In the Matter of J.J.B. III. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00162-CV
__________________

IN THE MATTER OF J.J.B. III.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-13502-J
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this accelerated appeal, Appellant J.J.B. III, a juvenile, complains the

juvenile court erred by waiving jurisdiction and transferring his case to criminal

district court when there is no evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile Probation

Department exhausted all means to rehabilitate him. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§

54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the juvenile

court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to Criminal Court.

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PERTINENT BACKGROUND

J.J.B. III, a sixteen-year-old, was charged with the following felony offenses

against persons or property: evading arrest/detention with a motor vehicle,

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two counts of theft of a firearm. The State

filed a Petition for Discretionary Transfer, requesting that the juvenile court waive

jurisdiction and transfer the case to the appropriate criminal district court under

section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code because J.J.B. III was sophisticated and

mature enough to be treated as an adult. The State alleged that: (1) the prospects of

the public’s adequate protection and the likelihood of J.J.B. III’s reasonable

rehabilitation by the use of available procedures, services, and facilities to the

juvenile court warrant his treatment as an adult; (2) the record and J.J.B. III’s history

warrants his treatment as an adult; (3) J.J.B. III is sophisticated and mature enough

to be treated as an adult; and (4) the seriousness of the alleged offenses, J.J.B. III’s

background, and the community’s welfare requires criminal proceedings.

The trial court appointed counsel to represent J.J.B. III in the discretionary

transfer proceeding. The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s Petition

during which it considered witness testimony and the following records in making

its decision: Certification Analysis, Dr. Nisha Amin’s Psychological Evaluation

Report, and Dr. Edward Gripon’s Psychiatric Evaluation. Dr. Amin’s Psychological

Evaluation states that J.J.B. III understood what he was charged with, the nature of

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the pending proceedings, and that J.J.B. had demonstrates his capacity to assist his

counsel. In her report, Dr. Amin concluded that there are “no critical factors that

adversely affect” J.J.B. III and that “there is ample clinical evidence” that he is “fit

to proceed.” Dr. Gripon’s Psychiatric Evaluation states he diagnosed J.J.B. III with

ADHD by history and that while J.J.B. III had not been treated for that condition, he

did not have significant symptoms. Dr. Gripon concluded that J.J.B. III was “not

mentally disabled” and during his evaluation appeared to have “no mental health

contraindication to certification/discretionary transfer.”

Sheronda Lee (“Lee”), a probation officer with the Jefferson County Juvenile

Probation Department, testified that she prepared J.J.B. III’s Certification Analysis,

which includes information from Dr. Amin’s psychological report and Dr. Gripon’s

psychiatric report. Lee explained that, in her opinion, Dr. Amin’s and Dr. Gripon’s

reports raise no concerns about whether J.J.B. should be certified as an adult.

Lee explained that her analysis includes information that she received from

the police about the offenses that resulted in J.J.B.’s arrest. As to J.J.B.’s arrest, Lee

stated that on January 15, 2023, at about 3:00 a.m., Jefferson County Sheriff

Deputies were dispatched after a black male in black clothing wearing a facemask

was reported as seen pulling on car door handles on a security camera. When the

deputies spotted the black male, he got into a Ford F-150, and he drove off at speeds

of more than 100 miles per hour. By Lee’s account, when deputies activated their

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emergency lights on their clearly marked Jefferson County patrol units, the driver

took deputies on a short pursuit for several miles and only stopped when the vehicle

crashed. Information Lee received from the police investigation indicated that upon

removing J.J.B. III, the sole occupant and driver in the Ford F-160, deputies found

he had two firearms, a Taurus 9mm and Sig Sauer .22, in his possession. J.C.C., the

owner of Ford F-150, advised he did not consent to anyone operating his truck. Lee

explained that police determined that D.C. owned the two pistols that were found in

J.J.B.’s possession, and that D.C. had reported the pistols as having been stolen when

two of his vehicles were burglarized the same night J.J.B. took the Ford F-150. When

an officer contacted the owner of the Ford F-150, J.C.C. told police that he no longer

feels safe and carries a gun when he goes outside.

