State v. Cassidy

2026 UT App 125
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
DONALD C ASSIDY ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240585-CA
Filed August 6, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen
No. 191402087
Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jonathan S. Bauer,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES R YAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Donald Cassidy was convicted of raping and forcibly
sodomizing his fiancée’s underage daughter, Stephanie.1 Cassidy
appeals, arguing that the inculpatory statements he made during
a police interview were taken in violation of his Miranda rights
because he unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right
to counsel. He also asserts that the district court erroneously
barred his expert from testifying at trial about what the words and
syntax he used may have meant when he apparently confessed to
the charged crimes in a phone call with Stephanie and during his
interview. Finally, he avers that the district court made a number
1. A pseudonym.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 125
of other erroneous evidentiary rulings. We reject all of Cassidy’s
arguments and affirm his convictions.
BACKGROUND2
The Assault
¶2 	In September 2018, Cassidy was living in Provo, Utah, with
his children, his fiancée (Mother), and Mother’s sixteen-year-old
daughter, Stephanie. On September 8, Stephanie and her friend
(Friend) took LSD at Friend’s house. That afternoon, the two went
to Cassidy’s house, where they drank beer with another minor.
Later in the evening—while Mother was working and not at
home—Cassidy offered Stephanie methamphetamine, and the
two went to Cassidy’s room and smoked some of it together. After
that, Stephanie smoked some more methamphetamine, this time
with Friend, and then spent more time with Friend and others
before telling them that she was going to bed. She prepared for
bed by putting “a tampon in” because she “was at the end of [her]
period” and “didn’t know for sure if [she] was off of it.” She then
went to Cassidy’s bedroom, where Cassidy was already in bed,
and lay on his bed and watched television.
¶3 	While Stephanie was trying to fall asleep, Cassidy began
fondling her breasts and her groin. Stephanie then pretended to
be asleep, and Cassidy pulled aside her underwear and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Although Cassidy temporarily stopped
the assault, he then performed oral sex on her. He then reinserted
his penis into Stephanie’s vagina. At some point, Stephanie
“gained enough courage to pretend [she] was moving to get
2. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly. We present
conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised
on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (cleaned
up).

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 125
comfortable” in order to make it seem like she was having a
“disturbing dream.” In response to these movements, Cassidy
“got off” of Stephanie “slowly.” Cassidy then fell asleep in the bed
as Stephanie tried, but struggled, to fall asleep herself.
¶4 	The next morning, Stephanie went to the bathroom to “dig
out” the tampon, which had been pushed painfully deep inside of
her during the assault. She then sent Friend messages on Snapchat
asking him to come over to Cassidy’s house and “bring anything
that could get [her] drunk or high.” From the tenor of the
messages, Friend could tell that Stephanie was “distress[ed].”
When Friend arrived at Cassidy’s house, Stephanie told him what
Cassidy had done to her the prior night. The assault, however,
was not reported to law enforcement at that time.
The Allegations and the Pretext Call
¶5 	The next year, Stephanie was living in foster care when she
reported the incident to her foster mother, who in turn reported
the allegation to the police. A detective (Detective) investigating
the allegations facilitated and recorded a pretext phone call
between Stephanie and Cassidy.
¶6 	Stephanie began the call by asking Cassidy whether he
remembered when they “smoked meth” together. While Cassidy
initially denied remembering the incident, he then said, “Okay,
what’s your point?” Stephanie answered, “Do you remember
when I was trying to sleep and you said we’d never talk about it
again 	and 	you 	had 	sex 	with 	my 	body?” 	Cassidy 	initially
responded, “Okay, say that again? And you know, we shouldn’t
be talking about this.” After Cassidy said that Child Protective
Services (CPS) was “watching” him and that he had an upcoming
drug test, Stephanie stated that she didn’t care about what “CPS
says or anything” and that she just needed to tell Cassidy that she
“felt attacked that day when [he] did those things to [her].” After
a lengthy pause, Cassidy responded, “I knew you were going to
do this to me.” Then, in response to Stephanie’s request that

