Clifton Todd Hanks v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00132-CR
__________________

CLIFTON TODD HANKS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 21-05-07217-CR
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Clifton Todd Hanks (“Appellant” or “Hanks”) appeals his

conviction for online solicitation of a minor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c).

A grand jury indicted Hanks and alleged that Hanks committed the offense on or

about May 19, 2021, and that Hanks was previously convicted of two felony

offenses. Hanks pleaded not guilty. A jury found Hanks guilty as charged in the

indictment. Hanks pleaded “not true” to the enhancement allegations, but the jury

found the allegations “true” and assessed punishment at seventy-five years of

1
confinement. Hanks timely appealed, and he challenges his conviction in fourteen

issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Evidence at the Guilt or Innocence Phase of Trial

Testimony of Detective Darrick Dunn

Detective Darrick Dunn, with the Conroe Police Department, testified that he

was currently assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”) task force.

According to Dunn, the ICAC works “proactively and reactively[]” to fight internet

crimes against children and child exploitation. Dunn testified that in a reactive case,

the task force would respond to a complaint from a citizen or a “cyber tip” that a

child has been exploited, and in a proactive case, the task force members work online

and undercover “trying to get to the suspect before they get to the child.” Dunn

further testified that in a proactive case, he might pretend to be a minor online on

KIK—a commercial electronic messaging app for communicating one-on-one, in

groups, or anonymously, including sending text messages, photos, and videos—

chatting with people who believe they are chatting with a minor and seeking out

minors for sexual gratification. Dunn explained that when he is undercover and

pretending to be a minor online, he states an age for his undercover persona in the

beginning when he chats with someone.

Dunn testified that “there is nothing to regulate who can get on KIK[,]” but

that the terms of service require a user to be thirteen years old. According to Dunn,

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it is common for children under the age of seventeen to use KIK, for child

pornography to be shared on KIK, and he has investigated cases and made arrests

where children were solicited on KIK. Dunn explained that when he works

undercover on KIK, he posts an age-regressed photograph of himself or a

photograph of someone in the department who looks young. He generally logs into

a group on KIK, messages start coming in soon afterwards, and he generally talks to

multiple people at a time. According to Dunn, he is never the first person in a KIK

chat to bring up sex because that would be against ICAC standards. Dunn testified

that when he tells someone on KIK that he is fourteen years old, about half of the

people say he is too young, but “a lot of people continue chatting.” Dunn explained

that when a chat turns sexual in nature, he tries to match the other person’s tone to

“continue chatting with this person and see where it goes.” When Dunn is doing an

investigation in KIK, he does not take a screenshot 1 of every message he sends or

receives because saving screenshots all day long would prevent him from chatting

and because his phone does not have enough storage capacity to store that many

screenshots. According to Dunn, KIK does not crash often, but he has seen it happen,

and after a crash, “all those messages are gone [and] whatever you don’t screen shot

when it crashes is gone[]” with no way to recover the lost messages. Dunn testified

1
Applicable to this case, “a screenshot is a picture taken by a cell phone of
what was on the cell phone’s screen.” Villareal v. State, 590 S.W.3d 75, 80 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2019, pet. ref’d).
3
that, after KIK crashes, he just picks up a communication where he left off and takes

screenshots.

Dunn conducted an investigation in Montgomery County in the spring of 2021

that involved Clifton Hanks, and he identified the defendant as Hanks. Dunn testified

that he was the lead investigator posing as “Ally Martinez,” and Hanks—who was

sixty-three years old at the time—was using KIK. Dunn recalled that he started

chatting with Hanks in early March of 2021, and in chats during April of 2021,

Hanks asked his age and where he lived, Dunn told Hanks that he lived in Conroe,

and Hanks said he lived in Houston near “Irvington and Collingsworth[.]” Dunn

testified that “eventually the chats got sexual in nature[]” with Hanks saying he was

interested in meeting. According to Dunn, Hanks never questioned whether Dunn

(posing as Ally) was older than fourteen, and Hanks never said Ally was too young

to be on KIK. Dunn also testified that he never told Hanks that he was engaging in

role play or fantasy and such a statement would be against ICAC standards.

Dunn identified State’s Exhibit 1 as a photograph he sent Hanks of “Ally,”

the child Dunn was portraying. Dunn testified that he had screenshots of

conversations with Hanks that occurred in April, but Dunn did not have screenshots

of his conversations with Hanks from March and part of April because KIK crashed,

and he “just hadn’t got around to screen shotting all the conversations[,]” so that

there was some content he did not have because KIK crashed.

4
Dunn identified State’s Exhibit 2 as a copy of a screenshot of a text message

exchange between Hanks and Dunn (posing as Ally) he took in April of 2021 using

his undercover iPhone cell phone. The prosecutor and Dunn read the text message

exchange aloud to the jury, which was as follows:

[Hanks]: F**k you hard
Where we going to
I want to f**k you today, want my c**k in you

[Ally]: You have protection…not tryna get pregnant at 14…my
mom would kill me

[Hanks]: Thought your on pill
But yeah I always have that and lube

[Ally]: I’m not on the pill

Dunn testified that this was the second time he mentioned Ally’s age. Dunn again

agreed that he did not have screenshots of other messages because the application

crashed. Dunn testified that he did not decide to end his investigation when KIK

crashed, and that Hanks contacted him again in April after the site had crashed.

Dunn identified State’s Exhibit 3 as a screenshot of messages he exchanged

with Hanks between April 29 and May 19 of 2021, and Dunn agreed that after April

29, he took screenshots of all the messages between himself and Hanks. Dunn further

agreed that the text messages in Exhibit 3 are consistent with the messages between

himself and Hanks that occurred before April 20. After he messaged Hanks again

that Ally was fourteen years old, Hanks sent a picture of himself, and when Ally

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asked what he was doing that day, Hanks replied, “Nothing planned but the thought

putting a rise in my pants[.]” As the messaging continued, Dunn (pretending to be

Ally) asked how far Hanks was from Conroe, and Hanks responded that he was just

north of downtown Houston, “I’d like to get you here, we wouldn’t be interrupted”

and “I live two blocks from Moody Park. . . . Irvington and Collingsworth. 3403

Elser Street.” Dunn further testified that, as the messaging continued, Hanks stated,

“I am going to get myself together. Talk to you in a short[]” and “You need to play

spending the night with a friend. Rubbing my c**k, watching porn, spun.” Dunn

explained that “spun” means high on drugs or a drug binge. Dunn further testified

that Hanks sent a picture of himself, and the photo also showed that Hanks had a

pornographic image on a television. After Hanks messaged Ally that he would take

an Uber to see Ally, Hanks also sent a video of a man and woman having sex and

messaged, “We are going straight to getting a buzz and naked. Oral. I like giving as

much as receiving.” In other messages, Hanks told Ally that he needed a shower and

suggested they could shower together. When Ally asked him, “What you going to

tell people when they see us together?” he replied, “My wife[,]” and Ally then

messaged, “I am 14 and say I am your granddaughter or something, not your wife.”

Additional messages from Hanks that day indicated he was in an Uber car “about 5

minutes away” from Ally, his Uber driver was driving a Black Chrysler, and later he

6
texted Ally he had arrived and that he was standing “right behind” the Chrysler

waiting for her.

Dunn identified State’s Exhibit 4 as a map from Hanks’s address to Conroe.

After Hanks sent the last message, officers pulled in and arrested Hanks. Dunn

identified State’s Exhibit 5 as drugs confiscated from Hanks when he was arrested,

and based on his experience, Dunn thought one of the substances was marijuana.

Dunn also testified that the arresting officers obtained two cell phones and an iPad

from Hanks. Hanks signed a “Consent to Search Digital Device” form, and a copy

was admitted into evidence. Dunn agreed that Hanks was arrested in Montgomery

County, and Dunn was in Montgomery County when he was receiving messages

from Hanks.

On cross-examination, Dunn testified that his first contact with Hanks was in

early March of 2021 and Hanks reached out to Dunn. Dunn further testified that he

did not know the exact date of the initial contact, and he does not typically make the

first contact, although it was possible that he reached out to Hanks first. According

to Dunn, he told Hanks his age (posing as Ally) because ordinarily “[a]s soon as we

start talking, I mention my age, first contact.” He agreed he did not take screenshots

of his initial messages with Hanks. When asked why he did not take screenshots,

Dunn explained:

So when I am talking to a suspect, I am talking to multiple suspects at
a time. Possibly ten. So at that given time I just hadn’t got around to it
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because I am going back and forth with different persons that I am
chatting with. And it just so happens that [] the application crashed
before I was able to screen shot anything. So I just don’t have it.
...
You have to understand I am talking to multiple people, ten people at a
time. I am talking to multiple people every day. So to screen shot
everything? You know, my phone wouldn’t have enough storage to just
screen shot everything. You know, I couldn’t do it. And that’s all I
would be doing every day is screen shotting.
...
So after it crashed, you know, I started trying to capture what I had.
And that’s just what I have. So what you see is what you have.

