In the Interest of M.Z.K.E. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00367-CV
__________________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.Z.K.E.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 410th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 16-11-13430-CV
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal of a final Order in a Suit to Modify the Parent-Child

Relationship after a bench trial. Appellant Mother appeals the judgment, raising two

issues: (1) she argues the evidence was not sufficient for the trial court’s order that

Mother’s possession of the child, “Macy,”1 shall be supervised, and (2) she contends

the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial court’s order that Mother pay

Father $247,056.50 in attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in

part and reverse and remand in part.

We use pseudonyms to refer to the parties and lay witnesses. See Tex. Fam.
1

Code Ann. § 109.002(d).
1
Background

Mother and Father were married in December of 2011, and the order the trial

court modified is the Final Decree of Divorce dated December 26, 2018, which

names the parents joint managing conservators of Macy. The subject of the suit is

Macy, Mother and Father’s child who was five years old at the time of the divorce,

and ten years old at the time of the modification trial.

On May 14, 2021, Mother filed a Petition to Modify the Parent-Child

Relationship with Request for Temporary Restraining Order. Macy was eight years

old at the time the petition to modify was filed. Mother alleged that circumstances

had materially and substantially changed since the date of the order to be modified

was signed, and she asked to be designated as Macy’s sole managing conservator.

According to the Petition, Father had “engaged in a history or pattern of child abuse

and child neglect[,]” and Mother asked that Father have limited and supervised

access to or possession of Macy, including visitation supervised under the Access

Builds Children program or similar supervision. Mother further alleged that Father

had a “history or pattern of committing family violence” in the two years before

Mother filed her Petition and Mother asked the court to render a possession order

that would protect Macy’s safety and well-being, including ordering that Father’s

access to Macy be supervised and ordering that exchange of Macy occur in a

protective setting. Mother sought temporary orders appointing her temporary sole

2
managing conservator and a temporary restraining order, enjoining Father from

“[d]isturbing the peace of the child or of another party[,] [w]ithdrawing the child

from enrollment in the school or day-care facility where the child [was] presently

enrolled[, and] [h]iding or secreting the child from [Mother].” Mother attached her

affidavit to the Petition, in which Mother alleged that Macy had made a “sexual

abuse outcry” after being with Father, and that Macy had also come home with

bruises on her legs and had reported that her Father and her Father’s girlfriend

spanked Macy.

On May 18, 2021, the trial court signed a Temporary Restraining Order and

Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Orders against Respondent Father. The order

restrained Father from: disturbing the peace of the child or another party;

withdrawing the child from school; hiding the child from Mother; and removing the

child from Mother’s possession.

On June 1, 2021, Father filed his Original Answer, asserting a general denial

and seeking attorney’s fees. On June 16, 2021, Father filed his Counter-Petition to

Modify Parent-Child Relationship. Father asked to be appointed sole managing

conservator of Macy, or in the alternative, to remain as a joint managing conservator.

Father also sought attorney’s fees.

On June 30, 2022, Mother filed her First Amended and Supplemental Petition

to Modify Parent-Child Relationship with Second Request for Temporary

3
Restraining Order. Mother alleged that Father had engaged in a history of child abuse

and neglect as well as family violence. Mother also asked for an increase in the

amount of child support Father pays. Mother further asked the trial court to order a

psychological evaluation and full mental examination of Father, that Father be

ordered to make payments to support Mother until a final order is signed, and that

Father pay attorney’s fees.

On July 5, 2022, Mother filed her Second Amended and Supplemental

Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship with Second Request for Temporary

Restraining Order, which was Mother’s live petition at the time of trial. Mother

alleged that the circumstances of the child or parties have materially and

substantially changed since the order to be modified was signed and asked to be

designated sole managing conservator of Macy; for Father not to have access to

Macy or, in the alternative, that Father’s visitation with Macy be supervised; and for

Father’s child support to be increased. Mother also alleged that Father had engaged

in a history or pattern of child abuse and neglect and family violence and had not

adequately fed Macy. Mother asked for temporary orders for a child custody

evaluation and a psychological and mental evaluation of Macy and of Father. She

further requested a TRO enjoining Father from disturbing the peace of the child or

other party; withdrawing the child from enrollment in school or day care; and hiding

or secreting the child from Mother. Mother also sought attorney’s fees. According

4
to the Petition, “two or more potential Parental Child Abduction factors exist[,]” and

Mother asked the trial court to consider additional measures to protect Macy from

abduction by Father. Mother attached her Declaration to the Petition in support of

her allegations.

On September 15, 2022, Father filed his First Amended Counter-Petition to

Modify Parent-Child Relationship, which was Father’s live counterpetition at the

time of trial. According to the Counter-Petition, the circumstances of the child or

other party have materially and substantially changed since the order to be modified

was signed, and Father asked to be appointed sole managing conservator of Macy

or, in the alternative, to remain joint managing conservator. Father also asked that,

if he is appointed conservator with the exclusive right to designate Macy’s primary

residence, Mother be ordered to pay child support and he not be required to pay child

support. Father also sought temporary orders for a psychological evaluation of

Mother. Father requested a permanent injunction enjoining Mother from: taking

Macy for health care except in an emergency; authorizing a SANE (Sexual Assault

Nurse Examiner) examination of Macy; and taking photographs of Macy when she

is naked or of her genitals. Father also sought attorney’s fees.

That same day, Father filed a Motion for Enforcement, alleging that Mother

had violated terms of the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce nineteen times by taking

5
Macy for psychological treatment without getting Father’s prior agreement.2 Father

asked for Mother to be held in contempt and sought attorney’s fees for enforcement

of the prior order. In Mother’s responses, she asserted that she did not take Macy for

any psychological treatment but “merely did what was told she should do” in

response to outcries by Macy.

On October 4, 2022, Mother filed a “Supplemental Motion to Hear and to

Grant the Motion for Mental Examination of [Father.]” Mother alleged that Father

has evaded service, tried to strangle her, and made false claims against Mother, and

that Macy “may be at risk” when in Father’s possession. Mother asked the trial court

to hear evidence and order a psychological examination of Father.

The matter was tried to the bench on July 31 through August 4, 2023. On

August 22, 2023, the trial court entered an Interim Order ordering that Father shall

have the exclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of

Macy.

The Final Decree of Divorce stated, in relevant part, that both parties, as joint
2

managing conservators, had the right “to confer with the other parent to the extent
possible before making a decision concerning the health, education, and welfare of
the child[.]”
6
Evidence at Trial 3

Mother’s Testimony

Mother works as an electrical engineer for Cisco Systems. She testified she

had master’s degrees in electrical engineering and telecommunications.

According to Mother, she had met with Dr. Tinder before the divorce, Dr.

Tinder conducted a custody evaluation, and Mother believed that Child Protective

Services (CPS) was called as a result. Mother testified that after the divorce but

before she filed her original petition to modify, she had problems with Father, she

saw bruises on Macy’s “private area[,]” and she took Macy to the pediatrician.

