In the Interest of N.L. v. the State of Texas

CourtListener 10801235Txctapp9Feb 26, 2026

Full text

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00387-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF N.L.
________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24DCFM0176
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child,

“Nancy.” 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds exist for termination of Mother’s, A.L., parental rights and that termination

of her parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2).2

1
To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child
and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated the unknown Father’s parental rights.
1
Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there

are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no

pet.) (noting Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief

presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no

arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney

represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief she filed

and notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief. The Court likewise notified

Mother of her right to file a pro se response, the deadline for doing so, and this Court

notified Mother that a copy of the appellate record was available to her upon request.

Mother did not file a response with the Court or request a copy of the record.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)

(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,

no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would

arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.

See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and

reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the

2
requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346

S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new

counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Should

Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s

obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for

an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations

omitted).

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on February 24, 2026
Opinion Delivered February 26, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

3

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