Dunn did not know the date that the KIK app crashed, and he was aware that KIK

does not store old messages, so he could not reach out to KIK to get the messages.

According to Dunn, he is not an expert on computers or apps, but he regularly uses

social media apps to communicate with people. Dunn did not know the screenshots

in Exhibit 3 show the provider (Verizon), bars for the strength of service, the time,

and a battery icon (showing the phone’s charge) whereas the screenshot in Exhibit 2

does not show these items. He also admitted he did not save screenshots before KIK

crashed, that he preserved the evidence that he had, and that there were more

messages between himself and Hanks that were not saved than messages that were

saved. On re-cross, Dunn testified that he was only able to preserve one screenshot

from April. Dunn agreed that State’s Exhibit 3 (screenshots of messages) included a

reference to a time when Hanks said he was going to come meet Ally, but “for

whatever reason, [Hanks] never showed up.”

8
On redirect, Dunn agreed that when you take a screenshot, that image includes

metadata, which includes the time and date of the image and what kind of image it

is—for example, if it is a screenshot. Dunn testified that State’s Exhibits 12 and 13

were copies of the metadata for State’s Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 12 reflects that the

image in Exhibit 2 was a screenshot taken on April 21, 2021. Dunn agreed that

State’s Exhibit 14 also includes metadata, and the exhibit gives a “date modified” of

“5/19/2021” for several images and “4/21/2021” for one image that was the

screenshot in Exhibit 2. Dunn also agreed that the metadata had been provided to the

defense before trial.

Testimony of Investigator Nikki Neeley

Investigator Nikki Neeley testified that she is an investigator with the District

Attorney’s office assigned to the “digital forensics lab.” Neeley explained that she

became a licensed peace officer in 2005 and has worked for the Navasota Police

Department and Grimes County Sheriff’s Office where she was promoted to patrol

officer and a detective in the criminal investigations division. Neeley testified that

as a detective, she primarily worked on cases of sexual assaults of children and is a

member of the Houston Metro Internet Crimes Against Children task force, working

as a field investigator. She further testified that she was hired by the Montgomery

County Sheriff’s Office in 2011 and worked with Children’s Safe Harbor on cases

9
of sexual assaults of children aged ten and younger. According to Neeley, she started

doing forensics and primarily phone forensics in 2014.

Neeley testified she was “chat certified [and] [t]here is a cyber crimes course

we take.” She explained that she also received a five-week training course in

computers and cell phone forensics through the National Computer Forensic

Institute. She received Cell Hawk training on how towers track mobile devices.

According to Neeley, in her work, she has examined “[h]undreds[]” of cell phones.

She has used the Cellebrite software to extract data from cell phones, but Cellebrite

does not extract every single piece of data from a cell phone. She explained that the

KIK app works like text messaging, and it is common to see the use of KIK in child

exploitation cases. She agreed that in 2021, KIK crashed from time to time, and

when it crashed, messages would not be retrievable, the company that runs KIK does

not store messages, and there are no tools or programs that she knows about that

would allow someone to get messages that were lost.

Neeley agreed she was asked to examine some devices related to this case.

She obtained images from Hanks’s iPad, but she did not obtain any KIK messages

from the iPad. Neely obtained some data from Hanks’s purple Samsung phone,

including images in a file path that indicated the data was from KIK, but she did not

obtain text messages. Neeley testified a white Samsung phone was also obtained

from Hanks, and on that phone, she was able to see there were some KIK messages,

10
but Cellebrite was not able to pull some of the messages from the phone. Neeley

agreed that she found some KIK messages from Hanks to Ally on the white Samsung

phone, including the photo that Dunn used to pose as Ally, a fourteen-year-old child.

According to Neeley, the metadata gave a date of March 11, 2021 for that image.

Neeley identified State’s Exhibit 10 as a screenshot of KIK message threads on

Hanks’s phone, which included a thread with “Ally Martinez,” and the image was

on Hanks’s phone. Neeley testified that Ally’s name in the screenshot means “there

was communication on KIK with the Defendant -- with the phone and Detective

Dunn.” Neeley also testified that State’s Exhibit 11 had the same content as State’s

Exhibit 3; that State’s Exhibit 11, which was extracted from Hanks’s phone, had

more messages than Detective Dunn’s screenshots in State’s Exhibit 3; and that one

page of State’s Exhibit 11 was a map of the Hardy Toll Road. Neeley concluded that

Hanks was communicating with Dunn’s undercover persona because the messages

on Hanks’s phone matched the screenshots that Detective Dunn had taken from

Dunn’s undercover phone.

On cross-examination, Neeley testified that Defense Exhibit 1,

“Evidence/Property - Receipt/Release[,]” was a form she received from Detective

Dunn in this case, that the form gave the defendant’s name as “Eric Davis, Junior[,]”

and that “Davis” was another defendant and not an alias for Hanks. She agreed that

the “Eric Davis” name was a mistake.

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Neeley identified the first image in State’s Exhibit 11 as Hanks’s “home

screen on his phone[.]” Neeley did not know why the home-screen image was dated

March 24, 2021, but she indicated that the setting may have been “off” on the phone,

and Neeley testified it was “not uncommon for this to happen if phones have been

off for a period of time[,]” and she did not perform the extraction until October 12,

2021. Neeley agreed that State’s Exhibits 3 and 11 did not include all the same “chats

and screen shots[.]” Neeley further testified that she had seen cases where there were

fifteen to twenty pages of chat messages that were missing from a Cellebrite report.

On redirect, Neeley testified that some messages included in Exhibit 3 may

not appear in Exhibit 11 because “they could have been deleted on the Defendant’s

end[.]” Neeley and the prosecutor read through some of the messages aloud, which

included: a message from Hanks stating the size of his penis; messages from Hanks

saying he had been with a thirteen-year-old girl when he was twenty-seven; and a

message from Hanks saying, “I need to pick you up.” Neeley testified that a message

from Hanks saying, “I would like to get you here. We wouldn’t be interrupted[,]”

was a “solicitation of a meeting.” Neeley testified that, based on her experience and

training, she believed the messages constitute an online solicitation for sex with a

minor. Another set of messages stated:

[Hanks]: Rainy weather is for staying naked all day.

[Ally]: Maybe. Hey, you at home?

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[Hanks]: Yes. Come over.

[Ally]: How? I don’t drive.

[Hanks]: How long can you stay? Have a buddy coming over. Get a
ride with him and me.

[Ally]: WIM? What do you mean? Where he at?

[Hanks]: He owes me money. I have know him since 5 years old.

[Ally]: Okay. So you want me to ride with some stranger and come to
you?

[Hanks]: No. I will be there too. Or I can send Uber.

Neeley testified that she understood from these messages that “[c]ome over[]” meant

for Ally “[t]o come over for sex[]” and the messages constituted a solicitation for

sex with a child. After reading the messages aloud, Neely testified as follows:

[Prosecutor]: Now, Detective Neeley, the Defense attorney asked you
if it is highly corroborative of intent when somebody actually travels to
a meeting with a purported child for sex; is that correct?

[Neeley]: Correct.

[Prosecutor]: So based on your training and experience, if this
Defendant traveled all the way from just north of downtown Houston
to 808 Gladstell in Conroe, Texas, to meet for sex, what would that say
about his intent?

[Neeley]: To have sex with a child.

On recross-examination, Neeley agreed that a critical piece of information is

whether the initial contact is the undercover officer reaching out to a suspect or the

suspect reaching out to the undercover officer. Neely agreed that in her work she did
13
not always document that kind of information. She also testified that she has not

documented when system or application crashes have occurred. Neely explained that

when a chat with a suspect turned sexual in nature, she would “make every

attempt[]” to document those messages and preserve the information.

The State rested, and the defense also rested without calling any witnesses.

The jury found Hanks guilty of the offense of online solicitation of a minor as alleged

in the indictment.

