Jacob Harris v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-22-00225-CR
__________________

JACOB HARRIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 21-36913
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A grand jury indicted Appellant Jacob Harris (a/k/a Jacob R. Harris or Jacob

Ray Harris) for aggravated assault, and the indictment alleged that Harris used a

deadly weapon—a car seat—in committing the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 22.02. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty. The trial court

found Harris guilty and found that Harris used a deadly weapon in committing the

offense charged. After a hearing on punishment, the trial court sentenced Harris to

eight years of confinement. Harris timely appealed, and in four issues, he challenges

1
his judgment of conviction. In his first two issues, he challenges the evidence to

support the deadly weapon finding, and in his other two issues, he argues that the

trial court erred by allowing him to plead guilty. Appellant asks this Court to reverse

and remand for a new trial. In the alternative, Appellant asks that this Court reform

the judgment by deleting the deadly weapon finding and remand for resentencing.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Background Information1

Harris was indicted in April 2021, and trial began in May 2022. The record

reflects that Harris was represented at all stages of the proceeding by retained

counsel. After voir dire and selection of the jury, and outside the presence of the

jury, Harris stated, “I’m getting me a new attorney. So, we need to reschedule or

something.” The trial court responded, “we’re not stalling because of you. We are

moving forward. You can represent yourself, if you wish[.]” The trial court also told

Harris that, if Harris wanted to represent himself, the court would allow his retained

counsel to be present on standby. The following exchange then occurred:

The Court: . . . Do you understand what I’ve said, sir?

The Defendant: No.

The Court: I spoke -- do you speak the English language? I’m not being
silly, but do you understand[,] did you understand the words I said to
you?

1
We limit our discussion about the proceedings in the trial court to
information and evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal.
2
The Defendant: No.

The Court: Do you speak any language other than English?

The Defendant: (No response).

The Court: We are in recess, and please note that the defendant refuses
to answer.

After a break in the proceedings, Harris stated on the record to the court that he could

not represent himself and he needed another attorney. The trial court told Harris,

“You can certainly hire another lawyer but we’re not going to interrupt the flow of

the proceedings to work on your timetable[.]” Harris also stated, “I wasn’t informed

about the process or none of this. I wasn’t informed about the process. He told me

we [were] going to go, and I don’t feel like I had enough of going through a trial.”

The trial court confirmed on the record that Harris’s retained counsel was prepared

to move forward for trial.

At that point, the trial court noticed that Harris had family members present

and the trial court asked Harris if he wanted to speak with his family. Harris replied,

“Yes.” During a break, Harris spoke with his family members and with his retained

counsel. When trial resumed, the following exchange occurred:

The Court: . . . [B]efore we broke for lunch, we had selected a jury and
then it was Mr. Harris who made a statement that he wished -- so it’s
clear on the record and correct me if I’m wrong, anybody -- that he
wished to replace his attorney [] and the Court inquired and I was a little
confused as to whether he wanted a new lawyer or wanted to represent
himself and he made it clear that he didn’t wish to represent himself.
That wasn’t [] his plan. He wanted a lawyer to replace [his retained
3
counsel]. And so, the law is pretty clear and this is Andrew Perez versus
Texas, 2015, and it is clear this was a case decision where on the day
of trial, the defense lawyer announced not ready because his client, the
defendant, told him the client desired to terminate his employment. And
the Court looked into that and finally deemed that a defendant may not
wait until the day of trial to demand different counsel or to request that
counsel be dismissed so that he may retain other counsel. When
competent counsel [] is available and fully prepared to represent the
defendant, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying an
untimely request for continuance based upon the availability of the
defendant’s counsel of choice.
The defendant has been -- this case has been set on the trial
docket since June of last year and [defense counsel] has been in this
case since December of last year and there has been no representation
that [defense counsel] had not received discovery and was not prepared
to go forward with trial. The Court decided in its legal decision that the
trial court reasonably could have concluded that the intent -- the attempt
to terminate his lawyer at the day of trial was an effort to delay trial and
that the defendant in that case was manipulating his right to counsel
when he waited until the day of trial to voice dissatisfaction.
They went on to rule that in this case, that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by disallowing the defendant on the morning of trial
-- that was on the morning of trial. Here, we’ve already picked a jury;
and it was at noon that the defendant expressed his desire. So, the Court
ruled there that there was no 6th Amendment or other violation of law
for the Court to overrule and deny the defendant’s request. And I’ve
allowed Mr. Harris to -- and we broke for lunch and it’s after 2[] o’clock
and I’ve allowed him to reflect and speak to his family.
And at this moment, Mr. Harris, it’s my understanding that you
wish to continue with [defense counsel’s] representation of you and
you’re intending to enter a plea of guilty in this case and waive a jury
trial? Is that what I understand?