Mother agreed she took pictures of bruises on Macy’s shins and “private part[,]” and

she took Macy to the doctor and to Texas Children’s Hospital in Conroe in February

of 2019. Mother agreed that, at the hospital, she reported that Father “will turn

[Macy] upside down and pinch her private parts[.]” According to Mother, CPS asked

her questions in the hospital. Mother agreed she took Macy to the hospital again in

March of 2019 after discovering “bruises again in [the child’s] labia.” During this

visit, someone from the sheriff’s office questioned Mother and Macy, and an

ambulance took Macy to Texas Children’s Hospital in downtown Houston. Mother

testified that CPS had a forensic interview with Macy and that she did not remember

3
We limit our discussion of the evidence to the issues Appellant raises on
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
7
the dates of all of Macy’s bruises because there were so many incidents. Mother

agreed she told nurses at Texas Children’s Hospital that she suspected Father of

physical and sexual abuse because of the bruises she found on Macy. And Mother

agreed that Macy had a SANE exam in March of 2019. Mother further agreed that

there were five reports involving child abuse, assault, or sexual assault of Macy since

March of 2018, and, as of March of 2019, there were three allegations of sexual

abuse against Father. Mother also testified that at some point, Macy “[p]ossibly[]”

told Mother that Father kissed Macy where “she might go poop[.]”Mother

understood that in February of 2019, the hospital staff had a low suspicion of sexual

abuse.

Mother recalled an incident in September of 2020 when Macy fell in the

driveway after Father brought her back to Mother’s house. According to Mother,

Father pulled on Macy’s backpack while Macy was getting out of the car, and Macy

fell. Mother testified that she spoke to the police and told them she did not want

charges filed. Mother also testified that a CPS worker contacted her in May of 2021.

Mother also recalled taking Macy for counseling at The Women’s Center, where

Macy had about seventeen counseling sessions, and Mother started seeing Dr.

Harrison in 2022. Mother testified that there were plans to terminate Macy’s sessions

at The Women’s Center, but in April of 2022, The Women’s Center advised Mother

that Macy had reported that “my daddy licks my private parts[.]”

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Mother recalled going to see Dr. Harrison with Macy on May 27, 2022, but

she did not agree that she and Macy talked about a sexual abuse allegation in the car

on the way to Dr. Harrison’s office. According to Mother, she had no idea that Macy

was going to outcry to Dr. Harrison about a new sexual abuse allegation, and Mother

agreed that she told Macy that if Macy had something to tell Dr. Harrison, Macy

should write it down.

Mother agreed she talked with a detective in July of 2021, and she believed

that CPS thought she was coaching Macy. She also agreed she told detectives that

she and Macy had hand signals that Macy came up with because Macy was worried

to go to her Father’s house. According to Mother, using hand signals was important

because Mother needed to protect Macy from being in danger and to make sure Macy

was safe from Father. She agreed she was asked to take Macy for a SANE exam at

that time, but she did not do so. Mother also agreed she took Macy for forensic

interviews to discuss physical and sexual abuse by Father.

According to Mother, Macy always tells her the truth. She recalled law

enforcement discussing with her about Macy being inconsistent with her stories.

Mother testified that CPS kept saying she was coaching Macy, but Mother insisted

she did not coach Macy.

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Testimony of George

George testified that he is a friend of Mother’s and he has seen bruises on

Macy’s knees and shins. He agreed he had heard Macy say things that concerned

him and that he had encouraged Mother to seek psychological assistance.

Testimony of Cindy

Cindy testified that she had worked with Mother and was her boss and friend.

Cindy recalled that she and her child went to Disney with Mother and Macy a couple

of weeks before trial, and there was a short Zoom call between Macy and Father

during which Macy “was very upset and a little bit scared.” Cindy also testified that

she had never had any interaction or conversation with Father.

Testimony of Chad

Chad testified that he had known Mother for about twenty years, and he used

to work with her. According to Chad, Mother was easygoing and friendly. Chad had

seen Mother with Macy, and Chad thought Macy appeared happy. Chad recalled

seeing Mother with Father after the divorce, and he described Father as “a little bit

agitated.”

Father’s Testimony

Father testified that he grew up in Malaysia, where he met Mother, and moved

to the United States at age nineteen. He has an undergraduate degree in economics

10
and an MBA in telecommunications. Father previously worked for Microsoft, and

at the time of trial, he worked for Hewlett Packard Enterprise.

Father testified that he likes to travel, and he has taken Macy on several car

trips or camping. Father described several photos of Macy’s activities with Father

including outdoors activities, the zoo, and museums. Father reported that he goes to

Macy’s school to have lunch with her, but sometimes Mother shows up and insults

him. Father offered into evidence numerous photos of Macy and himself with Macy

dated from April of 2019 through July of 2022.

Father testified that he knew of five CPS reports in this case, but later

discovered there were seventeen reports. He knew that Macy had one SANE exam,

but at trial he learned that there was a total of five SANE exams and seventeen

allegations. According to Father, he did not know Macy was in counseling at The

Women’s Center until he had “spen[t] 40 thousand dollars on paperwork[.]” He

testified that he was fired from one job because he had to meet with a CPS

investigator frequently.

Father testified that there was no truth to the allegations against him of sexual

or other abuse. Father also testified that he was not informed of the incident alleged

to have occurred in February of 2019. He testified that allegations that he hung Macy

upside down, hit her with a hanger, or pinched her privates were not true. He stated

there was “[z]ero[]” truth to the allegations on which the TRO was based. He also

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testified that he does not use corporal punishment with Macy. Father agreed that

Macy’s bruises were not “fictitious[,]” but he testified that he thought Mother

“prefabricated” stories and “coached” Macy as to the allegations that he licked

Macy’s privates.

Father testified that, after reading Mother’s statements, CPS records, and

records from the Sheriff’s Department, Father thought that Macy was “coached by

her mom so that [Mother] can get custody or to make [his] life miserable.” Father

testified that he thought Mother was “weaponizing” Macy and “poisoning” her with

lies. According to Father, Macy was “easily swayed by her mom[.]” He also found

Mother’s stories contradictory, and it was hard to determine what was real and what

was not. He testified that sometimes Mother would send him thirty-seven messages

a day, including at 4:00 in the morning, and at other times, she would not respond to

his questions about Macy’s bruises or hospital visits, and Mother would sometimes

cancel Macy’s medical appointments. Father believed Mother needed psychological

help and that Mother’s lies were detrimental to Macy’s health.

Father testified that he had paid over $160,000 in this lawsuit because of the

continuous allegations Mother made against him since he filed for divorce, and that

the allegations against him were an “amplification” by Mother that was “continuous

and nonstop and fictitious.” He also testified that he has incurred significantly more

legal fees in preparation for trial—about $80,000. Father testified that he cancelled

12
his zoo memberships due to litigation expenses, that the legal expenses had

“devastated” him financially, and his parents send him money. He also testified that

he had spent his “whole fortune, [his] retirement, and [his] future just to defend

[him]self.” Father further explained that he had used savings for Macy’s education,

his savings, and “everything” to pay his legal fees, including $20-30,000 that he put

on his credit cards and borrowing from family. According to Father, not only was he

in debt because of having to fight the allegations against him, but Macy has also

suffered because he had to use Macy’s education fund to pay his legal fees. Father

testified that he would be doing well financially but for his legal bills, which he

described as “a strangle or chokehold on [him] every day.” Father agreed that

Mother’s behavior or her attorney’s behavior, such as being unprepared for trial,

caused an increase in attorney’s fees in this case.