Lee testified that J.J.B. III was charged with four state jail felonies, evading

detention with a vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two charges for

stolen guns. Lee testified J.J.B. III was from Louisiana, where he violated his

probation for an aggravated assault case and was sentenced to Louisiana’s version

of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department Institutional Division. Lee explained J.J.B.

III, who was sixteen and a half, was discharged from the Louisiana juvenile prison

in February 2020 and committed the current offenses, which are crimes against

property, in January 2023 while on parole in Louisiana. Lee explained that J.J.B. III

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was in detention and attending school when he ran from police and wrecked J.C.C.’s

vehicle.

Lee testified J.J.B. III was smart, polite, articulate, and mature for his age. Lee

explained J.J.B. III has a substance abuse problem and knowledge about guns. His

prior record includes illegal possession of a handgun, illegal possession of stolen

property, and theft of a firearm. Lee also explained that she received a report

showing while in Louisiana, J.J.B. III had been placed in a boy’s home and

committed to a facility, so the Texas Juvenile Probation Department could offer him

no more help than he had already received in Louisiana. Lee testified that based on

the multiple charges following J.J.B.’s January 15, 2023 arrest and J.J.B. III’s record,

in her opinion the likelihood that J.J.B. III is capable of being rehabilitated through

programs offered by or in coordination with those of the Juvenile Probation

Department is remote. Lee explained that in her opinion, J.J.B. III’s conduct was

willful, aggravating, and could lead to violence, and that she thought it would be in

the community’s best interest to treat him as an adult.

Joe Evans (“Evans”), an intervention specialist with the IEA program,

testified he is a mentor who intervenes on behalf of youth to ensure they correct their

behavior after they are detained. Evans testified he was working with J.J.B. III, who

reads a lot, and he meets with him twice a week to visit and play cards and games.

Evans explained that J.J.B. III was receptive to intervention, and based on his alleged

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offenses, there was a possibility that he could be admitted to the program if he was

placed on probation. Evans also explained he would like to continue working with

J.J.B. III in the juvenile system and not see him certified as an adult, and he would

recommend J.J.B. III for the program, which was unavailable where J.J.B. III lived

in Louisiana. Evans testified J.J.B. III was sharper than the usual kids he deals with

in the program. Evans did not have an opinion on J.J.B. III being certified as an adult.

J.J.B. III’s mother, who lives in Louisiana, testified that she was at the hospital

visiting her newborn grandson when J.J.B. III committed the current offenses. J.J.B.

III’s mother explained she is a member of Family and Friends of Louisiana’s

Incarcerated Children (“FFLIC”) and the assistant lead for the Lafayette chapter.

According to her, the program’s goal is to represent children and to offer services

and mentorship programs, programs in which J.J.B.’s mother claimed that her son

was qualified to enroll. She explained that J.J.B. III was not involved with the

mentorship program when he was at the boy’s home in Louisiana, and she claimed

the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice did not offer him the services that she

thought he needed. J.J.B. III’s mother testified that her son should not be tried as an

adult for several reasons: in her opinion he is immature, lacks a consistent father

figure, and was pressured by older kids whom he considered to be his peers when

they brought him to Texas.

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Jennifer Landry, a youth advocate for FFLIC and founder of Speaking 2

Inspire thru Experience Program, testified that J.J.B. III would benefit from her

program as well as other available programs. Chad Landry (“Chad”), an advocate

and chapter lead for FFLIC and founder of Speaking 2 Inspire thru Experience and

Bridging the Gap, testified that J.J.B. III would benefit from his mentoring programs.

Chad testified that J.J.B. III has a good heart and he would like the opportunity to

mentor him and show him a better way.