Evidence During Punishment Phase of Trial

At the beginning of the punishment phase of trial, the State read the

enhancement allegations against Hanks:

. . . Defendant, Clifton Todd Hanks, was convicted of a felony, to wit,
Driving While Intoxicated Third, on June 11, 2003, in the 183rd District
Court, Harris County, Texas, in Cause No. 934805 under the name
Clifton Todd Hanks, and said conviction became final prior to the
commission of the aforesaid offense in count 1 of this indictment.
....
. . . Defendant, Clifton Todd Hanks, was convicted of a felony, to wit,
attempted burglary of a building, on February 25, 1980, in the 262nd
District [C]ourt of Harris County, Texas, in Cause No. 309882, under
the name Clifton Todd Hanks; and said conviction became final prior
to the commission of the aforesaid offense in count 1 of this indictment.

Hanks pleaded “[n]ot true[]” to both allegations.

Testimony of Joe Nichols

Joe Nichols, an investigator from the Montgomery County District Attorney’s

office, testified that he is trained as a fingerprint expert, and he does fingerprint

14
comparisons. Nichols explained that, when he does comparisons, he uses a known

print from a person from a certified document or one he himself has printed and

compares it to another print, looking for unique characteristics and determining

whether there is enough consistency to determine the prints are from the same

person.

Nichols identified State’s Exhibit 20 as a card he used to get a fingerprint of

Hanks on April 25, 2023. Nichols also identified State’s Exhibit 16 as a “pen pack[,]”

which he explained is a penitentiary packet the Texas Department of Corrections

creates when a person is sentenced to state prison and which includes a photograph,

notations of tattoos (if any), fingerprints, criminal judgments, and a person’s history

at the penitentiary. He further testified that, when a person is arrested and booked

into jail in a Texas county, the booking fingerprints are sent to the Texas Department

of Public Safety (“DPS”) for recordkeeping. According to Nichols, State’s Exhibit

16 does not include readable or identifiable fingerprints.

Nichols testified that he compared the prints in State’s Exhibit 20 with prints

that were obtained when Hanks was booked into the Montgomery County jail, along

with Hanks’s name, his state identification number, and his date of birth. Nichols

believed that the fingerprints from Exhibit 20 were the same as those obtained when

Hanks was booked into jail in Montgomery County. According to Nichols, Exhibit

16 included a judgment for Clifton Todd Hanks from Harris County dated June 11,

15
2003, for a driving-while-intoxicated offense for which Hanks received a twelve-

year sentence. Nichols agreed that the pen packet in State’s Exhibit 16 was for a

2003 conviction for driving while intoxicated and that the indictment for the 2003

DWI included an enhancement paragraph for a 1980 conviction for felony attempted

burglary of a building. The enhancement paragraph gives a date of February 25,

1980, for the date of commission and November 12, 1982, for the date of conviction

for the burglary of a building. Nichols testified that the judgment for the driving-

while-intoxicated offense reflects that Hanks pleaded “true” to the alleged

enhancement.

Nichols identified State’s Exhibit 17 as another pen packet for Clifton Todd

Hanks for an offense of attempted burglary of a building. Nichols testified that he

was not able to compare the fingerprints from the booking on that offense to Hanks’s

booking fingerprints in Montgomery County, but he was able to link the pen packet

to Hanks by reference to a review of Hanks’s criminal history, his name, the date of

the offense, and the jurisdiction for the offense. The judgment for the burglary

offense states the defendant’s name as Clifton Todd Hanks and gives a date of

February 9, 1980, for the date of commission of the crime. Both State’s Exhibits 16

and 17 include a declaration from the custodian of records for TDCJ in Huntsville,

stating that the records were made in the regular course of its business activity, were

16
made as a regularly conducted activity at or near the time of the occurrence as the

matters set forth in the records by a person with knowledge of those matters.

Nichols identified State’s Exhibit 18 as a pen packet for Clifton Todd Hanks

for the offense of possession of a controlled substance, and the date of the judgment

in the pen packet is April 23, 2018. Nichols also identified State’s Exhibit 19 as a

pen packet for Clifton Todd Hanks for the offense of forgery and the date of the

judgment in Exhibit 19 is November 12, 1982.

Testimony of Cassie Reynolds

Cassie Reynolds, Hanks’s sister, testified for the defense. Reynolds testified

that there were three children in their family—she is the youngest and Hanks is the

middle child. Reynolds recalled Hanks got in trouble at some point and spent time

in prison. She also testified that Hanks had a problem with drugs for years. Reynolds

agreed that due to a back injury from his truck driving work, Hanks could not

continue working.

On cross-examination, Reynolds testified that she was “[n]ot real close[]” to

her brother. She also testified that she was not close enough to Hanks to have known

about the 1977 and 1980 offenses for which he was convicted.

Testimony of Clifton Hanks

Hanks testified in the punishment phase of the trial. He testified that he was

sixty-five at the time of trial. When he was arrested, he was receiving disability and

17
retirement for a spinal cord injury, and he was not working. Hanks agreed he had

received treatment for stage 4 prostate cancer, and some of his medical records were

admitted in Defendant’s Exhibit 3. He further testified that, when he was arrested,

he did not own a vehicle and he was living in an RV in Houston. Hanks told the jury

he believed “a whole lot different story[]” would result if Detective Dunn had

preserved all of the messages in this case. He testified that he went to Conroe on the

day he was arrested to “[k]ick somebody’s butt that ha[d] been sexually harassing”

him for more than three months. Hanks agreed there were two times when he was

supposed to meet up with Ally, but he did not go and that he only went to meet Ally

the third time because he was angry and was going to “knock the cr*p out of them.”

He also testified that he had been drinking that day and he took a “pill,” and he

agreed he brought drugs with him when he went to Conroe. Hanks agreed he was in

a group chat on KIK that was sexual in nature, and the group was called “the gang

bang club.” Hanks agreed he had been arrested and convicted many times in his life,

the first time was in 1977, and that he pleaded guilty to “[e]very single one of those

convictions[.]”

On cross-examination, Hanks testified that 2003 was the last time he went to

prison for driving while intoxicated and he pleaded true to that charge. He also

agreed that although he had told the jury it was not true that he had been convicted

18
of attempted burglary of a building and forgery, those allegations are in fact true.

The following exchange occurred:

[Prosecutor]: For the last 44 years, you have been in and out of prison
for multiple offenses?

[Hanks]: Correct.

[Prosecutor]: That is including the burglary of a building we have seen,
right?

[Hanks]: Correct.

[Prosecutor]: Forgery?

[Hanks]: Correct.
....
[Prosecutor]: Possession of a controlled substance?

[Hanks]: Correct.
....
[Prosecutor]: So fair to say from 1977 through 2021, you have never
stopped committing crime?

[Hanks]: I wouldn’t say that. I mean, on and off, I guess, if you want to
put it that way.

Issues

Appellant raises fourteen issues on appeal, which we quote below:

Issue One: Was the evidence sufficient to support conviction of
Appellant?

Issue Two: Was the evidence sufficient to prove proper venue?

Issue Three: Did the trial court err by overruling Appellant’s Motion
for New Trial?

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Issue Four: Did the trial court err by failing to properly instruct the jury
related to the enhancement paragraphs at punishment?

Issue Five: Was the evidence sufficient to punish Appellant as a
habitual offender where it was not proven that Appellant was
previously finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second
previous felony conviction was for an offense that occurred subsequent
to the first previous conviction becoming final?

Issue Six: Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s request for a
spoliation jury charge?

Issue Seven: Did the trial court err by admitting evidence related to
child pornography and other investigations over a relevance objection?

Issue Eight: Did the trial court err by admitting evidence related to child
pornography and other investigations over an objection pursuant to
Tex. R. Evid. 403?

Issue Nine: Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s Motion to
Suppress due to lack of authenticity?

Issue Ten: Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s Motion to
Suppress due [to] a violation of Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14?

Issue Eleven: Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s Motion to
Suppress due to a Brady Violation?

Issue Twelve: Did the trial court err by admitting State’s Ex. 2 where
there was a lack of foundation?

Issue Thirteen: Did the trial court err by admitting State’s Ex. 16, a pen
packet, where it was not proven that Appellant was the same person in
the pen packet and it was irrelevant?

Issue Fourteen: Did the trial court err by admitting State’s Ex. 17, a pen
packet, where it was not proven that Appellant was the same person in
the pen packet and it was irrelevant?

