In re K.J.

2018 UT App 216
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF K.J.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
J.J.,
Appellant,
AND
C.J.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
Nos. 20170812-CA and 20170814-CA
Filed November 16, 2018
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Susan H. Eisenman
No. 1131478
Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant J.J.
Jordan Putnam, Attorney for Appellant C.J.
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce and Natalia Peterson,
Guardian ad Litem
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	This case requires us to determine whether the State may
file a petition seeking termination of parental rights when the
child 	is 	already 	subject 	to 	ongoing 	abuse, 	neglect, 	and

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dependency proceedings.1 We conclude that the plain language
of the Juvenile Court Act (the JCA) permits the State to file a
termination petition at any time. Accordingly, we affirm the
juvenile 	court’s 	order 	terminating 	C.J.’s 	(Mother) 	and 	J.J.’s
(Father) parental rights in K.J. (Child).2
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child. At
birth, Child tested positive for benzodiazepines, oxycodone, and
morphine and remained in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care
unit for eleven days for treatment related to opiate withdrawals.
¶3 	Approximately three weeks after Child was born, he was
taken into custody by law enforcement, and the Division of
Child 	and 	Family 	Services 	(DCFS) 	filed 	a 	verified 	petition
alleging that Child was “an abused, neglected, or dependent
child.” The juvenile court held a shelter hearing and placed
Child in DCFS’s temporary custody. At the adjudication hearing,
the 	parents 	stipulated 	to 	certain 	factual 	findings, 	and 	the
1. Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by
Part 5 of the Juvenile Court Act (the JCA), known as the
Termination 	of 	Parental 	Rights 	Act. 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§§ 78A-6-501 to -515 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Abuse, neglect,
and dependency adjudications, proceed under Part 3 of the JCA,
“Abuse, 	Neglect, 	and 	Dependency 	Proceedings.” 	See 	id.
§§ 78A-6-301 to -324. Where the applicable statutory provisions
remain substantially unchanged or unless noted otherwise, we
refer to the current version of the Utah Code for convenience.
2. The juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights is the subject of separate appeals. Because both
parents’ 	arguments are 	the same, 	we 	issue 	a 	joint 	opinion
resolving both appeals.

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juvenile court adjudicated Child as neglected by Mother and
dependent as to Father. The court entered a dispositional order
in 	September 	2016, 	ordering 	DCFS 	to 	provide 	reunification
services to Father but not to Mother who was incarcerated at the
time. After Mother’s release, the court ordered her to participate
in 	a 	substance 	abuse 	evaluation 	and 	to 	follow 	any
recommendations from that evaluation. In February 2017, the
court determined that reunification services had been successful,
transferred permanent custody of Child back to the parents, and
terminated its jurisdiction and DCFS’s involvement.
¶4 	Five 	months 	later, 	in 	July 	2017, 	DCFS 	filed 	another
verified petition alleging that Child was “abused and neglected.”
At that time, Mother was again incarcerated. The juvenile court
held a shelter hearing and placed Child in DCFS’s temporary
custody “for appropriate placement.” The court also appointed
counsel for both parents.
¶5 	In August 2017, DCFS filed a verified petition seeking
termination of both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. The
court scheduled a pretrial hearing and a trial on the termination
petition. During the pretrial hearing, the parents moved “for a
hearing for reunification services.” DCFS opposed the parents’
motion, asserting that there is no provision for reunification
services when DCFS files a termination petition instead of an
abuse and neglect petition. The juvenile court stated that it
would consider any motions for reunification services “filed in a
timely manner.”
¶6 	Before trial, Father filed a “Motion to Stay Termination of
Rights Petition and Convert Trial Setting to Pretrial Hearing on
Underlying Petition.” In his motion, Father requested a stay of
the termination petition and argued that DCFS was required to
proceed on its abuse and neglect petition, “and only once [the
juvenile court] has determined that reunification services are
inappropriate 	should 	[DCFS] 	file 	a 	termination 	of 	rights
petition.” He further argued that “[t]he dispositional statute
clearly contemplates that there will be a hearing to determine