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 125
Cassidy “just tell [her] that [he] did it,” Cassidy stated, “No,
because I didn’t, and I’m not going to admit to something . . . I
didn’t do.” However, in response to Stephanie’s later statement
that “it wasn’t consensual,” Cassidy said, “I know. But you know
what? My whole life is ruined.” Stephanie then began asking him
whether he had just admitted that he knew the sex hadn’t been
consensual when Cassidy interrupted her and said, “No.” Later
in the call, Stephanie again asked Cassidy why he couldn’t confess
so she could “get over it.” Cassidy responded, “Because it’s going
to ruin me, [Mother], all the kids, you, everything, okay?” Finally,
in response to Cassidy’s accusation that she was trying to “screw
up” his life, Stephanie stated, “Well, if I tell you that, would you
tell me that you fucking raped me?” Cassidy responded, “I
didn’t.”
The Interrogation
¶7 	Following the pretext call, Detective and another officer
arrested Cassidy at his workplace and took him to the police
station for interrogation. At the outset of the interrogation,
Detective told Cassidy that he had “some questions” for him.
Detective said that before they could proceed, he had to read
Cassidy his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Cassidy twice indicated that he understood his rights. Detective
then presented Cassidy with a form setting forth his Miranda
rights and asked Cassidy to sign it if he was willing to waive those
rights and speak with him and answer some questions. While
Cassidy was reading the form, Cassidy stated, “I’ll answer what
questions I can because I don’t know why I’m here. And I will—I
do want a lawyer.” Immediately after he said that he wanted a
lawyer, 	however, 	Cassidy 	signed 	the 	waiver 	form, 	which
specifically stated, “I am willing to make a statement and answer
questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time.” Noticing the
contradiction between Cassidy’s words and the waiver form that
he had just signed, Detective explained, “You just said you want
a lawyer. If that’s what your answer is, then I actually won’t be

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 125
able to . . . ask you my questions without you having a lawyer.”
Cassidy responded, “You can ask me your questions, and if I feel
like my rights are being not, whatever, then I will stop you and
ask for a lawyer.” Detective then clarified, “So, currently, you’re
willing to speak with me without your lawyer, but if you change
your mind, you’ll let me know? . . . Is that what you’re saying?”
Cassidy answered “yes” to both questions.
¶8 	At the beginning of the interrogation, Cassidy denied that
anything 	sexual 	happened 	between 	him 	and 	Stephanie. 	He
speculated that if anything had happened, it was that Stephanie
had touched him inappropriately while he was asleep. Detective
then lied to Cassidy, telling him that the police had found
Cassidy’s DNA on the underwear Stephanie wore on the night of
the incident. Confronting this falsity, Cassidy stated, “I remember
one time she was laying in my bed, and she was rubbing . . . her
butt up against me. And I’d fallen asleep. And I don’t know if
maybe it made me hard, and she could have put it in her or I don’t
know. 	But 	I 	don’t 	remember 	anything.” 	He 	stated 	further,
“Whatever happened was not against her will because she was
doing it. . . . She was just rubbing up against me, and I had fallen
asleep, you know? And . . . like I said, I don’t know if I’d gotten a
hard-on or not because I passed out.”
¶9 	Cassidy was then taken to the county jail and was charged
with two counts of rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and one
count of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance.
The Pretrial Proceedings
¶10 	Before trial, Cassidy moved to suppress the interrogation,
arguing that Detective violated his Fifth Amendment rights
because 	his 	waiver 	was 	not 	knowingly, 	voluntarily, 	and
intelligently 	made. 	The 	district 	court 	denied 	the 	motion,
concluding, based on the totality of the circumstances, that
Cassidy understood and knew his rights before he waived them.

