In re B.J...

2026 UT App 144
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF B.J., C.J., AND S.W.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
C.D.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20250836-CA
Filed September 24, 2026
First District Juvenile Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Bryan Galloway
Nos. 1210346, 1210347, 1210349
Alexandra Mareschal, Kirstin Norman, and
Jason B. Richards, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and
John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke,
Guardians ad Litem
JUDGE R YAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
TENNEY, Judge:
¶1 	At the conclusion of a three-day trial, the juvenile court
terminated 	C.D.’s 	(Mother) 	parental 	rights 	to 	three 	of 	her
children. Mother now challenges that decision on three grounds.
First, she argues that the court erred in finding that the Utah
Division 	of 	Child 	and 	Family 	Services 	(DCFS) 	had 	made
reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children prior to

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terminating her parental rights. Second, she argues that the court
erred in finding that DCFS’s efforts were compliant with the
Americans 	with 	Disabilities 	Act 	(the 	ADA). 	Finally, 	she
challenges 	the 	court’s 	finding 	that 	termination 	was 	in 	the
children’s best interests. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Mother has six children, but only four of them are at issue
in this appeal, and as explained below, this appeal ultimately
concerns a ruling that terminated her parental rights to just three
of them. The involved children are: B.J. (a boy who was born in
2011); C.J. (a boy who was born in 2014); H.J. (a girl who was born
in 2017); and S.W. (a girl who was born in 2019). The biological
father of B.J., C.J., and H.J. (Father) is also the legal father of S.W.
because he was married to Mother at the time of S.W.’s birth. D.W.
is the biological father of S.W. and was living with Mother and the
children when the legal proceedings at issue in this appeal began.1
The First Removal Proceeding
¶3 	On April 18, 2022, the State filed a Verified Petition for
Protective Supervision as to Mother, D.W., and the children. The
1. The four children we’ve just identified were involved in most
of the proceedings at issue in this appeal, and for ease, we’ll
generally use the term “the children” to refer to them collectively.
As will be noted later in this opinion, however, H.J. was placed in
a permanent custody and guardianship with her aunt midway
through the process, so Mother’s parental rights to H.J. were not
terminated and are not at issue in this appeal.
In addition, we note that while the parental rights of both
Father and D.W. were also eventually terminated, this appeal
only concerns Mother’s parental rights.

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petition came in response to multiple referrals to DCFS. One
referral alleged that H.J. was being neglected because her special
needs for speech therapy were not being met and that she had
been dropped off at preschool in clothes that were caked in dirt
and with her underwear covered in dried feces. The same referral
noted that H.J. had “a large bite mark on her left shoulder,” which
H.J. reported had been caused by C.J. Another referral came after
law enforcement had been called to Mother’s home in response to
a domestic dispute between Mother and D.W. This referral from
law enforcement 	included 	allegations that the 	home was a
“deplorable mess” and “unfit for any human or animal to live in.”
DCFS also received information that the children were not
attending school and that when they did come to school, B.J. and
C.J. smelled bad and were dirty. Additional information showed
that C.J. had come to school with “a large bruise on his cheek.”
¶4 	On May 3, 2022, while the petition was pending, Mother
and D.W. were arrested and the children were removed and taken
into state custody. Mother was charged with four counts of child
endangerment, two counts of child abuse, possession or use of a
controlled 	substance, 	and 	use 	or 	possession 	of 	drug
paraphernalia, while D.W. was charged with one count of child
endangerment, one count of child abuse, possession or use of a
controlled 	substance, 	and 	use 	or 	possession 	of 	drug
paraphernalia. Mother later pleaded guilty to certain charges in
the criminal case. At the close of a shelter hearing, the children
were placed in Father’s temporary custody, with DCFS providing
both protective supervision services and reunification services to
Mother and D.W.
¶5 	The juvenile court issued an adjudication order on the
petition in June 2022. There, the court found that D.W. had
physically abused both H.J. and S.W. The court also determined
that the children had been neglected by both Mother and D.W. In
support of the neglect determination, the court entered factual
findings detailing how Mother and D.W. had failed to obtain