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whether reunification services are appropriate” and that, “[b]y
moving straight to a petition to terminate parental rights, the
State jumps over all of the safeguards and due process given to
the family in the dispositional statute.” See generally Utah Code
Ann. 	§ 78A-6-312 	(LexisNexis 	Supp. 	2018) 	(discussing
dispositional hearings and reunification services).
¶7 	DCFS objected to Father’s motion, arguing that Father
“does not have a constitutional right to reunification” and that
his “due process rights will be preserved and protected during
the trial” on the termination petition. DCFS further asserted that
“[t]here is no provision for reunification [services] to be granted
under the Termination of Parental Rights Act.”
¶8 	At 	the 	beginning 	of 	the 	termination 	trial, 	the 	court
addressed and denied Father’s motion to stay. In its written
ruling, the court stated that it was not persuaded that Father’s
“due process rights are violated by the State pursuing alternative
petitions and acting on the more final petition first.” First, the
court determined that “there is no recognized substantive due
process right that would require the state to either dismiss . . . or
proceed on a verified [abuse or neglect adjudication] petition
prior to proceeding with a Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights.” The court recognized that parents have a “‘fundamental
liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children’” and that, notwithstanding that interest, “‘a parent
shown by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit can be
permanently deprived of all parental rights.’” (Quoting In re J.S.,
2017 UT App 167, ¶ 7, 405 P.3d 828 (per curiam).) The court
observed 	that 	requiring 	the 	State 	to 	forgo 	“alternative
jurisdictional 	theories 	would 	dilute 	the 	State’s 	‘moral 	and
statutory obligation to step in and protect children when those
children are suffering from neglect and abuse.’” (Quoting id.)
Thus, 	the 	court 	concluded, 	“[t]he 	separate 	filing 	does 	not
implicate [Father’s] substantive due process rights.”
¶9 	Second, the court concluded that Father was not denied
procedural due process. Specifically, the court observed that the

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parties 	had 	“concede[d] 	that 	there 	is 	no 	constitutional 	or
statutory right to reunification services, nor do the presumptions
for or against reunification services apply to a verified petition
for termination of parental rights.” The court determined that
there is “no right to have a petition for adjudication [of abuse or
neglect] filed before a petition to terminate parental rights” and
that 	“the 	State 	or 	any 	party 	has 	the 	discretion 	to 	file 	a
termination 	petition 	whenever 	the 	parties 	believe 	there 	are
grounds to terminate parental rights.” The court observed that
Father (1) had participated in all of the proceedings since Child’s
birth, (2) had received notice of the termination petition, (3) had
been appointed counsel “at all stages of the proceeding,” and
(4) “had a full and fair opportunity to defend against” the
termination 	petition. 	The 	court 	determined 	that 	there 	was
“nothing 	‘fundamentally 	unfair’ 	about 	proceeding 	with 	a
properly filed termination proceeding while a verified petition
alleging abuse and neglect remains filed and outstanding.”
¶10 	Ultimately, the court terminated both parents’ parental
rights. Regarding Mother, the court found that (1) Mother had
neglected Child and was an unfit parent because she “habitually
and excessively use[d] controlled substances or dangerous drugs
that render[ed] her unable to care for [Child]”; (2) Child was
being cared for in an out-of-home placement and Mother had
“substantially neglected, willfully refused or [was] unable or
unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] [Child] to
be in an out-of-home placement[,] and there [was] a substantial
likelihood that [she would] not be capable of exercising proper
and effective parental care in the near future”; and (3) Mother
had experienced a failure of parental adjustment. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(b), (d), (e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); id.
§ 78A-6-508(2)(c), (d). The court further determined that it was in
Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
¶11 	Regarding Father, the court found that (1) Father had
neglected Child and was an unfit parent because he “habitually
and excessively use[d] controlled substances or dangerous drugs

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that render[ed] him unable to care for [Child]”; (2) Child was
being cared for in an out-of-home placement and Father had
“substantially neglected, willfully refused or [was] unable or
unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] [Child] to
be in an out-of-home placement[,] and there [was] a substantial
likelihood that [he would] not be capable of exercising proper
and effective parental care in the near future”; and (3) Father had
experienced 	a 	failure 	of 	parental 	adjustment. 	See 	id.
§ 78A-6-507(1)(b), (d), (e); id. § 78A-6-508(2)(c), (d). The court also
took judicial notice “of its disposition and review orders related
to [Father]” and found that “the services provided to [Father] in
2016 when [Child] was removed the first time were reasonable.”
The court further determined that it was in Child’s best interest
to terminate Father’s parental rights.
¶12 	The parents moved to amend the order terminating their
parental 	rights 	under 	rule 	59 	of 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) (“[A] new trial may be
granted to any party on any issue for any of the following
reasons: . . . that the verdict or decision is contrary to law or
based on an error in law.”). They asserted that the juvenile
court’s ruling that the State could proceed on its termination
petition instead of the underlying abuse and neglect petition was
contrary to this court’s decision in In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10,
¶ 43, 268 P.3d 831. According to the parents, In re S.F. stands for
the 	proposition 	that, 	where 	juvenile 	court 	jurisdiction 	is
terminated in an earlier case, the child welfare proceedings must
begin 	anew, 	which requires a 	shelter hearing, adjudication,
disposition, and a permanency hearing before the State can seek
termination of parental rights. Thus, the parents asserted, the
State should have been required to “proceed on its underlying
verified petition of abuse and neglect prior to proceeding on its
termination of rights petition.”
¶13 	The juvenile court denied the parents’ motion. The court
was not persuaded by the parents’ arguments and disagreed
with their reading of In re S.F., concluding that the case held that