State v. Cassidy
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The court found particularly important that Cassidy took “some
time” to “read through” the waiver form, stated multiple times
that “he knew his rights,” and indicated that he would stop the
questioning if he did not “want to answer another question.”
¶11 	Cassidy also sought to introduce evidence under rules 608
and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to undermine Stephanie’s
credibility. Cassidy claimed such evidence included—among
other things—Stephanie’s (1) text messages in which she recanted
the allegations underlying the charges in this case, (2) history of
practicing witchcraft to “hex” her biological father, (3) hearing
voices telling her to kill others, (4) admittedly false accusations
that her brothers had sexually abused her, and (5) prior juvenile
adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon. The district court
excluded the juvenile assault adjudication under rule 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, the court found that the
adjudication’s probative value was “super low” because it was
not for sexual assault and that its potential for unfair prejudice
was “very high.” The court determined, however, that evidence
of Stephanie recanting could “definitely come in . . . on cross.”
Still, the court limited much of the other evidence, seemingly
under rule 403. However, the court also effectively reserved
judgment on some of the evidence, noting that some decisions
about admissibility were “going to have to wait until trial.”
¶12 	For its part, the State moved to exclude testimony from
Cassidy’s 	linguistics 	expert 	regarding 	whether 	Cassidy’s
statements during the pretext call and interrogation actually
constituted admissions of guilt. The court determined that the
expert’s testimony would go to Stephanie’s credibility, which the
court thought was “a huge problem.” The court also found it
problematic for an expert to “say how the jury should interpret
terms” because the jurors were “to decide on their own . . . the
meaning of the terms that were used based on all the surrounding
circumstances in this case.” For these reasons, the court barred the
expert from testifying.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 125
The Trial
¶13 	At trial, the State called Stephanie and Detective, among
other witnesses, and they testified to the facts recited above. The
State introduced the recordings of the pretext call and police
interrogation through Stephanie’s and Detective’s testimony.
¶14 	Stephanie 	also 	testified 	that 	Mother 	had 	tried 	to
“manipulate” her to get the State to drop the charges. As part of
these efforts, Stephanie claimed, Mother pressured her to submit
a letter to the State in which she recanted the allegations.
According to Stephanie, Mother had actually written the letter.
The State also presented text messages that Stephanie had sent to
Mother, 	one 	of 	which 	stated, 	“It 	didn’t 	fucking 	happen.
Screenshot that. [Cassidy] did not rape me. I was on acid and was
delusional. I was with [others] all night long.” In response to the
State’s 	question 	about 	why 	she 	had 	written 	that 	message,
Stephanie said, “I was fed up with her . . . mind games. So I gave
in and I snapped, in a way.”
¶15 	After Stephanie testified, Detective took the stand. During
cross-examination, Cassidy’s counsel asked Detective where in
the police interview Cassidy had “admit[ted] to something.”
Detective responded that there were “several points in the
interview” 	where 	Cassidy 	had 	admitted 	to 	something. 	In
response to counsel’s follow-up question asking him where in the
call Cassidy had “admit[ted] to the rapes,” Detective stated,
So the . . . first point where he admits to rape was
where he actually blames the victim and says there
was . . . one time in my bed where she started
rubbing her butt up against me, and I don’t know if
I got hard or something, and that she may have
slipped it in. He admits to that.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 125
To this, Cassidy’s counsel asked, “Isn’t that a lot more speculation
than admission? . . . This might have happened?” Detective
responded, “No, that’s an admission.”
¶16 	After the State rested, the defense called a number of
witnesses. Some of those witnesses had been in Cassidy’s home
for the entire night of the incident. They testified that Stephanie
had either been in her room the entire night or had not entered
Cassidy’s room. Mother—who had been working and was not at
Cassidy’s home that night—also testified, stating that Cassidy has
erectile dysfunction, which prevents him from “get[ting] an
erection.” When the State, on cross-examination, attempted to
confront Mother with text messages suggesting that she tried to
dissuade Stephanie from cooperating with the investigators in
this case, Mother became nonresponsive and the State ended its
questioning. For his part, Cassidy elected not to testify.
¶17 	The jury convicted Cassidy on all counts.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶18 	Cassidy appeals, raising three issues. First, he argues
that he unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to
counsel 	under 	Miranda 	and 	that 	the 	district 	court 	should
therefore have granted his motion to suppress the custodial
interview. “We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress for correctness, and we review its factual findings in
support of its ruling for clear error.” State v. Qayum, 2025 UT App
178, ¶ 29, 582 P.3d 1245 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 47 (Utah
2026).
¶19 	Second, Cassidy maintains that the district court abused its
discretion when it barred his linguistics expert from testifying at
trial. “The trial court has wide discretion in determining the
admissibility 	of 	expert 	testimony, 	and 	such 	decisions 	are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 125
standard, we will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.”
See, e.g., State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794 (cleaned up).
We nonetheless review the challenged ruling “to ensure that no
mistakes of law” affected how the court exercised its discretion.
Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Center, 2010 UT 59,
¶ 5, 242 P.3d 762 (cleaned up).
¶20 	Finally, Cassidy asserts that the court abused its discretion
by excluding Stephanie’s prior assault adjudication and various
other evidence that may have been relevant to her credibility. We
review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998) (rule 403); State
v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 18, 402 P.3d 91 (rule 404(b));
State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ¶ 31, 352 P.3d 107 (rule 609).
ANALYSIS
I. The Motion to Suppress
¶21 	Cassidy argues first that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress, asserting that he invoked his right to
counsel and the interrogation should therefore have stopped
under Miranda. Because the record demonstrates that Cassidy did
not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke that right, we are
not persuaded.3
3. The State argues that Cassidy did not preserve his argument
because, in the proceedings below, he failed to “alert the district
court to any concerns that all questioning should have ceased
based on his oral statement of invocation.” Because we can easily
resolve this issue on the merits in favor of the party arguing that
it wasn’t preserved, we elect to exercise our discretion to do so
“without addressing preservation.” See State v. Kitches, 2021 UT
App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 125
¶22 	“Where an individual is subject to custodial interrogation
and not given Miranda warnings, any statement made by that
individual is inadmissible at trial.” State v. Jessop, 2023 UT App
140, ¶ 38, 540 P.3d 713 (cleaned up). But a suspect may waive
Miranda rights if he or she does so “voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.” State v. Qayum, 2025 UT App 178, ¶ 69, 582 P.3d
1245 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 47 (Utah 2026). Even after
waiving Miranda and answering the interviewer’s questions,
however, a suspect may invoke the right to counsel at any time,
and—assuming 	the 	invocation 	is 	unequivocal 	and
unambiguous—the interviewer must stop the interrogation. See,
e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (“If the suspect
effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda
warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. But
if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he
is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made
available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” (cleaned
up)). With limited exceptions not at issue here, the State “may not
use any statements made by the accused taken in violation of
Miranda’s protections.” Qayum, 2025 UT App 178, ¶ 69 (cleaned
up).
¶23 	Cassidy contends that before he signed the waiver form, he
unequivocally and unambiguously indicated that he was willing
to answer Detective’s questions but that he also wanted a lawyer
present. Invoking Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), Cassidy
argues that Detective rejected his “legitimate request” to counsel
and that he was entitled to have counsel present during the
interrogation. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court
explained that “when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that 	right 	cannot 	be 	established 	by 	showing 	only 	that 	he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even
if he has been advised of his rights.” Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
And once the suspect has “expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel,” he cannot be subjected “to further

