Ramon Gerardo Morales v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00379-CR
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RAMON GERARDO MORALES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24DC-CR-00198
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant Ramon Gerardo Morales guilty of felony evading

arrest or detention with a vehicle, a third-degree felony. See Act of May 27, 2011,

82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 920, § 3, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2321, 2322; Act of May

23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, § 1, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1046, 1046

1
(current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2)(A)). 1 The trial court found

there was sufficient evidence that Morales had a prior felony conviction as alleged

in the indictment and assessed Morales’s punishment as a habitual offender at five

years of confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(a).

Morales’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief that presents counsel’s

professional evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1978). On December 15, 2025, we granted an extension of time for

Morales to file a pro se brief, and Morales filed no response.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination

of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson

v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). We have reviewed

the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably

support the appeal. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it

1
We note that the Legislature enacted two different versions of section
38.04(b) in 2011 and that an offense is a third-degree felony if an offender used a
vehicle to evade arrest, regardless of whether he has a prior conviction
for evading. See Copeland v. State, No. 09-19-00194-CR, 2020 WL 1280194, at *3
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); see also Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 920, § 3, 2011 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2321, 2322; Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, § 1,
2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1046, 1046 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
38.04(b)(2)(A)).
2
considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error

but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 47.1.”). Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new

counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.2

AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on March 24, 2026
Opinion Delivered April 1, 2026
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

2
Morales may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition of
discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex. R. App. P.
68.1.
3