,

273 S.W.3d at 295.

As a result, we overrule Lin’s last point of error.

V. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeff Rambin
Justice

Date Submitted: August 26, 2025
Date Decided: December 15, 2025

Do Not Publish

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