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 125
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id.
¶24 	Edwards does not offer Cassidy the sanctuary he seeks.
Invoking the right to counsel under Miranda requires a suspect to
“unambiguously request counsel in such a way that the desire to
have counsel present is sufficiently clear.” Qayum, 2025 UT App
178, ¶ 64 (cleaned up). If the “suspect makes a reference to an
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the
questioning may continue.” Id. ¶ 65 (cleaned up). That said,
“when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it
will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to
clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney.” Davis, 512
U.S. at 461.
¶25 	Under the facts here, Cassidy’s request for counsel was
ambiguous and equivocal. In a vacuum, his statement that he did
“want a lawyer” would certainly constitute an unambiguous and
unequivocal request. But the statement wasn’t made in a vacuum.
Instead, Cassidy uttered the words while he was reading the
waiver form, which specifically stated, “I do not want a lawyer at
this time.” Specifically, right before he signed the form, he stated,
“I’ll answer what questions I can because I don’t know why I’m
here. And I will—I do want a lawyer.”
¶26 	Detective recognized the contradiction between Cassidy’s
words and the waiver form. For this reason, Detective then sought
to clarify whether Cassidy in fact wanted a lawyer, a clarification
that is acceptable—and often affirmatively encouraged—under
the law. See id. Specifically, Detective explained, “You just said
you want a lawyer. If that’s what your answer is, then I actually
won’t be able to . . . ask you my questions without you having a
lawyer.” 	And 	Cassidy 	responded, 	“You 	can 	ask 	me 	your

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 125
questions, and if I feel like my rights are being not, whatever, then
I will stop you and ask for a lawyer.” Detective then clarified, “So,
currently, you’re willing to speak with me without your lawyer,
but if you change your mind, you’ll let me know? . . . Is that what
you’re saying?” Cassidy responded “yes” to both questions.
¶27 	Pointing to this exchange, Cassidy asserts that “Detective
tried to talk [him] out of his request for a lawyer by falsely
claiming that [he] could not both ask and answer questions and
have the aid of counsel.” At oral argument, Cassidy’s appellate
counsel contended,
[The government] needs to follow Miranda as it’s
written. It’s written very precisely for this purpose
so that they . . . aren’t putting defendants in the bind
of having to choose between their rights. They’re
presented with all of their rights, not in this . . . one
against the other perspective. You have the right to
remain silent. You have the right to have an attorney
here with you while you talk to us. [Miranda] does
not say you have the right to an attorney, but if you
ask for one, we won’t talk to you. . . . It makes Mr.
Cassidy decide, do I want to talk or do I want to
have a lawyer here? And he has to weigh those
against each other after he’s already invoked.
In short, appellate counsel argues that in response to Cassidy’s
clear invocation of the right to both answer questions and have an
attorney 	present, 	Detective 	presented 	Cassidy 	with 	a 	false
dichotomy—i.e., answer questions or have an attorney present—
and that his doing so violated Cassidy’s constitutional rights.
However, the trouble with Cassidy’s argument is that (1) Cassidy
did not clearly state that he wanted to talk but only with an
attorney present and (2) Detective did not respond to Cassidy’s
statement with a false dichotomy.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 125
¶28 	First, immediately after he indicated his willingness to
answer the questions he could while stating that he wanted a
lawyer, Cassidy signed a written waiver (which he appeared to
have been reading prior to signing) that said, “I am willing to
make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer
at this time.” Cassidy’s oral statement and his contemporaneous
written waiver were plainly at odds. His oral statement conveyed
that he would answer questions but only with an attorney
present. By contrast, his written waiver conveyed that he was
presently willing to speak with Detective without an attorney.
This 	ambiguity 	justified 	Detective’s 	subsequent 	attempt 	to
ascertain Cassidy’s intent.
¶29 	Second, Detective sought to ascertain that intent by stating,
“You just said you want a lawyer. If that’s what your answer is,
then I actually won’t be able to . . . ask you my questions without
you having a lawyer.” Contrary to appellate counsel’s assertion,
this statement did not present the false dichotomy that Cassidy’s
only options were to answer questions or to have an attorney.
Rather, it plainly implied a scenario where Detective would be
able to ask Cassidy questions with a lawyer present.
¶30 	Under 	these 	circumstances, 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	in
Detective’s shoes “would have understood only that [Cassidy]
might be invoking the right to counsel,” so Detective was free to
continue the interrogation without counsel present. See Qayum,
2025 UT App 178, ¶ 64 (cleaned up). Cassidy pushes back, arguing
that he “possessed the form for a total of 24 seconds,” which,
“excluding the Provo Police logo and the witness signature lines,
contain[ed] 181 words.” This would have required him to read
approximately 7.5 words per second to read through the entire
form, which he correctly states is “fast.”4 More broadly, Cassidy
4. At oral argument, the point was made that after Cassidy
indicated he wanted counsel, he placed his left hand over part of
(continued…)

