Carla Culver v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00355-CR
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CARLA CULVER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23DCCR1647
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this accelerated appeal, Carla Culver (“Culver” or “Appellant”) appeals the

trial court’s decision to deny bail pending appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 44.04(g). A grand jury indicted Culver for aggravated assault causing serious

bodily injury, a second-degree felony.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1).

1
We take judicial notice of the appellate record in Culver’s underlying appeal.
See Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (an appellate court
1
Culver pleaded “not guilty” to the charge, but a jury found her guilty of the offense

as charged in the indictment. The jury assessed punishment at eight years of

incarceration, and the trial court sentenced Culver in accordance with the jury’s

verdict. Culver filed a motion for new trial. 2 On August 6, 2025, Culver’s trial

attorney sent the trial court a written request for the trial court to set a bond pending

Culver’s appeal. On August 8, 2025, the trial court signed an order granting Culver’s

request for bail on appeal and set a bond at $20,000. On September 9, 2025, after

multiple hearings, the trial court rescinded the trial court’s previous order granting

Culver bail on appeal, and the trial court denied bail pending appeal. Culver timely

appealed the trial court’s rescission of its earlier order allowing bail on appeal. In

two issues, Culver argues that the trial court abused its discretion in rescinding

Culver’s bail pending her direct appeal and committed reversible error in denying

bail pending her direct appeal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

may take judicial notice of its own records in the same or related proceedings
involving the same or nearly same parties).
2
In her motion for new trial, Culver argued that she was entitled to a new trial
because (1) the trial court “misdirected the jury about the law” when instructing the
jury; (2) the trial court made improper comments during the trial that constituted
“material error” that likely injured Culver’s rights; (3) the verdict was contrary to
the law and evidence; (4) the trial court disallowed two material defense witnesses
from testifying; (5) the vehicle identified as the deadly weapon by the trial court was
never produced to the defense or the jury; and (6) the cumulative errors during the
trial effectively denied Culver a fair trial.
2
Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s decision regarding appeal bonds under an abuse of

discretion standard of review. Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1981). An appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court, but we ask whether the trial court’s decision was made without reference to

any guiding rules or principles of law, or in other words, whether it was arbitrary or

unreasonable. See Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). If the trial

court’s decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we must uphold the

decision of the trial court even if we would have reached a different result.

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).

Analysis

In Culver’s first issue, she argues the trial court abused its discretion in

rescinding Culver’s bail pending her direct appeal. In her second issue, she argues

the trial court committed reversible error “in failing to admit [A]ppellant to bail

pending her direct appeal.” She briefed the two issues together, and we will address

both issues together. According to Culver, the trial court arbitrarily denied her bail

and due process, and the trial court denied an appeal bond on an unlawful basis—

the fact that Culver’s case involved the use of a deadly weapon.

3
The State argues that the trial court has discretion to change its mind and upon

review, the trial court concluded that the initial grant of a bond was improper, and

that the trial court found that it was within his discretion to rescind the bond.

According to the State, the recission of the bond was “procedurally proper, with

notice, representation, and multiple hearings, satisfying due process[,]” and the

nature of Culver’s underlying offense and her criminal record including a previous

probation revocation provided sufficient support for the trial court to find good cause

to deny bail either due to Culver’s risk of reoffending or due to her risk of failing to

reappear.

The primary objective of an appeal bond is to secure the appellant’s

apprehension if that appellant’s conviction is subsequently affirmed. Ex parte

Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Convicted felons are not

guaranteed the right to bail under the Texas Constitution. See Ex parte Lowe, 573

S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 11. Article

44.04(b) renders a convicted felon ineligible for bail pending appeal where

punishment of more than ten years of confinement has been assessed, or the

conviction is for an offense listed under article 42A.054(a). See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(b). In cases where the assessed punishment for a felony

conviction is ten years or less, the trial court has discretion to modify bail, set a

reasonable bail, deny bail, revoke existing bail, or impose reasonable conditions on

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bail. Id. art. 44.04(c), (d). The authority granted in article 44.04(c) allows a trial court

to rescind an earlier order allowing bond even in situations other than when a

condition was violated. See Ex parte LeBlanc, 615 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1981) (rejecting appellant’s contention that a court may not rescind an earlier

order allowing bail pending appeal unless conditions were set on that bail and one

of the conditions was shown to have been violated); Robinson v. State, 700 S.W.2d

710, 712 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.) (citing Ex parte LeBlanc

and rejecting appellant’s argument that since the court placed no condition on his

bond, the trial court was still without authority to rescind the order allowing that

bond).

In determining what constitutes reasonable bail on appeal, the trial court

considers factors including the length of the sentence, the nature of the offense, the

appellant’s work record, family ties, and length of residency, her ability to make bail,

her prior criminal record and conformity with previous bond conditions, and any

aggravating factors in the offense. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-50.

Additionally, the trial court may deny bail altogether if there exists good cause to

believe that the defendant would not appear when her conviction became final or is

likely to commit another offense while on bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

44.04(c).

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Because Culver was sentenced to eight years in prison and her conviction did

not involve offenses listed in article 42A.054(a), she was eligible for bail pending

her appeal. See id. art. 44.04(b). Nevertheless, the trial court had discretion to deny

bail if the trial court believed Culver would not appear when the conviction became

final or Culver would be likely to commit another offense while on bail. See id. art.