Father agreed he was asking to be sole managing conservator of Macy, that

Mother be restricted from taking Macy to any kind of doctor except for an

emergency, for Mother’s possession and access to Macy be stopped, to require

Mother to get psychiatric and psychological help before Mother’s possession and

access to Macy is reinstated, and for the court to award him attorney’s fees. Father

also asked the trial court to require Mother’s possession and access to Macy be

supervised whenever it was reinstated. Father testified that, if the trial court did not

make Father the sole managing conservator, Father feared that Macy would become

13
an “unproductive person[]” and would make further allegations against him or

someone else. He was also afraid he could end up incarcerated based on false

allegations.

Dr. Kit Harrison’s Testimony and Report

The trial court ordered psychologist Kit Harrison, Ph.D., to perform a custody

evaluation in October of 2021. Father’s counsel called Harrison to testify as an

expert at trial, and Harrison’s report was admitted into evidence. Dr. Harrison

testified that both parents underwent psychological testing and evaluation, he

interviewed the child and observed her with each parent multiple times, he visited

each parent’s home, and he reviewed Macy’s educational and medical records plus

law enforcement records.

According to Dr. Harrison, there was a longstanding history of family conflict

and allegations of violence in this family. Dr. Harrison testified that Macy may have

developed “attachment problems” early in her life when Father’s work and travel

took him away from home, and that the family’s history of conflict had probably

harmed Macy.

Dr. Harrison testified that Mother had persistent old issues about Father, and

that Mother lacked “insight in terms of being able to examine evidence, facts, and

the child’s conduct[.]” During his evaluation, he learned that Mother and Macy use

hand signals when they talk over FaceTime while Macy is in Father’s possession.

14
Harrison was not convinced that Mother was able to separate fact from fiction as to

Macy’s allegations about Father. He described Mother as “a victim of the child.” Dr.

Harrison testified that if Mother continued to believe Macy’s false allegations that

Macy herself did not believe, then Macy would be at risk for developing

psychological problems and that Mother should seek psychological help. According

to Harrison, he observed evidence of Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another4—

that Macy imposed false information on Mother and Mother participated, resulting

in Macy and Mother having a “shared misbelief.” Harrison explained that this

disorder typically starts when a parent makes false allegations to the child and then

the child picks up on them. Harrison testified that Mother asserted “tremendous,

undue influence both intentional and unintentional[]” on the child. He described

Mother as “enmeshed” with Macy.

Dr. Harrison testified about a particular incident. On or about April 15, 2022,

Mother reported that she observed bruises on Macy when she picked Macy up after

4
Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another was formerly known as
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See Ex parte Wood, No. WR-93,810-01, 2023 Tex.
Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 220, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 2023); In re Marriage
of Karsagi, No. 13-20-00077-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1934, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 24, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re A.B.V., No.
13-18-00457-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1061, at **7-8 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Feb. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (expert witness testified that
factitious disorder imposed on another “manifests itself where a caregiver
intentionally causes another—usually a young child—to become ill in order to
benefit herself, such as by obtaining sympathy and attention[]”).
15
Father’s period of possession, and Macy had told Mother that Father had “physically

beat[en] her seriously” on or around April 11, 2022, and caused bruises. However,

Harrison learned from Macy’s school that during that period of Father’s possession,

Mother had been a chaperone for a school outing, Mother had seen Macy at the

outing, Mother had changed Macy’s clothes, and there were no bruises on Macy. It

was only after Macy returned to Mother that Macy reported to her Mother that Father

had assaulted her. In addition, Dr. Harrison noted that photos of Macy taken the day

after the school outing do not show any bruises on Macy. As a result of these

observations, Dr. Harrison concluded that “mom was complicit in the process [and

she] was not an innocent victim of her child. She was a participant.” Dr. Harrison

concluded that the allegations about Macy’s bruises in April of 2022 were

“shenanigans[.]”

Dr. Harrison described Father as well-educated and “devoted” to education,

and as having good insight and he demonstrated an ability to take responsibility for

his conduct. He also testified that Father displays anxiety, worry, and “guilt[-]driven

behavior.” According to Harrison, Macy has a “[l]oving, close, affectionate bond[]”

with Father. Harrison learned that Father and his girlfriend had broken off their

relationship because “she couldn’t handle [the] stress associated with the litigation

process [and] the child’s poorly supported allegations[.]”

16
Dr. Harrison testified that Macy was bonded with and enjoyed both parents,

yet she made unreliable allegations against Father. He also described Macy as

“brilliant, precocious, [and] highly-verbal[.]” In describing Macy, Dr. Harrison

stated,

The child makes poorly supported, very detailed, fictitious allegations
about her father in a very pathological way and for all kinds of reasons.
And is an extremely precocious, brilliant [] little girl who has made a
childhood career of making allegations. And then goes and visits dad
and has a great time.

According to Harrison,

The allegations got so egregious [that] the tail was wagging the dog and
it was obvious. The child was manufacturing and making up [] detailed
sexual abuse allegations that never occurred and then [Macy] sta[]ted []
that mom knew all about it, and that she had told mom and Mom was
supporting her. None of that was true. Mom had no idea what the child
had been up to[.]

Harrison testified that, in his report to the trial court, he wrote that Macy’s false

allegations about her parents was “evidence of the child becoming out of control and

poorly supervised.”

Dr. Harrison testified that the family dynamic has caused Macy to be

traumatized, to feel a need to protect Mother from Father, to retaliate against Father

and “even up the score board.” He further testified that Macy’s exploitation of her

Mother was “more egregious and flagrant than [he’d] seen in years and years.”

Harrison agreed he thought Mother and Macy were “working in concert together[.]”

Dr. Harrison testified that Mother should not put up with falsehoods and should
17
confront Macy with reality, and if Mother cannot do so, then the trial court should

make Father the primary supervisor and Mother should have supervised visitation.

According to Harrison, if the family dynamic is not corrected, the pattern would

cause Macy to be self-loathing, delusional, and exploitative and risk her developing

borderline personality disorder, antisocial conduct disorder, self-destructive

conduct, problems with peers, and manipulativeness. Harrison testified that in the

approximately 1,500 family or child custody lawsuits in which he had worked, he

had never seen a child as precocious and as “awesomely manipulative[]” as Macy.

Dr. Harrison testified that records from Texas Children’s Hospital reflect that

it was never determined how Macy got the bruises reported in February of 2019.

Based on his examination of Macy and his review of law enforcement and CPS

records, he concluded that Father was not abusing Macy. Dr. Harrison described

Macy’s reports of sexual abuse as “very vague[,]” and he found no factual support

for her allegations. Harrison testified that law enforcement investigation found

Mother’s statements did not match what Macy had reported and that Macy’s

statements were not reliable. His interviews with CPS personnel indicated CPS

thought the allegations against Father were “malicious” and “false[.]”