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 125
again overlooks the context in which the alleged invocation was
made. As the district court noted in the waiver context, Cassidy
specifically stated at least twice that he understood his rights. And
his remarks before he signed the form—when considered in
tandem with his statement after he signed that he would stop the
questioning if he felt like his rights were “being not, whatever”—
strongly 	suggest 	he 	knew 	that 	he 	had 	a 	right 	to 	counsel.
Consequently, his contention that he didn’t understand this right
when he signed the waiver form seems empty. And given
Cassidy’s repeated statements that he understood his rights and
his signing a waiver of those rights in front of Detective after he
was given an opportunity to read the waiver reasonably led
Detective 	to 	perceive 	an 	ambiguity 	between 	Cassidy’s 	oral
invocation of the right to counsel and his contemporaneous
written waiver of that right.
¶31 	In summary, the circumstances under which Cassidy told
Detective that he wanted a lawyer make clear that he did not
invoke his right to counsel in an unambiguous and unequivocal
way because (1) when he made the request, he signed a form
specifically waiving his right to counsel and (2) he confirmed that
he was willing to speak with Detective without a lawyer present.
For these reasons, the district court properly denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the custodial interrogation.
II. The Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
¶32 	Cassidy argues next that the district court erroneously
granted the State’s motion to exclude his linguistics expert from
testifying about the pretext call and the police interview. He
the waiver form and, in so doing, may have obscured the
language regarding the waiver of a right to counsel. We have
reviewed the interrogation footage and the document, and it
appears unlikely that Cassidy’s hand had actually obscured the
relevant language.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 125
maintains 	that 	the 	expert 	would 	have 	used 	“conversation
analysis” to aid the jury in its determination of “how Cassidy
understood the pretext call, how he understood Stephanie’s
specific questions and statements, [Cassidy’s] frames of reference,
and 	which 	interpretations 	are 	best 	supported 	by 	Cassidy’s
responses in the custodial interrogation.” And he argues the error
was harmful because the jury heard testimony from Detective that
some 	of 	Cassidy’s 	statements 	during 	the 	police 	interview
constituted admissions. In response, the State argues first that
“[t]here is no way for Cassidy to establish error or prejudice on
appeal because he failed to put [the] expert’s reports into the
appellate record.” On the merits, the State contends that the
linguistics expert’s testimony “would not have helped the jury
evaluate the plain-English pretext call and interview” and that
Cassidy has not shown harmful error “because the jury could
make its own assessment of his recorded statements and the
extent to which they corroborated Stephanie’s testimony.” We
first assess the State’s inadequate record argument and conclude
that the record on appeal is plainly adequate to reach the merits.
On the merits, however, we are not persuaded that the district
court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s testimony.
A. 	The Adequacy of the Record
¶33 	The State spends the bulk of its brief on this issue arguing
that Cassidy has not presented us with an adequate record on
appeal 	that 	would 	enable 	us 	to 	review 	whether 	the 	court
erroneously barred the linguistics expert from testifying at trial.
Specifically, the State contends that Cassidy should have included
the expert’s reports in the record and that his failure to do so
should keep us from reaching the merits. We disagree.
¶34 	Under our rules of appellate procedure, “[t]he record on
appeal 	consists 	of 	the 	documents 	and 	exhibits 	filed 	in 	or
considered by the trial court, including the presentence report in
criminal matters, and the transcript of proceedings, if any.” Utah