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Sufficiency of the Evidence
(Issue One)

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence at trial is not sufficient to

support his conviction. Specifically, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient

for a jury to reasonably infer that he intended to solicit a minor. Hanks argues

“Appellant did not travel to meet two (2) times which means that he did not have the

necessary intent.” Appellant points to other evidence he claims shows a lack of

intent, including that when he arrived at the encounter where he was arrested, he did

not have condoms; and further he argues the first contact may have been initiated by

law enforcement. Hanks does not make any argument about whether he knowingly

solicited a minor, nor does he argue he did not believe Ally was younger than

seventeen.2

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2
The Online Solicitation of a Minor Statute defines a “minor” as follows:

(a) In this section:
(1) “Minor” means:
(A) an individual who is younger than 17 years of age; or
(B) an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than
17 years of age.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(a).
21
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record

contains conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved such

facts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326);

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury as factfinder

is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and

a jury may believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. See

Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Margraves v.

State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by

Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); Heiselbetz v. State, 906

S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The appellate court does not reweigh the

evidence nor determine the credibility of the evidence, nor does it substitute its own

judgment for that of the factfinder. Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Williams v. State, 235

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: ‘Circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.’” Clayton, 235

22
S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). Each fact need not point directly

and independently to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative force of

all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Temple v.

State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13;

Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

A person commits the crime of online solicitation of a minor if

. . . the person, over the Internet, by electronic mail or text message or
other electronic message service or system, or through a commercial
online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person,
including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual
contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor
or another person.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c). The gravamen of the offense is “the conduct of

requesting a minor to engage in illegal sexual acts[.]” See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d

10, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The statute expressly states: “It is not a defense []

that the meeting did not occur.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(d).3

3
Applying the previous version of section 33.021(d), this Court stated:

Because the requisite intent arises within the conduct of soliciting a
minor, “[] it does not matter whether the solicited meeting actually
occurs….”

Ganung v. State, 502 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.)
(quoting Ex parte Zavala, 421 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet.
ref’d)). As we explained in Ganung, the State has the burden of proof to show that
the defendant knowingly solicited the minor to meet with intent that the minor
engage in sexual conduct at the time of the solicitation, and the offense is complete
23
Under the statute, the State has the burden of proof to show that a defendant

“knowingly solicited” a minor with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual

contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another

person. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c). It follows then, that for purposes of an

offense under section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code, the offense has been

completed when the defendant knowingly solicits the minor with the intent that the

minor will engage in sexual conduct as outlined in the statute. See Tuazon v. State,

661 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.); see also Ganung v. State,

502 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.) (discussing the 2015

version of the online solicitation statute).

Under the Texas Penal Code,

(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.

at the time of the solicitation. Ganung, 502 S.W.3d at 829; Ex parte Wheeler, 478
S.W.3d 89, 95-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

24
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b). Intent is a fact issue for the factfinder (here, the

jury) to determine from all the circumstances. Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The factfinder may infer a defendant’s intent from his

actions, words, and conduct. See Session v. State, 680 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1984, no pet.) (citing Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1982); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).

Detective Dunn testified that in a KIK message in April of 2021, Hanks texted

to Dunn’s undercover persona Ally, “F**k you hard” and “I want to f**k you today,

want my c**k in you[.]” A screenshot of this message was admitted as State’s

Exhibit 2. Dunn also testified that, in the hours leading up to Hanks’s arrest, he

messaged “Ally” through the KIK app saying he needed to pick her up and he told

Ally, “You need to play spending the night with a friend[.] Rubbing my c**k[.]

Watching porn[.]” He sent her sexually explicit photos and videos. He further texted

to her, “We are going straight to getting a buzz and naked[.] Oral I like giving as

mu[c]h as receiving[.]” Hanks told Ally he wanted them to take a shower together.

In one message exchange, Ally told Hanks she should tell her mother she was going

to a friend’s house, and Hanks replied that he was on his way and needed an address

from her. He messaged her that he was in a black Chrysler and was on his way.

During these communications, Ally again messaged that she was fourteen years old.

Hanks also told Ally to “[m]ake sure your ready [] To get in the car[.]” According

25
to Dunn, after the last message from Hanks and when Hanks pulled into the location

where he agreed to meet Ally, officers pulled in and arrested Hanks.

Detective Dunn’s screenshots of his messages with Hanks while Dunn was

posing as Ally were admitted as State’s Exhibits 2 and 3. Investigator Neeley

testified that she found KIK messages from Hanks to Ally on one of Hanks’s phones

and that State’s Exhibit 11 from Hanks’s phone had the same content as State’s

Exhibit 3.

On this record, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Hanks

communicated over the internet with Ally who informed Hanks she was a minor,

younger than seventeen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(a). The

jury also could have inferred that Hanks “knowingly solicited” Ally (a minor) with

“the intent to engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual

intercourse.” See id. § 33.021(c). Hanks does not dispute that the messages between

Hanks and Detective Dunn (posing as Ally) were over the internet or another

electronic messaging service. Hanks also does not cite any legal authority requiring

evidence about who started the communication. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). There

was testimony that Hanks had at some point agreed to meet Ally sometime before

he was arrested and Hanks failed to appear for those meetings, but it was up to the

jury to decide the weight and credibility of this testimony. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d

at 13; Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 518; Session, 680 S.W.2d at 552.

26
Based on the record before us, we conclude the jury could have reasonably

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence presented that Hanks

committed the offense of online solicitation of a minor, as alleged in the indictment.

We further conclude the evidence was sufficient and that “[t]his was not a

determination so outrageous that no rational trier of fact could agree.” Wirth v. State,

361 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Proof of Venue
(Issue Two)

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to

prove venue. According to Appellant, while multiple events in the case occurred in

“Montgomery County,” the evidence did not establish that the events occurred in

Montgomery County, Texas. Appellant further argues that the case should be

reversed, and a judgment of acquittal should be entered because of this alleged

deficiency.

To support a conviction, the evidence must be adequate for the factfinder to

rationally find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319). An “element” is a fact that is legally required for a factfinder to convict

a person of a substantive offense. Id; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(22)

(defining “element of offense” to include conduct, result, culpability elements, as

well as “negation of any exception”). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held
27
that venue is not an “element of the offense” because it is not a “criminative fact.”

Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 34 (quoting Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 140 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990)). The Court further explained that our Rules of Appellate

Procedure permit appellate courts to presume that venue was established unless it

was disputed in the trial court, or the record affirmatively shows the contrary. Id. at

35 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(c)(1) (permitting appellate presumption on proof of

venue); State v. Mason, 980 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing venue

and jurisdiction as distinct from elements of offense)).

Appellant does not argue that he challenged venue in the trial court, nor does

the record show that he did so. Detective Dunn testified at trial that Hanks sent him

a message that Hanks lived in Houston, “two blocks from Moody Park[.]” Copies of

Dunn’s screenshots of messages that were admitted at trial include a message from

Hanks stating, “I’m just north of downtown Houston[.]” Also admitted at trial was

a map showing a route from Hanks’s address in Houston to Conroe, and messages

from Dunn (posing as Ally) include a message asking Hanks how far he was from

Conroe. The evidence also includes evidence that Hanks sent messages to Dunn

(Ally) when Hanks neared the location of the scheduled meeting and when he was

in Montgomery County for the meeting. Hanks also signed a “Consent to Search

Digital Storage Devices” signed by Hanks on letterhead of the District Attorney for

28
Montgomery County, and the letterhead provides an address in Conroe, Texas. As

we have explained herein, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence.

See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We conclude that the evidence does not show that venue was disputed, nor

does it show that venue was affirmatively proved to be in a county other than

Montgomery County, Texas. Therefore, we apply the presumption that venue was

correct as provided in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P.

44.2(c)(1). We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

Spoliation and Nondisclosure of Evidence
(Issue Six)

In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court should have included

the spoliation instruction he requested because the State failed to preserve material,

exculpatory evidence. According to Appellant, a “multitude” of text messages were

not preserved, and such messages were material, exculpatory, and favorable to

Appellant, so that there is a reasonable probability that, if such evidence had been

disclosed, the outcome of the trial could have been different. In particular, Appellant

contends that messages about him not showing up for a “scheduled encounter[]”

were “both exculpatory and material[.]” Appellant asserts that he was harmed by the

trial court’s denial of the adverse-inference instruction he requested, and a new trial

should be granted.

29
We review a claim of alleged jury charge error using a two-step process in

which we examine (1) whether error existed in the charge and (2) whether sufficient

harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-

44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). Where, as here, the defendant properly

objected to the charge at trial, jury charge error requires reversal if we find “some

harm” to his rights. Id. (citing Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). The

Almanza standard requires that an appellant show actual, and not theoretical, harm

from jury instruction error. Id. at 750; see also Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446, 449

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Spoliation concerns the loss or destruction of evidence. See Guzman v. State,

539 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing

Torres v. State, 371 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.

ref’d)). In a criminal case, when spoliation concerns potentially useful evidence, the

defendant bears the burden of establishing that the State lost or destroyed the

evidence in bad faith. Id. (citing Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202, 229 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010); Torres, 371 S.W.3d at 319).

