White Star Energy, Inc and County Royalty Acquisition Program, Inc. D/B/A Reagan County Royalty Company, Inc. v. Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC.

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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No. 08-24-00063-CV
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White Star Energy, Inc. and County Royalty Acquisition Program, Inc.
d/b/a Reagan County Royalty Company, Inc., Appellants

v.

Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 112th District Court
Reagan County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV02505

OPINION
This permissive appeal stems from one of a series of cases involving mass tax foreclosure

suits filed in West Texas in 1999. Among the hundreds of mineral interests foreclosed in the

underlying tax suit were certain interests owned by Anne Mounts Bradford. Appellants White Star

Energy, Inc. and County Royalty Acquisition Program, Inc. d/b/a Reagan County Royalty

Company, Inc. (collectively, White Star) purchased some or all of these interests at a tax sale on
July 6, 1999.1 In 2021, Appellee Ridgefield Permian Minerals, LLC purchased Bradford’s

remaining interests, if any. Ridgefield then sued White Star, bringing trespass-to-try-title and

quiet-title claims, among others.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Ridgefield’s motion,

denied White Star’s motion, and, damages not yet having been addressed by the parties, permitted

White Star to file this permissive interlocutory appeal.2 We vacate the trial court’s summary

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND
In 1982, Bradford acquired mineral interests in Section 46, Block 36, Township 5 South,

T&P RR Co. Survey, Reagan County, Texas. Specifically, she acquired an undivided one-third

mineral interest in the East Half (Tract A) of the property and an undivided one-twenty-fourth

mineral interest in the West Half (Tract B). By 1999, like many mineral interest owners in the area,

Bradford was allegedly delinquent in paying her property taxes.

What followed next somewhat resembles what occurred in Reeves County as described in

Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 184–86 (Tex. 2022). In short, like the taxing

authorities there, the Reagan County taxing authorities here filed a tax foreclosure suit against

numerous mineral interest owners, effected service solely by posting, and obtained a default

judgment against all defendants. And like the Mitchell heirs, who asserted that at the time of the

1
White Star asserts that all of Bradford’s interests in the property at issue were conveyed at the tax sale; Ridgefield
asserts that only some, if any, of her interests were conveyed. As explained below in n.3 of this opinion, the scope of
interests that may have been conveyed is not before us.
2
As explained below, the appeal came to this Court on the following controlling questions:
(1) Does [Ridgefield] have standing to assert the tax foreclosure judgment is void for lack of due
process? and
(2) Do any of the limitations and other clauses in the Tax Code [§§] 34.08(a), 34.08(c), or 33.54
apply to [Ridgefield’s] claims?

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tax judgment, deed records on file contained an address for Elizabeth Mitchell, here Ridgefield

asserts that the 1998 and 1999 Reagan County Mineral Tax Rolls contained an address for

Bradford. See id. at 184. Following the tax judgment, White Star purchased Bradford’s foreclosed

mineral interests at a tax sale and recorded its sheriff’s deed in August 1999.

More than two decades later, in October 2021, Ridgefield purchased Bradford’s remaining

mineral interests, if any, in the subject property, then filed this suit against White Star, bringing

trespass-to-try-title, quiet-title, declaratory-judgment, unjust-enrichment, and money-had-and-

received claims. Ridgefield’s claims are all rooted in its contention that it holds superior title

because the tax suit judgment against Bradford is void. More specifically, Ridgefield contends

Bradford’s due-process rights were violated in the tax suit because service by posting was

improper, thus the resulting default judgment was void and nothing was transferred in the sale of

her mineral interests to White Star.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. Ridgefield filed a traditional motion, arguing

that (1) the tax judgment against Bradford was void because her due-process rights were violated

by improper service of the tax suit, thus no interest was conveyed to White Star; and (2) no Tax

Code requirements apply to its claims, as the tax judgment was void. Among the exhibits attached

to Ridgefield’s motion were purported copies of 1998 and 1999 Reagan County Mineral Tax Roll

records reflecting a street address for Bradford.

