Flightline Escrow, LLC and Danny Armstrong v. Stephanie Leavelle and Jet Zone, LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS

FLIGHTLINE ESCROW, LLC and DANNY § No. 08-25-00051-CV
ARMSTRONG,
§ Appeal from the
Appellants,
§ 198th District Court
v.
§ of Bandera County, Texas
STEPHANIE LEAVELLE and JET ZONE,
LLC, § (TC# CVDC-XX-XXXXXXX)

Appellees.

OPINION 1

Appellee Stephanie Leavelle (Stephanie) filed a petition for divorce against her husband,

Jason Leavelle (Jason), in Bandera County in January 2021 seeking a division of their community

assets and rulings on conservatorship issues with respect to their children. Stephanie amended her

petition to bring tort claims against Appellant Danny Armstrong (Armstrong), claiming Jason had

fraudulently transferred three million dollars in community property funds generated by Appellee

Jet Zone, LLC (Jet Zone), a company owned by the couple, to Armstrong though Armstrong’s

company, Appellant Flightline Escrow, LLC (Flightline), with the intent to defraud Stephanie and

1
The appeal was transferred to this Court from the Fourth Court of Appeals pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s
docket equalization efforts. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of that court to the extent it
conflicts with our own. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
deprive her of her interest in the funds. The trial court judge presiding at the time granted

Armstrong’s motion to sever the tort claims and transfer venue of those claims to Tarrant County,

where a Tarrant County judge later entered a take-nothing claim against Stephanie.

Stephanie thereafter amended her divorce petition several times, adding Flightline and Jet

Zone as co-respondents, bringing tort claims against Flightline that again centered on the allegedly

fraudulent transfer of the three million dollars into Flightline’s accounts. Acting on behalf of Jet

Zone, Stephanie also filed a cross-claim against Flightline and a third-party claim against

Armstrong (collectively, the Flightline Appellants), bringing tort claims against them centering on

the transfer of the same three million dollars. The Flightline Appellants filed motions to sever all

pending tort claims against them and transfer venue to Tarrant County, primarily arguing that the

2022 venue determination fixed venue in Tarrant County for Stephanie’s original claims against

Armstrong as well as her related claims against them. The trial judge who heard the motions

disagreed and issued two separate orders denying the Flightline Appellants’ motions.

The Flightline Appellants appealed from both orders, and in the alternative, petitioned for

mandamus asking this Court to direct the trial court to sever and transfer the claims against them

to Tarrant County. We conclude that the trial court’s order is not appealable, but that mandamus

relief is appropriate as the 2022 venue ruling permanently fixed venue in Tarrant County for all of

the pending tort claims against the Flightline Appellants.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Stephanie files tort claims against Armstrong

In January 2021, Stephanie filed her original petition for divorce against Jason in Bandera

County, where the couple had been residing. Stephanie testified at a venue hearing that she and

Jason owned Jet Zone, an airplane brokerage company through which Jason sold private aircraft

2
to individuals and corporations. She testified that Jason created escrow company Hillstyle

Holdings into which he would typically place Jet Zone’s revenue, the family’s only source of

income during their marriage. According to Stephanie, Jason had transferred approximately three

million dollars belonging to Jet Zone into Hillstyle’s escrow account—or into another unidentified

escrow account—then transferred it to Flightline, which she alleged was another escrow company

Jason and Armstrong had started together.

In her first and second amended petitions, which she filed in June 2022 and October 2022

respectively, Stephanie added Armstrong as a “co-respondent,” bringing two tort claims against

him. First, she brought a cause of action labeled “Relief from Third-Party for Fraudulent Transfer,”

alleging Jason fraudulently transferred at least three million dollars in community property to

Armstrong through transfers to Hillstyle Holdings, LLC—a company owned and operated by

Jason—and Flightline Escrow—a company owned by Armstrong and/or Armstrong and Jason

jointly—“without consideration and/or for less than reasonably equivalent value,” for the purpose

of defrauding Stephanie “of community property rights.” Stephanie alleged that, during her

marriage to Jason, Armstrong was the couple’s accountant for their personal and corporate

finances and he therefore had knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transfer and of Jason’s

“intent to injure [her] rights.”

Second, Stephanie brought a cause of action against Armstrong for civil conspiracy,

alleging Jason and Armstrong conspired to withhold financial information from her and

fraudulently transferred the three million dollars in community property funds “into accounts held

by Flightline Escrow, a company started by [Jason] and [Armstrong].” Once again, she alleged

that, because Armstrong was aware of the parties’ finances, he knew the transferred funds were

3
community property and the transfers were “unlawfully made for the purpose of defrauding the

community estate.”

Stephanie sought an order setting aside the transfer as fraudulent and declaring the assets

community property and/or Stephanie’s separate property; actual damages for the loss of the

transferred assets; exemplary damages against both Jason and Armstrong, claiming they acted with

malice; and temporary and permanent injunctive relief against Jason and Armstrong to prohibit

them from conveying or encumbering the property in question.

B. The predecessor trial judge grants Armstrong’s joint motion to sever and
transfer the tort claims against him to Tarrant County

In August 2022, Armstrong filed a joint motion to sever Stephanie’s “fraud” and

“conspiracy” tort claims against him from the divorce proceedings and transfer those claims to

Tarrant County. In support, Armstrong argued the tort claims were unrelated to Stephanie’s

divorce claims and there were “no common question[s] of law or fact.” Armstrong also argued that

the court was required to transfer the claims to Tarrant County where he resides, claiming venue

was improper in Bandera County pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.002,

which provides, in relevant part, that a lawsuit shall be brought “(1) in the county in which all or

a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred [or] (2) in the county

of defendant’s residence at the time the cause of action accrued if defendant is a natural person.”

In an unsworn declaration, Armstrong attested to being a resident of Tarrant County without

contacts with Bandera County. He further argued that none of the events Stephanie alleged in her

tort claims occurred in Bandera County. The trial court ruled in favor of Armstrong, finding

severance and transfer of the tort claims to Tarrant County appropriate.

4
At the same time, the trial court granted Armstrong’s special exceptions, which sought to

clarify Stephanie’s claims pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91, and directed Stephanie

to amend her pleadings to clarify her claims within 30 days. 2 After Stephanie filed her second

amended petition, the severed tort claims against Armstrong were transferred to Tarrant County

on November 30, 2022.