Bad faith requires a showing of “some sort of improper motive, such as
personal animus against the defendant or a desire to prevent the
defendant from obtaining evidence that might be useful.” [Napper, 322
S.W.3d at 238.] When conduct can, at worst, be described as negligent,
the failure to preserve evidence does not rise to the level of a due
process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
30
Id. at 402.

The duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that possesses an

exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed. Id. at 401

(citing White v. State, 125 S.W.3d 41, 43-44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d). The Supreme Court has explained:

Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected
to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. To meet this standard
of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed,
and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (citation omitted).

In civil cases, a party who has deliberately destroyed evidence is presumed to

have done so because the evidence was unfavorable to its case, and the Court of

Criminal Appeals has held that in criminal cases, a similar presumption arises when

a party controlling missing evidence cannot explain the State’s failure to produce the

missing evidence. See State v. Lerma, 639 S.W.3d 63, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(citing Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 22 (Tex. 2014); Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003)). On appeal, an appellant

who was denied a spoliation instruction must affirmatively show that the lost

evidence was favorable and material to his defense. Guzman, 539 S.W.3d at 401

(citing White, 125 S.W.3d at 44).

31
At trial, Detective Dunn testified that he did not have screenshots of his

conversations with Hanks from March and a part of April of 2021 because KIK

crashed and he had not taken screenshots of all of his conversations. Dunn further

testified that KIK does not crash often, but when it does, there is no way to recover

the lost messages. On cross-examination, Dunn testified that it is easy to take a

screenshot of a message, and that he could have taken screenshots “in the beginning

of the communication with Mr. Hanks[.]” He also agreed that there was a time when

Hanks had agreed to a meeting, but Hanks did not show up, and Dunn did not

document that in his files. Dunn further testified that KIK does not store old

messages in “the cloud,” so he would not be able to get messages that had been lost

when KIK crashed. When asked whether this would make screenshotting messages

important, Dunn replied that, in his work, he is often messaging with multiple

suspects at the same time, that his phone did not have enough storage to save

screenshots of every conversation, and if he took screenshots of everything, “all [he]

would be doing every day is screen shotting.” Investigator Neeley testified that KIK

does not store messages and there are no tools or programs that would allow

someone to get messages that are lost when KIK crashes.

The defense argued to the trial court that it was “fighting against something

that hasn’t been turned over[.]” The State responded that “KIK [] is not monitored

or run by law enforcement[,] that is a private company, and this officer has no control

32
over what they keep or do not keep in their records.” The defense requested the

following spoliation instruction:

The State of Texas had a duty to retain all communications between law
enforcement officers and Defendant, including electronic mail or text
message or other electronic message service or system, or through a
commercial online service, that occurred during the investigation.
These communications were deleted or not preserved by law
enforcement while in their care, custody, management and control.
During your deliberations, you may consider that this evidence would
have been unfavorable to the State.

The trial court denied the requested instruction.

On this record, we cannot say the trial court erred because Appellant failed to

show that the lost messages had an exculpatory value that was apparent before the

evidence was destroyed, and Appellant failed to show the messages were favorable

and material to his defense. See id. Additionally, the trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the State provided an explanation for the failure to

produce the messages that had been lost when KIK crashed, and even if the lost

messages concern potentially useful evidence, the defendant failed to meet his

burden of establishing that the State lost or destroyed the evidence in bad faith. See

Lerma, 639 S.W.3d at 69 (citing Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d at 22; Johnson, 106 S.W.3d

at 721); Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 229; Guzman, 539 S.W.3d at 402. Also, Appellant

makes only a conclusory assertion that he was harmed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i);

Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 179-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (concluding

that appellant’s conclusory argument on appeal was inadequate). That said, because
33
we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the requested instruction, we

need not examine whether Appellant was harmed. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44.

We overrule Appellant’s sixth issue.

Admission of Evidence
(Issues Seven and Eight)

We address Appellant’s seventh and eighth issues together because both

pertain to the admission of evidence. In his seventh issue, Appellant argues that the

trial court erred by overruling his objection to the relevance of “evidence of child

pornography and other investigations.” In his eighth issue, Appellant argues that the

trial court erred by admitting “evidence of child pornography and other

investigations” because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Appellant’s brief does not cite to any part of the record where he contends the

complained-of evidence appears for each of these issues. Neither does the brief

explain why the unidentified complained-of evidence is not relevant or why it is

more prejudicial than probative. An appellant’s brief must contain a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i). To comply with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure, an appellant must not only cite existing and relevant legal authority, but

also apply the facts to the cited law to show how the trial court committed error. See

Trimble v. State, No. 09-23-00183-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3587, at **8-9 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont May 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i);
34
Broussard v. Vicknair, No. 09-21-00391-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9371, at *43

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Golden v. Milstead

Towing & Storage, Nos. 09-21-00043-CV, 09-21-00044-CV, & 09-21-00045-CV,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2988, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.)). It is not enough to list authorities in support of a conclusory argument;

an appellant must also apply the authorities to the applicable facts, and we have no

obligation to construct an appellant’s argument or analysis for him. See Busby v.

State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Smith v. State, 907 S.W.2d 522,

532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. See Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82-83 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016). Even assuming Appellant adequately briefed these issues, we conclude based

on the record before us that the trial court did not err. The trial court explained on

the record that Detective Dunn’s testimony about “child pornography and other

investigations” he has worked on was relevant to inform the jury about the nature of

the Detective’s work, about the Internet Crimes Against Children task force, and

about the use of the KIK app. The trial court could reasonably have determined that

the Detective’s testimony would be helpful to the jury regarding the investigation in

the context of the alleged crime. See Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Crim. App.

35
1990) (op. on reh’g). We presume the trial court engaged in a Rule 403 balancing

test before overruling Appellant’s objection at trial, and Appellant has provided no

analysis to the contrary. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195-96 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). Further, Appellant has not articulated how his substantial rights were

affected by the admission of the evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Gonzales v.

State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We overrule Appellant’s

seventh and eighth issues.

Authentication of Evidence
(Issues Nine and Twelve)

In his ninth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

State’s Exhibit 3 because there was a lack of authenticity due to missing evidence.

In his twelfth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting State’s

Exhibit 2 because it lacked authentication and a foundation. Specifically, Appellant

argues that Detective Dunn could not testify from his personal knowledge about the

date and time of the communications in Exhibit 2, and the State refreshed the

Detective’s memory “via a master suspect’s log folder that contained a date

modified[.]” Appellant argues that the “log indicates the message was modified” and

the image was not consistent with other images offered. Appellant further argues

that Exhibit 2 “does not contain a date or time identification and has a different

appearance than other communications offered.” Appellant contends “authenticity

36
is lacking[]” as to Exhibits 2 and 3 when considered under Tienda v. State, 358

S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

We review a trial court’s ruling on authentication for an abuse of discretion.

Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under this deferential

standard, if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, an

appellate court must uphold the court’s admissibility decision. Id. Rule 901, which

governs the authentication requirement for the admissibility of evidence, requires

the proponent of an item of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). In

Tienda, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that “the provenance of []

electronic writings can sometimes be open to question[,]” but electronic evidence

may be authenticated in a number of ways as long as the evidence is “sufficiently

linked to the purported author so as to justify submission to the jury for its ultimate

determination of authenticity.” 358 S.W.3d at 639-40.

The authentication requirement is a liberal standard of admissibility. Fowler,

544 S.W.3d at 848-49 (quoting Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015)). The proponent has to produce sufficient evidence from which a

reasonable factfinder could properly find genuineness. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638.

Conclusive proof of authenticity is not required. Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848.

Evidence may be authenticated by direct testimony from a witness with personal

37
knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial

evidence. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court need only make a preliminary

determination that the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts sufficient to

support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.

Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849. It is up to the jury to make the final determination of

whether the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at

600.

Any complaint that an exhibit is inaccurate goes to the weight of the evidence

and not to its admissibility. See Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1987) (en banc); Hasley v. State, 786 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

1989, pet. ref’d). In a previous memorandum opinion involving an online solicitation

case, we determined that photographs of text messages were adequately

authenticated when the witness (through whom the messages were offered) testified

that she took the photographs, and she knew the conversation was with the

defendant. See Coe v. State, Nos. 09-13-00409-CR & 09-13-00410-CR, 2015 Tex.