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necessary services such as autism testing and speech therapy for
H.J., had failed to obtain medical care for B.J., had allowed the
children to have poor hygiene and miss school, and had allowed
the children to live in “deplorable conditions.” The court also
found that drug paraphernalia had been located in areas of the
home that were accessible to the children.
¶6 	On the same date the court entered this ruling, DCFS
submitted a Child and Family Plan. The juvenile court accepted
this plan and entered a finding that it “constituted reasonable
efforts 	on 	the 	part 	of 	[DCFS] 	to 	accomplish 	the 	goal 	of
reunification.” The Child and Family Plan directed Mother to
complete a “mental health assessment” and enroll in a parenting
course. It further provided that DCFS would arrange for in-home
parenting instruction and make a referral for Mother’s mental
health assessment.
¶7 	In 	accordance 	with 	this 	plan, 	Mother 	completed 	a
comprehensive mental health assessment in July 2022 with a
psychotherapist 	(Psychotherapist). 	Psychotherapist 	diagnosed
Mother with (1) dysthymic disorder,2 (2) an unspecified anxiety
disorder, (3) post-traumatic stress disorder, and (4) an unspecified
personality disorder. Psychotherapist recommended continued
therapy, including “cognitive behavioral interventions.”
¶8 	The court held a review hearing in September 2022. At the
close of that hearing, the court ruled that Mother could have
overnight visits with the children, so long as D.W. was not
present. The court also entered a finding that DCFS was making
2. Dysthymic disorder, which is now referred to as persistent
depressive disorder, “is mild or moderate depression that doesn’t
go away.” Persistent Depressive Disorder (PDD), Cleveland Clinic,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/9292-persistent-de
pressive-disorder-pdd [https://perma.cc/NE4C-A2GC].

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“reasonable efforts toward finalizing the permanency goal of
reunification.”
¶9 	In November 2022, DCFS submitted an updated Child and
Family Plan that was similar to the first plan. This second plan
noted 	that Mother 	and 	D.W. 	had 	completed 	mental 	health
assessments pursuant to the first plan, and it incorporated the
prior plan’s recommendation for “ongoing therapy” for Mother.
Also in November 2022, Mother was sentenced on charges
stemming 	from 	her 	May 	3 	arrest. 	Her 	jail 	sentence 	was
suspended, and one of the requirements of her probation was that
she “[c]omply [with] and follow DCFS recommendations.” It
appears from the record that around this time, Mother moved out
of the home she shared with D.W. and into Father’s home, which
is where the children were staying.
¶10 	Back in the protective supervision case, Mother and D.W.
obtained a continuance for a hearing that had been scheduled for
December, and they then failed to appear for a hearing that was
scheduled for January 2023. In a DCFS progress report that was
submitted around this time, DCFS observed that “the barriers
preventing” the children from returning to Mother and D.W.’s
home were “the lack of follow through by [Mother] and [D.W.] in
completing their services and providing a safe home.”
¶11 	After a review hearing that was held in February 2023, the
court found that “very little of the services had been completed or
complied with.” The court also found that Mother was “residing
in the home” with Father and “having unsupervised access to the
children.” The court further noted that DCFS had “re-assessed the
risk and safety of the children,” that DCFS had concluded that the
children were “at moderate risk and safe,” and that DCFS was
recommending “that the case be closed.”
¶12 	Accepting the recommendation of DCFS, the juvenile court
closed the first removal proceeding.

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The Second Removal Proceeding
¶13 	Between May and August 2023, law enforcement was
called seven times with reports that the children had been
observed unsupervised. On August 14, 2023, the State filed a
Verified Petition for Custody and Substantiation, along with a
Motion for Expedited Placement in Temporary Custody, based on
the allegations of non-supervision as well as reports of the
continued unsanitary nature of the home.
¶14 	On 	August 	21, 	2023, 	Mother 	was 	arrested 	on 	an
outstanding warrant for failing to appear in justice court on a
traffic citation, and DCFS took custody of the children.
¶15 	At an August 24, 2023, shelter hearing in the removal case,
the court found that there was “a substantial danger to the
physical health or safety of the children and [that] the children’s
physical health or safety may not be protected without removing
the children from the custody of the children’s parents.” The court
based 	this 	finding 	on 	“the 	seven 	occurrences 	of 	a 	lack 	of
supervision,” the “unsanitary conditions of the home,” and the
“unavailability of the medications for [B.J.] and [C.J.] when the
children were removed at the time of [Mother’s] arrest.” The court
also found that
reasonable efforts [had been] made to prevent the
need for removal of the children from the children’s
home, 	including 	a 	child 	protective 	services
investigation for the past two months, during which
time 	the 	parents[ 3 ] 	were 	notified 	on 	several
occasions 	of 	the 	necessity 	of 	more 	diligent
3. Though not explicitly spelled out in the court’s order, insofar as
Mother was living with Father at this point, it seems the reference
to “parents” as well as others in the above paragraph were about
Mother and Father (as opposed to Mother and D.W.).