C. The Tarrant County trial court issues a take-nothing judgment against
Stephanie

While the tort claims were pending in Tarrant County, in March 2023, Stephanie’s attorney

withdrew and Stephanie did not file any amended pleadings in that court. In May 2023, Armstrong

filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion, contending Stephanie failed to respond to any of

his discovery requests and no evidence supported her fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy

claims. Stephanie did not file an opposition to the motion.

The district court sent at least two hearing notices to the parties, and in August 2023, it

granted Flightline summary judgment motion and entered a take-nothing judgment against

Stephanie on both tort claims against Armstrong. The trial court stated that it was a final judgment

disposing of all claims and parties. Stephanie did not appeal.

D. Stephanie amends her petitions adding Flightline as a co-respondent

It does not appear that any additional proceedings took place in the Bandera County court

while the Tarrant County proceedings were pending. In the meantime, a new trial judge took the

bench in the Bandera County court and began presiding over the parties’ divorce proceedings.

2
Rule 91 provides: “A special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also
point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency
in the allegations in the pleading excepted to.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91.

5
Beginning in December 2023, after retaining a new attorney, Stephanie filed four

additional amended divorce petitions ending with her Sixth Amended Petition in September 2024.

Significant to the current proceeding, in her Fourth Amended petition, Stephanie named Hillstyle,

Jet Zone, and Flightline as “co-respondents,” alleging Jason operated Hillstyle and Jet Zone as his

alter egos.

In her Fourth Amended Petition, Stephanie brought two causes of action sounding in tort.

First, on Hillstyle’s behalf, she alleged breach of fiduciary duty against Flightline, maintaining that

Flightline was an escrow company which held funds in trust for third parties, that it held money in

trust for Hillstyle, and that it therefore owed Hillstyle a fiduciary duty. She contended Flightline

breached its fiduciary duty to Hillstyle by using monies belonging to Hillstyle for Flightline’s

“personal gain” and by refusing Hillstyle’s demands to return the money and/or to provide it with

an “accurate accounting” of what happened to the money.

Second, Stephanie alleged “civil conspiracy” but did not state against whom that cause of

action was directed. However, she alleged, as she did in earlier petitions, that on or about 2018,

Jason and Armstrong conspired to withhold financial information from her, and transfer

approximately three million dollars into Flightline’s accounts “for the purpose of defrauding the

community estate.” Again, Stephanie sought actual and exemplary damages (without specifying

against whom), temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent any further transfers, and the

appointment of a receiver over Jet Zone and Hillstyle.

After answering the amended petition, Flightline again filed special exceptions, requesting

clarification of Stephanie’s claims. Stephanie thereafter filed her Sixth Amended Petition (her live

pleading), bringing an identical claim for civil conspiracy as alleged in her Fourth Amended

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Petition and the same claim of breach of fiduciary duty against Flightline on Hillstyle’s behalf. 3

However, Stephanie added an allegation that Flightline had given her “a 1099-MISC for personal

income of one million five hundred thirty thousand seven hundred fifty five dollars,” ostensibly

representing her one-half interest in the transferred three million dollars. Stephanie claimed that

she had never been given any of the money allegedly “assigned” to her by the 1099, and pointed

to the 1099 as further proof of Flightline’s fraud. 4

E. Jet Zone files a cross-claim against Hillstyle and Flightline plus a third-party
claim against Armstrong

In June 2024, on behalf of Jet Zone, Stephanie filed a cross-claim against Flightline and a

third-party claim against Armstrong. Stephanie alleged that, on or about 2020 or 2021, Jet Zone

sold its primary assets to an unidentified third party through a transaction allegedly handled by

Jason and Armstrong, but Jet Zone retained over three million dollars in escrowed funds after the

sale, which were initially held by Hillstyle. According to the pleadings, at some point during 2021,

Jason transferred his interest in Hillstyle to Armstrong, who Stephanie claimed was also Jet Zone’s

accountant. Stephanie alleged that, shortly after Armstrong took over Hillstyle’s operations, he

transferred the escrowed funds to Flightline, this time alleging Jason was its sole owner and Jet

Zone had since been unable to obtain information regarding the whereabouts of the funds.

Stephanie brought a brought a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the

Flightline Appellants on Jet Zone’s behalf, alleging they breached a fiduciary duty owed to Jet

3
In her Sixth Amended Petition, Stephanie added a new co-respondent, Kahlo Investments, LLC, a now defunct LLC
whose charter was forfeited in February 2024 for nonpayment of taxes. She alleged that Jason started Kahlo during
their marriage to purchase a home with funds he borrowed from Armstrong. Any claim Stephanie may have against
Kahlo is not at issue in this appeal.
4
At a hearing in the trial court, Jason’s attorney explained that there was some confusion regarding the issuance the
1099, contending that although it was mistakenly sent to Stephanie, it was never sent to the IRS, and accordingly,
there was “no IRS 1099.”

7
Zone when the escrowed funds were transferred to Flightline for less than their full value.

Stephanie accused the Flightline Appellants of self-dealing, fraud, and malice or gross negligence

in the transfer, and sought actual and exemplary damages for their alleged misconduct. She brought

a second cause of action against them on Jet Zone’s behalf for an alleged violation of the Texas

Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (TUFTA), claiming the transfer was made fraudulently to

render Jet Zone insolvent and defeat Jet Zone’s creditors. Stephanie sought injunctive relief to

prohibit the transfer of any additional escrowed funds belonging to Jet Zone. She further sought

an audit, the appointment of a receiver, and damages against the Flightline Appellants for their

alleged wrongdoing.

F. The Flightline Appellants file a rule 12 motion

The Flightline Appellants filed a Rule 12 motion challenging Stephanie’s authority to act

on behalf of Jet Zone, contending that, because Jet Zone was an LLC, it could only act through a

majority of its members and Stephanie was not its sole member. Stephanie responded that she was

Jet Zone’s sole member, but even if she were not, she had the right to assert Jet Zone’s claim due

to the failure of its other members to act on its behalf. It does not appear that the trial court ever

ruled on that motion.