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“when 	a 	child 	is 	removed 	after 	the 	Court’s 	jurisdiction 	is
terminated, the filing of a new petition is needed to reanimate
the Court’s jurisdiction.” But the court did not read the decision
“to limit how the Court’s jurisdiction is reanimated to only
custody petitions.” The court determined that “it is clear that
that juvenile court act procedures did begin anew in this case,”
explaining:
A new petition for custody was filed to take [Child]
back into protective custody. A shelter hearing was
held and the parents were afforded counsel and a
right to be heard. After the shelter hearing but
before adjudication of the first petition, the State
filed 	a 	second 	petition, 	this 	one 	requesting
termination of parental rights. The case proceeded
to adjudication: the termination of parental rights
petition 	was 	adjudicated, 	and 	the 	order
terminating 	parental 	rights 	constituted 	the
dispositional order.
(Quotation simplified.) The court further stated that it “had
jurisdiction to hear either petition and it determined to hear . . .
the more determinative petition first.”
¶14 	Mother and Father appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶15 	Mother and Father contend that their due process rights
were violated “when the juvenile court allowed DCFS to proceed
on 	its 	termination 	of 	[parental] 	rights 	petition, 	rather 	than
requiring DCFS to proceed on the underlying abuse/neglect
petition.” “Whether a parent has been afforded adequate due
process is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.” In re S.F.,
2012 UT App 10, ¶ 24, 268 P.3d 831 (quotation simplified).
“Likewise, any interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness.” Id.

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ANALYSIS
¶16 	“The right to raise one’s children is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” In re X.C.H., 2017 UT App 106, ¶ 14, 400
P.3d 	1154 	(quotation 	simplified); 	see 	also 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§ 78A-6-503(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (“Under both the United
States Constitution and the constitution of this state, a parent
possesses a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of the parent’s child.”). “Accordingly, that right
may not be terminated without due process of law.” In re X.C.H.,
2017 UT App 106, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified); see also U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-503(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (“The court
shall provide a fundamentally fair process to a parent if a party
moves to terminate parental rights.”).
¶17 	Mother and Father contend that the State “should have
been 	required 	to 	proceed 	on 	the 	underlying 	abuse/neglect
petition” and that their due process rights were violated when
the juvenile court instead allowed the State to proceed on its
termination petition. Once the State filed its abuse and neglect
petition, the parents contend they then “had a due process right
to an adjudication of the abuse, neglect, and/or dependency
petition . . . , and to a dispositional hearing [thirty] days later.”
They assert that “[t]he dispositional statute clearly contemplates
that there will be a hearing to determine whether reunification
services are appropriate, and if not, then the case proceeds to a
permanency hearing, where a petition to terminate parental
rights could be filed.”3 In other words, the parents contend that,
3. Mother and Father concede that “a parent does not have a
right 	to 	reunification 	services from 	the 	State 	of 	Utah.” See
generally In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955–56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(“Reunification services are a gratuity provided to parents by the
(continued…)

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once the State filed its abuse and neglect petition, the parents
were thereafter entitled to the full panoply of proceedings set
forth in Part 3 of the JCA before the State was permitted to seek
termination of either parent’s parental rights.
¶18 	“When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that [our]
primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent in light of
the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.” Monarrez v.
Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11, 368 P.3d 846 (quotation
simplified). As Utah courts have often noted, “the best evidence
of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute
itself.” Id. (quotation simplified). “Our task . . . is to determine
the meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute
(including, 	particularly, 	the 	structure 	and 	language 	of 	the
statutory 	scheme).” 	Id. 	(quotation 	simplified). 	We 	therefore
“read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret
its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter
and related chapters.” Id. (quotation simplified). Lastly, “we
avoid any interpretation which renders parts or words in a
statute inoperative or superfluous in order to give effect to every
word of a statute.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶19 	We see nothing in the JCA’s plain language prohibiting
the State from bringing a termination proceeding while an
abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding is pending in the
juvenile 	court. 	We 	first 	address 	the 	statutory 	language,
concluding that the statutes’ language permits the State to file a
termination petition at any time during the pendency of an
abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding. We then address the
case law upon which the parents rely.
(…continued)
Legislature, and [parents] thus have no constitutional right to
receive these services.”).

