In the Interest of M.F. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-26-00002-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF M.F.

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On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23DC-CV-01817
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

S.F. (“Susan”) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her

four-year-old daughter, M.F. (“Margaret”).1 The jury found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that statutory grounds exist for the termination of Susan’s parental rights

and that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of the child.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P), (2). The trial court

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To protect the child’s identity, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and
the parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The
trial court’s Order of Termination also terminated the child’s father’s parental rights,
but the father is not a party to this appeal.
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signed an Order of Termination in accordance with the jury’s verdict, terminating

Susan’s parental rights to Margaret. Susan timely appealed.

Susan’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-right termination

cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and

explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The

attorney filed a letter with this Court indicating that she gave Susan a copy of the

Anders brief she filed, notified Susan of her right to file a pro se brief, and advised

Susan on how to access the appellate record. The Court notified Susan of her right

to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doing so. Susan did not file a response

with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Susan’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005); In re E.A.G., No. 09-25-00234-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8567, at *2

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 6, 2025, pet. denied) (citing In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d

618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.)). Based on our review, we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal, and we agree that the appeal is

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frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of

Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the

briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of

appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re

E.A.G., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8567, at *2 (citing In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619).

Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief

the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Susan’s parental

rights.2

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on May 11, 2026
Opinion Delivered May 21, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

2
We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review in the Supreme Court of
Texas, counsel may satisfy her obligations to Appellant “by filing a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24,
27-28 (Tex. 2016).
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