G. The Flightline Appellants move to sever and transfer the tort claims against them
to Tarrant County

Flightline filed a motion to sever and transfer Stephanie’s tort claims against it to Tarrant

County, and the Flightline Appellants jointly filed a similar motion with respect to the tort claims

Stephanie filed against them on Jet Zone’s behalf. 5 In their respective motions, the Flightline

5
In its motion, Flightline also argued in the alternative that the trial court should dismiss the claim Stephanie brought
on Hillstyle’s behalf, contending Stephanie did not have standing. It does not appear that the trial court ruled on
Flightline’s motion to dismiss.

8
Appellants raised res judicata and collateral estoppel to argue the trial court’s earlier 2022 order

fixing venue of Stephanie’s tort claims against Armstrong in Tarrant County had a preclusive

effect that required venue of Stephanie’s current tort claims in Tarrant County. According to the

Flightline Appellants, her current claims involved the same alleged transfer of three million dollars

and the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. In the alternative, they argued

that, assuming the 2022 order did not apply, venue was proper in Tarrant County as Armstrong

resided there, Flightline’s principal place of business was there, and they had no contacts with

Bandera County.

In response, Stephanie argued her tort claims against the Flightline Appellants were all

factually related to the community property division issues in her divorce; they involved the same

evidence; and she had no other way to value the community assets without including the tort claims

in the divorce proceedings. She pointed out that, in his deposition, Jason said he was not sure who

owned the funds at issue. She further argued venue was proper in Bandera County because all the

acts and omissions she alleged occurred there.

Although Jet Zone did not file a separate response to the Flightline Appellants’ motion to

sever and transfer venue, after the special exceptions were filed, Jet Zone filed a second amended

petition bringing the same allegations plus an allegation addressing severance and venue. In that

petition, Jet Zone maintained its claims against the Flightline Appellants were properly heard in

the divorce proceedings in Bandera County because they arose from the “same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” at issue in Stephanie’s divorce petition, i.e.,

the same allegedly improper transfer of community property funds “through the improper actions

of Respondent Jason,” all of which occurred in Bandera County.

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H. The trial court issues its ruling

The trial court held a hearing on the Flightline Appellants’ motions, during which the

parties focused primarily on whether the trial court’s earlier severance and venue ruling was

binding on the current tort claims against the Flightline Appellants. Following the hearing, the

court issued two separate orders denying both motions to sever and transfer venue of the pending

tort claims. The Flightline Appellants appealed from both orders.

The Flightline Appellants contend the trial court’s orders are appealable interlocutory

orders and this Court should conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant

their motions and reverse the trial court’s orders. In the alternative, the Flightline Appellants

contend that, if the orders are not appealable, they are entitled to mandamus relief as the trial court

committed a clear abuse of discretion and they lack an adequate remedy by appeal.

II. THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE
We first consider whether the trial court’s orders denying the Flightline Appellants’ motions

to sever and transfer venue to Tarrant County are appealable interlocutory orders. For the reasons

below, we conclude they were not.

A. Applicable law

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly provides that no interlocutory

appeals are permitted from a trial court’s venue determination. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d

257, 259–60 (Tex. 2008) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a) (providing that a

court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits, and that “[n]o

interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination”); Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(6) (providing that

“[t]here shall be no interlocutory appeals” from determinations made on motions to transfer

venue)); see also Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc., 68 S.W.3d 254, 257–58

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(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (recognizing that “[t]he legislature has provided that no

interlocutory appeal is available from a trial court’s determination of a venue question” and that

“[g]enerally, a party must await a final judgment to appeal an erroneous venue ruling”).

However, as the Flightline Appellants point out, in 2003, the Texas Legislature created a

limited exception to this general rule by amending Texas Practice and Remedies Code § 15.003 to

allow interlocutory appeals of a trial court’s venue determination in certain cases in which there is

more than one plaintiff. 6 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.003(b). Section 15.003 (a)

provides, “In a suit in which there is more than one plaintiff, whether the plaintiffs are included by

joinder, by intervention, because the lawsuit was begun by more than one plaintiff, or otherwise,

each plaintiff must, independently of every other plaintiff, establish proper venue.” Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code Ann. § 15.003(a). It further provides that “[i]f a plaintiff cannot independently

establish proper venue, that plaintiff’s part of the suit, including all of that plaintiff’s claims and

causes of action, must be transferred to a county of proper venue or dismissed, as is appropriate”

except under certain four specified conditions set forth in subsections (a)(1)–(4). 7

Subsection (b) provides, “An interlocutory appeal may be taken of a trial court’s

determination under Subsection (a) that (1) a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper

venue; or (2) a plaintiff that did not independently establish proper venue did or did not establish

the items prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)–(4).” Id. § 15.003(b)(1–2). As the Texas Supreme Court

6
We note that the prior version of § 15.003, which was amended effective September 1, 2003, did not provide for
appeals of this nature. See Rush Truck Centers of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, No. 24-0040, 2025 WL 1599527, at *1 (Tex. June
6, 2025).

7
Those conditions are: “(1) joinder of that plaintiff or intervention in the suit by that plaintiff is proper under the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) maintaining venue as to that plaintiff in the county of suit does not unfairly
prejudice another party to the suit; (3) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff's claim tried in the county in
which the suit is pending; and (4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff
and all persons against whom the suit is brought.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).

11
recently explained, this statute is limited and only applies when there are multiple plaintiffs and

when the trial court has made an independent determination of venue with respect to each plaintiff.

See Rush Truck Centers of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, No. 24-0040, 2025 WL 1599527, at *1 (Tex. June 6,

2025) (recognizing that the “mere presence of multiple plaintiffs in front of the [trial court] does

not suffice to invoke appellate jurisdiction” and that “Section 15.003(b) permits interlocutory

appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue”). “Put differently,

Section 15.003(b) applies only to venue determinations to retain or transfer one of the plaintiffs

within a suit—not to every venue determination that happens to involve multiple plaintiffs.” Id. at

*4.

B. Analysis

At issue here is whether this lawsuit is one in which there is more than one plaintiff for

which the trial court made an independent determination of venue within the meaning of § 15.003.

