Recreational Land Sales, LLC/James M. Allen, Charles Cedars, and Deborah Cedars v. James M. Allen, Charles Cedars, and Deborah Cedars/Recreational Land Sales, LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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No. 08-24-00375-CV
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Recreational Land Sales, LLC/James M. Allen, Charles Cedars,
and Deborah Cedars, Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v.

James M. Allen, Charles Cedars,
and Deborah Cedars/Recreational Land Sales, LLC, Appellees/Cross-Appellants

On Appeal from the 33rd District Court
Burnet County, Texas
Trial Court No. 53196

M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N 1
This double appeal concerns Appellant/Cross-Appellee’s development of a subdivision of

17 lots adjacent to Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ land in Burnet County, Texas. After

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This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See
Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
Appellees/Cross-Appellants initiated suit, the jury found Appellant/Cross-Appellee liable for

negligent nuisance and awarded Appellees/Cross-Appellants damages for annoyance, loss of

enjoyment, and discomfiture. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and render.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant below and original Appellant here, is Recreational Land Sales, LLC (RLS).

James M. Allen, Charles Cedars, and Deborah Cedars (collectively, the Neighbors), are the

plaintiffs below and Appellees/Cross-Appellants here. In May 2021, RLS purchased a 1,472-acre

tract of land now known as Cross Timber Ranch. RLS later subdivided 107 of those acres into 17

lots ranging from about five to eight acres each. These 17 lots are the crux of this appeal.

The deed provided that the 107 acres are subject to restrictive covenants of the subdivision,

Blacksmith Ranch. The “Blacksmith Ranch Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and

Restrictions” (the restrictive covenants), executed in 2004, governs the 107 acres and states that

“[n]o lot may be resubdivided without the written approval of the Declarant or the [Architectural

Control Committee]” (ACC). “Declarant” was identified as four individuals. Because Blacksmith

Ranch is an exempt, unplatted subdivision, no recorded map or plat existed, and the 107 acres were

described only by metes and bounds. RLS did not know where Blacksmith Ranch was located until

it hired a surveyor. RLS manager Richard Grandy testified he discovered no ACC or Home Owners

Association (HOA) had ever been formed and that Blacksmith Ranch had been operating without

one since 2004. RLS attempted to contact the four declarants but located only one, and after

speaking with him, it was confirmed that there was no ACC or HOA and there had been “inactivity

in [the] subdivision regarding any kind of enforcement or anything.” Through a private

investigator, RLS learned that two declarants were deceased. RLS eventually determined there had

been inactivity in enforcing the restrictive covenants.

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In October 2021, RLS applied to Burnet County for a subdivision plat of Cross Timber

Ranch to divide the 107 acres into 17 lots, and Burnet County approved the plat. RLS then sold all

the lots to third-party purchasers. RLS also installed a gate at the entrance of Cross Timber Ranch,

powerlines, and a road running through the Cross Timber Ranch subdivision.

The Neighbors own land adjacent to the 17 lots. Charles and Deborah Cedars are a married

couple who own 30 acres and built what Charles described as their “forever home” on their land.

They were living out their retirement. Charles engaged in many projects on their land—building

their home, a barn, a chicken and rabbit pen, and a pond—and Deborah gardened. Brandon Allen

owns 60 acres and testified that he planned to move to his land and build a home there with his

wife after she retired. Allen specifically planned to build his home facing east to enjoy the Texas

sunrise. He had spent the last 20 years fishing, hunting, and working his land, and tending to his

Longhorn cattle. The below map illustrates the respective locations of Blacksmith Ranch, the 17

lots, and the Neighbors’ land. 2

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This demonstrative map, Defendant’s Exhibit 1, was prepared for trial and was admitted without objection at trial
and shown to the jury.

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On January 24, 2022, Allen filed suit against RLS for breach of contract, fraud, and

injunctive relief. The Cedars later joined the suit as plaintiffs. Together, the Neighbors asserted

claims for breach of restrictive covenants, intentional nuisance, and negligent nuisance against

RLS. Their pleadings alleged that they “had hoped to retain the rural character of their community”

and that RLS breached the restrictive covenants by not obtaining approval of “the other property

owners in Blacksmith Ranch . . . despite having notice of the express restrictions and the manner

of compliance.” They further alleged that “RLS’s subsequent development and marketing of the

property has included building roads, gates, installing powerlines, clearing of trees, digging wells,

hosting open houses, and other activities” that caused “increased and unreasonable offensive noise

and light, trespass onto their property by third-parties, congestion of the single lane road in and

out of the property, dust, increased hazard to person and property, impairment of the comfortable

enjoyment of their real property, lessening of the enjoyment of their real property, inability to hunt

on the land, personal discomfort, and other unreasonable and offensive intrusions.” According to

the Neighbors, “future development will, in all reasonable probability, occur[, including] the

building of homes, other infrastructure, and a cell phone tower on Lot 48—upon information and

belief still owned by RLS. Such activities will, in all reasonable probability, continue and continue

to cause substantial and unreasonable interference with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their

property and cause Plaintiffs unreasonable discomfort and annoyance.”