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 125
R. App. P. 11(a). “The burden is upon the appellant to provide an
adequate record for review, and without an adequate record, we
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.” Gorostieta
v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 34, 17 P.3d 1110. Cassidy has met that
burden here.
¶35 	Because Cassidy seeks review of the district court’s ruling
on the motion to exclude, we must consider what the court had
before it when it ruled on the motion. See Utah R. App. P. 11(a)
(requiring that the record include “the documents and exhibits
filed in or considered by the trial court” (emphasis added)). The
record suggests that neither the State’s motion to exclude nor
Cassidy’s opposition included the expert’s reports as exhibits.
And the State does not argue that the reports were before the
court. Most importantly, the court did not purport to base its
ruling on the reports. The court instead appears to have relied on
a proffer or descriptions of the anticipated testimony in the
written briefing and oral argument. And the briefing and the
transcripts from the oral argument do appear in the record.
Consequently, the record is sufficient for us to address the merits
of Cassidy’s argument. See, e.g., State v. Bridgewaters, 2025 UT App
184, ¶ 26 n.5, 585 P.3d 73 (rejecting the State’s assertion on appeal
that the defendant failed to produce an adequate record when the
record included the relevant transcripts), cert. granted, 591 P.3d
746 (Utah 2026). For these reasons, we disagree with the State’s
inadequate record argument.
B. 	The Merits
¶36 	On 	the 	merits, 	Cassidy 	argues 	that 	the 	“need 	for 	a
linguistics expert became clear when the district court determined
that 	[he] 	waived 	Miranda” 	rights 	and 	that 	“the 	custodial
interrogation would be admitted at trial.” He contends that the
court abused its discretion in excluding his expert’s testimony
because the court incorrectly determined that the testimony (1)
would have gone to the credibility of witnesses and thereby

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 125
impermissibly invaded the jury’s province and (2) would not have
been helpful to the jury because the jurors could “decide on their
own . . . the meaning of the terms that were used on all the
surrounding circumstances in this case.”
¶37 	Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows “a witness
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education” to “testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a) (emphasis added).
“Thus, under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to
the admission of any expert evidence is whether, on balance, the
evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.” State v. Campos, 2013
UT App 213, ¶ 75, 309 P.3d 1160 (cleaned up). Although district
courts have considerable discretion on this front, if we determine
that the court erroneously interpreted rule 702 or committed
another mistake of law when it granted the motion to exclude the
expert’s testimony, then it “did not act within the limits of
reasonability, and we will not defer to” the ruling. See Eskelson ex
rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Center, 2010 UT 59, ¶ 5, 242 P.3d
762. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined that the expert’s
testimony would not be helpful. Consequently, we can dispose of
the issue on the court’s second basis for excluding the expert’s
testimony and need not address the first. See, e.g., Brady v. Park,
2019 UT 16, ¶ 7, 445 P.3d 395 (declining to address one argument
when the court’s resolution of another was dispositive of the
underlying issue).
¶38 	Cassidy argues that the court should have admitted his
linguistics expert’s testimony under State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72,
356 P.3d 1258. He claims that the case stands for the broad
proposition 	that 	“lawyers 	and 	judges 	. 	. 	. 	professionally
hyperfocus 	on 	vocabulary 	and 	sentence 	structure” 	and 	are
nonetheless “incapable of expertly defining words and phrases

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 125
. . . and 	need 	expert 	guidance.” 	From 	this, 	he 	maintains, 	it
necessarily follows that “a jury would benefit from a primer on
linguistic analysis during a multiple rape trial.” But as the State
correctly suggests, the only language from Rasabout that could
plausibly be relevant to Cassidy’s argument centered on a dispute
over whether “corpus linguistics” was an appropriate tool to
interpret ambiguous statutes. See id. ¶¶ 16–21. Nowhere in its
opinion did the Utah Supreme Court discuss the propriety of
using an expert to interpret for the jury what a witness may have
meant when he or she said something. Consequently, Rasabout
simply does not help Cassidy here.
¶39 	Moreover, “when assessing the helpfulness of evidence
under rule 702, the [district] court must first decide whether the
subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average
individual.” State v. Draper, 2024 UT App 152, ¶ 66, 560 P.3d 122
(cleaned up). Juries are tasked with discerning the facts from the
evidence, including witness testimony, based on common sense
and “in the light of their experience as to the natural inclinations
of human beings.” M.K. v. Doyle, 2014 UT App 160, ¶ 7, 330 P.3d
1278 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Model Utah Jury Instructions 2d
CR401, https://legacy.utcourts.gov/muji/?cat=2 [https://perma.cc/
GN2Z-ZDTM] (instructing the jury to use “common sense in
evaluating all witnesses”). Cassidy points us to no authority
beyond Rasabout and another case discussing corpus linguistics in
the context of statutory interpretation, see Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Haik, 2020 UT 29, ¶ 23 n.29, 466 P.3d 178, to support his contention
that juries need expert witnesses to understand plain English and
the nuances of how people communicate with each other. And for
reasons 	we’ve 	already 	explained, 	those 	cases 	do 	not 	help
Cassidy’s argument.
¶40 	Finally, Cassidy also maintains that his expert should have
been allowed to testify to effectively rebut Detective’s statement
at trial that Cassidy admitted to the conduct on the pretext phone
call with Stephanie. While this argument has some superficial