The Flightline Appellants contend that, although Stephanie was the original and only plaintiff in

the case, Jet Zone should also be considered a “plaintiff” for purposes of § 15.003 based on its

third-party petition against Armstrong and cross-claim against Flightline. In making their

argument, the Flightline Appellants point to the broad language in § 15.003 (a) providing that it

applies to venue determinations made in suits in which multiple plaintiffs began the suit, as well

as suits in which plaintiffs were brought in by “joinder,” “intervention,” “or otherwise.” According

to the Flightline Appellants, despite “Jet Zone’s nominal status as a cross/third-party plaintiff,” it

is ‘“otherwise’ a plaintiff under § 15.003.” In turn, they argue the trial court’s orders determining

venue involved multiple plaintiffs and were therefore appealable under § 15.003(b). We disagree.

As Stephanie points out, when, as here, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims

are at issue, § 15.062—not § 15.003—governs venue determinations. Section 15.062 provides that

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“[v]enue of the main action shall establish venue of a counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party

claim properly joined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or any applicable statute.” Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.062 (a). Based on the plain language of the Code, venue of third-

party claims is determined by venue of the main action. See Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital

Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 130–32 (Tex. 2018). Significantly, § 15.062 provides no

exceptions to the general rule regarding the non-appealability of venue determinations.

The Third Court of Appeals examined the interplay between § 15.003 and § 15.0062 in

Pedison USA, Inc. v. CNC Constr. Inc., No. 02-16-00271-CV, 2016 WL 6900877, at *1–2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Pedison, the original suit was

between one plaintiff and one defendant; however, the defendant then brought a claim against a

third-party defendant. Id. at *1. The original plaintiff subsequently nonsuited the case, and the

third-party defendant filed a motion to sever the claims against it and transfer venue. Id. The trial

court denied the motion, and the third-party defendant attempted to appeal the order pursuant to

§ 15.003(b), contending it was one of “multiple plaintiffs” within the meaning of that Code

provision. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding § 15.003 is “inapplicable to a defendant’s

third-party claim against third-party defendants.” Id. at *2 (citing Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc.,

438 S.W.3d 556, 558 n.16 (Tex. 2014) (“[A] third-party plaintiff . . . is not a ‘plaintiff’ but a

‘defendant suing a non-party.’”); Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517, 520

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (holding that filing of a cross-claim did not transform

party into a “plaintiff” because party was already part of the suit)). The court went on to hold that

“[s]ection 15.062 governs venue of third-party claims, not section 15.003.” Id. (citing Hopson v.

Dallas ISD, No. 05–02–01819–CV, 2003 WL 402881, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 24, 2003,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that joinder of third–party claims is governed by § 15.062, not

13
§ 15.003)). The court concluded that “no statutory authority exists for Appellants’ interlocutory

appeal of the trial court’s denial of their motion to sever and transfer venue of the third-party

claims.” Id.

Similarly, the Fourth Court of Appeals, whose precedent we must follow, relied on the

analysis in Pedison in concluding that § 15.003 does not apply in a situation in which a lawsuit

had been filed by one plaintiff, but where a defendant filed a cross-claim against the plaintiff.

Verdun Oil & Gas, LLC v. Quintanilla, No. 04-21-00156-CV, 2021 WL 1894901, at *2

(Tex. App.—San Antonio May 12, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Specifically, the court held that

a defendant’s filing of a cross claim against a plaintiff did not “transform” him into a “plaintiff”

for purposes of § 15.003. Id. (citing Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517, 520

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied)). The court therefore held that § 15.003 had no

applicability to the case, and that instead, the venue provisions in § 15.062 governed the case. Id.

(citing Pedison, 2016 WL 6900877 at *1–2); Harding Bars, 374 S.W.3d at 520). Consequently,

the court held that the trial court’s venue determination was not an appealable interlocutory order

under § 15.003(b). Id. at *2–3.

Here, Stephanie named Jet Zone as a defendant or “co-respondent” in the divorce

proceeding, and Jet Zone then filed its third-party claim against Armstrong and its cross-claim

against Flightline. Neither action transformed Jet Zone into a plaintiff for purposes of § 15.003.

We therefore conclude that § 15.003 does not apply to the trial court’s venue decision; instead,

§ 15.062 is the applicable venue statute. To hold otherwise would require us to ignore the

provisions in § 15.062 governing venue determinations in cases involving cross-claimants and

third-party defendants, and would render the provisions of § 15.062 meaningless. See In re Cnty.

of Galveston, 211 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (recognizing

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that if it were to apply the venue provisions in § 15.015 in the Code when a third-party defendant

had been named in the case, rather than § 15.062, the provisions in § 15.062 would be rendered

meaningless). This we decline to do.

We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, and we

dismiss the appeal.

III. THE FLIGHTLINE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF

We next consider the Flightline Appellants’ alternative request for mandamus relief based

on the preclusive effect of the trial court’s 2022 venue ruling.

A. Standard for granting mandamus relief

In general, mandamus relief is available only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when

there is no other adequate remedy at law. In re Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 562 S.W.3d 655, 659

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (citing In re M–I, L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016)

(orig. proceeding)). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when its decision is “so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Id. (citing M–I, L.L.C., 505

S.W.3d at 574); see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam)

(recognizing same). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying

the law to the particular facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

(Tex. 2004). Therefore, if the trial court fails to analyze or apply the law correctly, it has clearly

abused its discretion. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 562 S.W.3d at 659

“Mandamus should not issue to correct grievances that may be addressed by other

remedies.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207

(Tex. 2009) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). But, when “[u]sed

selectively, mandamus can ‘correct clear errors in exceptional cases and afford appropriate

15
guidance to the law without the disruption and burden of interlocutory appeal.’” Id. (quoting

Prudential., 148 S.W.3d at 138).

B. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

In arguing the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion in denying their motions to

sever and transfer venue, the Flightline Appellants primarily rely on the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel, contending the trial court’s 2022 venue determination fixed venue in

Tarrant County for the tort claims pending against them. 8

As the Fourth Court of Appeals has recognized, “res judicata is the generic term for a group

of related concepts concerning the conclusive effects given final judgments.” City of San Antonio

v. Cortes, 468 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (citing Barr v.

Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992)). “Within this doctrine, there are two

principal categories: (1) claim preclusion (also known as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion

(also known as collateral estoppel).” Id. “For res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a prior final

judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in

privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have

been raised in the first action.” Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449

(Tex. 2007) (citing Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)). For collateral

estoppel to apply, a party must establish three factors: “(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the

second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the

judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.” Sysco

Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). Collateral estoppel is “frequently

8
The Flightline Appellants also argue that, even if collateral estoppel did not apply, the trial court committed a clear
abuse of discretion by denying their motions, as venue is proper in Tarrant County rather than Bandera County.
Because we agree that collateral estoppel applies, we do not address this alternative argument.

16
characterized as issue preclusion because it bars relitigation of any ultimate issue of fact actually

litigated and essential to the judgment in a prior suit, regardless of whether the second suit is based

upon the same cause of action.” Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818

(Tex. 1984) (citing Wilhite v. Adams, 640 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. 1982); Benson v. Wanda

Petroleum Company, 468 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Tex. 1971)). The doctrine of collateral estoppel “is

designed to promote judicial efficiency and to prevent inconsistent judgments by preventing any

relitigation of an ultimate issue of fact.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579

(Tex. 2001).

C. Team Rocket and the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to venue
determinations

In Team Rocket, the Texas Supreme Court discussed res judicata and collateral estoppel in

the context of venue rulings. Team Rocket, 256 S.W. 3d at 260–61. In that case, the plaintiffs

initially filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the defendants in Harris County where the plaintiffs

resided. Id. at 258. The defendants challenged venue, asserting that they did not reside in Harris

County and that a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the cause of action did not occur

there. Id. at 258–59 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.002(a)(1)–(2). The Harris County

trial court determined venue was proper in Williamson County and transferred the case. Id. at 259.

The plaintiffs then voluntarily nonsuited their case and refiled in Fort Bend County. Id. Relying

on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the defendants moved to transfer venue to Williamson

County based on the Harris County trial court’s prior venue order. Id. After the Fort Bend County

trial court denied the motion, the defendants filed a petition seeking mandamus relief in the court

of appeals, but the court denied the petition. Id. The defendants then filed a petition for mandamus

in the Texas Supreme Court.

17
In granting the defendants’ relief, the Texas Supreme Court first agreed with the defendants’

argument that “only one venue determination may be made in a proceeding and that Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 87 specifically prohibits changes in venue after the initial venue ruling.” Id. (citing

Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(5) (“if an action has been transferred to a proper county in response to a motion

to transfer, then no further motions to transfer shall be considered”)). And because, at least under

the facts in that case, there was no right to appeal the venue decision, the court concluded that

“once the Harris County trial court transferred the cause to the proper venue of Williamson County,

venue was fixed permanently in Williamson County for these causes of action between these

parties.” Id. at 260.

In reaching its conclusion, the court pointed to the “long-standing and fundamental judicial

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which ‘promote judicial efficiency, protect parties

from multiple lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent judgments by precluding the relitigation’ of

matters that have already been decided or could have been litigated in a prior suit.” Id. (quoting

Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994)). The court recognized that

“[j]ust as a decision on the merits cannot be circumvented by nonsuiting and refiling the case, a

final determination fixing venue in a particular county must likewise be protected from

relitigation.” Id. It further explained that when a court makes a venue decision under Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code § 15.064, since there is no appeal from such a decision, “[t]he only

remedy afforded by the Legislature . . . is to proceed with trial in the transferee county and appeal

any judgment from that court on the basis of alleged error in the venue ruling.” Id. at 261 (citing

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064 (b) (“On appeal from the trial on the merits, if venue

was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error.”)). But the court

pointed out that the plaintiffs did not avail themselves of that remedy, and “instead attempted to

18
circumvent the venue ruling by nonsuiting and refiling” their petition in another county. Id. at 261.

It held that because the Harris County court’s venue determination was “conclusive as to those

parties and claims” and permanently fixed venue in Williamson County, the venue determination

could not be “overcome by a nonsuit and subsequent refiling in another county.” Id. at 260. To

interpret the provisions otherwise would allow forum shopping, a practice the court has repeatedly

prohibited. Id. at 263 (citing In re Autonation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 667–68 (Tex. 2007)). The

court therefore “conditionally grant[ed] the writ of mandamus directing the Fort Bend County trial

court to vacate its venue order and transfer the [plaintiffs’] case to Williamson County.” Id.

D. The decision to sever the claims essential to the court’s 2022 venue determination

Arguing that Team Rocket does not govern her case, Stephanie first notes that Team Rocket

did not involve a situation, as here, in which the trial court severed the parties’ claims before

transferring venue. Moreover, she points out that, in the present case, the trial court could not have

transferred her pending tort claims to a different county without first severing them from the

divorce proceeding. In turn, she contends the trial court properly refused to sever her newly raised

tort claims, maintaining they were directly related to her community property claims and it would

have been error for the court to split them into two different court proceedings. See, e.g., In re

Burgett, 23 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court

clearly abused its discretion by severing wife’s “third-party fraud action” brought in her divorce

proceeding against a corporation she and her husband owned along with the third-party defendant,

where her claims for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty involved ownership of

community property assets, and therefore the claims had to “be explored and determined” before

the court could “determine the nature, extent, and value of the community property and make a

proper division of it”).

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However, as explained above, the trial court was not writing on a clean slate in determining

the propriety of severing and transferring venue of Stephanie’s newly raised tort claims. Nor is this

Court. Instead, our focal point is whether the trial judge’s 2022 venue determination was final and

conclusive with respect to Stephanie’s pending tort claims. As Stephanie herself recognizes, when

the trial judge transferred venue of her tort claims to Tarrant County, it could not have done so

without first determining that severance was proper. In fact, the 2022 order expressly states that

the court was severing Stephanie’s tort claims for “fraud” and “civil conspiracy” from her divorce

case and transferring those severed claims to Tarrant County. 9 Accordingly, the court’s

determination that severance was proper was fundamental to the venue determination, and to the

extent collateral estoppel applies to the venue determination, it will apply to the court’s severance

determination as well. 10 See generally Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802

(Tex. 1992) (“Collateral estoppel also precludes the relitigation of essential issues of law that were

litigated and determined in a prior action.”).

E. Venue of Stephanie’s tort claims against Flightline fixed in Tarrant County

We first consider whether the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata required the

trial court to apply the 2022 venue determination to Stephanie’s newly raised tort claims against

9
As set forth above, the Tarrant County trial court, out of an abundance of caution, also stated in its final judgment
that it was severing those tort claims from the divorce proceeding.