Dr. Harrison’s report, which was admitted into evidence, includes the

following observations:

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There is no conclusive evidence the child was abused, but there is very
clear evidence that several of the allegations are based on factitious
reports[.]
...
The dynamic between [Macy] and [Mother] is characterized by a
mutual fixation and preoccupation on abuse issues that are not
substantiated, although [Mother] is not solely responsible for causing
false allegations[.]
...
[I]nteractions between [Mother] and [Macy] are best conceptualized as
a vicious-cycle of disinformation between parent and child more
appropriately identified in the clinical and forensic literature as
Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another.
...
. . . [Macy] feeds factitious (unsubstantiated) information of her own
construction, or exaggerates information, making it equally unreliable,
to her mother. Mother in turns publishes and amplifies the false
information, in part, for her own secondary gain[.]
...
[Mother] feels compelled to report anything the child says as the
undisputed truth.

Dr. Harrison’s report noted that a CPS investigator reported that Macy’s allegations

had been very inconsistent; that the hospital concluded “low suspicion of sexual

abuse[]” after examining a small bruise on Macy’s groin; and that the Montgomery

County Sheriff’s Office closed its case related to the family because the family was

uncooperative and because they concluded no abuse or neglect had occurred.

Dr. Harrison’s report recommended that the parents remain joint managing

conservators; stated that Father tends to maintain better boundaries and meet Macy’s

emotional needs better; recommended monitoring, supervision, and counseling for

the family; recommended “increased physical supervision” of Mother “during her

19
periods of possession[]” due to her “[c]ontinued involvement with factitious

behavior”; and recommended placing Macy with Father if Mother’s patterns

regarding the allegations against Father did not abate.

Testimony of Father’s Attorney

Father’s attorney testified on attorney’s fees. He testified that he has been

licensed since November of 1992 and that the hours he billed in this case were

reasonable based on his and his staff’s experience level. He testified that through the

last invoice, his fees totaled $168,147 and since then, another $78,909 in fees have

been incurred. Father’s attorney testified that the fees were “excessive” based on the

allegations against Father as well as Mother’s previous attorney, who produced

documents in disarray and with embedded documents, necessitating extra work

preparing for trial. Father’s attorney testified,

. . . [Father], I believe, based on my experience in cases like this, has
incurred exorbitant fees, not because of what we did intentionally but
because of what we had to do to defend him with 18 or so CPS
allegations, multiple SANE or vagina[l] exams, multiple forensic
interviews. This case required going through thousands of pages [] of
medical records to police reports and also Talking Parents.
The multitude of allegations required us to spreadsheet these
allegations, to be able to quickly for trial purpose, go through one
allegation, be able to pull up specifics of each allegation, loop them to
other allegations where they might be mentioned later in the future. It
took a tremendous amount of time, labor, and effort to defend these
allegations for [Father].

20
On cross-examination, Father’s attorney acknowledged that his fees “are in the top

3 percent[]” and were appropriate for his level of experience, given that he has

handled very large cases in his career.

Records Admitted Into Evidence

a. Law Enforcement Records

A report by a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office detective in 2020 states

that there had been five reports since March of 2018 involving allegations of child

abuse, assault and sexual assault of a child, Macy had undergone forensic interviews

for every allegation, and a CPS investigator reported that he believed that Mother

and Father were using the child for their personal agendas.

A report from February of 2019 states that “[Mother] said that she asked [the

child] how she got the bruises and that [the child] keeps changing her story. [] The

hospital staff has a low suspicion of sexual abuse.” The records also state that

“[Macy] made conflicting statements” to the SANE, and the case was rendered

inactive due to a lack of evidence and inconsistent statements by Macy. In a

supplemental report, a detective wrote that Mother “advised that she was unsure of

what to do because [Macy] is always so inconsistent with her statements and would

often change her story.” The supplement also states that, “in the previous cases,

[Macy] has never been consistent on her outcr[ies] and continuously changes her

21
story[.]” The detective further wrote that a CPS investigator had informed him that

the CPS case was closed because the family was “uncooperative[.]”

b. CPS Records

CPS records offered into evidence by Father reflect intake reports for

September 25, 2020, April 30, 2021, May 4, 2021, May 17, 2021, August 27, 2021,

September 16, 2021, and October 8, 2021, that some of the cases were merged, and

all were ultimately closed as “ruled out,” meaning “it was reasonable to conclude

that the alleged abuse or neglect did not occur.” The CPS records reflect that there

had been a history of allegations relating to Macy, “but the allegations have not been

well supported.” CPS notes also indicate that “the child and mother had sign

language codes that could be used to make an outcry of abuse by facetime [] or in-

person[.]” The CPS records indicate that CPS found “evidence of [Macy] being

coached by her mother.” CPS noted that Dr. Harrison had told CPS he did not have

any concerns about Macy being in danger or abused and that neither parent was

abusive or neglectful. The CPS case notes also indicate that George told a CPS

investigator that he had gotten “different stories” from Macy and he had told Mother

“to go to therapy so that she can work on healing from her past but she refuses.”

c. Hospital Records

Hospital records from March of 2019 include a note that personnel

“[d]iscussed with SANE nurse and based on patient and mother’s history, SANE

22
exam is not required.” The hospital records also note that Mother reported that the

child’s story changed and that CPS was taking the case.

d. Other documentary evidence

Both Mother and Father offered records of the Montgomery County Women’s

Center relating to Macy that were admitted into evidence. In the records offered by

Mother, counseling notes reflect that Macy told a counselor that she only wanted to

be with Mother because of what Father did to her. In the records offered by Father,

a report from March of 2022 reflects that Macy told a counselor, “you know my

daddy licks my private parts[,]” after which Macy changed the subject.

About two hundred pages of messages between Mother and Father via

“TalkingParents” were admitted into evidence. Father offered numerous photos of

Macy and himself taken from April of 2019 through July of 2022.

Final Order and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

After the bench trial, the trial court signed an Order in Suit to Modify Parent-

Child Relationship appointing Father as Sole Managing Conservator and requiring

Mother’s possession to be supervised:

The Court finds that it is not in the best interest of the child that
[Mother] and [Father] be appointed as Joint Managing Conservators of
the child at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that [Mother] and [Father] are
removed as Joint Managing Conservators and that [Father] is appointed
Sole Managing Conservator and [Mother] is appointed Possessory
Conservator of the [] child[.]
23
....
The Court finds good cause to restrict the rights afforded a parent
under Tex. Fam. Code § 153.073 due to the conduct of the parties and
the psychological impact on the child. . . .
...
IT IS ORDERED that all periods of possession of and access
with the child, [Macy], by [Mother] shall be under the supervision of
Access Builds Children[.]

The trial court also ordered that Macy participate in ongoing counseling and

psychological treatment and that both Father and Mother participate in counseling

for individual concerns and for co-parenting. The trial court ordered judgment of

$247,056.50 against Mother for attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Father and

requiring Mother to pay all attorney’s fees she incurred.