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 125
appeal, it doesn’t stand up to meaningful scrutiny. The court
resolved the motion to exclude prior to trial, so Detective had not
testified 	yet. 	Where 	Cassidy 	did 	not 	object 	to 	Detective’s
statement at the time he made it, there is no reason for us to review
the court’s ruling as of that time. District courts rule on motions
based on the evidence, arguments, and information they have
before them. But they are well within their authority to revisit
those rulings when the facts on the ground change. See, e.g., IHC
Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 27, 196 P.3d
588 (explaining that a district court’s prior decisions bind the
parties for subsequent stages of the case but that the court itself is
free to reconsider those decisions prior to appeal). Here, Cassidy
does not argue that the district court had an obligation to revisit,
sua sponte, its ruling on the motion to exclude and allow his
expert to testify in response to Detective’s statement. Nor does he
argue that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
statement. And there is a good explanation for why his counsel
would not have objected, namely that the statement was made in
direct response to his counsel’s own question about where in the
phone call Cassidy had admitted to anything. In short, where the
court 	ruled 	on 	the 	motion 	to 	exclude 	prior 	to 	Detective’s
challenged statement and where Cassidy’s counsel elicited that
statement, we find no merit in this argument.
¶41 	For these reasons, the district court did not exceed the
limits 	of 	reasonability 	in 	ruling 	that 	the 	linguistic 	expert’s
testimony would not have been helpful to the jury. Consequently,
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to
exclude the testimony.
III. Excluded Evidence Bearing on Stephanie’s Credibility
¶42 	Finally, Cassidy argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it declined to admit evidence of Stephanie’s
assault adjudication and other acts and that he suffered prejudice
as a result. The State counters, asserting that Cassidy has failed to

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 125
adequately brief the adjudication argument and that he did not
preserve his other-acts argument. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its broad discretion when it excluded the
assault adjudication under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
We 	further 	determine 	that 	Cassidy 	has 	not 	preserved 	his
argument that the court should have admitted the other-acts
evidence under rule 404(b). We explain each conclusion in turn.
A. 	Stephanie’s Assault Adjudication
¶43 	The district court did not analyze the admissibility of
Stephanie’s adjudication for assault under rule 609, as Cassidy
argues on appeal it should have. See Utah R. Evid. 609(d)
(“Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is admissible under this rule
only if: (1) it is offered in a criminal case; (2) the adjudication was
of a witness other than the defendant; (3) an adult’s conviction for
that offense would be admissible to attack the adult’s credibility;
and (4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine
guilt or innocence.”). Rather, it appears that the court simply
reasoned that, even if the adjudication was admissible under rule
609, it still had to pass a rule 403 balancing to be admissible. See
id. R. 609(a)(1)(A) (subjecting evidence that attacks a witness’s
character to rule 403). This is where the district court focused its
analysis when it concluded that the probative value of the assault
adjudication was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. See id. R. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger 	of 	one 	or 	more 	of 	the 	following: 	unfair 	prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
¶44 	In order to prevail on appeal, Cassidy must engage with
the district court’s rule 403 reasoning. In other words, Cassidy
bears 	the 	burden 	of 	persuading 	this 	court 	“through
reasoned, supported argument that the district court committed
harmful, reversible error—a burden that necessarily requires

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 125
[him] to address the reasoning and basis of the . . . court’s
ruling and to explain why [the] court got it wrong.” See Cottam v.
IHC Health Services Inc., 2024 UT App 19, ¶ 15, 544 P.3d 1051
(cleaned 	up). 	When 	“an 	appellant 	does 	not 	meaningfully
engage with the [district] court’s reasoning, that appellant falls
short of demonstrating any error” on the court’s part. State v.
Millett, 2025 UT App 67, ¶ 34, 572 P.3d 389 (cleaned up), cert.
denied, 585 P.3d 44 (Utah 2026). And this is where Cassidy comes
up short.
¶45 	Cassidy makes what can best be described as a minimal
effort to engage with the court’s rule 403 reasoning. While the
reasoning of the district court may not have been well articulated,
Cassidy still needs to engage with the balancing test underlying
it. While Cassidy certainly points to some of the factors from rule
403, 	he 	does 	not 	make 	a 	meaningful 	effort 	to 	show 	how
Stephanie’s 	violent 	behavior 	associated 	with 	her 	assault
adjudication bore on her credibility, the consideration of which
was critical to the court’s rule 403 determination.
¶46 	Cassidy argues on appeal,
When Stephanie committed assault, and threatened
harm to others, she faced serious consequences.
Those consequences were imposed by the State.
Stephanie’s conviction taught her that the State has
a 	monopoly 	on 	force 	and 	can 	hurt 	people.
Immediately 	following 	her 	interaction 	with 	the
State, 	she 	learned 	how 	to 	weaponize 	the
government against Mother, and she chose the
easiest target. Her soon-to-be stepdad.
This argument, while creative, is so steeped in speculation that it
does next to nothing to address the probative value of the assault
adjudication. Cassidy’s reasoning appears to be that Stephanie’s
legal troubles taught her that she could weaponize the power of
the State to punish her enemies. And Cassidy makes the leap that