In turn, White Star filed a traditional and no-evidence motion, arguing that (1) Ridgefield

lacks standing to assert that Bradford’s right to due process was violated; and (2) Ridgefield’s suit

is barred under several provisions of the Tax Code, including the one-year statute of limitations

under § 33.54(a). White Star also filed objections to Ridgefield’s summary judgment evidence,

including an objection that the purported tax roll pages submitted were unauthenticated. The record

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reflects no ruling on these objections but includes a motion requesting a ruling and a written

objection to the trial court’s refusal to rule.

The trial court initially granted Ridgefield’s motion for summary judgment without stating

any grounds. After White Star filed a motion for permissive appeal and both sides submitted related

memoranda and additional briefing, the trial court signed an amended interlocutory summary

judgment granting Ridgefield’s motion for summary judgment, denying White Star’s motion,

giving its reasons for doing so, and permitting White Star to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The

amended judgment did not address damages, which the parties had not yet briefed.

As to the basis for the trial court’s rulings, the amended judgment included (1) findings

that the 1999 tax suit judgment “was and is void as to [Bradford] . . . because the court in that suit

failed to obtain personal jurisdiction[,]” “the Sheriff’s Deed did not convey any of [Bradford’s]

interests,” and “none of the provisions of the Texas Tax Code providing a bar or condition

precedent to suit apply . . . nor does standing present any bar to [Ridgefield’s] claims”; and (2)

conclusions that “[White Star’s] claims to superior title running through the Sheriff’s Deed fail[,]”

and “[Ridgefield] established its claim to title through [Bradford] as the common source of title

and prevailed on its trespass to try title claim and quiet title claims.”

Further, the amended judgment granted White Star permission to pursue an interlocutory

appeal based on the following controlling questions of law:

(1) Does [Ridgefield] have standing to assert the tax foreclosure judgment is void
for lack of due process? and

(2) Do any of the limitations and other clauses in the Tax Code [§§] 34.08(a),
34.08(c), or 33.54 apply to [Ridgefield’s] claims?

In addition, the amended judgment found that an “immediate appeal . . . will materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because if these controlling issues of law are

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resolved in [White Star’s] favor, [Ridgefield] will be barred from litigating [its] claims”; and “if

these controlling issues of law are resolved in [Ridgefield’s] favor, there will be no procedural or

jurisdictional bars preventing [Ridgefield’s] claims.”

After the amended judgment was entered, White Star filed a petition for permissive appeal,

which we granted. Following oral argument, we invited the parties to submit additional briefing

on the issue of whether “the tax judgment against Bradford violated her due process rights and was

therefore void.” Both sides submitted supplemental briefs on this issue.

II. PERMISSIVE APPEAL
Permissive appeals are governed by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d)–

(h), Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3. Such an

appeal involves several steps. First, the order being appealed must “identify the controlling

question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and “state why

an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Tex. R.

Civ. P. 168; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d) (requiring same). While both

§ 51.014(d) and Rule 168 refer to “controlling question of law” in the singular, multiple controlling

questions may be certified. See Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 142

(Tex. 2022) (identifying multiple controlling questions). The controlling questions must be

questions of law unconstrained by procedural or factual issues. Aris Water Sols., Inc. v. Stateline

Operating, LLC, No. 08-25-00031-CV, 2025 WL 1207315, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 25,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Archibald v. El Paso Orthopedic Surgery Group, P.A., No. 08-22-

00091-CV, 2023 WL 2214184, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see

also El Paso Tool & Die Co., Inc. v. Mendez, 593 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no

pet.) (dismissing permissive appeal in part because evidence reflected disputed facts); Diamond

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Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. Handsel, 142 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no

pet.) (“The statute does not contemplate permissive appeals of summary judgments where the facts

are in dispute.”).

After the controlling questions have been certified by the trial court, the appealing party

must file a petition for permissive appeal with the appellate court, and the non-appealing party

must be given an opportunity to respond or file a cross-petition. Tex. R. App. P. 28.3; Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(f).

The appellate court must then decide whether to hear the appeal, which it has discretion to

accept or deny. Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 732

(Tex. 2019); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(j). In exercising its discretion, the appellate court is guided by

the legislative intent behind § 51.014(d): to favor “early, efficient resolution of determinative legal

issues[.]” Sabre, 567 S.W.3d at 732; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(f)

(appellate court “may accept an appeal permitted by [§ 51.014(d)]” if appellant shows why

immediate appeal is warranted) (emphasis added).