The Defendant: Uh-huh, yeah.

The Court: . . . I have before me some plea papers and does the
defendant waive a formal reading of this indictment and arraignment
here . . . and can we proceed in summary?

Defense counsel: You may and you can, Your Honor.
4
At that point, the trial court informed Harris that he was charged with the

second-degree felony of aggravated assault with the use of a deadly weapon, namely

a car seat. When asked whether he understood what he was charged with, Harris

replied, “Yes, sir.” The trial court told Harris that, if convicted, punishment would

be not more than twenty years or less than two years in prison and a fine not to

exceed $10,000, and Harris again replied that he understood. When asked if he was

knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial and leaving sentencing to

the court, Harris, replied, “Yes.” The court told Harris that he had the right to appeal,

and Harris said, “yes,” that he understood. Harris then pleaded guilty, and agreed he

was pleading guilty on his own free will and because he was guilty. He also agreed

that he had signed the written plea admonishments wherein he declared that he is

mentally competent, that he was entering his guilty plea freely and voluntarily, that

he was aware of the consequences of pleading guilty, that the indictment had been

read to him, that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he was satisfied

with his attorney’s representation, and Harris agreed this was true. The “Written Plea

Admonishments” are included in the clerk’s record. The trial court asked Harris

whether he understood that there was enough evidence for the court to find Harris

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and Harris replied, “Yes, sir.” The trial court then

found Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and stated it would wait until a

presentencing report was available to finalize the finding.

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Harris then told the court, “I want you to look into, like fabrication of the

story[]” and “overexaggerating-type stuff[]” by the complainant. The trial court

stated it would hear the evidence, that it would release the jury and proceed with a

hearing on punishment. Before the punishment hearing began, the trial court stated,

“the Court has found that the defendant has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently

waived a jury trial, entered a plea of guilty before the Court and has elected to have

the Court decide punishment in this case.”

During the punishment hearing, a neighbor and friend of Harris testified, and

Harris’s girlfriend, J.G., 2 also testified. The neighbor testified that she witnessed an

argument between Harris and J.G., and she saw Harris pick up an infant car seat and

hit J.G. with the car seat. The neighbor testified that J.G. passed out twice. The

neighbor also testified that Harris slammed J.G. on the ground. According to the

neighbor, a police officer intervened to stop the fight, and an ambulance arrived at

the scene. On cross-examination, the neighbor agreed that J.G. was pointing her

umbrella at Harris and jabbed or poked him with the umbrella.

Harris’s girlfriend3, J.G., testified that on the day of the incident, she and

Harris were living together, and they had a verbal disagreement. After J.G. told

2
We refer to the victim by her initials to conceal her identity. See Tex. Const.
art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and
with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”).
3
J.G. testified she is also Harris’s ex-wife.
6
Harris to leave, he refused to leave and threatened to break the windows. He then

grabbed the car seat and broke a window and started hitting J.G. with the car seat.