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A
¶20 	The 	JCA 	contains 	multiple 	statutory 	avenues 	for 	the
termination of parental rights. To begin with, Part 3 of the JCA,
governing abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, sets out
a detailed process by which the State may intervene in the
parent-child relationship, work to improve that relationship and
the conditions of the family, and seek to terminate a parent’s
parental 	rights 	if 	necessary. 	See 	generally 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§§ 78A-6-301 to -324 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Pursuant to the
JCA, a juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in a
proceeding 	concerning 	“a 	child 	who 	is 	an 	abused 	child,
neglected child, or dependent child.” Id. § 78A-6-103(1)(b).
¶21 	Under 	Part 	3, 	an 	abuse, 	neglect, 	or 	dependency
proceeding generally begins when, after taking a child into
protective custody, the State files a verified petition alleging that
the child has been abused, neglected, or is dependent.4 See id.
§§ 78A-6-302, -304. The juvenile court is then required to hold a
shelter 	hearing 	pursuant 	to 	section 	78A-6-306 	to 	determine
whether 	continued 	removal 	and 	placement 	of 	the 	child 	in
DCFS’s temporary custody are necessary. See id. § 78A-6-306.
The matter then proceeds, and the court holds an adjudication
hearing. See id. § 78A-6-311. “If, at the adjudication hearing, the
court 	finds, 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence, 	that 	the
allegations contained in the petition are true, it shall conduct a
dispositional hearing.” Id. § 78A-6-311(1). At the dispositional
stage, 	the 	juvenile 	court 	has 	myriad 	dispositional 	choices
available 	to 	it, 	from 	protective 	supervision, 	to 	reunification
services, 	to 	termination 	of 	parental 	rights. 	See 	id.
§§ 78A-6-117(2), -312(1)–(2). 	If 	the 	court 	does 	not 	order
4. Although “any interested person” may file an abuse, neglect,
or dependency petition, for our purposes we refer only to the
State. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-304(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2018).

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reunification 	services, 	a 	permanency 	hearing 	must 	be 	held
within thirty days. Id. §§ 78A-6-312(26), -314(1)(b). If, at the
permanency hearing, the final plan for the child is to proceed
toward 	termination 	of 	parental 	rights, 	“the 	petition 	for
termination of parental rights shall be filed, and a pretrial held,
within [forty-five] calendar days after the permanency hearing.”
Id. § 78A-6-314(9).
¶22 	Notably, section 78A-6-314 provides that nothing in the
section pertaining to the permanency hearing and the final
permanency plan “may be construed to . . . limit or prohibit the
filing of a petition for termination of parental rights by any
party, or a hearing on termination of parental rights, at any time
prior to a permanency hearing.” Id. § 78A-6-314(11)(c). “This
provision 	clearly 	contemplates 	the 	possibility 	that 	if 	a
termination trial is held prior to a permanency hearing and the
parent’s rights are terminated, then the parent may never receive
a permanency hearing.” In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10, ¶ 53, 268
P.3d 831.
¶23 	The State concedes that this process is “the norm” and
that, “[i]n child welfare proceedings initiated by the State, it is
more typical that the proceedings begin with a petition pursuant
to Utah Code [section] 78A-6-304” seeking adjudication of abuse,
neglect, or dependency. But while that process may be “the
norm,” 	we 	agree 	with 	the 	State 	that 	“it 	is 	not 	a 	legal
requirement” 	for 	this 	process 	to 	occur 	before 	terminating
parental rights. In other words, while most termination cases
begin as abuse, neglect, and dependency cases, a termination
proceeding does not necessarily flow from an abuse, neglect, and
dependency proceeding. Nor does a termination proceeding
depend upon a prior adjudication of abuse or neglect.
¶24 	Pursuant 	to 	Utah 	Code 	section 	78A-6-103(1)(f),
juvenile 	courts 	also 	have 	exclusive 	original 	jurisdiction 	in
proceedings concerning “the termination of the legal parent-
child relationship in accordance with Part 5, Termination of
Parental Rights Act, including termination of residual parental