Following entry of the final order, Mother filed a Request for Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law. The trial court made written Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, which included the following findings pertinent to this appeal:

26. The court finds that [Father] was a more credible witness than
[Mother].
27. Credible testimony by Dr. Kit Harrison, the custody
evaluator, supports the court’s rulings on the conservatorship of the
child and the rights and duties of the parties.
...
Findings of Fact—Modification of Possession and Access
1. The Court finds that the provisions of the possession order as
ordered by the court in this modification are the least restrictive means
necessary to protect the best interest of the child.
2. The Court further finds that good cause exists and it is in the
best interest of the child to deviate from the Standard Possession Order
contained in the Texas Family Code at sections 153.311 through
153.317.

24
3. Limited, supervised possession and access by [Mother] with
the child of this suit as ordered by the court is the least restrictive
possession and access schedule that the court could order while still
protecting the best interest of the child. The possession and access
schedule and the terms and conditions for same were based on the
credible facts and evidence and were necessary due to the severity of
the harm and future harm to the child.
4. Credible testimony by Dr. Kit Harrison, the custody evaluator,
supports the court’s ruling on possession and access for [Mother].
5. Unsupervised possession of the child by [Mother] is not in [the
child’s] best interest.
6. Credible evidence showed that [Mother’s] unsupervised
possession and access to the child is emotionally harmful to the child
due to the years of false allegations of abuse lodged by [Mother] against
[Father], and that it would continue to be emotionally harmful to the
child in the future. There is credible evidence that it is not in the child’s
best interest for [Mother] to have unsupervised access to the child.
7. Credible evidence was presented overcoming the presumption
that a Standard Possession Order is in the best interest of the child.
Supervised possession of the child by [Mother] is the least restrictive
means necessary in order to protect the best interest of the child.
8. It is in the best interest of the child that all periods of
possession of and access to the child by [Mother] should be under the
supervision of Access Builds Children. [Mother] should have Skype
communication with the child to supplement these periods of
possession.
9. It is in the best interest of the child that [Mother] shall
participate in on-going therapeutic counsel with Dr. Jean Guez. It is in
the child’s best interest that [Mother] and [Father] shall each pay fifty
percent (50%) of the costs for the child’s individual therapeutic sessions
with the child’s therapist.
10. It is in the child’s best interest that [Mother] shall participate
in therapeutic counseling and psychological treatment with Jean Guez
[], in the manner, frequency and duration as recommended by said
therapist.
11. It is in the child’s best interest that [Mother] shall specifically
receive counseling and psychological treatment regarding the
following:
a. To challenge her beliefs that everything the child the subject
of this suit is saying is the absolute truth;
25
b. To deal with past trauma issues that may be impeding her
ability to be the best parent she can be to the child;
c. To address her paranoia regarding [Father];
d. To address attachment issues with the child so she [] can make
the necessary changes to have a healthier relationship with the
child and to prevent further damage to the child;
e. To address all the issues outlined in the written report of Kit
W. Harrison, Ph.D., a copy of which to be provided to the
therapist; and
f. To work on co-parenting communication through
TalkingParents.com.
...
14. It is in the best interest of the child that [Mother] should be
permanently enjoined from:
a. Disciplining the child using corporal punishment;
b. Communicating with the child using sign language or any
language other than English;
c. Making disparaging remarks about the other party, or the other
party’s family members, including but not limited to the child’s
grandparents, aunts, uncles, stepparents, or anyone with whom a
party has a dating relationship, in the presence or within the
hearing of the child;
d. Discussing with the child, or with any other person in the
presence of the child, any litigation related to the child or any
other party;
e. Photographing the child after a period of possession with the
other conservator; and
f. Photographing the child’s body parts.
15. A custody evaluation was conducted by Kit W. Harrison,
Ph.D. This evaluation was admitted into evidence. The evaluation
consisted of clinical interviews, observation of the parties and child,
their interactions, and psychological testing. Kit W. Harrison, Ph.D.
testified at trial and was credible. The findings of that custody
evaluation and the testimony of Dr. Kit Harrison support the court’s
rulings.
16. The court’s rulings on conservatorship, possession, and
access are supported by the testimony and report of Dr. Kit Harrison,
the custody evaluator appointed in the case.

26
17. Dr. Harrison testified that [Mother] has engaged in conduct
that has been detrimental to and/or significantly endangered the child’s
physical health and emotional development and well-being.
18. [Mother] has a long history of making allegations against
[Father] of physical abuse and/or sexual abuse against the child. These
allegations by [Mother] were not credible. The child was subjected to
physical examinations as well as a multitude of Safe Harbor interviews
that were ultimately detrimental to the child’s emotional well-being.
19. Credible evidence was presented by the custody evaluator
that [Mother] is enmeshed emotionally with the child [] to a level that
is emotionally harmful to the child.
20. Credible evidence was presented that [Mother] created a
secret sign-language with [the child] in order for the child to be able to
tell her mother that she had been physically abused when on FaceTime
or in person while [the child] was in [Father’s] possession. This type of
behavior is harmful to [the child].
21. The physical and sexual abuse allegations made by [Mother]
and [the child] on May 27, 2022, was an attempt to influence the
outcome of the child custody evaluation performed by Dr. Kit Harrison.
22. [Mother] committed acts intended to alienate [the child] from
her father.
23. [Mother] was requested by Dr. Harrison to name collateral
witnesses that he could interview. Before Dr. Harrison could interview
one of the witnesses, [Mother] met with that witness and [the child]
ma[d]e outcries to her of sexual abuse, which were not credible and
which were meant to falsely manipulate evidence.
24. [The child] is bonded emotionally and appropriately to her
father [] and appears to enjoy her time with her father. [Father]
maintains appropriate physical boundaries with [the child].
25. There was credible evidence that [the child] has an unhealthy
fusion with [Mother].
26. There have been numerous CPS (Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services) and police investigations primarily
initiated by [Mother], all of which have failed to render any credible
evidence of child abuse.
27. [Mother] appears to be incapable of reasonably evaluating
the allegations that the child makes before taking swift action, and
therefore appears incapable of preventing future investigations of
allegations of abuse against [Father].

27
28. There was credible evidence to support Dr. Harrison’s
finding that [the child] had not been physically abused by [Father] or
[Father’s girlfriend].
30. Dr. Harrison testified that interactions between [Mother] and
[the child] are best conceptualized as a vicious-cycle of disinformation
between parent and child more appropriately identified as Factitious
Disorder Imposed on Another.
31. Dr. Harrison testified that [Mother] suffered from Factitious
Disorder Imposed on Another. He further testified that with Factitious
Disorder Imposed on Another, an individual presents another person to
others, or in some cases presents themselves, as a victim, ill[,] impaired
or injured.
32. Dr. Harrison testified that [the child] feeds factitious
(unsubstantiated) information of her own construction to [Mother].
33. The court found credible evidence that if [the child’s]
behavior remained the same, that more serious overt conduct disorder
symptoms would present themselves.
34. [Mother] published and amplified the false allegations of [the
child].
35. Credible evidence was presented that [the child] has been
subjected to undue influence by [Mother].
36. Credible evidence was presented that because of the actions
of [Mother], [the child] over time began making allegations that were
no longer directly influenced by [Mother’s] leading or suggestive
questioning.
...
Findings of Fact—Attorney’s Fees
1. [Father] incurred reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to
preserve and protect the rights of the child the subject of this suit in the
amount of $247,056.50.
2. Multiple trial resets had to be given due to [Mother’s] previous
attorney being unable to properly comply with the court’s Docket
Control Order/Trial Preparation Order (and additional orders) with
respect to the listing and exchange of exhibits for trial, which cost
[Father] additional attorneys fees in order to prepare for trial.
3. The unsubstantiated allegations made by [Mother] against
[Father], and the seriousness of same, caused [Father] to incur a
significant amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in order
to protect himself and the child.