The Neighbors alleged that RLS breached the restrictive covenants by subdividing the land

into the 17 lots, that RLS’s knowing breach of the restrictive covenants constituted intentional

nuisance, and that RLS’s failure to exercise reasonable care by way of their breach of the restrictive

covenants constituted negligent nuisance and substantially interfered with their use and enjoyment

of their land. They sought damages for “increased and unreasonable offensive noise and light,

invasion of privacy, congestion of the single lane road in and out of the property, dust, increased

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hazard to person and property, impairment of the comfortable enjoyment of their real property,

lessening of the enjoyment of their real property, annoyance and discomfiture, mental anguish,

damage to the intrinsic value of the property, apprehension of danger to person or property, and

other unreasonable and offensive intrusions.”

At trial, testimony established that the 17 lots remained undeveloped and that construction

of the gate, the road inside Cross Timber Ranch, and the powerlines, had been completed. Photos

of the gate, the road, and the lots were admitted. Grandy testified about RLS’s purchase of the

1,472 acres and its process for subdividing the 17 lots. Herb Darling, Development Services

Director of Burnet County, and Brewer, the engineer who platted the 17 lots, both testified to the

plat approval process. Allen testified about his future retirement plans, the importance of the

restrictive covenants to his decision to purchase his land, and the activities he engaged in on his

land. He also testified about his diminished “enthusiasm” and mental health since learning about

the 17 lots, but acknowledged that although he did not know what the future owners would do with

their land, he was still able to engage in the same activities on his land. The Cedars also testified.

Charles described the improvements he made on his land and explained how the construction of

the gate and road caused dust, cedar mulch he was allergic to, and noise. Both Charles and Deborah

testified that the thought of having 17 neighbors had affected Deborah’s mental health and had

decreased her motivation to garden. Charles stated he was not prevented from completing his

projects or hunting, that Deborah “definitely could” still garden, and that wildlife still roamed their

property. The Neighbors presented no evidence of economic damages, and the trial court granted

their motion in limine prohibiting any evidence of fair market value.

After the Neighbors rested, RLS moved for directed verdict. The trial court granted RLS’s

motion as to the breach of a restrictive covenant claim and dismissed that claim. As to RLS’s

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contention that the claimed nuisance was temporary, the trial court disagreed and held the nuisance

was permanent.

RLS called other Blacksmith Ranch owners, one of whom testified that the “whole area”—

not just the 17 lots—was being developed “more so than ever before.” Private investigator Kenton

Stephans testified about the undeveloped condition of the 17 lots and confirmed that two declarants

had died. RLS also called Grandy, who testified that he did not intend to harm the Neighbors

through the subdivision and had expended reasonable resources—including searching county

records and hiring attorneys, engineers, and a surveyor—before subdividing the 17 lots. Before

RLS sought approval from the county to subdivide the 17 lots, it held two community meetings,

and Grandy testified they did not hear from the Blacksmith Ranch owners. He also explained that

all of Cross Timber Ranch, including the 17 lots, is a “grazing association” requiring each lot to

be at least five acres and limiting owners to building structures on only one acre to allow cattle to

roam freely across the association.

During closing, counsel for the Neighbors—for the first time—introduced a “damage

model” for past and future damages for each of the Neighbors. RLS objected that the dollar

amounts were not tied to any evidence presented in trial. The trial court overruled RLS’s objection

and allowed the Neighbors’ counsel to proceed. Questions of intentional nuisance and negligent

nuisance were submitted to the jury. The jury found no liability on the intentional nuisance claim.

It found RLS liable for negligent nuisance and awarded the following:

• Allen: $20,000 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture sustained in the past,

and $175,000 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture that, in reasonable

probability, he will sustain in the future.

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• Deborah: $22,500 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture sustained in the past,

and $175,000 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture that, in reasonable

probability, she will sustain in the future.

• Charles: $22,500 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture sustained in the past,

and $175,000 for annoyance, loss of enjoyment and discomfiture that, in reasonable

probability, he will sustain in the future.

The trial court rendered its final judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. This double appeal

followed.