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rights and duties.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(f) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2018).5 Section 78A-6-504 provides that “[a]ny interested
party . . . may file a petition for termination of the parent-child
relationship with regard to a child.” Id. 78A-6-504(1). “When
termination proceedings are initiated under [the Termination of
Parental Rights Act], the [juvenile] court must make two distinct
findings supported by clear and convincing evidence before a
person’s parental 	rights can 	be 	properly terminated.” 	In 	re
Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 480. “First, the
court 	must 	find 	that 	the 	parent 	is 	below 	some 	minimum
threshold of fitness, such as finding that a parent is unfit or
incompetent based on any of the grounds for termination under
section 78A-6-507 of the Utah Code.” In re X.C.H., 2017 UT App
106, ¶ 34, 400 P.3d 1154 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-507(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (listing the grounds
for termination of parental rights and providing that the finding
of a single enumerated ground will support the termination of
parental 	rights). 	Second, 	after 	finding 	at 	least 	one 	of 	the
enumerated grounds, “the court must find that the best interests
and welfare of the child are served by terminating the parents’
parental rights.” In re X.C.H., 2017 UT App 106, ¶ 34 (quotation
simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-506(3) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2018).
¶25 	Mother and Father do not challenge the constitutionality
or statutory procedures set forth under either Part 3 or Part 5 of
the JCA independently. Rather, they assert that due process
5. While juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
consider the termination of the parental rights of parents who
are deemed unfit, pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-112, a
district court has jurisdiction “to terminate parental rights in a
child if the party who filed the petition is seeking to terminate
parental rights in the child for the purpose of facilitating the
adoption 	of 	the 	child.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	78B-6-112(1)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2018).

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prohibits the State from jumping to a termination proceeding
under 	Part 	5, 	while 	an 	adjudication 	of 	abuse, 	neglect, 	or
dependency is proceeding under Part 3. Such a change in course,
the parents argue, deprives them of “the safeguards and due
process” 	provided 	in 	the 	adjudication 	statute. 	We 	are 	not
persuaded. The statutes do not prohibit the State from changing
course and, as we discuss later, infra ¶¶ 39–42, such a turn does
not violate the parents’ due process rights. The plain language of
the applicable statutes simply does not prohibit the State from
filing a petition seeking termination of parental rights while an
abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding is pending in the
juvenile court. Indeed, as previously discussed, section 78A-6-
314 	provides 	that 	nothing 	in 	the 	section 	relating 	to 	the
permanency hearing and the final permanency plan “may be
construed to . . . limit or prohibit the filing of a petition for
termination of parental rights by any party, or a hearing on
termination of parental rights, at any time prior to a permanency
hearing.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(11)(c) (LexisNexis Supp.
2018) (emphasis added). Rather, we agree with the State that the
plain language of the JCA “allows for a termination petition to
be filed at any time [during an abuse, neglect, or dependency
proceeding], or even as a stand-alone action.”
¶26 	Moreover, the JCA provides that juvenile courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over “a child who is an abused
child, neglected child, or dependent child,” as well as “the
termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance
with 	Part 	5, 	Termination 	of 	Parental 	Rights 	Act, 	including
termination of residual parental rights and duties.” Utah Code
Ann. 	§ 	78A-6-103(1)(b), 	(1)(f). 	Here, 	DCFS 	filed 	a 	verified
petition alleging that Child was “abused and neglected.” The
juvenile court held a shelter hearing and placed Child in DCFS’s
temporary 	custody 	“for 	appropriate 	placement.” 	Before
adjudication on the first petition, DCFS filed a second verified
petition 	seeking 	termination 	of 	both 	Mother’s 	and 	Father’s
parental 	rights. 	The 	juvenile 	court 	had 	exclusive 	original
jurisdiction over both petitions, and we agree with the juvenile