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20250836-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 144
supervision, of the need to maintain a more sanitary
living 	environment, 	and 	of 	the 	need 	to
communicate with one another regarding the care
of the children.
The court further found that DCFS had “provided cleaning
supplies, trash bags, and groceries,” and it also found that DCFS
had “attempted to arrange a meeting” with Mother and Father “to
make a firm plan regarding care of the children, but the parents
failed to cooperate with this effort.” The court ordered the
children’s removal from the home, and the children were placed
in various foster homes or with relatives.
¶16 	The court later issued an adjudication order, wherein it
made a finding that during a home visit in July 2023, Mother had
told DCFS that she was “currently receiving mental health
therapy.” The court also made a legal determination that “the
children were neglected due to the faults or habits” of Mother,
Father, and D.W. This determination was supported by factual
findings 	detailing 	multiple 	instances 	of 	lack 	of 	appropriate
supervision of H.J. and S.W., evidence of substance abuse by the
adults in the home, concerns about C.J.’s mental health not being
attended to, physical abuse of B.J. by Father, and, again, the
deplorable conditions inside the home.
¶17 	In October 2023, the court held a dispositional hearing
where it addressed the terms of a newly proposed Child and
Family Plan and concluded that this plan constituted “reasonable
efforts 	on 	the 	part 	of 	[DCFS] 	to 	accomplish 	the 	goal 	of
reunification.” This Child and Family Plan included requirements
similar to the prior plans (including a requirement that Mother
“follow[] 	the 	recommendations 	from 	her 	Mental 	Health
Assessment”), and it also required a co-parenting course for
Mother and Father as well as a stepparenting course for Mother’s
and Father’s new partners. A DCFS progress report from late
December 2023 indicated that Mother and her new partner

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attended the required course and “seemed to benefit from having
participated in the class.” The same report indicated that Mother
had met with a therapist one time and that they were scheduled
to meet weekly.
¶18 	At a review hearing in January 2024, the court ordered
DCFS to expand Mother’s parent-time “up to and including [a]
trial home placement.” A DCFS progress report from March 2024
indicated that Mother had “been consistent with her attendance
in therapy,” and Mother’s therapist reported that she “actively
participated in sessions.” At a review hearing later that month,
the court entered a finding that B.J., C.J., and H.J. had begun trial
home placements and that S.W. would be starting one soon as
well. At this same hearing, DCFS raised and addressed ongoing
concerns with school attendance, as well as with “appropriate
supervision 	of” 	S.W., 	and 	Mother’s 	counsel 	presented
photographs of the home’s current condition and discussed
Mother’s attempts to address DCFS’s concerns. At the close of the
hearing, the court found that DCFS was making “reasonable
efforts” toward reunification.
¶19 	On April 17, 2024, H.J. and S.W. were found wandering
unsupervised near a busy intersection. Five days later, DCFS
ended the trial home placements of C.J., H.J., and S.W. and
returned those children to foster homes. Immediately after these
removals, Mother’s counsel filed a Discovery Request seeking all
of the documents that DCFS had relied on when deciding to
remove the children.
¶20 	On April 29, 2024, Mother’s probation officer filed an
affidavit in support of a motion for an order to show cause in her
criminal case. There, the probation officer alleged that Mother had
lied to her children, DCFS, her attorney, and a social worker about
being pregnant and delivering a stillborn child. The probation
officer alleged that Mother had used an internet photograph of a
stillborn child in support of this lie. And the probation officer