10
Stephanie also contends that the Flightline Appellants did not adequately brief the issue of severance, and we should
therefore dismiss both their appeal and their mandamus petition on briefing waiver. See Bertucci v. Watkins, 709
S.W.3d 534, 541 (Tex. 2025) (recognizing that the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure “require adequate briefing”
and that “a failure to comply with these rules can result in waiver”) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record.”)). As the Flightline Appellants point out, however, they did in fact address the issue of severance both in the
trial court and in their appellate briefing. In any event, the question before us is not whether severance was proper, but
whether the trial court’s prior ruling on severance and venue in 2022 precluded the trial court from making a different
ruling in 2024.

20
Flightline. Stephanie appears to concede that after her tort claims against Armstrong were

transferred to Tarrant County and the court issued its final take-nothing judgment, the trial court’s

2022 venue determination became final as to those claims. Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 261.

However, she contends the 2022 order has no preclusive effect on the tort claims that are currently

pending against Flightline because they are “new claims against a different defendant.” Flightline

counters that the 2022 venue ruling permanently fixed venue for her newly raised tort claims, as

they involved the same subject matter, i.e., whether the three million dollars was fraudulently

transferred to Flightline’s accounts, and the same parties or those in privity with the original

parties. Flightline therefore contends that, consistent with the trial court’s opinion in Team Rocket,

the trial court’s 2022 venue ruling has a final and preclusive effect in determining the proper venue

of Stephanie’s current claims. 11 See Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 261.

(1) Effect of Flightline’s special exceptions

As a preliminary matter, Stephanie maintains Flightline is precluded from arguing that her

current claims involved the same subject matter because Flightline filed special exceptions to her

Fourth Amended Petition arguing her claims did not provide sufficient notice of the basis of her

allegations. According to Stephanie, if Flightline did not understand the nature of her allegations,

it would be illogical if not impossible for Flightline to argue that her claims centered on the same

subject matter as the claims that Stephanie brought against Armstrong. According to Stephanie,

Flightline therefore essentially “pled [itself] out of ‘preclusive theory.’” We note, however, that

after Flightline filed its special exceptions to Stephanie’s Fourth Amended Petition, she filed her

11
Flightline does not argue that Stephanie was collaterally estopped from bringing her claims against Flightline by
the Tarrant County’s final judgment in which it rendered a take-nothing judgment against Stephanie. Instead,
Flightline’s sole argument is that the trial court’s 2022 venue determination collaterally estopped her from re-litigating
the venue issue. That is the only issue we address in this appeal.

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live petition. Flightline did not file special exceptions to that petition, thereby impliedly

acknowledging it understood her claims. Moreover, we conclude that the allegations in Stephanie’s

live petition are clear enough to allow us to determine whether her claims centered on the same

subject matter as her earlier claims against Armstrong.

(2) Stephanie’s tort claims involve the same subject matter

Turning to the question of whether Stephanie’s two tort claims against Flightline involve

the same subject matter as her claims against Armstrong, we first note that her civil conspiracy

claim against Flightline is an almost verbatim duplication of her civil conspiracy claim against

Armstrong. In both petitions, Stephanie alleged Armstrong and Jason conspired to conceal

financial information and transfer three million dollars of Jet Zone’s income belonging to the

marital estate “into accounts held by Flightline Escrow” for the purpose of defrauding her and

depriving her of her share of the community funds. Although Stephanie does not name Armstrong

as a co-respondent in her live pleading, her current civil conspiracy claim appears to be directed

at Armstrong rather than Flightline, as she expressly alleges that the conspiracy was between Jason

and Armstrong, not between Jason and Flightline. We therefore conclude that these two claims

share the same subject matter.

In her second cause of action against Flightline, Stephanie attempts to recast her claim

somewhat, purporting to bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of Hillstyle,

claiming Flightline owed it a fiduciary duty, which Flightline breached when it allegedly used

Hillstyle’s funds for its “own personal gain.” But collateral estoppel may still apply to different

tort claims based on the same subject matter. As the Fourth Court of Appeals has recognized,

collateral estoppel “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and

resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in

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the context of a different claim.” City of San Antonio, 468 S.W.3d at 586 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (emphasis in original)). Thus, even if a plaintiff brings “a slightly

different claim [if] it is based on the same facts as the first proceeding [then] collateral estoppel

would still apply.” Id. (citing Proctor v. Dist. of Columbia, 74 F. Supp.3d 436, 451 (D. D. C. 2014)).

A closer examination of Stephanie’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action reveals that

it is based on the same alleged facts about which Stephanie complained in her earlier fraud and

civil conspiracy claims against Armstrong. As in her earlier pleadings, Stephanie alleges Jason

transferred funds generated from Jet Zone to Hillstyle then “coordinated” with Armstrong to

conceal financial information and transfer the money to Flightline to defraud her. Although

Stephanie alleged she was bringing her claim on behalf of Hillstyle, she sought damages on her

own behalf, again alleging the transferred funds were community property and Flightline’s

wrongdoing deprived her of her interest. 12 We therefore conclude that this claim also centered on

the same subject matter she raised in her earlier pleadings against Armstrong.

(3) Armstrong and Flightline in privity for purposes of collateral estoppel

We next consider whether Stephanie’s claims involved the same parties or those in privity

with the original parties for purposes of applying the 2022 venue determination. Stephanie finds it

significant that her original claims were against Armstrong rather than Flightline. As Flightline

notes, however, strict mutuality of parties is not required to apply the doctrine of collateral

estoppel; to the contrary, collateral estoppel applies in cases in which the parties, including newly

12
In her pleading, Stephanie also alleged Hillstyle was damaged by Flightline’s actions, as Hillstyle had an interest
in the transferred funds and Flightline was holding the money in its account and refusing to return it. But there is
nothing in the record to suggest that Stephanie had standing to bring a claim on Hillstyle’s behalf; to the contrary, she
alleged in her pleadings and testified at the venue hearing that Jason had created Hillstyle as his own company and
she had no membership interest. Nor was Hillstyle named as a plaintiff in the case. Accordingly, Stephanie’s claim
against Flightline was just that: a claim against Flightline for her own alleged damages.