If the appeal is granted, the appellate court proceeds to “address the merits of the legal

issues certified,” including “all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to

resolving the controlling legal issue.” Elephant Ins., 644 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Tex. R. of App. P.

38.1(f), 53.2(f)).

If the appeal is denied, the appellate court must explain the reason for the denial. Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(g); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(l). The Texas Supreme Court may

review the denial de novo. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(h); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(l).

III. WHETHER EVIDENCE OF A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WAS PRESENTED
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo,

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considering all the evidence submitted, determining all the questions presented, and rendering the

judgment the trial court should have rendered. Thompson v. Landry, 713 S.W.3d 372, 376

(Tex. 2025). A traditional summary judgment movant has the burden to submit sufficient evidence

to establish on its face that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that the movant

is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC,

437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)). That is, the movant “must

conclusively prove every essential element of his claim or defense as a matter of law.” George

Fleming and Fleming & Associates, L.L.P. v. Wilson, 694 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. 2024). If the

movant meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to disprove or raise an issue

of fact as to at least one of those elements. Amedisys, 437 S.W.3d at 511.3

B. No evidence of lack of diligence in service
White Star’s traditional motion for summary judgment sought, among other things, to

establish an affirmative defense under Tax Code § 33.54(a), which provides that “an action relating

to the title to property may not be maintained against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale

unless the action is commenced . . . before the first anniversary of the date that the deed executed

3
Ridgefield contends the standard of review should further include the following: “When, as here, the trial court’s
summary judgment order does not state the basis for [its] decision, the [appellate] [c]ourt must uphold the order if any
of the theories advanced in the motion are meritorious,” citing Provident Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d
211, 216 (Tex. 2003). However, Provident is inapplicable here, as the trial court’s order did state the basis for its
decision, including the court’s findings that the 1999 tax suit judgment “was and is void as to [Bradford] . . . because
the court in that suit failed to obtain personal jurisdiction,” “the Sheriff’s Deed did not convey any of [Bradford’s]
interests[,]” and “none of the provisions of the Texas Tax Code providing a bar or condition precedent to suit apply
. . . nor does standing present any bar to [Ridgefield’s] claims” as well as the resulting conclusions that “[White Star’s]
claims to superior title running through the Sheriff’s Deed fail[,]” and “[Ridgefield] established its claim to title
through [Bradford] as the common source of title and prevailed on its trespass to try title claim and quiet title claims.”
In contrast, the order did not address Ridgefield’s alternative theory that, even if the tax judgment was valid, “the
Sheriff’s Deed only conveyed the royalty interests in the Merchant Unit Tract 3 well(s) in Tract B owned by Bradford
and did not convey the underlying minerals in the Subject Tract or any of the Tract A Interest, which remained with
Bradford and are now owned by Ridgefield.” Nor was this alternative theory fully briefed by the parties. As a result,
we decline to consider it. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996) (holding that in
interest of judicial economy, appellate court may consider alternative grounds not ruled on by trial court, but declining
to do so in absence of full briefing by the parties, among other factors).

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to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record[.]” See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.54(a).

In response, Ridgefield did not dispute that this suit was commenced more than 20 years

after White Star acquired its interest in the property at issue at a tax sale. Instead, Ridgefield argued

that its trespass-to-try-title claim merely required it to make a prima facie showing of good title

from a common source, i.e., Bradford, to shift the burden to White Star to show it had superior

title. Ridgefield maintained that White Star “cannot avoid [its] burden of proof by invoking the

statute of limitations” and “cannot . . . just claim victory through limitations[.]” However,

Ridgefield cited no authority for the proposition that a trespass-to-try-title claim is not subject to

§ 33.54(a), and it did not explain how, under the plain language of § 33.54(a), a trespass-to-try-

title claim would not constitute “an action relating to the title to property[.]” Further, as White Star

noted, other courts of appeals have held that trespass-to-try-title claims are subject to § 33.54(a).