II. RLS’S APPEAL
RLS asserts five issues on appeal. In Issue One, RLS challenges the legal sufficiency of

the evidence to support the judgment that a condition substantially interfered with the Neighbors’

use and enjoyment of their land and that any alleged harm was objectively unreasonable. In Issue

Two, RLS argues that because the Neighbors do not have any concrete injuries, they lacked

standing and their claims were not ripe for review. In Issue Three, RLS asserts that the Neighbors

presented no evidence of a legal duty because their claim for negligent nuisance sounded only in

breach of contract. In Issues Four and Five, RLS challenges the damages awarded to the Neighbors.

Our initial inquiry is Issue Two—whether the Neighbors’ claims are ripe for this Court’s review.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal.

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993); see also Robinson v.

Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011) (recognizing same). “Ripeness is an element of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). “The

ripeness doctrine conserves judicial time and resources for real and current controversies, rather

than abstract, hypothetical, or remote disputes.” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928. It “is a threshold

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issue that . . . emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to be presented.”

Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at 755 (citing Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., 971

S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). We review whether a claim is ripe for review de novo. Robinson,

353 S.W.3d at 755.

In evaluating ripeness, a court must consider “whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the

facts are sufficiently developed ‘so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than

being contingent or remote.’” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928 (citing Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis in original)). “A case is not ripe when its

resolution depends upon contingent or hypothetical facts or upon events that have not yet come to

pass.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998).

A nuisance is a “condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land

by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting

to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex N. Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 593

(Tex. 2016) (citing Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003)). Nuisance is a

legal injury; it does not refer to a “cause of action or to a defendant’s conduct but to the legal injury

that the conduct causes and that gives rise to the cause of action.” Id. at 604. “A legal injury,

however, is neither the breach of a duty that gives rise to liability for the legal injury nor the

damages that may be awarded as compensation for the legal injury.” Id. at 594.

The Texas Supreme Court recognizes that a nuisance “could involve interference with

numerous different interests through both physical substances and intangible conditions, such as

‘water, stones, rubbish, filth, smoke, dust, odors, gases, noises, vibrations, and the like.’” Id. at

592. But an interference is “a nuisance—and thus as a legal injury—only if the interference is

‘substantial’ and causes ‘discomfort or annoyance’ that is unreasonable.” Id. at 595. By requiring

that an interference be substantial, the Court set “a minimum threshold that confirms that the law

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‘does not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all of the petty annoyances and disturbances

of every day life in a civilized community even from conduct committed with knowledge that

annoyance and inconvenience will result.’” Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton § 88, at 626).

Determining whether an interference is substantial or merely a “trifle” or “petty annoyance”

depends on the circumstances, “including, for example, the nature and extent of the interference,

and how long the interference lasts or how often it recurs.” Id. at 595–96. The condition “may

interfere with a wide variety of the plaintiffs’ interests in the use and enjoyment of their property

[, including] physical damage to the plaintiffs’ property, economic harm to the property’s market

value, harm to the plaintiffs’ health, or psychological harm to the plaintiffs’ ‘peace of mind’ in the

use and enjoyment of their property.” Id. at 596.

An interference must not only be substantial; to constitute a nuisance, “a plaintiff must

establish that the effects of the substantial interference on the plaintiff are unreasonable.” Id. at

597. To show unreasonableness, a plaintiff “must prove only that the effects of the interference

(the plaintiff’s ‘discomfort or annoyance’) are unreasonable, not that the defendant’s conduct or

land use was unreasonable.” Id. at 599. Courts employ an objective standard for determining

whether the effects of the interference are unreasonable—“the effects of the defendant’s conduct

or land use must be such as would disturb and annoy persons of ordinary sensibilities, and of

ordinary tastes and habits.” Id. (“[U]nreasonableness must be determined based on an objective

standard of persons of ordinary sensibilities, not on the subjective response of any particular

plaintiff.”) (cleaned up). “It is not enough that plaintiff himself is offended or annoyed if he is

peculiarly sensitive.” Id. at 600. The inquiry “requires balancing a wide variety of factors,

depending on the specific facts.” Id. at 596.

For negligent nuisance claims, ordinary principles of negligence apply. Id. at 607. A

plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages

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proximately caused by the breach. Id. To establish breach, a plaintiff must show that “the

defendant’s conduct constituted negligence, which is ‘simply doing or failing to do what a person

of ordinary prudence in the same or similar circumstances would have not done or done.’” Id.

(citing Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1998)). The

plaintiff bears the burden “to prove that the defendant’s negligent conduct caused a nuisance,

which in turn resulted in the plaintiff’s damages.” Id.