28
Findings of Fact as Conclusions of Law
1. Any finding of fact that is a conclusion of law shall be deemed
a conclusion of law.

In addition, the trial court made the following Conclusions of Law pertinent

to this appeal:

Conclusions of Law—Modification of Possession and Access
1. The provisions of the possession order as ordered by the court
in this modification are the least restrictive means necessary to protect
the best interest of the child.
2. Good cause exists and it is in the best interest of the child to
deviate from the Standard Possession Order contained in the Texas
Family Code at sections 153.311 through 153.317.
3. The supervised possession schedule ordered by the court is in
the best interest of the child and is necessary to protect the child’s
emotional health and well-being.
4. [Mother] should be awarded the supervised possession and
access schedule ordered by the court.
...
Conclusions of Law—Attorney’s Fees
1. [Father’s attorney] should be awarded judgment of
$247,056.50 against [Mother] for attorney’s fees and costs incurred by
[Father] for legal representation in this suit, with interest at five percent
(5%) per year compounded annually from the date of judgment.

Issues

In her first issue, Appellant Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support the trial court’s order that Mother’s visitation and communication with Macy

be supervised.5 Specifically, Mother challenges certain findings of fact by the trial

court, which her brief states as follows:

5
We do not read Mother’s brief to challenge the trial court’s ruling appointing
Father as Sole Managing Conservator and Mother as Possessory Conservator.
29
18. The Court finds good cause to restrict the rights afforded a parent
under Tex. Fam. Code Section 153.073 due to “conduct of the parties
and psychological impact on the child.”
...
26. [Father] was more credible witness tha[n] [Mother].

27. Credible testimony by Dr. Kit Harrison, the custody evaluator,
supports the court’s rulings on the conservatorship of the child and the
rights and duties of the parties.

According to Appellant, these findings “confused ‘facts’ with ‘conclusions of

law[,]’” and are “conclusion[s] of fact.” Mother argues that the trial court’s finding

assumes certain facts and that “Dr. Harrison’s opinion is fact dependent on the Court

making findings that Appellant was coaching the child[, but] Dr. Harrison made no

such finding.” Further, Appellant argues that Dr. Harrison performed no “forensic

analysis” regarding the allegations of sexual assault, but rather he relied on CPS and

Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office findings. According to Appellant, although the

trial court’s order stated that “[l]imited, supervised possession and access by

[Mother] with the child [] is the least restrictive possession and access schedule that

the court could order while still protecting the best interest of the child[,]”the “very

restrictive” supervised visitation and communication is not the least restrictive nor

reasonable ruling, and the ruling was arbitrary. Appellant argues that Dr. Harrison’s

conclusions are “unfounded or not supported by his testimony.” Appellant contends

that the trial court’s ruling depends upon a finding that Mother coached or was

30
complicit in false allegations, which is not supported by the record, or in the absence

of such a finding, the trial court’s ruling is unreasonable and arbitrary.

In her second issue, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support

the trial court’s order that Mother pay $247,056.50 in attorney’s fees. Mother argues

that Father’s attorney did not testify about the rates he charged for his own work and

his paralegals’ work. Mother also argues that Father’s attorney included costs and

expenses in his attorney’s fees.

Standard of Review

In a modification suit, whether the moving party has met the burden of

establishing a material and substantial change is a threshold question. See In re R.A.,

No. 09-20-00275-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 7575, at *17 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re T.M.P., 417 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)). Determination of a material and substantial change

is fact specific and not controlled by a set of guidelines. Id. (citing Arredondo v.

Betancourt, 383 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)).

To be entitled to a modification, the party requesting the modification must prove

(1) the modification requested is in the child’s best interest, and (2) the

circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have

materially and substantially changed since the prior order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 156.101(a)(1)(A). Section 261.107 of the Texas Family Code provides.

31
A finding by a court in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship that
a report made under this chapter before or during the suit was false or
lacking factual foundation may be grounds for the court to modify an
order providing for possession of or access to the child who was the
subject of the report by restricting further access to the child by the
person who made the report.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.107(b); see also In re M.M., No. 05-21-00992-CV, 2023

Tex. App. LEXIS 242, at **17-19 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

op.).

The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a

minor child, and we review a trial court’s decision pertaining to a modification order

under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re R.A., 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 7575,

at *13 (citing Smith v. Karanja, 546 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2018, no pet.)); see also Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.

1982); In re E.C.C., 539 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, pet. denied).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or without reference to any

guiding rules or principles. See In re G.J.G., No. 09-21-00396-CV, 2023 Tex. App.

LEXIS 9542, at **11-12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.

1985); In re M.A.M., 346 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied)). “‘A

trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes restrictions that exceed those required

to protect the child’s best interest.’” In re S.C.T., No. 09-23-00044-CV, 2025 Tex.

App. LEXIS 1254, at *98 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 27, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem.
32
op.) (quoting In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5497, at *83

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)). A trial court does not

abuse its discretion if its order is supported by some evidence of a substantial and

probative character. See In re L.J.L., No. 09-21-00286-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS

6568, at *12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In

determining whether some evidence supports the decision, we review the evidence

in the light most favorable to that decision, and we indulge every presumption in its

favor. See In re L.K.S., No. 09-23-00364-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5879, at *14

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re G.E.D., No.

05-17-00160-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8, at **11-12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 2,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

The trial court as factfinder “‘is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility

and demeanor,’” and our review must defer to the trial court’s factual

determinations. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)). The factfinder is the sole judge of

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be assigned to their testimony. See City

of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder is free to

believe one witness and disbelieve another, and reviewing courts may not impose

their own opinions to the contrary. See id. As such, reviewing courts must assume

that the factfinder decided all credibility questions in favor of the findings, and chose

33
what testimony to disregard in a way that was in favor of the findings, if a reasonable

person could do so. See id. at 819-20. We review a trial court’s findings of fact for

legal sufficiency, and its conclusions of law under a de novo standard of review. See

BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). We

assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder

could have disbelieved or found to have been not credible. See In re J.F.-G., 627

S.W.3d at 312 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). “When a party

attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it did not

have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports

the adverse finding.” Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex.

2014) (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)). “Anything

more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.” In re

A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); see also In re

S.C.T., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1254, at *101.