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court that the State may elect to proceed with the more final
petition first. Indeed, as the juvenile court observed, “[t]o require
the State to [forgo] alternative jurisdictional theories would
dilute the State’s ‘moral and statutory obligation to step in and
protect children when those children are suffering from neglect
and abuse.’” (Quoting In re J.S., 2017 UT App 167, ¶ 7, 405 P.3d
828 (per curiam).)
¶27 	In 	sum, 	where 	an 	abuse, 	neglect, 	or 	dependency
proceeding is pending, nothing in the plain language of the JCA
prohibits the State from reasserting jurisdiction by filing another
petition seeking termination of parental rights.
B
¶28 	Mother and Father direct our attention to In re S.F., 2012
UT App 10, 268 P.3d 831, for the proposition that the State must
go through all of the statutory child welfare proceedings under
Part 3, once initiated, before proceeding to termination under
Part 5. The parents’ reliance on In re S.F. is misplaced.
¶29 	There, the father’s children were first placed in DCFS’s
protective custody in August 2007, and the juvenile court later
adjudicated the children as neglected. Id. ¶ 2. After twelve
months of reunification services, the juvenile court found that
the father had substantially complied with the treatment plan,
and the court returned custody and guardianship of the children
to the father “subject to protective supervision by DCFS.” Id.
¶¶ 3–4 (quotation simplified). The court also ordered DCFS to
create a new service plan for the father and scheduled a review
hearing for a few months later. Id. ¶ 4. Shortly after the father
entered into the new service plan, police responded to two
separate 	domestic 	violence 	incidents 	at 	his 	home, 	and 	in
November 2008, DCFS filed a petition seeking to have the
children removed from the father’s custody. Id. ¶ 5. The juvenile
court placed the children in DCFS’s temporary custody, having
determined that removal was necessary and in the children’s
best interests. Id. ¶ 7. At the next pretrial hearing, the State filed

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a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, id. ¶ 9, and at
a subsequent hearing, the court denied further reunification
services to the father, see id. ¶¶ 10, 13–14. The case proceeded to
a termination trial, and the court ultimately terminated the
father’s parental rights. Id. ¶ 16.
¶30 	On appeal, the father asserted that the juvenile court
failed “to hold statutorily-mandated child welfare proceedings”
after his children were removed for the second time and that the
juvenile court therefore exceeded its “jurisdiction and violated
his due process rights.” See id. ¶ 24. More specifically, he argued
that when his children were returned to DCFS’s custody in
November 2008, the juvenile court was required “to adjudicate
the [c]hildren again in order to obtain jurisdiction over the
[c]hildren.” Id.
¶31 	This court first determined that, although the juvenile
court had returned legal custody of the children to the father in
August 2008, the court had retained its dispositional authority
over the children as evidenced by the court’s order, which
anticipated 	continued 	protective 	supervision 	by 	DCFS 	and
required the father to enter into a new service plan. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.
We determined that “as long as the juvenile court does not
dismiss the case or terminate jurisdiction, 	the court retains
dispositional authority over the [c]hildren because there has
been an initial legal determination that those [c]hildren are
abused, neglected, or dependent.” Id. ¶ 34. “In contrast, where
the 	juvenile 	court 	makes 	a 	ruling 	incompatible 	with 	a
continuation of its authority, the court’s jurisdiction ends.” Id.
Because the juvenile court “did not affirmatively renounce its
jurisdiction or enter any ruling incompatible with its continuing
authority,” 	the 	juvenile 	court 	retained 	jurisdiction 	over 	the
children. See id. ¶¶ 35–36.
¶32 	Regarding the father’s argument that the juvenile court
was required to adjudicate the children as neglected again, this
court concluded that the juvenile court was not required to
restart the child welfare proceedings in November 2008. Id. ¶ 39.

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Observing that “the juvenile court did not amend the children’s
status as neglected [or] surrender its jurisdiction over the family”
in August 2008 when it restored legal custody to the father, we
determined that the court retained dispositional authority over
the children and could therefore return the children to DCFS’s
custody in November 2008. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44. As a result, the court
was not required to restart the child welfare proceedings after
the 	children’s 	second 	removal. 	That 	is, 	the 	court 	was 	not
required to hold a shelter hearing or readjudicate the children as
neglected. See id. ¶ 48.
¶33 	Relevant to this appeal, this court also observed, in dicta,
that under a different set of circumstances—for example, if the
father “had abided by the service plan until the court had
terminated child supervision services and its jurisdiction, and
only then had engaged in domestic violence in front of the
[c]hildren”—“the situation would be entirely different.” Id. ¶ 43.
We stated that “[i]n such a case, where the court has terminated
its jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court Act procedures would begin
anew.” Id. (emphasis added). We then set forth a hypothetical
sequence of events that would occur in the new proceedings:
After taking the [c]hildren into protective custody,
the State would file a petition introducing new
allegations 	of 	neglect 	pursuant 	to 	Utah 	Code
section 78A-6-304(1)(b). The court would then hold
a shelter hearing pursuant to section 78A-6-306, the
result of which might be to remove the children
and place them in DCFS’s temporary legal custody.
After 	that, 	the 	matter 	would 	proceed 	to
adjudication.
See id. (quotation simplified).
¶34 	The parents assert that In re S.F. demonstrates that “where
new grounds for removal occur after termination of jurisdiction”
in a previous case, the juvenile court is required to “restart the
child welfare proceedings.” Relying on the sequence of events