23
named defendants, are in privity with the original defendants. See First Sabrepoint Capital Mgmt.,

L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc., 712 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Tex. 2025) (recognizing that when new parties

are added as defendants, sufficient evidence must establish that they were in privity with the

original named defendant before the doctrine of collateral estoppel will apply) (citing Wilhite, 640

S.W.2d at 876 (“Under a plea of collateral estoppel, essential issues of fact . . . are binding in a

subsequent action between the same parties and those who stand in privity with them.”)).

Thus, a plaintiff may not circumvent a venue ruling by nonsuiting their claims—or by

allowing their claims to be reduced to judgment—then refiling new claims involving the same

factual issues against the original parties or parties in privity therewith. See Miller v. State & Cnty.

Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (concluding that

where multiple suits were filed in an insurance coverage case, collateral estoppel applied to the

trial court’s venue determination in the original suit and it was thereby binding on subsequently

filed suits involving the same subject matter, where parties were in privity with the original party);

see also Ryan Marine Services, Inc. v. Hoffman, 668 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (concluding that trial court’s venue ruling in appellees’ first suit involving a

collision between two vessels at sea was final, and the venue decision could not be “circumvented”

by nonsuiting the case and refiling the suit with the addition of a new negligence claim and a new

defendant, where the same subject matter, i.e., the collision, was at issue) (citing In re Lowe’s Home

Centers, L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, orig. proceeding)).

“There is no general definition of privity that can be automatically applied in all res judicata

cases; the circumstances of each case must be examined.” Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 800; see

also Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 852 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet.

denied) (recognizing that “there is no generally prevailing definition of privity which can be

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automatically applied to all cases involving the doctrine of res judicata and the determination of

who are privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of each case as it arises”).

However, it is well-established that “parties may be in privity if (1) they ‘control an action,’ (2)

‘their interests can be represented by a party to the action,’ or (3) they are ‘successors in interest.’”

Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 225 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Amstadt, 919

S.W.2d at 653). Stated otherwise, “[p]rivity exists if the parties share an identity of interests in the

basic legal right that is the subject of litigation.” Raddatz v. Gem Rental Properties, LLC, No. 04-

16-00365-CV, 2017 WL 685751, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 653).

Here, both Armstrong and Flightline share the same basic “legal interest” in defending

against Stephanie’s claims, i.e., in attempting to establish they did not engage in any wrongdoing

with respect to concealing financial information or allegedly transferring funds into Flightline’s

accounts. In her own pleadings, Stephanie has repeatedly alleged that Flightline was a company

owned and operated by Armstrong. And in both of her tort claims in her live petition, she alleges

Jason either conspired with Armstrong or coordinated with him in making the allegedly fraudulent

transfer to Flightline. 13 Accordingly, we conclude that Armstrong and Flightline stood in privity

with each other in terms of Stephanie’s allegations of wrongdoing for collateral estoppel purposes.

See Mendez v. Haynes Brinkley & Co., 705 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ

ref’d n.r.e.) (recognizing that the insurance company and its alleged agent were in privity for

13
Stephanie contends Armstrong and Flightline were not in privity because she sued them in “different capacities.”
According to Stephanie, in her earlier petitions, she sued Armstrong in his individual capacity, while in her current
suit, she is suing Flightline “as a fiduciary of Hillstyle Holdings.” This is only true of her claim for breach of fiduciary
duty but not for her claim of civil conspiracy. In any event, we view this distinction as one without a difference.
Regardless of whether Flightline was acting on behalf of Hillstyle, Stephanie viewed Armstrong and Flightline as
virtually the same entities, and she names them both as actors involved in the alleged breach.

25
purposes of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel where the plaintiff alleged the company’s

acts of wrongdoing occurred only through its agent).

We therefore conclude that the trial court’s 2022 venue determination applies to Stephanie’s

current tort claims against Flightline and is conclusive as to those claims. Accordingly, the trial

court committed a clear abuse of discretion when it denied Flightline’s motion to sever Stephanie’s

tort claims and transfer venue to Tarrant County.

F. Venue of Jet Zone’s claims against the Flightline Appellants fixed in Tarrant
County

We similarly conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the trial court’s

2022 venue determination with respect to Jet Zone’s tort claims against the Flightline Appellants.

(1) The effect of the Flightline Appellants’ special exceptions

Jet Zone contends the Flightline Appellants are precluded from arguing that its claims

involved the same subject matter as Stephanie’s earlier claims against Armstrong based on their

filing of special exceptions. As Stephanie did with respect to her claims against Flightline, Jet Zone

argues that if the Flightline Appellants were not able to understand the nature of its allegations,

they cannot now argue that its claims cover the same subject matter as the claims Stephanie

originally brought against Armstrong. We note, however, that after the Flightline Appellants filed

their special exceptions, Jet Zone filed its Second Amended Petition, which became Jet Zone’s

live pleading. The Flightline Appellants did not file special exceptions to that petition, impliedly

acknowledging that they understood the nature of Jet Zone’s allegations. Moreover, we conclude

that the allegations in Jet Zone’s Second Amended Petition are clear enough to allow us to

determine whether the claims in that petition centered on the same subject matter as Stephanie’s

earlier claims against Armstrong.

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(2) Jet Zone’s claims involve same subject matter

Turning to the question of whether Jet Zone’s two tort claims against the Flightline

Appellants involve the same subject matter as Stephanie’s claims against Armstrong, we conclude,

as we did with her claims against Flightline, that although she recast her claims to bring different

causes of action against the Flightline Appellants, fundamentally, they centered on the same

issue—whether the three million dollars was fraudulently transferred to Flightline’s accounts.

In its first cause of action, Jet Zone alleged the Flightline Appellants owed Jet Zone a

fiduciary duty, which they breached by allegedly transferring the three million dollars in funds

generated from Jet Zone’s business to other entities for less than their full value. In its second cause

of action, Jet Zone alleged a TUFTA violation, claiming the Flightline Appellants transferred the

funds in question from Jet Zone to themselves and/or to third parties knowing the transfer would

render Jet Zone insolvent and unable to pay its creditors.