J.G. testified that she went to the hospital for injuries she received from Harris hitting

her with the car seat, which included a fractured wrist, an injury to her leg, a

“bust[ed] lip[,]” bruises to her face, and she had blood coming from her mouth and

nose. She also agreed that Harris “body slammed” her. J.G. agreed that, during her

argument with Harris, she used an umbrella to defend herself and, at one point, she

picked up a crutch. She agreed that, during the struggle, she also had chest pains

because of asthma.

After the State rested, Harris testified. Harris agreed that he took a car seat

and used it to break a window and that he hit J.G. with the car seat. On cross-

examination, Harris agreed he was accepting responsibility for assaulting J.G. with

a car seat, he had pleaded guilty, and he was not blaming anyone else. He agreed he

caused damage to J.G.’s face and fractured her wrist during the incident. He also

agreed he broke a window. Harris told the court that the fight with J.G. was his fault.

The parties returned to the trial court for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing

the trial court asked the parties if they had any objections to the presentence report

which had been prepared, and the defendant asked about certain alleged offenses as

well as whether the allegations on charges that were not prosecuted. The defense

attorney reviewed the testimony from the prior hearing noting that Harris claimed

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the argument with the “complaining witness” started when he was asleep, and the

complainant tried to wake him up and it ended up in the argument that lead to Harris

hitting the complainant with a car seat. The defense also emphasized that Harris had

been a “good father” to his children, and the defense asked the trial court to consider

placing Harris on probation. The prosecution reminded the trial court Harris

previously stated he did not want probation because he had not done anything, and

he did not plead guilty until after the jury was selected. Harris interjected at the

sentencing hearing as follows:

The Defendant: I’m not aggressive. I was asleep when it happened. I
was attacked when I was asleep. So, I wasn’t the aggressor in the case.

The Court: The defendant pleaded guilty earlier at a hearing, and it was
unagreed. The defendant pleaded guilty voluntarily, knowingly,
intelligently and the presentence report is subsequently made and the
parties can make their arguments and they are certainly not locked into
anything, especially when a presentence report has not been concluded.
The full range of punishment is what the Court is going to consider, the
full range, including deferred or unadjudicated probation. So, the
parties are allowed to make their own statements and, also, if there was
a deal that was binding, nobody brought that up to this Court like it
should have been or this wouldn’t be unagreed. Come on.
...
The Court: All right. Mr. Harris, what else with you like to say?

The Defendant: I mean, I was asleep when this all happened; and it
happened while I was under duress. I was asleep. I didn’t know what
was going on. I was attacked while I was asleep. I tried to go somewhere
else, and I was pursued. I feel like under the Texas Constitution, I’m
the victim in the case. I shouldn’t even -- I accept what happened; but
at the same time, what was I supposed to do? I was attacked while I was
asleep. That’s like being under duress, and then a witness even said that

8
I was attacked while I was asleep. It was supposed to be the
prosecutor’s witness that said I was attacked while I was asleep.

The Court: Isn’t that your signature? We went over that. Isn’t that your
signature?

The Defendant: Who, me?

The Court: Yes. You acknowledged it was your signature.

The Defendant: Uh-huh.

The Court: And you stated here, it says, “I am mentally competent to
enter my plea; the indictment has been read to me or I’ve read it; I am
guilty of the offense charged and all lesser included offenses. I am
doing this voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently,” and it says, “So help
me God, all of this is true.” You didn’t lie under oath, did you?

The Defendant: No, I didn’t at all.

The Court: Did you commit perjury when you did that?

The Defendant: I don’t know what that is, sir.

The Court: Lying under oath.

The Defendant: Under the circumstances, I mean –

The Court: I found that you made your decision consciously.

The Defendant: I mean, I was just trying to make the best decision, I
feel like. I [have] never been through [anything] like this before.

The Court: Anything else?

The Defendant: Under the circumstances, all my people came and told
me what they told me. I was just trying to get out. I mean, I don’t know.

The Court: All right. Anything else anybody wants to add?

9
[Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.

The Court: If not, then, I’m going to –

The Defendant: I would withdraw.

[Defense counsel]: I couldn’t hear you.