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further alleged that Mother had perpetuated this lie in an attempt
to be “freed from jail to attend” the alleged child’s funeral. As a
result of this motion for an order to show cause, Mother’s
probation was revoked and restarted in early May 2024, and she
was ordered to serve 30 days in jail.
¶21 	In late May 2024, a DCFS progress report indicated that
Mother’s therapist said she had met with Mother three times in
March but that Mother then “no showed 3 times before going into
the 	jail.” 	At 	the 	conclusion 	of 	this 	progress 	report, 	DCFS
requested “that the court include in its order a finding that
reasonable efforts were made to finalize” the “service plan” and
“permanency goal” for the children. Shortly thereafter, Mother
filed a document captioned “Memorandum Opposing [DCFS’s]
Reasonable Efforts Finding.” In this document, Mother alleged
that DCFS had failed to follow its procedures in its response to the
April 17 non-supervision incident as well as in the subsequent
removal of the youngest children, and she further alleged that
DCFS had failed to comply with prior discovery requests. This
document said nothing, however, about Mother needing any
additional services.
¶22 	On May 30, 2024, the court ordered B.J. to return to a trial
home placement with Mother.4 The court also ordered DCFS to
conduct weekly home visits.
¶23 	In July 2024, the court held a pretrial conference before a
permanency hearing, and during this conference DCFS outlined
its plan for bringing each of the children home on a trial placement
over the next 30 days. A DCFS progress report from this time
indicated that DCFS had “not received an update on [Mother’s]
continued therapy attendance.” At the conclusion of the progress
4. The record indicates that B.J. had been removed from Mother’s
custody at some point after the April 17, 2024, incident, but the
circumstances of that removal are unclear.

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20250836-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 144
report, DCFS recommended that the court “terminate jurisdiction
and release all parties from the case.”
¶24 	That same month, Mother’s counsel arranged for Mother
to complete a psychological evaluation with a retained clinical
psychologist (Psychologist). Psychologist determined that Mother
“presented with symptoms of borderline personality disorder.”
Although this evaluation was performed in July, its results were
not provided to DCFS or the juvenile court until after the second
removal proceeding had closed. Mother also began seeing a new
therapist and participated in a total of ten sessions with this
therapist between July 2024 and January 2025. These sessions
focused 	on 	“emotional 	regulation, 	distress 	tolerance, 	and
trauma.”
¶25 	On August 15, 2024, the juvenile court returned custody of
B.J., C.J., and S.W. to Mother pursuant to the plan DCFS had
presented at the July 2024 permanency hearing. The court granted
a permanent custody and guardianship of H.J. to her aunt, with
whom she had been placed sometime after the second removal,
and 	it 	granted 	this 	permanent 	custody 	and 	guardianship
pursuant to a stipulation from the parties. The court’s order stated
that it was basing its rulings on a DCFS court report and “the oral
representations and recommendations of the parties,” and it
concluded that it was in the best interests of the children “to be
released from the custody and legal guardianship” of DCFS. The
court did not make a finding that DCFS had provided reasonable
efforts 	at 	reunification, 	nor 	did 	it 	comment 	on 	Mother’s
memorandum opposing a finding of reasonable efforts. Upon
issuing 	this 	order, 	the 	court 	closed 	the 	second 	removal
proceeding.
The Third Removal Proceeding
¶26 	On September 6, 2024, Mother was again arrested and
incarcerated, necessitating another removal of B.J., C.J., and S.W.

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20250836-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 144
from the home. 5 Mother’s arrest was a result of an alleged
probation violation relating to S.W. being left unsupervised in the
parking lot of the apartment complex where the family was living.
In an affidavit in support of a motion for an order to show cause
that was filed in the criminal case, Mother’s probation officer
detailed the allegation involving S.W., and the probation officer
further alleged that there were poor living conditions in the home.
¶27 	At a shelter hearing on September 17, 2024, the juvenile
court found that there was “serious danger to the physical health
or safety of the children” and that the “danger to the health or
safety of the children result[ed] from” the “incarceration of
[Mother].” 6 The court found that S.W. had been in “serious
danger due to being unsupervised.” The court also found that
DCFS had “provided extensive services to the family over the past
two and one-half years, and that these efforts constitute[d]
‘reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.’”
And the court concluded that there were “no services available
that would prevent the need for continued removal, in light of the
parents’ current unavailability” due to incarceration. The children
were separately placed with foster families at this point.
¶28 	On November 1, 2024, Mother was released from jail, but
on November 11, she was again arrested, this time for retail theft
and violating the terms of her probation. An adjudication hearing
was held on November 13, 2024. At the close of that hearing, the
court determined that the children were neglected, and the court
issued detailed findings in support of that determination. On
5. From this point forward, and unless context suggests otherwise,
references to “the children” should be understood as referring to
the three children who were still involved in the ongoing events
and legal proceedings (B.J., C.J., and S.W.).
6 . Father was already incarcerated for domestic violence and
alcohol-related offenses at the time of the third removal.