These claims, although differing in nature and name from the claims Stephanie originally

brought against Armstrong for fraud and civil conspiracy, were again based on the same subject

matter and involved the same factual issue of whether the same three million dollars was

wrongfully transferred to either Armstrong or Flightline. In fact, in the venue statement Jet Zone

filed in support of its Second Amended Petition, Jet Zone expressly alleged that its claims involved

“[t]he same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” Stephanie alleged

against Jet Zone and Hillstyle in her “Original Claim,” which Jet Zone described as centering on

Jason’s “improper actions” of transferring the funds in question to Hillstyle and subsequently to

“Flightline and/or Armstrong.” Jet Zone further alleged the “subject matter” of its claims against

the Flightline Appellants was the same as the “subject of the Original Claim,” centering on the

“whereabouts” of the money and the “Defendants’ improper handling of Jet Zone’s funds.”

27
We therefore conclude that the claims that Stephanie brought on behalf of Jet Zone center

on the same subject matter as her claims against Armstrong for purposes of collateral estoppel.

(3) Parties were in privity for collateral estoppel purposes

Finally, we consider whether the parties were all in privity for purposes of applying the

doctrine of collateral estoppel to the trial court’s 2022 venue determination. We have already

concluded that Armstrong and Flightline were in privity with each other for purposes of collateral

estoppel with respect to the tort claims against them involving the transferred funds. The only

remaining question is whether Stephanie and Jet Zone were in privity as well.

Jet Zone contends it is not in privity with Stephanie with respect to its claims, as their “legal

interests” in the property at issue are different—Stephanie is seeking reimbursement of the funds

to the marital estate, while Jet Zone is asserting its own interest in the transferred funds. However,

as the Flightline Appellants note, this is not the only basis for finding the parties in privity. Instead,

as set forth above, parties are considered in privity for purposes of applying either collateral

estoppel or res judicata to a claim based on a finding that one party is exerting control over the

other in the litigation and/or that one party is representing the interests of the other party. See Getty

Oil, 845 S.W.2d at 800 (“Those in privity with a party may include persons who exert control over

the action [and] persons whose interests are represented by the party . . . .”).

Here, Stephanie’s own pleadings establish that she was exerting control over Jet Zone’s

claims against the Flightline Appellants. She alleged she was the “record owner of membership

interests in Jet Zone at all relevant [times],” and she could “fairly and adequately represent[] the

interests of Jet Zone and the interests of other shareholders similarly situated in enforcing its

rights.” In response to the Flightline Appellants’ Rule 12 motion contesting her authority to

represent Jet Zone, Stephanie again alleged she was Jet Zone’s “sole member” and had authority

28
to bring the lawsuit. We therefore conclude that, based on Stephanie’s own factual admissions, she

and Jet Zone were in privity for collateral estoppel purposes.

Accordingly, the trial court’s 2022 order fixed venue for Jet Zone’s tort claims against the

Flightline Appellants in Tarrant County. We therefore conclude the trial court clearly abused its

discretion in denying the Flightline Appellants’ motion to sever and transfer venue of those claims

to Tarrant County.

G. The Flightline Appellants lack an adequate remedy at law

Finally, we examine whether the Flightline Appellants have an adequate remedy at law.

Stephanie and Jet Zone contend they have an adequate remedy, as they may appeal the trial court’s

final judgment and contest the trial court’s venue determination at that time. She cites the Texas

Supreme Court’s holding in Walker v. Packer, in which the court reaffirmed its position that

mandamus will “issue only where there is no adequate remedy by appeal,” and that “[a]n appellate

remedy is not inadequate merely because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an

extraordinary writ.” See Walker, 827 S.W. 2d at 833.

A court, however, will not deny mandamus relief simply because a party may later

challenge a trial court’s interim order on appeal from a final judgment; such a rule would swallow

the rule allowing mandamus relief whole, as virtually any interim order may be challenged in such

an appeal. Instead, as the Flightline Appellants points out, the question of whether a party has an

adequate appellate remedy is determined by “balancing the benefits of mandamus review against

the detriments.” Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 262 (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at136). This is

In Team Rocket, the court noted that one consideration is “whether mandamus will preserve

important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss.” Id. The court noted that the

Texas venue statutes create important rights between the parties, and allowing the plaintiffs to defy

29
a trial court’s venue ruling by nonsuiting and refiling elsewhere impaired the defendant’s

procedural rights. Id. Here, too, we conclude that Stephanie’s actions in allowing her original tort

claims to be dismissed by the Tarrant County trial court without filing an appeal, then attempting

to recast her tort claims in Bandera County resulted in the same impairment of the Flightline

Appellants’ rights.

In Team Rocket, the court also considered whether “mandamus will spare litigants and the

public ‘the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136). The court noted that although it does

not generally grant a petition for mandamus for venue determinations absent extraordinary

circumstances, it has done so in the past—particularly when the trial court has clearly failed to

follow the law in applying the venue statute and issued a ruling that “would inevitably result in

considerable expense to taxpayers and defendants, requiring defendants to proceed to trial in the

wrong county is not an adequate remedy.” Id. (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137). While the

court recognized that an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because of delay or expense,

“extraordinary relief can be warranted when a trial court subjects taxpayers, defendants, and all of

the state’s district courts to meaningless proceedings and trials.” Id.

Here, we agree with the Flightline Appellants that this case involves extraordinary

circumstances, as not only did the Bandera County court initially transfer Stephanie’s court claims

to Tarrant County, but the Tarrant County trial court also issued a final judgment on those claims,

finding she had no evidence to support them. To allow her to recast her claims, and refile them

again in Bandera County when the trial court’s 2022 venue determination permanently fixed venue

in Tarrant County would result in just such a “meaningless” trial in the wrong county. We conclude

that the Flightline Appellants therefore have no adequate remedy at law and that mandamus relief

30
is appropriate. See In re Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d at 877 (concluding that, where

a Starr County court made an initial venue determination that would preclude an Hidalgo County

court from addressing the issue of venue, mandamus would issue to correct the Hidalgo County

court’s failure to give effect to that determination) (citing Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 260;

Fincher v. Wright, 141 S.W.3d 255, 264 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct

the Bandera County trial court to grant the Flightline Appellants’ motions to sever Stephanie and

Jet Zone’s tort claims from her divorce petition and transfer venue of those tort claims to Tarrant

County. The writ will issue only if the court fails to do so.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

June 30, 2025

Before Salas-Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

31