When findings of fact are filed and are unchallenged, they occupy the same

position and are entitled to the same weight as a jury’s verdict; they are binding on

an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no

evidence to support the finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696

(Tex. 1986); In re Marriage of Karsagi, No. 13-20-00077-CV, 2022 Tex. App.

34
LEXIS 1934, *20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 24, 2022, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). Thus, we defer to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by

some evidence. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d

518, 523 (Tex. 2014). We overrule an appellant’s issue when unchallenged findings

or conclusions independently support the trial court’s judgment or ruling. See Patton

v. Echols, No. 09-22-00334-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7751, at *51, *58 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Oct. 31, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Howeth Invs., Inc. v.

City of Hedwig Vill., 259 S.W.3d 877, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,

pet. denied)).

“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the

court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to

the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002. On appeal, we assess the trial court’s

best-interest finding by using the Holley factors. See In re D.E.T., No. 09-22-00197-

CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5811, at **18-19 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 3, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976)).

The Holley factors include (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s current and future

physical and emotional needs; (3) any physical or emotional danger to the child in

the present or future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals involved; (5) the

programs available to those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the

plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) acts or

35
omissions by a parent tending to show that the existing parent-child relationship is

not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 371-72. The Holley factors are not exclusive, and the evidence that the

factfinder considers in making a best-interest decision need not address all the Holley

factors. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002); In re K.R.K.-L.H., 671 S.W.3d

761, 770 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, pet. denied). The factfinder may consider

direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the

evidence. See In re K.P., No. 09-22-00049-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5787, at

**29-30 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 11, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In

re R.J., 568 S.W.3d 734, 751-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.)).

A trial court may place conditions on a parent’s access, such as supervised

visitation, when it is in the child’s best interest. In re A.G., 531 S.W.3d 329, 333

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). There is a rebuttable presumption

that the standard possession order provides the reasonable minimum level of

possession and access for a parent named possessory conservator and is in the best

interest of the child. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (citing Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 153.252). When determining whether to deviate from the standard

possession order, a court may consider “(1) the age, developmental status,

circumstances, needs, and best interest of the child; (2) the circumstances of the

managing conservator and of the parent named as a possessory conservator; and

36
(3) any other relevant factor.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.256; In re J.J.R.S., 627

S.W.3d at 218. The terms of an order that deviates from the standard possession

order—that is, an order that “denies possession of a child to a parent or imposes

restrictions on a parent’s right to possession of or access to a child”—“may not

exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child.” In re J.J.R.S.,

627 S.W.3d at 218-19 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.193). In addition, a court

“shall specify and expressly state in the order the times and conditions for possession

of or access to the child, unless a party shows good cause why specific orders would

not be in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.006(c); In re

J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 219. “[A] severe restriction or limitation, even one that

amounts to a denial of access, is permissible if it is in the best interest of the child.”

In re Walters, 39 S.W.3d 280, 286 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).

Supervised Possession

In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Mother

should be restricted to supervised visitation with the child twice a month because

she contends it is a “strict, limited communication order” not supported by the

record. According to Mother, for the trial court to make such a ruling, the trial court

“would have had to find that [Mother] coached the child in the allegations, which is

not supported by the record.” Mother argues that without a finding that Mother

coached the child in the allegations against Father, the trial court’s ruling was

37
arbitrary and unreasonable and contrary to public policy as articulated in section

153.001 of the Family Code; the trial court misapplied the Holley factors; and the

trial court’s order violated section 153.256 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. §§ 153.001 (“Public Policy”), 153.256 (“Factors for Court to Consider” when

ordering terms of possession of a child other than a standard possession order);

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.

Mother specifically challenges two credibility findings by the trial court—the

finding that Father was more credible than Mother and the finding that Dr.

Harrison’s testimony is credible. As previously explained herein, the factfinder is

the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their

testimony, and in an appeal from a bench trial, we defer to the trial court’s factual

determinations. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at

346; City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. We lack a basis to reverse the trial court’s

credibility determinations. As this Court has explained, “‘the trial court is in the best

position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can “feel”

the forces, powers and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the

record.’” See Warchol v. Warchol, 853 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

1993, no writ) (quoting Jeffers v. Wallace, 615 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1981, no writ)). Because the trial court as factfinder is free to believe one witness

38
and disbelieve another, reviewing courts may not impose their own opinions to the

contrary. See In re L.K.S., 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5879, at *14.

We read Appellant’s brief to challenge an implied finding by the trial court—

that the trial court “factually concluded that Appellant coached or was involved in,

complicit in, the false allegations with the purpose of alienating the child from the

father and concluded that behavior would continue.” Ordinarily, when a trial court

does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, then all facts necessary to

support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. See BMC Software

Belg., N.V., 83 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.

1990); Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1987); In

re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984)). Such implied findings are not

conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. See id.

A party may request specified additional or amended findings or conclusions

within ten days after the trial court files its findings and conclusions. In re A.E.D.,

No. 09-13-00555-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10587, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Sept. 4, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 298). Failure

to request a finding on a specific issue generally waives error on the issue. See id.;

see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d) (permitting a sufficiency complaint on appeal from

a bench trial “as distinguished from a complaint that the trial court erred in refusing

to amend a fact finding or to make an additional finding of fact”); Vapor Corp. v.

39
Welker, 582 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ) (“In the

absence of a request by appellant to make such a specific finding of fact after the

trial court had entered its findings, appellant waived its right to complain of any

failure to make any such additional finding of fact.”). Here, Appellant has provided

no legal support for her argument that this Court should review an alleged implied

finding where the trial court made explicit written findings, and she did not request

additional specific findings. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (an appellate brief should

cite to the record and to applicable authority). Therefore, we lack a basis to challenge

a finding the trial court did not make.

That said, Appellant may challenge the factual and legal sufficiency to support

the trial court’s ruling on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). In this case, written

findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal independently support the trial

court’s order that Mother’s possession of Macy be supervised, namely:

2. The Court [] finds that good cause exists and it is in the best
interest of the child to deviate from the Standard Possession Order
contained in the Texas Family Code at sections 153.311 through
153.317.
...
6. Credible evidence showed that [Mother’s] unsupervised
possession and access to the child is emotionally harmful to the child
due to the years of false allegations of abuse lodged by [Mother] against
[Father], and that it would continue to be emotionally harmful to the
child in the future.
...
17. Dr. Harrison testified that [Mother] has engaged in conduct
that has been detrimental to and/or significantly endangered the child’s
physical health and emotional development and well-being.
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18. [Mother] has a long history of making allegations against
[Father] of physical abuse and/or sexual abuse against the child. These
allegations by [Mother] were not credible. . . .
19. Credible evidence was presented by the custody evaluator
that [Mother] is enmeshed emotionally with the child [] to a level that
is emotionally harmful to the child.
20. Credible evidence was presented that [Mother] created a
secret sign-language with [the child] in order for the child to be able
[to] tell her mother that she had been physically abused when on
FaceTime or in person while [the child] was in [Father’s] possession.
This type of behavior is harmful to [the child].
...
22. [Mother] committed acts intended to alienate [the child] from
her father.
...
25. There was credible evidence that [the child] has an unhealthy
fusion with [Mother].
26. There have been numerous CPS [] and police investigations
primarily initiated by [Mother], all of which have failed to render any
credible evidence of child abuse.
27. [Mother] appears to be incapable of reasonably evaluating
the allegations that the child makes before taking swift action, and
therefore appears incapable of preventing future investigations of
allegations of abuse against [Father].
...
34. [Mother] published and amplified the false allegations of [the
child].