App. LEXIS 6374, at **27-28 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 24, 2015, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). We explained:

The events surrounding the messages sent to [the victim’s] sister
indicate circumstantially that [the defendant] was the author of the text
messages. See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 641. When considered in
combination with other circumstantial evidence in the record and the
fact that Coe arrived in person at the designated place and time and
announced his arrival by the same cellphone number, we hold a
38
reasonable factfinder could have believed the text messages were
created and sent by [the defendant].

Id. Our sister courts have also concluded that when authenticating an electronic

communication, a witness qualifies as having knowledge of the communication

when he participated in an exchange of messages and can testify to an exhibit’s fair

and accurate depiction of the messages exchanged. See Chavezcasarrubias v. State,

No. 02-14-00418-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10652, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex.

R. Evid. 901(b)(1); Aekins v. State, No. 04-13-00064-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS

13694, at **13-16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 2013) (mem. op., not

designated for publication), aff’d, 447 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ussery

v. State, No. 03-07-00116-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 741, at *22 (Tex. App.—

Austin Jan. 30, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see also

Peña v. State, 467 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). Potential

discrepancies between or within exhibits may go to the weight of the evidence, but

not its admissibility. Hoover v. State, No. 09-15-00255-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS

3668, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (citing Peña, 467 S.W.3d at 75).

At trial, Detective Dunn identified State’s Exhibit 2 as a copy of a screenshot

he took of a text message exchange between himself (posing as Ally) and Hanks in

April of 2021. He also identified State’s Exhibit 3 as a screenshot of text messages
39
between himself (posing as Ally) and Hanks between April 29 and May 19 of 2021.

He testified that he used his undercover iPhone for the messaging and to take the

screenshots.

The evidence includes a “Consent to Search Digital Storage Devices” form

signed by Hanks. Investigator Neeley testified that she found messages between

Hanks and Ally on one of Hanks’s phones, and she testified that State’s Exhibit 11

(data from Hanks’s phone) had the same content as Detective Dunn’s screenshots

contained in State’s Exhibit 3. Neeley concluded that Hanks was communicating

with “Ally,” Dunn’s undercover persona, because the messages on Hanks’s phone

matched the screenshots that Dunn took.

On the record before us, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that

Dunn created the screenshots that were admitted as State’s Exhibits 2 and 3, so that

he was a person with personal knowledge under Rule 901. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(a),

(b)(1); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. Dunn qualifies as having knowledge because he

testified that he participated in the exchange of messages. See Peña, 467 S.W.3d at

75. Further, Investigator Neeley testified that the messages extracted from Hanks’s

own phone match the screenshots that Dunn took. Therefore, Detective Dunn’s

testimony, considered together with Investigator Neeley’s testimony and other

evidence submitted at trial (and not challenged by Appellant), were sufficient for the

trial court to conclude that the State had supplied facts sufficient to support a

40
reasonable jury determination that State’s Exhibits 2 and 3 were authentic. See

Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849. Any alleged missing data in the evidence or

inconsistencies with other evidence would go to the weight, and not the authenticity,

of the challenged exhibits. See Robinson, 739 S.W.2d at 802; Hoover, 2017 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3668, at *5; Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 735. We overrule Appellant’s ninth

and twelfth issues.

State’s Duty of Disclosure
(Issues Ten and Eleven)

In Appellant’s tenth issue, he argues that the trial court erred by not

suppressing evidence because the State did not comply with its discovery obligations

under article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Appellant, the

State failed to disclose evidence to the defense that was favorable to Hanks “in that

it would have shown the first contact, who made it, how it was made, what was said,

and actions taken by Appellant which were consistent with a lack of intent.”

Appellant further argues that the undisclosed evidence “was material because it

would have provided context to the messages which followed, went to an element

of the case, specifically intent, and given a full picture to the jury of Appellant’s

purported actions.” In his eleventh issue, Appellant argues that the State’s failure to

preserve all the messages and its failure to disclose them was a Brady violation. See

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

41
At trial, the defense counsel asked the trial court to suppress all the electronic

messages because there was missing evidence. Defense counsel objected and argued

as follows:

I am fighting against messages that I don’t have because the officer
failed to preserve them. And it is an element of the offense -- electronic
communication devices messages.
....
I want information related to how and why that information is not
preserved, how many times the app crashed -- because that is going to
be his explanation. And the State has given me no information about
how many times it has crashed, if he reinstalled the app.
I am fighting against something that hasn’t been turned over to
me. And it is an undercover sting operation on the Internet with weeks
of communications that are missing that add context, that adds luring. I
have no idea who initiated contact.
....
Under 39.14 I get written communication by an officer.
....
Judge, I think that is Brady. I should be given it from the officer. It is
not from KIK.

The trial court explained that sometimes technology, such as a body camera,

fails for no known reason, but that does not mean that evidence that was preserved

should not be admitted, and any incompleteness goes to the weight and not the

admissibility of the evidence. The trial court further stated that the defense could

cross-examine Detective Dunn to test his credibility and to ask about actions he did

not take or things he might have done better. The trial court further explained, “I

don’t have anything before me right now that there was anything intentional to try

42
to deceive the Court or deceive the jury or to manipulate or under 38.23 that they

violated any law or anything.”

We apply a bifurcated standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress, giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical

facts and reviewing the court’s application of the law under a de novo standard. See

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Guzman v.

State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Where a trial court does not

make explicit findings, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported

in the record that support its conclusion. See id. at 327-28 (citing State v. Ballard,

987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).

Under article 39.14(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State has

the duty to disclose “any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item,

or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate

the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense

charged.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h). Appellant does not argue

that article 39.14(h) imposes an affirmative duty to preserve evidence. Detective

Dunn testified that he does not always take screenshots of his messages with suspects

because he is often dealing with multiple suspects at a time, it would take too much

43
time to screenshot everything, and his phone does not have enough storage to save

every message. He also testified that when the KIK system crashes, any previous

messages are lost and KIK does not retain the messages. Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the trial court could reasonably

have determined that the missing messages were not in the possession, custody, or

control of the State, and there was no article 39.14(h) violation. See id.; Carmouche,

10 S.W.3d at 327-28. We overrule Appellant’s tenth issue.

A Brady violation occurs when the State suppresses—willfully or

inadvertently—evidence that is favorable to the appellant. Harm v. State, 183

S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Brady obligation generally “does not

require prosecuting authorities to disclose exculpatory information to defendants

that the State does not have in its possession and that is not known to exist.” State v.

Heath, No. PD-0156-22, 2024 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 446, at **33-34 (Tex. Crim.

App. June 14, 2024) (quoting Harm, 183 S.W.3d at 406). However, “the government

is constitutionally required to preserve evidence that might be expected to play a

significant role in the suspect’s defense.” Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999). If the State fails to preserve evidence that is exculpatory and

material, then a due process violation has occurred regardless of the good or bad

faith on the part of the State in failing to preserve that evidence. See Illinois v. Fisher,

540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58; State v. Fellows, 471

44
S.W.3d 555, 563 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d). If the State

fails to preserve potentially useful evidence, the defendant must go a step further and

demonstrate that the State failed to preserve that evidence in bad faith. See Fisher,

540 U.S. at 547; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58; Fellows, 471 S.W.3d at 563.

Evidence is material under a constitutional standard when the missing evidence has

an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed or lost

and is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable

evidence by other reasonably available means. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. A Brady

claim requires proof that the evidence was both material and favorable to the

defendant such that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been

disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Ex parte Miles, 359

S.W.3d 647, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Favorable evidence is any evidence that, if disclosed and used effectively,

may make a difference between conviction and acquittal, and includes both

exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Harm, 183 S.W.3d at 408 (citing United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Exculpatory evidence may justify, excuse, or clear the

defendant from fault, while impeachment evidence is that which disputes or

contradicts other evidence. Id. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

45
proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also Ex parte

Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (adopting Bagley standard of

materiality); Miles, 359 S.W.3d at 665. A reasonable probability is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984)). Materiality is

determined by examining the alleged error in the context of the entire record and

overall strength of the state’s case. Harm, 183 S.W.3d at 409.

Appellant argues that the missing evidence (the KIK messages that were lost

when KIK crashed) was material because “it would have provided context to the

messages which followed, went to an element of the case, specifically intent, and

[would have] given a full picture to the jury of Appellant’s purported actions.”