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November 	20, 	Mother 	admitted 	to 	the 	probation 	violation
allegations in her criminal case and was sentenced to 364 days in
jail. She asked to be screened for mental health court, but that
request was denied.
DCFS’s Motion for No Reunification Services
¶29 	On October 8, 2024, DCFS filed a Motion for Dispositional
Order of No Reunification Services. DCFS argued that Utah Code
section 80-3-406(5) provides a presumption against reunification
if a minor has been “removed from the minor’s home on at least
two previous occasions and reunification services were offered or
provided to the family at those times.” DCFS asserted that the
“children ha[d] been removed on three separate occasions,” that
“reunification services [had been] offered or provided to each of
the parents at that time,” and that the “parents ha[d] failed to
respond to those services.” DCFS accordingly requested that it not
be 	required 	to 	provide 	additional 	reunification 	services 	to
Mother, Father, or D.W. and that the permanency goal for the
children be set as adoption.
¶30 	On December 4, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing
on DCFS’s motion. Psychologist testified at that hearing and
explained 	that 	he 	had 	diagnosed 	Mother 	with 	borderline
personality 	disorder. 	He 	testified 	that 	this 	disorder 	causes
“marked 	impulsivity” 	and 	“increase[s] 	one’s 	focus 	on 	and
devotion to one’s immediate needs, often at the sacrifice of long-
term goals and accomplishments.” He said that persons with this
disorder often “remain[] in high-risk relationships” and engage in
“compulsive 	lying.” 	Psychologist 	further 	testified 	that 	the
“science would tell us that if people are willing to engage in
appropriate interventions for the treatment of . . . borderline
personality [disorder],” the “prognosis can be promising.” He
testified that treatment for this disorder is “usually . . . intensive,”
involving treatment sessions “multiple times in a week for a
minimum of one year,” that it “typically moves to one session a

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week for about another year” and that it then involves ongoing
sessions that are a little less frequent for “another two to three
years following that.”
¶31 	Psychologist 	observed 	that 	“dialectical 	behavioral
therapy” (DBT) is “the gold standard” for treating an individual
with borderline personality disorder. He explained that “DBT is
one of the veins in the umbrella of” cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT)”7 and that CBT “runs through the whole of DBT.” At one
point, Psychologist suggested that if a clinician “didn’t have
specific 	training 	in 	understanding 	the 	symptoms 	and
presentation 	of 	borderline 	personality 	[disorder], 	they 	may
engage in good faith efforts that are less successful and potentially
even 	problematic.” 	But 	Psychologist 	also 	testified 	that 	“the
science is very clear that when a person chooses to participate and
does so reasonably effectively, there’s an expectation of growth,”
regardless of the type of treatment the person is receiving. He thus
observed that while there is a “much better expectation of faster
and longer sustained benefit from DBT than . . . from other
treatment paradigms . . . , again, some treatment is generally
better than no treatment.” Psychologist further testified that “if a
person 	chooses 	not 	to 	participate” 	in 	any 	treatment, 	“the
prognosis is usually” that “the symptoms become significantly
increased or at minimum maintain in their stability over time and
also across contexts.” And he also testified that, given Mother’s
history of “sporadic treatment interventions,” her “prognosis
would be in the poor range.”
7 . Cognitive behavioral therapy is a “form of psychological
treatment” that “involves efforts to change thinking patterns” and
“efforts 	to 	change 	behavioral 	patterns.” 	What 	is 	Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy?, Am. Psych. Ass’n, https://www.apa.org/ptsd-
guideline/patients-and-families/cognitive-behavioral [https://per
ma.cc/894K-79JJ].