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 125
Stephanie’s adjudication taught her she could lie to achieve this
end. We are not buying this line of thought. Taken to its logical
conclusion, anyone stung by the American justice system must be
assumed to have learned to lie as a means to seek revenge. This is
far too attenuated to get anywhere near showing the assault
adjudication has probative value for truthfulness—and certainly
not to a degree that it would outweigh the danger of unfair
prejudice. In other words, while Cassidy admirably attempts to
glean probative value from the adjudication, his argument suffers
from 	too 	many 	improbable 	inferential 	leaps 	for 	it 	to 	cast
meaningful doubt on the district court’s exercise of its ample
discretion here.
¶47 	The court balanced its determination that the adjudication
had low probative value against the evidence’s potential for
unfair prejudice, the latter of which it found was “very high.” To
be sure, the court could have explained in more detail why it
believed that admitting the evidence created such a danger of
unfair prejudice. But even with this shortcoming in mind, we see
little issue with the court’s determination on this point. The
assault adjudication could have painted Stephanie in a bad light
to the jury—as a person who is violent—thereby distracting the
jury from the pertinent issues in the case. This strikes us as an
example of both confusing the issues and unfair prejudice, the
latter of which refers to “an undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis.” State v. Logue, 2018 UT App 156, ¶ 23, 436
P.3d 136 (cleaned up). Consequently, although the district court
didn’t explain its finding on this point in much detail, the finding
did not exceed the limits of reasonability.
¶48 	Because Cassidy’s efforts to meaningfully engage with the
district court’s rule 403 reasoning are lacking, we have no basis to
conclude 	that 	the 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	in 	excluding
Stephanie’s 	juvenile 	adjudication 	for 	assault 	with 	a 	deadly
weapon.

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 125
B. 	Other-Acts Evidence
¶49 	Finally, Cassidy argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it excluded most of the other-acts evidence that
he sought to introduce to undermine Stephanie’s credibility. The
State argues that Cassidy failed to preserve the issue. For reasons
we explain below, we agree with the State on its procedural
argument.
¶50 	A party preserves an issue for appeal by presenting it “to
the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity
to rule on it.” Orem City v. Jakeman, 2025 UT App 187, ¶ 8, 583 P.3d
1090 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 588 P.3d 308 (Utah 2026). When a
party does not “raise and argue” an issue before the district court,
then the party “has failed to preserve [it].” Id. (cleaned up). In such
a circumstance, appellate courts will not reach the issue on the
merits “absent a valid exception to preservation.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶51 	Cassidy maintains that the district court should have
admitted various instance of other-acts evidence under rule 404(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence to establish Stephanie’s motive,
opportunity, knowledge, intent, or lack of accident so Cassidy
could more effectively undermine her credibility at trial. See Utah
R. Evid. 404(b) (stating that other-acts evidence may be admissible
for 	a 	non-character 	purposes 	such 	as 	“proving 	motive,
opportunity, 	intent, 	preparation, 	plan, 	knowledge, 	identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident”). The asserted evidence
was extensive and included a claim that Stephanie placed a hex
on her father using witchcraft and her prior false accusations that
her brothers had sexually abused her. As the State correctly notes,
however, Cassidy did not move for admission of the evidence
under rule 404(b) and instead moved under rule 608(a). See id. R.
608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by
testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of
an opinion about that character.”). In his opening brief, Cassidy

State v. Cassidy
20240585-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 125
does not point to anything in the record to demonstrate that he
raised the issue under rule 404(b) or that the court considered the
rule when it decided the issue. And he does not even attempt to
respond to the State’s rule 404(b) preservation argument beyond
his cursory statement that “[t]he evidentiary arguments were
preserved.” Under these circumstances, we agree with the State
that Cassidy failed to present the issue “to the district court in
such a way that the court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on it.” See
Jakeman, 2025 UT App 187, ¶ 8 (cleaned up). We therefore decline
to address Cassidy’s rule 404(b) argument on the merits.
CONCLUSION
¶52 	Cassidy’s invocation of counsel was neither unambiguous
nor unequivocal, so his police interview was properly admitted at
trial. He likewise has not established that the district court abused
its 	discretion 	when 	it 	excluded 	his 	linguistics 	expert 	from
testifying about the meaning of what he said during the pretext
call 	and 	during 	the 	interrogation. 	Finally, 	Cassidy 	has 	not
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in excluding
Stephanie’s assault adjudication or various instances of other-acts
evidence.
¶53 	Affirmed.