According to Appellant, the missing evidence would have been favorable to him

because it would have shown who made the first contact and conduct by Appellant

that was inconsistent with a lack of intent. Appellant acknowledges the situation in

this case is the failure to preserve evidence, and he argues that the police’s failure to

preserve the missing messages was in bad faith because Detective Dunn knew how

to preserve messages by taking screenshots, he did so “routinely,” and he was

familiar with the KIK app. The defense cross-examined Detective Dunn about his

practices and his messaging with Hanks, and Dunn testified about one occasion

when there had been a planned meeting, but Hanks did not show up. Appellant’s

46
brief does not argue that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

id.; Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 291. In addition, Appellant’s brief does not identify

evidence in the record from which the trial court could have concluded that the State

acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the missing KIK messages. See Fisher, 540

U.S. at 547; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58; Fellows, 471 S.W.3d at 563. The trial

court could have reasonably concluded that Hanks failed to show that the missing

evidence was material and exculpatory under the standard articulated in Bagley. See

473 U.S. at 682. We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress, and we overrule the eleventh issue.

Admission of the Pen Packets
(Issues Thirteen and Fourteen)

In issues thirteen and fourteen, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by

admitting State’s Exhibits 16 and 17 (pen packets). According to Appellant, Exhibit

16 includes no fingerprints, although Appellant admits it includes “other identifiers.”

Appellant argues that the “other identifiers” in the pen packets are not sufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the same person as indicated in

State’s Exhibit 16, and the exhibit was inadmissible for lack of relevance. As to

Exhibit 17, Appellant argues that this pen packet “had a differently spelled last name

than Appellant.” Because of the differently spelled name and the lack of any

fingerprints in the pen packet, Appellant argues that this pen packet was
47
inadmissible. Appellant further argues that in the absence of independent testimony

that Appellant was the person convicted of the offense shown in each of the pen

packets, the pen packets are inadmissible, citing Rose v. State, 507 S.W.2d 547, 548

(Tex. Crim. App. 1974). According to Appellant, because the pen packets did not

include usable fingerprints, a print comparison could not be made, and the State did

not sufficiently link Appellant to the prior judgments contained in the pen packets.

We have previously explained herein that we review a trial court’s ruling on

the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Henley, 493

S.W.3d at 82-83. The preliminary decision of whether to admit evidence is to be

decided by the trial court, but as we have explained that determination is not a

particularly “high hurdle” of admissibility. See Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545,

549 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (citing United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371

F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that Rule 901 does not establish a particularly

high hurdle, and that hurdle may be cleared by circumstantial evidence)). The

threshold inquiry made by the trial court is whether or not the proponent of the

evidence supplied facts that are sufficient for a reasonable jury determination that

the evidence is authentic. Id.

“[T]o establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the

defendant is linked to that conviction.” Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.

48
Crim. App. 2016) (citing Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007)). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two

elements. Id. Evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be

a preferred and convenient means, but the State may use other types of evidence to

prove an enhancement. Id. Examples of acceptable evidence include the admission

or stipulation of the defendant, testimony by people present at the time of the

defendant’s conviction and who can identify the defendant as the person convicted,

and documentary proof which contains sufficient information to establish that a prior

conviction exists and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted. Id. (citing

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-22).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated the process used by the State of

proving up prior convictions closely resembles putting together a “‘jigsaw puzzle.’”

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923 (quoting Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 835-36 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g)). Ultimately, it is for the factfinder to consider the

totality of the evidence admitted and determine (1) whether there was a previous

conviction, and (2) whether the defendant was the person convicted. Id. at 923. If

these two elements can be found beyond a reasonable doubt, then the pieces used to

complete the “jigsaw puzzle” are necessarily legally sufficient to prove a prior

conviction. Id. And as we have previously explained herein, the trier of fact weighs

the information, and any alleged missing details in the evidence or inconsistencies

49
with other evidence goes to the weight, and not the authenticity, of the challenged

exhibits. Id.; see Robinson, 739 S.W.2d at 802; Hoover, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS

3668, at *5; Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 735. A trial court’s ruling to admit evidence of

prior convictions is well within its discretion when the admitted documents identify

a person with the same name as appellant, the pen packets contain the same cause of

actions as illustrated in the judgments, the information establishes a crime committed

on the same date as is indicated in the judgments, and the same violations can be

inferred from other record evidence. See Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478, 488 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993); see also Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638 (“Evidence may be

authenticated in a number of ways, including by direct testimony from a witness

with personal knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by

circumstantial evidence.”).

Exhibits 16 and 17 include a Declaration by the custodian of records for the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice that attest that the pen packets are “true and

correct copies of information provided on inmate Hanks, Clifton Todd [] kept by the

TDCJ in the regular course of its business activity.” In this case, Investigator Joe

Nichols testified that the pen packets admitted as State’s Exhibits 16 and 17 did not

have readable fingerprints. Even so, Nichols also testified that he was able to tie the

pen packet in Exhibit 17 to Hanks by reference to a review of Hanks’s criminal

history, his name, the date of the offenses, and the jurisdiction for the offenses. He

50
further testified that the Exhibit 16 pen packet pertained to a 2003 conviction for

driving while intoxicated; the indictment for that offense included an enhancement

paragraph listing a 1980 conviction for felony attempted burglary of a building; the

judgment for the DWI offense reflects that Hanks pleaded “true” to the alleged

enhancement for the 1980 burglary conviction; and State’s Exhibit 17 includes the

judgment and sentence for the 1980 burglary conviction. Both pen packets in

Exhibits 16 and 17 include photographs of Hanks. Nichols testified that he

fingerprinted Hanks, and he identified Hanks as the defendant. Hanks also testified

during the punishment phase of trial that he went to prison in 2003 for driving while

intoxicated, that he pleaded “true” to that charge, and that it was true he was

previously convicted of attempted burglary of a building.

On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

the pen packets reflected by Exhibits 16 and 17. The trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the State supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable

jury determination that the proffered evidence in State’s Exhibit 16 was authentic.

See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849; Elliott, 858 S.W.2d at 488. Any complaints about

inconsistencies or missing information in the pen packets would go to the weight of

the evidence and not its admissibility. Robinson, 739 S.W.2d at 802; Hoover, 2017

Tex. App. LEXIS 3668, at *5; Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 735. We overrule issues

thirteen and fourteen.

51
Motion for New Trial and Enhancement Allegations
(Issues Three, Four, and Five)

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his

Motion for New Trial. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial

under an abuse of discretion standard. See Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 127

(Tex. Crim. App. 2024). The Appellant argues the trial court erred by overruling

Appellant’s Motion for New Trial because under “Tex. R. App. P. 21.3 [] a new trial

must be granted when the court has misdirected the jury about the law,” and here

“the jury was misdirected about the law as it relates to the available punishments and

enhancements in this case because the jury charge at punishment did not properly

follow the statute and require that the second enhancement paragraph be final

subsequent to the first.”

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by incorrectly

charging the jury regarding the required findings of the enhancement paragraphs.

According to Appellant, the jury charge asked the jury to find whether the two prior

felony convictions that the State alleged were true, and such an instruction was

incorrect because the jury was required to find that the second prior conviction was

for an offense that occurred after the first prior felony conviction became final, citing

Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

52
And in his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to

punish him as a habitual offender because of the alleged jury charge error as to proof

of the sequence of prior convictions.

As explained earlier herein, for a claim of jury-charge error, we first determine

whether error existed. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. In this case, Appellant did not

object to the jury charge instruction regarding the alleged enhancements until after

trial, when he filed his Motion for New Trial. Therefore, under the second step

outlined in Ngo, if we determine there was error we review the alleged jury-charge

error to determine whether egregious harm resulted. See id. at 743-44.

We apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard to determine the sufficiency of

evidence proving enhancement of punishment. See Davy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 745,

753 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19);

Andrus v. State, Nos. 05-08-00703-CR & 05-08-00704-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS

1665, at *19 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318)). Applying that standard, we consider

all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether,

based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder

could have found the essential proof requirements beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. We measure the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the enhancement by the elements of a

53
hypothetically correct jury charge for the enhancement, as it is defined by statute.

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. Here, the elements of

proof required for enhancement under Penal Code section 12.42(d) are set forth in

the statute.

Section 12.42(d) of the Penal Code provides, in relevant part:

. . . if it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a state jail
felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the defendant has
previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second
previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to
the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction the
defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or
less than 25 years. A previous conviction for a state jail felony
punishable under Section 12.35(a) may not be used for enhancement
purposes under this subsection.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d). In other words, “‘[t]he [chronological] sequence

of events must be proved as follows: (1) the first conviction becomes final; (2) the

offense leading to a later conviction is committed; (3) the later conviction becomes

final; (4) the offense for which defendant presently stands accused is committed.’”

Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 290-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). (quoting Tomlin

v. State, 722 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).

The indictment in this case specifically alleged that Hanks committed the

offense of online solicitation of a minor “on or about May 19, 2021[.]” The jury

charge for punishment in this case stated, in relevant part:

54
You have found the defendant, Clifton Todd Hanks, guilty of the
offense of Online Solicitation of a Minor, as charged in the indictment.
It is now necessary that you assess punishment in this cause.
....
The State of Texas has alleged in Enhancement Paragraph A of
the indictment that the defendant, Clifton Todd Hanks, was convicted
of a felony, to wit: Driving While Intoxicated - 3rd on June 11, 2003 in
the 183rd District Court of Harris County, Texas in Cause No. 934805
under the name of Clifton Todd Hanks and said conviction became final
prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense.
To the allegations listed in Enhancement Paragraph A of the
indictment, the defendant has pled “Not True.”
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the allegations set out in Enhancement Paragraph A of the indictment
are true, you will state in your verdict that you find “True” the
allegations of Enhancement Paragraph A of the indictment; but unless
you so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will
answer “Not True” to the allegations in Enhancement Paragraph A of
the indictment.
....
The State of Texas has also alleged in Enhancement Paragraph
B of the indictment that the defendant, Clifton Todd Hanks, was
convicted of a felony, to wit: Attempted Burglary of a Building on
February 25, 1980 in the 262nd District Court of Harris County, Texas
in Cause No. 309882 under the name of Clifton Todd Hanks and said
conviction became final prior to the commission of the aforesaid
offense.
To the allegations listed in Enhancement Paragraph B of the
indictment, the defendant has pled “Not True.”
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the allegations set out in Enhancement Paragraph B of the indictment
are true, you will state in your verdict that you find “True” the
allegations of Enhancement Paragraph B of the indictment; but unless
you so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will
answer “Not True” to the allegations in Enhancement Paragraph B of
the indictment.
....
If you have answered “True” to all of the allegations in
Enhancement Paragraphs A and B of the indictment, then you are
instructed that the punishment for Online Solicitation of a Minor is
55
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice for Life or for any term of years not less than twenty-
five (25) nor more than ninety-nine (99) years or Life.

The State argues that the jury charge in this case “aptly instructed the jury on the

requisite finality and sequencing.”

The jury charge stated that the jury had already found Hanks guilty of the

offense of online solicitation as alleged in the indictment, and the indictment alleged

that the offense of online solicitation was committed on or about May 19, 2021. The

jury charge instructed the jury that the State alleged in Enhancement Paragraph A

that Hanks was convicted of felony Driving While Intoxicated in 2003, and that

conviction became final prior to the commission of the “aforesaid offense.” Then

the next paragraph of the jury charge instructed the jury that the State alleged in

Enhancement Paragraph B that Hanks was convicted of felony Attempted Burglary

of a Habitation in 1980, and that conviction became final prior to the commission of

the “aforesaid offense.” The “aforesaid offense” referenced in this second

enhancement paragraph is the 2003 offense of felony Driving While Intoxicated.

“Aforesaid” means “said or named before or above.” Aforesaid, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aforesaid (last visited August 14,

2024). Appellant did not challenge the use of the word “aforesaid” at trial nor on

appeal. Finally, in the charge the instruction provides, “[i]f you have answered

‘True’ to all of the allegations in Enhancement Paragraphs A and B of the indictment,

56
then you are instructed that the punishment for Online Solicitation of a Minor is

confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice for Life or for any term of years not less than twenty-five (25) nor more than

ninety-nine (99) years or Life.” We conclude that the jury charge on the

enhancement allegations adequately contained a requirement that the jury must

decide whether the offense alleged in Enhancement Paragraph B (the 1980 offense)

became final before the offense alleged in the previous Enhancement Paragraph A

(the 2003 offense), and we cannot say the charge erroneously failed to provide a

sequential element consistent with article 12.42(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.42(d).

With respect to the sufficiency challenge, the evidence in the record shows

that the sentence for the 1980 conviction was “not less than 2 years and not more

than 3 years” of confinement, and the judgment for the 2003 DWI shows that Hanks

was sentenced to 12 years of confinement. Imposition of these sentences establishes

the finality of the convictions. See Ex parte Pue, 552 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018) (citing Martinez v. State, 531 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);

Snodgrass v. State, 150 S.W. 162, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912)).

At the time of the punishment hearing, the jury had already found Hanks guilty

as charged in the indictment of online solicitation of a minor, committed on or about

May 19, 2021. The pen packets admitted into evidence establish that Hanks’s

57
conviction for Attempted Burglary became final in February of 1980, and the

commission of the felony Driving While Intoxicated occurred twenty-three years

later in 2003. See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 647. Hanks testified at trial that the last time

he went to prison was in 2003 for driving while intoxicated, and he agreed that he

had committed crimes “on and off” from 1977 through 2021. He also admitted that

the enhancement allegations in this case were true, even though he had pleaded “not

true.” And as we discussed above, in the pen packet for the 2003 offense, the

evidence shows Hanks pleaded true to the enhancement allegation that the 1980 prior

offense of attempted burglary became final prior to the 2003 offense.

Considering the entirety of the charge and measuring the evidence presented

to the jury in this case against a hypothetically correct jury charge, a rational juror,

accurately instructed on the law regarding finality under section 12.42(d), would

reasonably conclude from the evidence, that Appellant’s conviction for burglary was

final in 1980, that his conviction for that crime became final before he was convicted

of driving while intoxicated in 2003, and that his conviction for the DWI became

final before the current offense for online solicitation of a minor. See Jordan, 256

S.W.3d at 290-91; Davy, 525 S.W.3d at 753.

Although Appellant has challenged the admission of the pen packets, he

admitted to the jury that the enhancement allegations were true, despite having

pleaded “not true.” Accordingly, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

58
to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding

of “true” to both of the alleged enhancements. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Davy,

525 S.W.3d at 753. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Appellant’s Motion for New Trial. See Becerra, 685 S.W.3d at 127.

But even assuming there was error in the enhancement part of the charge, the

error would still be subject to a harm analysis. See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645; see also

Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44. Here, because Appellant did not object to the charge

during the trial Appellant must show egregious harm. See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645.

To assess whether a charge error caused a defendant egregious harm, appellate

courts consider: “(1) the entirety of the jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence,

including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, (3) the arguments

of counsel, and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the trial record as a

whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

The entire jury charge given to the jury during the punishment phase included

a requirement that the jury must find “all” the allegations in the Enhancement

Paragraphs A and B true and then the punishment would range between 25 years to

life. The defense attorney never objected to the instruction nor did the defense

contest the finality or sequencing of the 1980 or 2003 offenses, and nothing in the

record before us shows there were any fact issues raised on finality or sequencing of

the alleged enhancement offenses. See Buchanan v. State, 453 S.W.2d 479, 484

59
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970). According to the evidence in the record, Appellant’s 1980

conviction as alleged in Enhancement Paragraph B became final before he

committed the “aforesaid offense,” his second felony offense as alleged in

Enhancement Paragraph A. During direct examination by defense counsel, the

Appellant testified that since 1977, he has been arrested and convicted many times

in his life, and that he pleaded guilty each time. During cross-examination, the

Appellant agreed that he went to prison in 2003 for a felony driving while intoxicated

(DWI) conviction, and that he admitted that he pleaded “true” to the enhancement

paragraph in his DWI case, and that his 1980 conviction for attempted burglary had

become final before he was convicted of the DWI. He also admitted in this case that

the enhancement paragraphs as alleged in his indictment were “in fact true[.]” Then,

during closing arguments, trial counsel emphasized that the appellant “got up there

. . . and admitted [the enhancement paragraphs are] true.” And then defense counsel

told the jury to “[f]ind Enhancements A and B true[]” and asked the jury to assess

his punishment at the minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment. Considering the

charge as a whole, the state of the evidence presented to the jury, the arguments of

counsel, and the record as a whole, we conclude that the Appellant failed to establish

he suffered egregious harm from the alleged charge error. See Almanza, 686 S.W.3d

at 171.

We overrule Appellant’s third, fourth, and fifth issues.

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Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment of conviction.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on August 5, 2024
Opinion Delivered September 11, 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.

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