The juvenile court signed a Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to

Criminal Court, finding the allegations are felony grade offenses against persons or

property and there is probable cause that J.J.B. III committed the offenses and there

have been no previous adjudications. The juvenile court found J.J.B. III was

sophisticated and mature enough to be treated as an adult, and it found that the

prospect of the public’s safety, the lack of time for the use of juvenile justice

services, and J.J.B. III’s record and history warranted the transfer. In support of the

discretionary transfer, the juvenile court found that J.J.B. III had: (1) a history of

school referrals and Student Discipline Reports; (2) six incident reports while in

detention; (3) a history of marijuana use and knowledge of firearms; (4) a previous

charge of possession of a stolen firearm; (5) a prior probation revocation based on a

new charge of aggravated assault and his placement in a Louisiana boy’s home; and

(6) a recent release from a boy’s home in Louisiana. Concerning J.J.B. III’s

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likelihood of rehabilitation using available procedures, services, and facilities, the

juvenile court made these findings in support of discretionary transfer: (1)

insufficient time to rehabilitate in a manner to adequately protect the public based

on the level of charged offenses; (2) the alleged crimes are so egregious and

aggravated that the psychological evaluation and reports show he will not be

amenable to rehabilitation efforts; and (3) J.J.B. III’s history and record make the

likelihood of rehabilitation doubtful. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction and

transferred J.J.B. III to criminal district court to be dealt with as an adult due to the

aggravated character of the felony offenses, the seriousness of the offenses to the

community, J.J.B. III’s willful conduct, pattern of adult living and repeated offenses,

emotional attitude, need for a controlled structured facility, and remote likelihood of

rehabilitation.

ANALYSIS

In a single issue, J.J.B. III complains the juvenile court erred by waiving

jurisdiction and transferring his case to criminal district court when there is no

evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile Probation Department exhausted all

means to rehabilitate him. See id. §§ 54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A). Specifically, J.J.B.

III complains the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to follow the

Progressive Sanctions Model under Chapter 59 of the Texas Family Code, and if it

had done so, the maximum disposition would have been to place him on intensive

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supervision with a monitor in his mother’s custody or in placement. See id. §§

59.001–.015. J.J.B. III also complains there is insufficient evidence establishing he

committed the offenses or that he was a threat to the community.

If, after an evidentiary hearing, a juvenile court determines that certain

requirements are satisfied, it may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to the

district court for criminal proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a), (c); Matter of C.M.M., 503

S.W.3d 692, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The statutory

requirements for a juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and

transfer a child to criminal district court include:

(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of
felony;

(2) the child was:

...

(B) 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to
have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the
second or third degree or a state jail felony, an no adjudication
hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and

(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines
that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court
committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of
the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the
community requires criminal proceedings.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a).

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In making a determination under section 54.02(a)(3), the juvenile court shall

consider, among other matters:

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with
greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood
of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and
facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Id. § 54.02(f). “Any combination of these criteria may suffice to support a waiver of

jurisdiction; not every criterion need weigh in favor of transfer.” Matter of C.M.M.,

503 S.W.3d at 701 (citation omitted).

We review a juvenile court’s decision to waive its exclusive original

jurisdiction and transfer a case to criminal district court using a two-step process.

Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d).

First, we review the juvenile court’s finding using the traditional evidentiary

sufficiency review. Id. (citations omitted). “In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s

findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not

reject it.” Id. (citations omitted); Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to

support the juvenile court’s findings, the evidence is legally sufficient. Bell, 649
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S.W.3d at 887. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all

the evidence to determine whether the juvenile court’s findings conflict with the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id.;

Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857 (citation omitted).

If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient

proof, we then review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet.

ref’d) (citations omitted); see also Matter of A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (citations omitted). In applying that

standard, we conduct our own analysis of the evidence and determine whether the

juvenile court acted without reference to the guiding rules or principles such that its

decision to transfer the case was arbitrary based on the evidence. See Collins, 516

S.W.3d at 520 (citation omitted); see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887.

The juvenile court found there is probable cause to believe J.J.B. III

committed the offenses of evading arrest with a vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle, and theft of a firearm, which are all state jail felonies. J.J.B. III argues the

evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that there was

probable cause he committed the alleged offenses. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

54.02(a)(3).