As previously explained, we overrule an appellant’s issue when unchallenged

findings or conclusions independently support the trial court’s judgment or ruling.

See Patton, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7751, at *51, *58 (citing Howeth Invs., Inc., 259

S.W.3d at 889). In addition, records from law enforcement, CPS, and Texas

Children’s Hospital describe their investigations into Mother’s and Macy’s

allegations against Father, and their conclusions that the allegations were

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inconsistent and not supported by facts. The CPS records reflect that CPS closed its

investigation with a disposition of “ruled out”—meaning “it was reasonable to

conclude that the alleged abuse or neglect did not occur.” Dr. Harrison described the

relationship between Mother and Macy as “enmeshed,” he described Mother as

unable to discern fact from fiction as to Macy’s allegations, and he described Macy

as “awesomely manipulative.” In Dr. Harrison’s opinion, the family situation was

“dangerous” and Macy was at risk for mood and conduct problems, including self-

harm and narcissism. Because there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support

the trial court’s ruling that supervised visitation was in the child’s best interest, we

find the evidence legally sufficient. See In re S.C.T., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1254,

at *101; In re A.G., 531 S.W.3d at 333; In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d at 414.

As to Mother’s argument that Dr. Harrison performed no “forensic analysis,”

we find nothing in the trial court’s Agreed Order for Child Custody Evaluation that

required Dr. Harrison to perform a forensic analysis. Further, the Order specifically

required Harrison to obtain and review school, CPS, health, and law enforcement

records. Having considered and rejected Mother’s arguments, we overrule her first

issue.

Attorney’s Fees

In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred in awarding Father

$247,056.50 in attorney’s fees because such an award was not supported by the

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record in accordance with Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578

S.W.3d 469, 501 (Tex. 2019). According to Mother, Father’s attorney did not testify

about the rate he charged for his work or his staff’s work or whether his rates or

charges were customary. According to Mother, an award of $247,056.50 is not

supported by sufficient evidence, given that the case included no depositions and a

five-day trial. Mother asks this Court to vacate the order as to the award of attorney’s

fees.

Section 106.002 of the Texas Family Code provides that a court “may render

judgment for reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses[,]” including judgment and

postjudgment interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 106.002(a). “We review a trial

court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.” Fort Worth Transp.

Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850 (Tex. 2018); see also In re A.C.J., 146

S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.). Under the abuse of

discretion standard, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant to

determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and whether the trial court abused

its discretion. See Bebeau v. Bebeau, No. 09-97-517-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS

7163, at **11-12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 23, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

In re A.D.H., 979 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.)). If there

is evidence of a substantive and probative character supporting a trial court’s

decision, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re

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E.R.A., No. 09-20-00042-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2026, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Mar. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d

475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)).

Whether attorney’s fees are reasonable and necessary is a fact issue to be

determined by the factfinder. See Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 489 (citing

Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 231 (Tex. 2010)). And “an amount

incurred or contracted for is not conclusive evidence of reasonableness or necessity.”

See id. at 488 (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812,

818 (Tex. 1997)). The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden to establish

reasonableness and necessity. See id. (citing In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d

794, 809 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding)).

“[T]he fact finder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is

determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and

the fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both counts.”

Id. at 498. “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence []

that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. A

rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to

-- for convenience -- as the prevailing market rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 n.11 (1984); see also Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 499. In awarding

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attorney’s fees, the trial court “‘must take into account various factors such as: the

nature and complexity of the case; the nature of the services provided by counsel;

the time required for trial; the amount of money involved; the client’s interest that is

at stake; the responsibility imposed upon counsel; and the skill and expertise

required.’” Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust, 296 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009)

(quoting Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990)).

One of the factors a court should consider in determining the reasonableness of

attorney’s fees is “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal

services[.]” Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 493-94 (citing Arthur Andersen, 945

S.W.2d at 818).

The unchallenged findings of fact regarding attorney’s fees bind the parties

and appellate court, unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or no

evidence supports the findings. See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696; In re S.C.T.,

2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1254, at *127. We will defer to unchallenged findings of

fact that are supported by some evidence. See Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at

523.

Father’s attorney testified that he has been licensed since November of 1992

and that the hours for which he billed in this case were reasonable based on his level

of experience and that of his staff. The attorney’s billing statements up until the time

of trial—from May of 2021 through March of 2023—were admitted into evidence,

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and they show the initials of the person performing work, a description of the work

performed, the hourly rate, and the number of hours worked. The attorney testified

that the billing statements total $168,147. The attorney further testified that since the

last invoice was submitted, there had been an additional $78,909 in attorney’s fees

and expenses incurred. The attorney testified that the amount of work performed was

driven by the number and nature of Mother’s allegations against Father and the need

to protect the best interest of the child. The attorney also testified that Mother’s initial

attorney did not provide documents timely, and when documents were produced,

they included “embedded information” and required extra work to read, understand,

and prepare for trial. On cross-examination, the attorney testified that his fees were

“in the top 3 percent[]” but were appropriate for his level of experience, particularly

with large family law cases.

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court noted that Mother’s initial attorney was

unable to comply with court deadlines, which required multiple trial resets, and that

Mother’s unsubstantiated and serious allegations against Father caused Father to

incur a significant amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to protect

himself and the child. The trial court also found that Father incurred $247,056.50 in

reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to preserve and protect the rights of the

child.

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At trial, Father’s attorney testified about his own background and

qualifications, but he provided very little information about the other employees who

worked on the case. Without such information, “a factfinder has no meaningful way

to determine whether an attorney’s fee request is (or is not) reasonable and necessary

for the services rendered.” L&W Supply Corp. v. Kizziah, No. 09-20-00198-CV,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8781, at *21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 1, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.).

“A reasonable attorney’s fee is one that is not excessive or extreme, but rather

moderate or fair.” Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. 2010). Father’s

attorney admitted that his fees were in “the top 3 percent[]” for what is customarily

charged in the area. Although the attorney’s testimony was uncontroverted, we find

that the evidence falls short of establishing that the hourly rates charged by Father’s

attorney and his staff were “not excessive or extreme”; were “in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience, and reputation”; and reflected the reasonable,

“prevailing market rate.” See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; Garcia, 319 S.W.3d at

642; Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 491, 494. Therefore, we remand to the trial

court for a determination of “reasonable attorney’s fees”—including the rates for the

attorney’s staff—under the appropriate standard. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488

S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex. 2016). We sustain Mother’s second issue.

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In summary, we overrule Mother’s first issue, and we sustain Mother’s second

issue. We affirm the trial court’s Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship

except as to attorney’s fees, and we remand the matter to the trial court for further

proceedings on attorney’s fees consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on December 4, 2024
Opinion Delivered April 24, 2025

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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