The Court: I’m going to find as follows: I’m going [to] find Mr. Harris
has pleaded guilty to this second degree felony voluntarily, knowingly,
intelligently. He understood the consequences of pleading guilty. There
was sufficient evidence supporting his guilty plea by his sworn
document stating he was guilty made at a time when the jury was
impaneled, ready to go forward and then the defendant stopped the trial
and urges the Court to accept his plea of guilty and this is an unagreed
plea. I find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based upon
his choices and his voluntary plea and based upon the presentence
report that has been admitted into evidence and the arguments made.
The defendant is hereby found guilty of the second degree felony and
is sentenced to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice to serve a term of 8 years.

The Defendant: How long?

The Court: 8 years. An affirmative finding that a deadly weapon –

The Defendant: Judge, under the Texas Constitution, I’m the victim in
this case.

The Court: You just interrupted the Court in the middle of its
articulation. You may speak in a minute. There is an affirmative finding
that a deadly weapon, namely, a car seat, as indicted, was used in the
commission of this crime; and it will be reflected on the judgment.
Anything else you want to say? You have a right to appeal this.

The Defendant: Well, can I withdraw my plea?

The Court: No, sir. No, sir, you can’t withdraw it. After a jury was here,
we seated a jury, we were ready. You insisted –

10
The Defendant: I’m not understanding. How am I -- how am I the
aggressor? In any aggravated assault case, the aggressor is the one that
was supposed to be tried. How was I the aggressor when I was asleep?

The Court: This hearing is finished. That is all. You’re found guilty
an[d] sentenced as a felon.

The Defendant: Yeah, I know.

The Court: That’s the way the rules work in the United States.

The Defendant: My rules don’t work like that.

The Court: They don’t work on your rules. Sorry.

Harris timely filed a notice of appeal.

Guilty Plea

We first address Appellant’s third and fourth issues, in which he argues that

the trial court committed reversible error by allowing him to plead guilty. According

to Appellant, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and a fair trial

when the trial court allowed him to plead guilty after the court denied his request for

new counsel. Appellant further argues that he became indigent after he retained his

trial counsel, and “the trial Court committed reversible error in not providing

Appellant with an attorney during his trial.” Appellant asserts that he pleaded guilty

“simply because the Court would not appoint an attorney for him, and he was

dissatisfied with [his trial counsel].” Appellant further alleges he “is mentally

impaired, and [], at least somewhat mentally retarded[,]” and he explains that,

despite multiple attempts, he could not complete high school. Appellant argues that
11
his guilty plea was “incompetent” because all plea bargain offers had been

withdrawn at the time, and there was ample time for the trial court to order a mental

evaluation. According to Appellant, he did not understand that he was also charged

with the use of a deadly weapon.

Appellant argues he is “mentally impaired” and suggests that the trial court

could have ordered a mental examination, but he does not cite to any part of the

record at the trial or in the sentencing to support his contention that the trial court

should have ordered a competency examination based on the record in this case, nor

does he cite to any case law supporting his contention that his guilty plea was

“incompetent” because all plea bargain offers had been withdrawn at the time of his

plea. 4 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Therefore, we consider these points inadequately

briefed. See id.; Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).5

Next, we examine Harris’s argument that the trial court erred by denying

Harris’s request on the day of trial for a new attorney. “A defendant may not use his

4
For the standards and framework for competency to stand trial and ordering
a competency examination and hearing, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts.
46B.003-.005; Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); and Turner
v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
5
The record reflects Harris executed “Written Plea Admonishments,” where
Appellant agreed that he was “mentally competent and [his] plea is freely and
voluntarily made.” Harris does not allege or contend that he cannot read. And, we
note that Harris was fully engaged in the sentencing hearing, asked questions, and
made arguments about not being the “aggressor” in the argument, and neither Harris
or his attorney ever suggested Harris was mentally challenged or incompetent before
or during either the trial where he pleaded guilty, or at the sentencing hearing.
12
right to counsel to manipulate the court or to delay his trial.” Culverhouse v. State,