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In evaluating a probable cause determination, we consider whether there are

sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent person’s belief that the

accused juvenile committed the offense. See Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858. “The

probable-cause standard ‘requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than

needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the

evidence.’” Id. (quoting Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702); see Guzman v. State,

955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (stating probable cause

is based on factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable

and prudent people act). In determining probable cause, courts apply a “‘totality-of-

the circumstances analysis[.]’” Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858 (citation omitted).

In reaching its probable-cause determinations, the juvenile court considered,

among other things, the testimony and documentary evidence submitted at the

certification hearing as described above. J.J.B. III was charged with unauthorized

use of a vehicle—that he intentionally and knowingly operated a motor-propelled

vehicle, an automobile owned by J.C.C., without J.C.C.’s effective consent. A

person commits the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle if he intentionally or

knowingly operates another’s motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent

of the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.07(a). The evidence shows J.J.B. III

operated J.C.C.’s F-150 without J.C.C.’s effective consent.

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J.J.B. III was charged with evading arrest/detention with a vehicle—that he

did then and there intentionally flee from J. Silva, the Complainant, a peace officer

lawfully attempting to detain the defendant and the defendant did then and there

know that Complainant was a peace officer attempting to lawfully detain him and

the defendant used a vehicle while in flight against the peace and dignity of the State.

A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally flees

from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.

Id. § 38.04(a). The evidence shows that J.J.B. III was driving J.C.C.’s F-150 at

speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour when deputies activated their emergency lights

on clearly marked patrol units, and rather than pulling over, J.J.B. fled for several

miles and crashed the vehicle.

J.J.B. III was also charged with two counts of theft of a firearm—that J.J.B.

III did then and there intentionally and knowingly appropriate property, by acquiring

and exercising control of corporeal personal property, a firearm owned by D.C., with

the intent to deprive D.C. of the property, and without the effective consent of D.C.

A person commits the state jail felony offense of theft if he unlawfully appropriates

property with intent to deprive the owner of property and the said property stolen is

a firearm. Id. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(C). The evidence shows that when deputies removed

J.J.B. III from J.C.C.’s vehicle, he had two firearms, a Taurus 9mm and Sig Sauer

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.22, on his person. D.C. reported his two firearms were stolen out of his vehicles the

same night J.J.B. III took J.C.C.’s vehicle.

After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, we conclude there is more

than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s findings that there is probable

cause to believe J.J.B. III committed the alleged offenses of evading arrest with a

vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a firearm. See Bell, 649

S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858–59; Matter of C.M.M., 503

S.W.3d at 702; see also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. After considering all the

evidence, we conclude the juvenile court’s findings do not conflict with the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. See Bell,

649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We conclude the juvenile

court’s findings that there is probable cause to believe J.J.B. III committed the

current offenses are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

J.J.B. III also argues the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s

finding that he was a threat to the community. In making its determination to waive

its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer J.J.B. III to criminal district court, the

juvenile court shall consider the welfare of the community and prospects of adequate

protection of the public. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3), (f)(4). The record

shows the juvenile court considered the prospects of adequate protection of the

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public and found that the public’s safety and welfare of the community warranted

the transfer for adult criminal prosecution. Lee testified that based on the totality

J.J.B. III’s current actions and past record, the public’s protection was remote and

that it was in the community’s best interest to transfer him to the adult system. The

evidence shows that along with his two current charges for theft of a firearm, J.J.B.

III has a knowledge about guns and a prior record that included illegal possession of

a handgun and theft of a firearm. The evidence also shows J.J.B. III drove at rates of

speed exceeding 100 miles per hour while fleeing from police, and the pursuit only

ended because he crashed the vehicle.

After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude there is more

than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the public’s safety

and welfare of the community warranted J.J.B. III’s transfer for adult criminal

prosecution. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858–59;

Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702. After considering all the evidence, we

conclude the juvenile court’s finding does not conflict with the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d

at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We conclude the juvenile court’s finding

that the public’s safety and welfare of the community warranted J.J.B. III’s transfer

is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

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J.J.B. III complains there is no evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile

Probation Department exhausted all means to rehabilitate him. In making its

determination to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer J.J.B. III to

criminal district court, the juvenile court is required to consider the likelihood of the

rehabilitation of the child using the procedures, services, and facilities that are

currently available to the juvenile court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(4). The

juvenile’s age at the time of the transfer “hearing is relevant to the ‘likelihood of the

rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently

available to the juvenile court’” because the juvenile court’s resources are designed

to assist and rehabilitate children, not adults. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 896–97

(citations omitted).