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described in In re S.F., the parents assert that they were entitled
to “an adjudication of the abuse, neglect, and/or dependency
petition . . . , and to a dispositional hearing 30 days later,” at
which hearing the juvenile court could have determined whether
reunification services were appropriate. See id. ¶ 43. We are not
persuaded.
¶35 	In In re S.F., this court was concerned with the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction over the children, not with setting forth a
mandatory sequence of events that must occur in all child
welfare proceedings before a party can seek termination of
parental rights. Specifically, we observed that “where the court
has 	terminated 	its 	jurisdiction, 	the 	Juvenile 	Court 	Act
procedures would begin anew,” which would involve the filing
of a new petition. See id. But as the juvenile court in this case
correctly observed, In re S.F. does not “limit how the [c]ourt’s
jurisdiction is reanimated.” The juvenile court’s jurisdiction may
be 	reanimated 	with 	a 	petition 	alleging 	abuse, 	neglect, 	or
dependency, or with a petition seeking termination of parental
rights. 	Our 	legislature 	has 	given 	juvenile 	courts 	exclusive
original jurisdiction over both types of proceedings. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(b), (1)(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
Here, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over both the State’s
abuse and neglect petition and its termination petition. Thus, as
previously discussed, the only issue was deciding on which
petition to proceed, and the State opted to proceed on the
termination petition. As such, the statutory procedures relating
to abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings in Part 3 of the
JCA had no bearing on the termination proceedings.
¶36 	Our conclusion is supported by this court’s decision in In
re A.K., 2012 UT App 232, 285 P.3d 772. In that case, the daughter
had been removed from her mother’s custody twice. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Both times, the daughter was returned to the mother’s custody
with protective supervision services. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. DCFS later filed
a joint petition for custody and termination of the mother’s
parental rights. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The juvenile court ordered removal of

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both the daughter and mother’s infant son (daughter’s third
removal and son’s first removal), granted custody to DCFS, and
set a discovery schedule for the termination hearing. Id. ¶ 7. The
court ultimately terminated the mother’s parental rights. Id. ¶ 10.
¶37 	On appeal, the mother asserted that “certain statutory
procedures were not followed after the final removal of her
children” 	and 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	therefore 	lacked
“jurisdiction to hear the State’s petition to terminate her parental
rights.” Id. ¶ 11. More specifically, she asserted that the juvenile
court “failed to hold a shelter hearing, an adjudication, and a
dispositional 	hearing,” 	and 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	was
“deprived of jurisdiction by its failure to strictly comply with the
statutory procedures for the abuse, neglect, and dependency
proceedings.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
¶38 	This court disagreed, observing that juvenile courts have
jurisdiction over proceedings concerning “‘a child who is an
abused child, neglected child, or dependent child,’” id. ¶ 16
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(c) (Supp. 2012)), and
that juvenile courts also have a separate statutory basis for
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning “‘the termination of the
legal 	parent-child 	relationship 	in 	accordance 	with 	Part 	5,
Termination of Parental Rights Act,’” id. ¶ 17 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(g) (Supp. 2012)). Consequently, this
court concluded that, “[e]ven if the alleged defects deprived the
court 	of 	jurisdiction 	over 	abuse, 	neglect, 	and 	dependency
proceedings,” the juvenile court “clearly had jurisdiction over
the termination proceedings . . . pursuant to subsection (1)(g).”
Id. In other words, any jurisdictional defects in the underlying
adjudication 	were 	remedied 	by 	the 	termination 	proceeding,
which provided the juvenile court with an independent grant of
jurisdiction.6 See id. Here, the State initially filed an abuse,
6. 	The 	mother 	in 	In re 	A.K. 	also 	asserted that 	the alleged
procedural defects violated her due process rights. In re A.K.,
(continued…)