755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see also Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d

780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (citing Thompson v. State, 447 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1969); Estrada v. State, 406 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966)); Burks

v. State, 227 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)

(citing Green v. State, 840 S.W.2d 394, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). In the interest

of minimizing disruptions and maintaining continuity at trial, “an accused may not

wait until the day of trial to demand different counsel or to request that counsel be

dismissed so that he may retain other counsel.” Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784. A trial

court has discretion to grant or deny a request to change counsel on the morning of

trial. Medley v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d)

(citing United States v. Magee, 741 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1984)). A trial court does

not abuse its discretion by denying a request for court-appointed counsel if the trial

court determines that the defendant is manipulating the right to counsel for purposes

of delay. See Davis v. State, No. 09-15-00450-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4226, at

**7-11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Lewis v. State, No. 02-12-00246-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1405,

at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 6, 2014, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Glover v. State, No. 09-06-325-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7321,

13
at **18-20 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 27, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

The record reflects that Harris asked for a new attorney after voir dire was

completed. The trial court stated that the law did not permit a defendant to delay trial

and change counsel in the middle of trial and that Harris had not articulated any

reason why Harris’s retained counsel should be replaced. The trial court also told

Harris, “we’re not stalling because of you. We are moving forward.” The clerk’s

record includes an “Appointment of Counsel” form signed by Harris on May 1,

2022, in which Harris stated that he did not want a court-appointed attorney at that

time. A handwritten note on the form indicated that defense counsel was hired in

December 2021, and the form is signed by the presiding judge. Appellant’s brief

fails to provide any factual basis to explain why Harris could not proceed with his

retained attorney and we find no explanation in the record. See Tex. R. App. P.

38.1(i) (arguments in an appellate brief must be supported by citations to the record

and to authority).

On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Harris’s request for a new attorney that he made during the first day of trial, and we

find no Sixth Amendment infirmity. See Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784; Davis, 2017 Tex.

App. LEXIS 4226, at **7-11; Medley, 47 S.W.3d at 23.

14
Finally, we consider Harris’s complaint that his guilty plea was not voluntary.

“No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court unless it

appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.”

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b). When we review the voluntariness of a

plea, we examine the record as a whole. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam); Doubout v. State, 388 S.W.3d 863,

865 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). When the record shows that the

trial court gave a proper admonishment, there is a prima facie showing of a knowing

and voluntary plea of guilty. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Ex parte Gibauitch, 688

S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 318

(Tex. App.–Beaumont 2013, no pet.) (“The admonishment is a prima facie showing

that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.”); Doubout, 388 S.W.3d at 865. The

burden then shifts to the defendant to show that he pleaded guilty without

understanding the consequences of his plea and thereby suffered harm. See Martinez,

981 S.W.2d at 197 (“A finding that a defendant was duly admonished creates a prima

facie showing that a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily[]” and “the

burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the

consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.”); see also Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c). Once a defendant has pleaded guilty and attested to the

voluntary nature of his plea, he bears a heavy burden at a subsequent hearing to

15
demonstrate a lack of voluntariness. Ybarra v. State, 93 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex.

App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

In this case, the reporter’s record from the plea hearing reflects that the trial

court informed Harris of his options regarding entering a plea and the consequences.

Harris testified at the hearing that he did not want a jury trial, he pleaded guilty to

the crime charged, he pleaded guilty of his own free choice, and he pleaded guilty

because he was guilty. He further testified that he understood the range of

punishment for the crime to which he pleaded guilty, and he pleaded guilty to the

allegations in the indictment. During the hearing on punishment, Harris testified that

he hit J.G. with a car seat and injured her, that he was responsible, and that he blamed

no one else. The “Written Plea Admonishments” filed in the clerk’s record and

signed by Harris, include a statement that “the defendant appears legally competent

to stand trial; that all of the defendant’s statements were freely and voluntarily made;

and that the defendant’s plea in this case was freely and voluntarily entered.” The

Written Plea Admonishments are then signed by Harris’s defense counsel at trial,

the prosecutor, and the trial judge approved the waivers and certify that Harris’s plea

was entered “freely and voluntarily.” The record reflects no evidence to substantiate

Appellant’s claim that he was misled by his attorney or that his plea was not

voluntary. In addition, the record reflects that Appellant chose not to represent

himself and he was represented by counsel throughout trial.