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¶32 	Mother testified at the hearing. When asked “what would
be different this time” if the court ordered reunification services,
Mother testified that she would be “[t]aking her mental health
seriously.” She testified that because she “know[s] [she] ha[s] this
diagnosis now,” she could “work towards getting better and not
having this hinder [her].” Mother testified that she planned to
address her mental health by “doing DBT” with her therapist, but
she noted that she hadn’t “had time to do DBT” yet because of her
incarceration.
¶33 	In 	closing 	arguments, 	Mother’s 	counsel 	argued 	that
Mother’s past challenges were “not necessarily due to a lack of
effort, but to a lack of the right people and the right tools to
actually 	guide 	her,” 	and 	counsel 	further 	argued 	that 	“the
evidence 	from 	[Psychologist] 	shows that.” 	Mother’s counsel
noted that there had recently been “a modicum of improvement
and glimmer of progress,” and counsel asserted that there could
now “be greater improvement with the correct treatment.”
¶34 	At the close of this hearing, the court ruled from the bench.
The court stated that it wished it had supervised Mother’s case
more carefully during past proceedings, and it acknowledged that
she had made some “change[s].” But it then observed that Mother
had not “responded to treatment in the past very well,” noting
that she “picked up a few things here and there that made things
better for a period of time, but not to the point [that] the children
were appropriately being cared for.” The court accordingly
concluded 	that 	Mother 	had 	not 	rebutted 	the 	statutory
presumption 	against 	providing 	reunification 	services 	and
ordered that no further reunification services would be offered.
The court then set adoption as the primary permanency goal.
¶35 	In early January 2025, the State filed a Verified Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights. On February 4, 2025, Mother was
arrested for another probation violation (this time for forging a

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doctor’s note), and after pleading guilty to one count of forgery,
she was sentenced on April 2 to 180 days in jail.
The Termination Trial
¶36 	In June 2025, the court held a three-day trial on the State’s
petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Before trial, Mother
filed a trial brief in which she argued that “[a]t its core, the [c]ourt
[was] asked to determine whether [DCFS] made reasonable
efforts to reunify [Mother] with her children, and whether the
failure 	to 	do 	so—particularly 	in 	light 	of 	her 	documented
disabilities—render[ed] the termination of her parental rights
legally and constitutionally impermissible.” In this brief, Mother
expressed her view that the trial would “center on” several issues
related to the ADA.
¶37 	Mother’s testimony. At trial, Mother testified that she has
“borderline 	personality 	disorder,” 	which 	she 	regarded 	as 	a
“disability.” 	When 	asked 	what 	DCFS 	could 	have 	“done
differently to help” her, Mother testified that she “wish[ed] [she]
would 	have 	known 	that 	[she] 	had” 	borderline 	personality
disorder “before” because “going into counseling with the right
tools and knowing would have been a little bit different.” Mother
further testified that no one had explained to her that “if [she] had
a disability, [DCFS] would be required to provide reasonable
accommodations 	to 	help 	[her] 	access 	or 	participate 	in 	the
services” and that no one had given her information about the
ADA. She testified that she felt overwhelmed and “unable to fully
participate in meetings or services.”
¶38 	DCFS 	testimony. 	The 	State 	called 	Mother’s 	DCFS
caseworker (Caseworker) and a DCFS supervisor (Supervisor) to
testify. Caseworker testified that in the course of his employment
with DCFS, he had not “received training on” the ADA. When
asked why DCFS had recommended that the second removal
proceeding be closed in 2024, Caseworker responded that DCFS