See, e.g., Haynes v. DOH Oil Co., 647 S.W.3d 793, 800 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.)

(holding that trespass-to-try-title claim was barred by § 33.54(a)); Roberts v. T.P. Three

Enterprises, Inc., 321 S.W.3d 674, 679 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)

(same); Session v. Woods, 206 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (same).

Such cases are inapplicable here, Ridgefield argued, because “the Texas Supreme Court

[has] held in no uncertain terms that a void judgment [i]s always subject to challenge and no

limitations bar applie[s],” citing Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d at 194. And Ridgefield contended that as in

Mitchell, here too “the tax suit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the common-source

[taxpayer] defendant because the taxing entity violated her due process rights by failing to exercise

any diligence towards locating her or effecting personal service before serving by posting.”

However, the law governing this case has developed meaningfully since the summary

judgment proceedings were ruled on in the trial court in February of 2024. In particular, in April

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of 2024, the Texas Supreme Court clarified (1) which side has the burden of proof as to whether a

due-process violation in the underlying tax suit renders the limitations provision in § 33.54(a)

inoperable; and (2) whether a defendant taxpayer’s address found in a public record is by itself

sufficient to prove such a violation. Gill v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2024). While Mitchell held

that “citation by publication or posting violates due process when the address of a known defendant

is readily ascertainable from public records,” 649 S.W.3d at 190—language Ridgefield cites in its

supplemental brief—Gill clarified that the Mitchell plaintiffs “presented evidence . . . showing an

address at which the former property owner . . . could have been reached and notified of the

foreclosure suit.” 688 S.W.3d at 869–70 (emphasis added).

Here, in contrast, while Ridgefield presented purported copies of tax roll pages showing an

address for Bradford, it presented no evidence that Bradford “could have been reached and

notified” at this address. As a result, White Star contends, “on the summary judgment record

provided, it is impossible . . . to determine whether Bradford’s due process rights were violated,”

thus “Ridgefield did not satisfy its burden to establish same as a matter of law.” Ridgefield, in turn,

maintains “its burden [wa]s to show its claim to the title, which then put[] [White Star] to the

burden to prove superior title,” a burden the trial court found White Star “could not meet.” We

agree with White Star that it was Ridgefield’s burden to prove—not White Star’s burden to

disprove—that Bradford’s due-process rights were violated. In reaching this conclusion, we are

guided by Gill.

Gill arose out of the same 1999 tax foreclosure suit as Mitchell. Id. at 866, 868. Like the

Mitchell defendants, the Gill defendants purchased certain mineral interests at the associated tax

foreclosure sale and, more than a decade-and-a-half later, were sued by successors-in-title to the

prior owners who had been adjudged delinquent. Id. at 866. The Gill plaintiffs claimed their

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predecessors’ due-process rights were violated by improper service by posting in the tax suit. Id.

However, the Gill plaintiffs presented no evidence of a due-process violation. Id. at 868, 871. In

an attempt to overcome this deficiency on appeal, the Gill plaintiffs asked the Texas Supreme

Court to take judicial notice of its own conclusion in Mitchell that Elizabeth S. Mitchell was

improperly served in the 1999 tax suit, arguing that if service by posting was improper for one

defendant in that suit, the same was true for the others. Id. at 871.

The high court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it explained that appellate

courts may take judicial notice only of facts either “generally known within the trial court's

territorial jurisdiction” or “accurately and readily determin[able] from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned,” neither of which category includes facts such as “whether a

particular type of notice comports with due-process.” Id. Second, it explained that whether due

process was afforded a particular party is an “individualized inquiry,” and “the facts that made

notice by posting insufficient . . . in Mitchell do not necessarily make notice by posting improper

for [the Gill plaintiffs’ predecessors]”:

[T]he appropriate level of diligence needed to satisfy due process is an
individualized inquiry. If the evidence shows that [the Gill plaintiffs’ predecessors]
w[ere] nowhere to be found after a diligent inquiry, then alternative service by
posting may have sufficed. See Mullane [v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.],
339 U.S. [306,] 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 [(1950)] (distinguishing the
appropriate notice for those “whose interests or addresses” are unknown); Walker
v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116, [77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178], [ ] (1956)
(“[I]n some cases it might not be reasonably possible to give personal notice, for
example where people are missing or unknown.”); see also Mitchell, 649 S.W.3d
at 189–90 (discussing what distinguishes the adequacy of notice by posting versus
notice by service). Unlike the petitioners in Mitchell, the [Gill plaintiffs] adduced
no individualized proof regarding the ease or difficulty with which [their
predecessors] could have been located and served.