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neglect, or dependency petition. Switching course, the State filed
a separate petition seeking termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights. The State’s new petition under Part 5 of the JCA
called upon a separate grant of jurisdiction given to the juvenile
court. Consequently, the State’s abandonment of the Part 3
neglect adjudication proceedings did not impact its ability to
proceed to termination of parental rights pursuant to a Part 5
petition. See id.
¶39 	Mother 	and 	Father 	do 	not 	challenge 	the 	statutory
procedures set forth under either Part 3 (abuse, neglect, or
dependency adjudication) or Part 5 (termination of parental
rights) 	independently. 	Rather, 	they 	assert 	that 	due 	process
requires 	the 	State 	to 	follow 	through 	with 	the 	dispositional
portion of Part 3, once that adjudication process is initiated,
before 	changing 	course 	and 	commencing 	termination
proceedings under Part 5. We have already concluded that the
statutes do not prohibit the State from altering course in this
way, supra ¶ 25, and we are not persuaded that the State doing
so in this case infringed on the parents’ due process rights.
¶40 	“Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that
a particular issue is being considered by a court and must be
given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that
issue before decision.” In re M.J., 2011 UT App 398, ¶ 51, 266
P.3d 850 (quotation simplified). “Parties are deprived of due
process when they are not properly informed of the nature of a
proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to
(…continued)
2012 UT App 232, ¶¶ 12, 18, 285 P.3d 772. However, she failed to
“adequately 	demonstrate[] 	what 	the 	alleged 	procedural
deficiency was or how, under the facts of [the] case, any alleged
deficiency 	violated 	her 	due 	process 	rights.” 	Id. 	¶ 	20.
Consequently, she failed to carry her burden of persuasion on
her due process claim. Id. ¶ 36.

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allow preparation.” In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11, 86 P.3d
745. 	“Judicial 	and 	administrative 	proceedings 	following 	the
State’s removal of children from their home are no exception to
this fundamental principle.” Id. ¶ 12.
¶41 	Here, once the State filed its termination petition, the
juvenile court scheduled a pretrial hearing on the petition and
set a date for the termination trial. See supra ¶ 5. Both parents
had proper notice of both hearings and an opportunity to argue
their positions at both hearings. See supra ¶¶ 5–8. In addition,
each 	parent 	was 	assisted 	by 	legal 	counsel 	throughout 	the
termination proceedings. See supra ¶ 4. The fact that the parents
were ultimately unsuccessful in their arguments does not mean
that they did not receive the due process to which they were
entitled.
¶42 	As 	a 	general 	consideration, 	we 	note 	that 	the 	State’s
decision regarding which cases should proceed through the
statutory 	abuse, 	neglect, 	and 	dependency 	proceedings 	and
which 	cases 	should 	proceed 	directly, 	or 	more 	swiftly, 	to
termination proceedings does seem somewhat arbitrary. But the
State’s decisions in that regard fall squarely within its use of
executive discretion. “It is not a function of the courts to review
the exercise of executive discretion,” see State v. Garcia, 504 P.2d
1015, 1015–16 (Utah 1972), and given the plain language of our
current statutory scheme, we cannot conclude that it was a
violation of due process for the State and DCFS to deviate from
the usual sequence of events in abuse, neglect, and dependency
proceedings and to proceed on the termination petition instead.
¶43 	The Guardian ad Litem is correct that what the parents
seek in this case is “a legislative remedy, not a judicial one.”
“The policy of the law in this instance has been set by the
legislature, as is its responsibility.” See In re S.L., 1999 UT App
390, ¶ 56, 995 P.2d 17 (Wilkins, J., concurring). That policy allows
the 	State 	to 	determine 	how 	to 	proceed 	in 	child 	welfare
proceedings. If this is not what the legislature intended, then it
should consider amending the relevant portions of the JCA to

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limit the circumstances under which the State may abandon
pending abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings in favor of
termination proceedings.7
CONCLUSION
¶44 	We conclude that the State was not required to see its
abuse, neglect, and dependency petition through to its end
before the State could file and proceed on a separate termination
petition. 	Both 	parents 	had 	notice 	of, 	and 	a 	meaningful
opportunity to participate in, the termination proceedings, and
we therefore conclude that they each received the due process to
which they were entitled. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile
court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
7. Regarding the juvenile court’s grounds for termination of the
parents’ parental rights, Mother and Father both assert that their
“only argument . . . in response to each of the grounds for
termination of parental rights [is] that [they were] not afforded
an opportunity to correct these problems by the juvenile court in
violation of due process.” They concede that “the due process
argument is key to the entirety of [their] appeal[].” Because we
have concluded that Mother’s and Father’s due process rights
were not violated, we need not address the court’s grounds for
termination.