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 144
“had offered all the services that [it] could” and that it had
“worked with [Mother] to the best [it] could to get her to fulfill
those services.” Caseworker testified that Mother “made the
assurance that she was going to continue the mental health
services for her and the children” and that she “wanted DCFS out
of her life also.” Caseworker testified that to his knowledge,
Mother did not receive any DBT during his time working with
her.
¶39 	During cross-examination, Mother’s counsel confronted
Caseworker about assessments he had conducted using the Utah
Family and Child Endangerment Tool (UFACET), and counsel
suggested that during the first two removal proceedings, despite
flagging multiple “areas that called for immediate attention,”
DCFS 	had 	failed 	to 	establish 	appropriate 	requirements 	for
Mother. Caseworker admitted that portions of the Child and
Family Plans (which, as noted, had built on each other through
the subsequent removal proceedings) should have been removed
because 	there 	was 	no 	evidence 	that 	Mother 	needed 	those
particular types of interventions,8 and he further admitted that
some of DCFS’s arguments to the juvenile court had been based
on Mother not being compliant with what now seemed to be those
unnecessary interventions. He also admitted that DCFS policy
had not been followed in certain respects during the April 2024
removal because DCFS did not complete a risk assessment
8 . 	For 	example, 	Caseworker 	testified 	that 	although 	neither
Mother’s UFACET assessment nor mental health assessments
supported a substance use requirement, DCFS imposed substance
use requirements on Mother anyway. Caseworker also testified
that domestic violence and anger management requirements
carried over from the Child and Family Plans in the first removal
proceeding to the Child and Family Plans in the second removal
proceeding 	but 	that 	those 	requirements 	“should 	have 	been
removed.”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 144
before removing the children from Mother’s custody. During this
same questioning, Mother’s counsel suggested that “the children
were not to be considered candidates for serious risk of removal”
under DCFS policy because the children were on a trial home
placement with Mother at the time of the April 2024 removal.
Caseworker 	admitted 	that 	he 	had 	not 	watched 	existing
surveillance footage of the non-supervision incident that led to
the April 2024 removal.
¶40 	For 	her 	part, 	Supervisor 	admitted 	that 	she 	was 	not
aware of a guidance memorandum that had been issued by the
federal government in August 2015 about how to handle parents
with disabilities in removal or termination cases, and she testified
that 	DCFS 	had 	not 	instituted 	systematic 	employee 	training
sessions on the ADA until the week before this trial. Supervisor
also 	testified 	that 	pursuant 	to 	“DCFS 	policy,” 	a 	UFACET
assessment “is supposed to be completed prior to” a proceeding
being closed, and Mother’s counsel suggested that at least one
UFACET 	assessment 	was 	completed 	after 	the 	closure 	of 	a
proceeding.
¶41 	Psychotherapist’s testimony. As noted, Psychotherapist
evaluated Mother in July 2022, and he testified at trial as well. He
expressed his view that Psychologist’s subsequent diagnosis of
Mother having borderline personality disorder was not contrary
to his own earlier diagnoses. He also testified that DBT is a
category of CBT. He agreed that in “the recommendations that
[he] made, [he] didn’t say DBT,” but he observed that they were
“essentially the same kind of recommendations that one would
think about when recommending DBT.” He testified that he did
not “make a borderline [personality disorder] diagnosis, and [he]
didn’t recommend DBT, but [he] essentially did recommend DBT
strategies.”
¶42 	Psychologist’s testimony. Psychologist testified about his
conclusion that Mother “presented with symptoms of borderline

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 144
personality disorder.” He testified that he did not believe his
diagnosis 	“and 	recommendations 	[were] 	divergent 	from”
Psychotherapist’s. He also agreed that the “underpinnings of DBT
share much in common with CBT.” He testified that DBT is
“commonly identified” as the “gold standard for treatment of
borderline 	personality 	disorder” 	and 	that 	CBT 	would 	not
“administer the same level of clinical success for borderline
personality disorder treatment as DBT” would.
¶43 	Psychologist testified that he would classify Mother as
moderate to severe in terms of how impacted she was by her
borderline 	personality 	disorder. 	He 	testified 	that 	borderline
personality disorder is a highly stigmatized disorder, and he
agreed that there is a risk that individuals who have borderline
personality disorder and are struggling with parenting abilities
might be blamed for their lack of willingness to try, as opposed to
recognizing that their failures are attributable to the disorder.
¶44 	Testimony from Mother’s therapist. The therapist who
had treated Mother during ten sessions between July 2024 and
January 2025 testified. He explained that he had some familiarity
with DBT and had incorporated aspects of DBT into those
sessions, including “mindfulness practice,” “breathing exercises,”
“progressive muscle relaxation,” and “activities that would bring
about more positive emotions to counteract the negative ones.”
He testified that in those sessions, she was improving in her
emotional regulation before their work was interrupted due to
Mother’s incarceration. He further testified that he had tried to
get Mother into the DBT treatment program at his clinic but
that this effort was unsuccessful because the program was already
full.
¶45 	B.J.’s testimony. B.J. was fourteen years old at the time of
trial. As noted, B.J. had been removed from Mother’s home in
September 2024 and had been living with foster parents. B.J.
testified that his mental health was better than it was when he