The trial court found that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of J.J.B.

III using the procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile

court are in doubt. After reviewing and considering the prospects of J.J.B. III’s

rehabilitation, the trial court made these findings in support of discretionary transfer:

(1) there was insufficient time for the juvenile court to use the available procedures,

services, and facilities to rehabilitate J.J.B. III due to the level of the charged

offenses, his current age of sixteen, and the Family Code’s restriction that he could

be placed only on probation until his nineteenth birthday; (2) the Family Code’s

restriction that he may be incarcerated only until his nineteenth birthday provided

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insufficient time for the juvenile court to provide the necessary services to

rehabilitate J.J.B. III in a manner that is adequate to protect the public; and (3) based

on the psychological evaluation, reports, and J.J.B. III’s alleged crimes, which are

so egregious and aggravated, he would not be amenable to the juvenile court’s

rehabilitation efforts.

The evidence shows that J.J.B. III had a criminal history in Louisiana where

he was placed in a boy’s home and committed to a facility. The evidence also shows

J.J.B. III violated his probation in Louisiana by committing aggravated assault, and

he committed the current offenses while on parole in Louisiana. Lee testified that

the Texas Juvenile Probation Department could not offer any help that J.J.B. III had

not already received in Louisiana, and there was nothing available to address J.J.B.

III’s situation in the time allowed. Lee testified that based on J.J.B. III’s current

offenses and history, the likelihood of any rehabilitation was remote. While the

juvenile court heard J.J.B. III’s mother testify that, in her opinion, Louisiana had not

offered her son the services that she thought he needed, as well as her testimony and

the testimony from several witnesses stating that J.J.B. III would benefit from

intervention and a mentoring program, the juvenile court could have determined that

a mentoring program would not provide the services necessary to sufficiently

rehabilitate J.J.B. III to offer adequate protection to the public if allowed to remain

in the juvenile system.

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After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude there is more

than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the likelihood of

reasonable rehabilitation of J.J.B. III using the procedures, services, and facilities

currently available to the juvenile court are in doubt. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887,

896–97; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 860; Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 703.

After considering all the evidence, we conclude the juvenile court’s finding does not

conflict with the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong

or unjust. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We

conclude the juvenile court’s finding that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation

of J.J.B. III using the procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the

juvenile court are in doubt is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

As for J.J.B. III’s complaint that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

failing to follow the Progressive Sanctions Model, we note that a juvenile may not

appeal based on a departure from the Sanction Level Assignment Model provided

by Chapter 59 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.014(3); In

re A.G., 292 S.W.3d 755, 762 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.); see also Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 59.003 (Sanction Level Assignment Model). Section 59.014

provides that a child may not appeal based on “a departure from the sanction level

assignment model provided by this chapter[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.014(3).

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Nothing in Chapter 59 prohibits imposing appropriate sanctions that are different

from those provided at any sanction level. In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.003(e)). A juvenile

may not appeal a departure from the Sanction Level Assignment Model because it

is treated more as a guide than a mandatory classification scheme. In re J.M., 287

S.W.3d 481, 496 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 59.014(3)); see also In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d at 858; In re A.G., 292 S.W.3d at

762 n.2. Since the Family Code does not permit a juvenile to bring this complaint on

appeal, we need not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Having concluded that the juvenile court’s complained of findings are

supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, we also conclude the juvenile

court did not abuse its discretion by waiving jurisdiction and transferring J.J.B. III’s

case to criminal district court as its decision was not arbitrary based on the evidence.

See Collins, 516 S.W.3d at 520; see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of A.M.,

577 S.W.3d at 659. Accordingly, we overrule J.J.B. III’s sole issue and affirm the

juvenile court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to Criminal Court.

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on May 6, 2024
Opinion Delivered May 23, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.
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