B. Analysis

RLS maintains that because the Neighbors did not present evidence of any concrete injury,

their claim for negligent nuisance is not ripe. RLS also argues that the Neighbors’ articulated injury

is breach of restrictive covenant, which sounds only in contract law, and that the Neighbors have

not shown how “their allegation of breach of contract can support a negligent nuisance claim in

light of the Supreme Court’s holdings to the contrary.” RLS relies on Southwestern Bell Telephone,

where the Texas Supreme Court stated, “if the defendant’s conduct . . . would give rise to liability

only because it breaches the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff’s claim ordinarily sounds only in

contract.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991). The Neighbors

respond that they “alleged and evidenced that [RLS] subdivided the 107 acres into 17 lots in

violation of the deed restrictions despite being fully aware of them” and that “the genesis” of their

negligent nuisance claim “is the fact that [they] now have seventeen neighbors where they should

have no more than 2.”

“In determining whether the plaintiff may recover on a tort theory, it is also instructive to

examine the nature of the plaintiff’s loss.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 809 S.W.2d at 494. In doing so, “[t]he

measure of damages, standing alone, is not always determinative of whether a tort claim can co-

exist with a breach of contract claim.” DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 105

(Tex. 1999). We have previously distinguished that “[c]ontract obligations arise from a specific

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agreement between the parties. Tort obligations, in contrast, are those that are imposed by law—

apart from and independent of promises made.”

Airborne Freight Corp. Inc., v. C.R. Lee Enters., Inc., 847 S.W.2d 289, 293–94 (Tex. App—El

Paso 1992, writ denied). The Texas Supreme Court has also clarified that ordinary principles of

negligence govern claims of negligent nuisance. Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 607.

Although Texas has long recognized restrictive covenants as contracts that are subject to

general rules of contract construction, we need not decide whether the Neighbors’ claim sounds

only in contract because in determining the ripeness of the Neighbors’ negligent nuisance claim,

we do not examine whether RLS owed or breached a duty. See Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners

Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. 2018) (stating the courts have treated unambiguous restrictive

covenants “as valid contracts between individuals”); Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478

(Tex. 1998) (“[R]estrictive covenants are subject to the general rules of contract construction.”);

Bruington v. Chesmar Homes, LLC, No. 08-23-00015-CV, 2023 WL 6972987, at *7 (Tex. App.—

El Paso Oct. 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op) (“In determining the ripeness of the Bruingtons’

negligence claims, we do not consider the question of whether Chesmar Homes owed a duty to the

Bruingtons or whether they breached that duty.”). Instead, our focus is whether the Neighbors

presented jurisdictional evidence showing that RLS caused a substantial and unreasonable

interference and that the Neighbors suffered actual damages to render their claim ripe. See

Bruington, 2023 WL 6972987, at *7. We conclude they did not.

The Neighbors did not show that subdividing the acreage into 17 lots or that having “17

neighbors” caused a substantial and unreasonable interference with their use and enjoyment of

their land. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, the engineering plans submitted to Burnet County for plat approval

of the 17 lots, was admitted at trial without objection. Brewer, the engineer who handled the plat

process for the 17 lots, testified about the “Schematic Utility Design,” which he described as an

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“outline” showing only “possible home sites,” “potential” septic-system locations, and “potential

water well location[s].” Brewer testified that it was merely “a potential” and “possible” for 17

homes, septic systems, and wells to be constructed, and the Schematic Utility Design labeled them

as “POTENTIAL” locations. But the evidence at trial showed that at the time, all 17 lots remained

completely undeveloped. No structures, wells, or septic systems had been built. There was also no

evidence at trial that any of the 17 owners occupied their land. The 17 lots were described at trial

as “rural, central Texas pastureland” and the photos admitted at trial reflect that description. No

evidence showed that any construction was imminent or certain to occur. If a party cannot show

“a reasonable likelihood that the claim will soon ripen,” the claim is not ripe and “the case must

be dismissed.” Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at 755 (citing Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 251

(Tex. 2001)).

The Cedars confirmed this. Charles testified he could see the undeveloped land from his

property, and when asked if it was an annoyance, he responded, “No.” Deborah testified that “when

they start building houses [] there’s going to be, you know, more traffic, more noise, more lights,

you know, it’s just not going to be the same,” underscoring that her concerns were purely

speculative. Allen likewise testified that he did know what the future owners would do with their

land. He stated that his “expectation is there’s going to be 17 houses built over there, and there’s

going to be drilling things going on, and there’s going to be septics put in. And it’s not like they’re

all going to be going on at the same time. They’re going to go on for a long time with that number

of building going on.” When asked whether he would still be able to “live out [his] vision,” Allen

responded, “I hope so, but no one can tell the future.” These contentions are based solely on

speculative future possibilities of events that have not occurred, and may or may not even occur,

and are insufficient to invoke jurisdiction. See Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 852 (recognizing that a

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“ripeness analysis focuses on whether the case involves ‘uncertain or contingent future events that

may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all’”).