16
The trial court’s admonishments are prima facie evidence that Harris’s guilty

plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. The

burden then shifted to Harris to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the

consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm. See id. On this record, Harris

did not meet his burden to demonstrate a lack of voluntariness. See id.; Ybarra, 93

S.W.3d at 925. We overrule Appellant’s third and fourth issues.

Deadly Weapon Finding

Appellant challenges the deadly weapon finding in his first and second issues

on appeal. According to Appellant, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that

he used an infant car seat as a deadly weapon because “it was predominantly used

in self-defense,” and the evidence was legally insufficient “that the [] car seat or its

manner of use caused either serious bodily injury or a threat of death.” Appellant

also argues that a car seat is not a deadly weapon because it is lightweight and lacks

sharp edges. Appellant argues that a factfinder may not “infer deadliness solely from

the infliction of superficial wounds[,]” citing to Danzig v. State, 546 S.W.2d 299,

302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Appellant also suggests that he was entitled to a jury

charge6 or resentencing on a lesser offense, such as reckless conduct.

In this case, the indictment read, in relevant part,

6
The record confirms he waived a jury trial, he entered a plea, and Harris
elected punishment to be made at a bench trial.
17
. . . Jacob Harris . . . did then and there intentionally and knowingly and
recklessly cause bodily injury to [J.G.], hereafter styled the
Complainant, by the use of a deadly weapon, namely, a car seat, that in
the manner of its use and intended use is capable of causing serious
bodily injury and death, by striking [J.G.] about the head and body with
said car seat[.]

Here, the language of the indictment provided Harris with sufficient notice that the

State sought a deadly weapon finding.7 See Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc) (“The language in the indictment may provide

sufficient notice if it alleges use of a deadly weapon.”).

“The entry of a valid plea of guilty has the effect of admitting all material facts

alleged in the formal criminal charge [and] waives all nonjurisdictional defenses

including [a] contention as to the insufficiency of the evidence.” Ex parte Williams,

703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); see also Ex parte Munoz,

666 S.W.3d 529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (Slaughter, J., concurring); Keller v.

State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d).

Harris pleaded guilty as charged in the indictment, and we have already

concluded that Harris did not meet his burden to demonstrate that his guilty plea was

not voluntary. Harris swore to and signed “Written Plea Admonishments” that

included “Stipulations, Waivers & Judicial Admission,” in which Harris agreed that

he had read the charging instrument, his attorney had explained it to him, and Harris

7
Appellant has not alleged that there was a defect in the indictment.
18
“committed each and every element alleged.” The indictment alleged the use of a

car seat as a deadly weapon. Therefore, Harris’s guilty plea was an admission that

he used the car seat as a deadly weapon. See Munoz, 666 S.W.3d at 530 (explaining

that, because the defendant had pleaded guilty to the charged offense and stipulated

to the deadly weapon finding, the guilty plea foreclosed his ability to challenge the

legal sufficiency of the deadly weapon finding).

In addition, during the punishment phase, Harris testified that he assaulted

J.G. with a car seat, he accepted responsibility for the assault, and he was not blaming

anyone else. The record reflects that the case was not a plea bargain case, and

Appellant does not suggest he had an agreement with the State that his guilty plea

did not include pleading guilty to the use of a deadly weapon. Therefore, in pleading

guilty “as charged in the indictment,” Appellant waived his complaint about the

deadly weapon finding, and we overrule Appellant’s first and second issues. See id.;

Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 682; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 604-05.

Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

19
AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on June 22, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 20, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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