44.04(c). In rescinding the prior order granting bail on appeal and then denying bail

on appeal, the trial judge stated that his prior order granting bail was based on the

assertions made in Culver’s motion for new trial about what had transpired during

the trial, but the trial judge’s decision to grant bail was made prior to the trial

transcript being available to him. The trial judge stated that after he received and

then read the trial transcript, he determined there were “discrepancies [between

Culver’s motion for new trial and the trial transcript,]” and the trial judge changed

his mind about granting bail on appeal after determining that Culver’s motion for

new trial did not accurately reflect what transpired at trial.

We conclude the trial court had the authority to rescind its previous order

granting bail pending appeal. See Ex parte LeBlanc, 615 S.W.2d at 726; Robinson,

700 S.W.2d at 712. That said, we still must determine whether the trial court abused

its discretion in deciding to deny bail pending appeal. A trial court may deny bail if

there exists good cause to believe that the defendant would not appear when her

conviction became final or is likely to commit another offense while on bail. See

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Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c). Additionally, it is well established that if

a correct ruling is made by the trial court but it is for the wrong reason, it will not

result in a reversal. Ex parte Reasor, 278 S.W.3d 460, 462-63 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2009, no pet.) (citing Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 651-52 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1988)). If the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the

case it will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.

At the hearing when the trial judge rescinded his earlier order and then denied

Culver bail on appeal, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: [Defense counsel], the initial decision that was
made for no bond on appeal was because of deadly weapon used. I’ve
always done that. If I open the door for one, I open the door for
everybody. It has been for 18-1/2 years [my] rule. The - - when a deadly
weapon is used, then there is not an appeal bond granted. When you can
find one otherwise, let me know but I know what it is. And that’s why
I did that. That’s why it was not set.
It was set because of the motion to - - for new trial that was not
compared to the transcript. And I relied on that. And that’s why I called
everybody together as soon as possible . . . . But we compared the [trial]
transcript to your motion [for] new trial. The statements in [the] motion
[for] new trial, I pointed out the discrepancies why that had changed
my mind. And that - - the transcript speaks for itself. It’s accurate. And
that’s why this Court is placing the defendant in the same position all
defendants are in . . . when they are convicted of a crime where a deadly
weapon was used.
....
And I asserted my discretion after your motion for new trial was
filed. And that discretion was misapplied, and I explained that. . . .
We’re back to where we were before. This is a deadly weapon that was
used in the commission of an offense, and the jury found [Culver]
guilty. And I’m treating her like I treated . . . everybody else for 18-1/2
years. . . . [W]hat’s fair for one is fair for all. All right. That’s what the
Court’s decision is. I’m denying your relief. We’re in recess on this.
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Based on the record, including the trial transcript, the nature of the offense,

the underlying facts, and the deadly weapon finding, as well as her prior history in

failing to comply with the terms of a prior misdemeanor probation, we conclude the

trial judge could have reasonably concluded that good cause existed to believe that

Culver either would not appear when her conviction became final or that she is likely

to commit another offense while on bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

44.04(c). Culver was convicted of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury.

In Culver’s trial, the trial court heard evidence that Culver had failed to make

payments on the vehicle she had purchased, and the vehicle was in repossession.

Culver encountered the man that sold her the vehicle when she was out one night,

and she and another man tried to hide the vehicle in a parking lot behind a nearby

business to avoid repossession. According to testimony at trial, despite her attempts

to conceal the vehicle, the man who sold her the vehicle had followed her and he

argued with her and then opened the hood to disable the vehicle’s engine. Culver

started the vehicle’s engine, reversed the vehicle and then pulled forward, striking

the man who was under the vehicle’s hood. During the punishment phase of the trial,

Culver testified that she failed to complete probation for a prior misdemeanor theft

conviction and was sentenced to a year in county jail. The State argued at the bail

hearing that Culver “couldn’t even follow th[e] rules on just a simple misdemeanor

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probation[]” regarding a prior misdemeanor probation which was revoked, and that

bail should be denied “for the safety of everyone involved.”3

A trial court may consider the defendant’s prior criminal history and the facts

of the underlying case, including the jury’s finding that there was a deadly weapon

used in the offense, when making a determination to deny bail on appeal and in

concluding that there exists good cause to believe that the defendant would not

appear when the defendant’s conviction became final or that the defendant is likely

to commit another offense while on bail. See, e.g., Evans v. State, Nos. 05-20-00972-

CR & 05-20-00973-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340, at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying bail under section 44.04(c) when no evidence was

presented at the bail hearing but the parties made arguments as to bail on appeal

based on the trial court’s previous history with the defendant who was convicted of

two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court could

have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s past history that he would likely

commit other offenses while on bail); Ex parte Mendiola, 961 S.W.2d 625, 627-28

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (In rejecting the defendant’s argument that

it was inappropriate to consider the nature of the underlying offense when

3
We note that defense counsel did not object or disagree at the bail hearing to
the State’s characterization of Culver’s criminal history.
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determining whether to deny bail, the appellate court concluded that consideration

of the nature of the underlying offense was proper because article 44.04(c) allows

the denial of bail upon the belief of the likelihood that the defendant will commit a

crime while on bail and that it is logical that the nature of the offense is relevant.);

Short v. State, 923 S.W.2d 168, 168-69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying bond pending appeal under former

statute; the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and

the trial court based the decision to deny bond on the underlying offense and

evidence presented in the trial of the offense); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 44.04(c). Here, the trial court could have reasonably inferred, based on Culver’s

criminal history and the facts of the underlying offense involving her attempt to

avoid the repossession and her use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon to assault the

victim, that good cause exists to believe that Culver would not appear when her

conviction became final or is likely to commit another offense while on bail. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c). We overrule both issues and affirm the

trial court’s denial of Culver’s bail on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on December 5, 2025
Opinion Delivered January 14, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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