Id. As a result, in the absence of such individualized proof, the Texas Supreme Court concluded

that the trial court in Gill correctly granted, and we correctly affirmed, summary judgment in favor

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of the defendants, i.e., the parties who acquired the property at the tax sale. Id.

Further, as to who carries the burden of proof, Gill explained that there are two types of

defenses a non-movant might raise in response to a limitations affirmative defense: (1) those that

argue certain days should not be counted, which place the burden on the movant; and (2) those that

concede limitations expired yet argue limitations should not apply, which place the burden on the

non-movant. Id. at 870. Ultimately, the distinction is between defenses that toll certain days and

defenses that avoid limitations entirely. Id. A defense that the one-year-limitations period under §

33.54(a) expired before suit was filed yet limitations should not apply because of a due-process

violation in the underlying tax suit falls under the latter category, thereby placing the burden of

proof on the non-movant, here Ridgefield. See id. at 870–71.

As White Star notes, Ridgefield produced neither “any ‘individualized proof regarding the

ease or difficulty’ with which Bradford could have been located and served,” nor “evidence that

the address [found in the purported tax rolls] was one at which Bradford could be reached for

service.”4 And again, Ridgefield does not dispute that this suit was commenced more than 20 years

after White Star acquired its interest in the property at a tax sale, and points to nothing that would

preclude it from being barred under § 33.54(a) other than the alleged violation of Bradford’s due-

process rights. As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred by (1) denying White Star’s motion

for summary judgment based on its limitations affirmative defense under § 33.54(a),5 and (2)

4
White Star also contends that “Ridgefield’s only evidence of a due process violation is inadmissible” because the
purported copies of tax roll pages submitted were unauthenticated. We need not and do not reach this evidentiary issue
since an address in a public record by itself would not suffice to satisfy Ridgefield’s burden to submit “individualized
proof regarding the ease or difficulty with which [their predecessors] could have been located and served.” Gill, 688
S.W.3d at 871 (describing applicable burden).
5
Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying White Star’s motion for summary judgment in relation to
Tax Code § 33.54(a), we need not and do not address whether it might also have erred in relation to its rulings in
relation to Tax Code §§ 34.08(a) and (c). Further, absent a due-process violation in the tax suit, which has not yet been
established, it would be premature to decide whether Ridgefield might have standing to assert that the tax suit judgment

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granting Ridgefield’s motion for summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying White Star’s motion for summary

judgment and in granting Ridgefield’s motion for summary judgment based on legal developments

after the trial court judgment was entered, we vacate the judgment and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion rather than reverse and render judgment in White Star’s

favor. See TRAP 43.3(b) (“When reversing a trial court’s judgment, the court must render the

judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except when: . . . the interests of justice require

a remand for another trial.”); see also Parker v. Pidgeon, 477 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (reversal of trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings may

be based on “substantial change in the law”), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Pidgeon v. Turner,

538 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2017); id. n.3 (“We have broad discretion to remand a case in the interest of

justice after reversing the trial court’s judgment[,]” and “[w]e may exercise our discretion to

remand as long as there is a probability that the case, for any reason, has not been fully

developed.”).

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

October 31, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
Palafox, J., dissenting (opinion forthcoming)

was or is void based on such a violation or, if such standing exists, whether White Star might possess equitable
defenses to a due-process claim. See Thompson v. Landry, 713 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Tex. 2025) (“Equitable defenses are
. . . available to a subsequent purchaser when the former owner obtains notice of the purchaser’s title to the property
outside the limitations period but unreasonably delays in seeking relief to the detriment of the purchaser.”).
Accordingly, we do not address these issues either.

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