The only construction performed at the time of trial was a gate for the entrance of Cross

Timber Ranch and a road within Cross Timber Ranch—which all had been completed well before

trial. When asked about the effects, Allen described stress and mental health issues, and confirmed

he could still hunt, fish, keep Longhorn cattle roaming his 60 acres, and watch the sunrise on the

east—all concerns he had. Allen’s son confirmed that their pond project could still proceed and

that nothing about the development prevented them from building the pond. Allen’s son also

testified that on one occasion, he and his father heard construction equipment and saw dust. This

testimony does not rise to level of substantial or unreasonable interference based on an objective

standard.

Charles testified that construction of the road produced cedar mulch, dust that covered his

roof and vehicles, and noise. But he provided no dates, no duration, no frequency, no evidence of

recurrence, and no evidence of physical injury, even though he stated he “actually got hit” by

cedar. Though Charles testified the dust covered his vehicles and stained his roof, he admitted that

he had not attempted to wash the dust from his roof and acknowledged that he did not know

whether his roof was permanently stained. He also admitted that the 17 lots and the construction

did not prevent him from hunting, that wildlife still roamed his land, and though his wife had

stopped gardening, nothing prevented her from doing so and she “definitely could” still garden.

Deborah provided brief testimony and likewise did not identify evidence of a substantial and

unreasonable interference. We agree with RLS that the Cedars “presented no evidence of any

concrete injury in the past and their concerns about the future are merely conjectural and

hypothetical.” Where the evidence consists of “mere allegations and speculation,” of events that

have not yet passed, the claim is not ripe. Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at 756 (citing Perry, 66 S.W.3d

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at 249) (claims based on “uncertain or contingent future events” is not ripe for judicial

determination); Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 444 (a potential injury cannot be ripe unless it is

established with certain and definite documentation); Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 600 (“It is not

enough that plaintiff himself is offended or annoyed if he is peculiarly sensitive.”); Bruington,

2023 WL 6972987, at *7−11 (holding nuisance claims were not ripe and dismissing cause due to

lack of evidence of a substantial or unreasonable interference, reliance on speculative opinions,

and insufficient jurisdictional evidence for damages or injunctive relief)

Accordingly, the Neighbors’ claim for negligent nuisance is not ripe for review and the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Issue Two is sustained. Because our holding is

dispositive, we do not reach the remaining complaints of RLS’s appeal.

III. THE NEIGHBORS’ CROSS-APPEAL

In their cross-appeal, the Neighbors assert that the trial court erred by granting a directed

verdict on their breach of restrictive covenant claim for lack of evidence of any damages.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

We review the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict de novo. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018). “In doing so, a directed verdict

is reviewed under the same legal-sufficiency standard that applies to no-evidence summary

judgments.” Gespa Nicaragua, S.A. v. Recom AG, 705 S.W.3d 362, 389 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2024, pet denied). The nonmovant bears the burden of identifying evidence raising a genuine issue

of material fact as to each challenged element of its cause of action. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s

ruling, we may affirm a directed verdict on any ground that supports it. Id.

B. Analysis

The Neighbors contend that they should be able to recover loss and enjoyment damages on

their breach of restrictive covenant claim and that the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict

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dismissing that claim. They maintain that they have “searched exhaustively and in vain for any

Texas authority on the question of whether loss of enjoyment damages are available in a breach of

restrictive covenant case and, if so, under what circumstances.” The Neighbors assert that loss of

enjoyment damages are recoverable for a breach of restrictive covenant claim, but RLS correctly

points out that “no Texas court has recognized loss of enjoyment as a measure of recoverable

damages in a breach of restrictive covenant case.” Aside from citing a 1972 Alaska case, the

Neighbors have not shown—and we are unaware of any—binding precedent permitting such

recovery for a breach of a restrictive covenant claim. We therefore cannot conclude that the trial

court erred in granting RLS’s motion for directed verdict on this ground. We overrule the

Neighbors’ sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having found that the Neighbors’ claim for negligent nuisance is not ripe for our review

and sustaining RLS’s Issue Two, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment

dismissing the Neighbors’ lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

April 7, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

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