Israel Lara v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-24-00128-CR
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ISRAEL LARA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F21-36824
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Israel Lara pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony offense of

aggravated robbery exhibiting a firearm. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2),

(b). The trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for

seven years and assessed a $500.00 fine. The State moved to adjudicate after Lara

violated multiple terms of his community supervision. After a hearing, in which Lara

pleaded “true” to multiple violations of the terms of his community supervision, the

trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty. He also

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testified that he was $1,338.00 behind in the court-assessed fees. At a subsequent

hearing, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and orally pronounced a sentence of

twelve years of confinement. The trial court’s written judgment also included an

“Admin” amount of $1,088.00 and a “Court Cost” amount of $722.00. We will

affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified for the reasons discussed below.

Counsel filed a brief containing his professional evaluation that after careful

review of the record, he could find no arguable grounds on which to appeal and

moved to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); High v.

State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). After Lara’s counsel filed his

brief, we granted an extension of time for Lara to file a pro se response. Lara has not

responded.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that we need not address the merits

of issues raised in an Anders brief. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). Rather, an appellate court may determine: (1) “that the appeal is

wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and

finds no reversible error[;]” or (2) “that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand

the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the

issues.” Id.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, a court must conduct a full examination of

the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488

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U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). We have reviewed the entire

record and counsel’s brief and, apart from the modification discussed below, we

conclude the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28. Therefore, we

find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the

appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also

Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)

(explaining that it would not remand for rebriefing where it could modify the

judgment to address sole arguable ground of error).

Modifying the Judgment

We have the power to reform or modify a judgment in Anders cases to address

non-reversible error and to affirm the judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P.

43.2(b) (allowing appellate court to modify trial court’s judgment and affirm as

modified); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting a court

of appeals may modify the lower court’s judgment by correcting or reforming it);

Bray, 179 S.W.3d at 729 (exercising authority to reform judgment in Anders case

and affirming trial court’s judgment). Our review of the record reveals the trial

court’s judgment must be modified, as discussed below.

Attorney Reimbursement Fee

As noted above, our review of the record reveals that the written judgment

included an “Admin” amount of $1,088.00 and a “Court Cost” amount of $722.00.

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for a total amount of $1,810.00. The record shows that the trial court found Lara

indigent and appointed counsel. The record also reflects that during the hearing on

the motion to revoke, Lara testified he was behind in his court-assessed fees by

$1,338.00. These court-assessed fees included the following: supervision fees of

$60.00 per month; crime stoppers fee of $50.00; attorney fee of $800.00; pre/post

sentence investigation fee of $500.00; and urinalysis fee of $15.00 per month. These

court-assessed fees were seemingly assessed in the Judgment under “Admin.”

Further, the certified bill of costs shows the state consolidated court costs of $185.00,

local consolidated court costs of $105.00, and reimbursement fees of $77.00 for a

total amount of $367.00.

Court costs are not punitive and do not have to be included in the oral

pronouncement as a precondition to their inclusion in the written judgment. Weir v.

State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The imposition of court costs

does not alter the punishment range, is authorized by statute, and is generally not

conditioned on a defendant’s ability to pay. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 42.16; Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)

(citation omitted). “Only statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against

a criminal defendant[.]” Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). Costs cannot be imposed “for a service not performed or for a service for

which a cost is not expressly provided by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

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103.002. Court costs are supported if there is a bill of costs denominating the amount

assessed and if those costs are authorized by statute. See id. arts. 103.001–.002. Even

so, certain reimbursement fees, including attorney’s fees, cannot be assessed against

an indigent defendant unless it is later determined he has financial resources to pay.

See id. arts. 26.04(p) (a defendant determined to be indigent is presumed to remain

indigent), 26.05(g) (providing for reimbursement of fees if the judge determines

defendant has financial resources); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (concluding judgment should be reformed to remove assessment of

attorney’s fees because there was no finding in the record an indigent defendant

could repay costs of court-appointed counsel).

Nothing in the record shows that Lara’s indigent status changed, so the

$800.00 attorney reimbursement fee included in the “Admin” amount is unsupported

by the record for that reason. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 26.04(p),

26.05(g); Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 252. The State has also conceded the Judgment

reflects the previously assessed attorney’s fee reimbursement of $800.00 against an

indigent defendant and agrees the Judgment should be modified to delete the

$800.00 attorney’s fee.

Conclusion

We modify the trial court’s Judgment by subtracting the $800.00 attorney

reimbursement fee from the $1,088.00 “Admin” amount, thus reducing that amount

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to $288.00. Consistent with this reduction, we reduce the amount under “Total fines,

Reimbursement Fees and Court Cost” from $1,810.00 to $1,010.00. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley, 865 S.W.2d

at 27; Bray, 179 S.W.3d at 729.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on March 28, 2025
Opinion Delivered August 27, 2025
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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