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 144
lived with Mother. Speaking of his foster placement, B.J. said that
“[i]t actually feels like a home.” He testified that he didn’t “feel
left out all the time” and that he didn’t “feel like” he was “not
loved.” When asked if he felt like his siblings would be “safe and
healthy” if they went back to Mother’s care, B.J. responded, “No,
not at all.” When asked what he thought would be best for him
long-term, B.J. responded, “Not going home” and “staying in the
placement” that he was in. Speaking of his siblings, he said he
thought it would be best if they stayed in their current placements
as well, observing that those placements were “great for them”
and that they were “doing a lot better.”
¶46 	Testimony from the children’s therapists. The therapists
who were treating B.J. and C.J. also testified. B.J.’s therapist
testified that “stability is probably [B.J.’s] greatest need, to feel
safe and stable so that he can move on.” She testified that
something that “provide[s] him the most stable environment
going forward, and not a back-and-forth type of a situation”
would be “in his best interest.”
¶47 	C.J.’s therapist testified that his greatest concern for C.J.
was “[o]ngoing stability and consistency.” He testified that C.J.
was aware that he may be adopted and had not “shared any
concern about that.” He also testified that C.J. “like[d] interacting
with [Mother]” and loved her “deeply.”
¶48 	Testimony from foster parents. One foster parent for each
of the children testified. B.J.’s foster mother testified that she had
acted in that capacity since September 2024 and that she hoped to
adopt him. She testified that DCFS had not explained to her the
differences between a permanent custody and guardianship as
opposed 	to 	an 	adoption, 	but 	she 	said 	that 	“[p]ermanent
guardianship 	never 	really 	crossed 	[her] 	mind[]” 	because
“[a]dopting” B.J. “was something that [she] wanted to do to make
him permanently part of [her] family.” She testified that B.J. had
minimal contact with Mother because he didn’t “want to talk to

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 144
her.” She testified that she would “do whatever” she could “to
make sure” that B.J. could “still talk to and see his siblings” and
that 	she 	would 	be 	supportive 	if 	B.J. 	chose 	to 	maintain 	a
relationship with Mother.
¶49 	C.J.’s foster father testified that C.J. was initially placed
with him temporarily in April 2024, and then continuously
beginning in September 2024. He testified that he understood the
differences between adoption and permanent guardianship and
that he preferred adoption because Mother had “lied and been
very manipulat[ive] when given control over situations,” so he
did not “trust her to make the decisions,” and he further testified
that he did not think that a permanent custody and guardianship
“would be in C.J.’s best interest.” He testified that DCFS had
spoken with him about the differences between a permanent
custody and guardianship versus adoption. He testified that he
would support C.J.’s continued communication with Mother
post-adoption.
¶50 	S.W.’s foster mother testified that S.W. had been with her
since January 2025. She testified that she preferred adoption over
a permanent custody and guardianship, and she said that she
supported S.W. maintaining a relationship with her siblings and
with Mother. She testified that DCFS “briefly” discussed with her
the differences between a permanent custody and guardianship
versus adoption.
¶51 	Testimony 	from 	Mother’s 	expert. 	Mother 	presented
expert testimony from a licensed clinical social worker (Expert),
who said that she had prepared for trial “[t]hrough a review of
[the] records and documentation” from Mother’s proceedings.
Expert 	testified 	that 	DCFS 	had 	provided 	Mother 	with
“inconsistent services” and also identified what she regarded as a
systemic failure by DCFS to be trauma-informed. She testified that
parents in child welfare cases may have “functional barriers that
may actually appear as noncompliance.”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 144
¶52 	Expert also testified that children who are adopted out of
foster care may experience ambiguous loss, and that, as a result,
the American Academy of Pediatrics has reported that children
who are adopted out of the child welfare system have four times
the rate of suicidality than their non-adopted peers. She testified
that secure attachment to a foster parent should not preclude
reunification with a parent and that such an attachment is actually
a positive indicator of a child’s mental health. She opined that
profound trauma may result from adoption out of foster care, and,
citing peer-reviewed research, she stressed the importance of
preserving sibling bonds in terms of providing family continuity,
preserving identity and cultural norms, and developing coping
skills.
The Termination Order
¶53 	After the submission of written closing arguments, the
juvenile court issued a detailed termination order. We’ll provide
a summary here but provide additional details from the court’s
ruling in the relevant portions of our analysis below.
¶54 	The court first found that there were several grounds for
terminating Mother’s parental rights. 	These 	included 	abuse,
neglect, a failure of parental adjustment, and unfitness.
¶55 	The court also addressed Mother’s arguments that DCFS
had 	not 	made 	reasonable 	efforts 	at 	providing 	reunification
services. 	With 	respect 	to 	the 	first 	and 	second 	removal
proceedings, the court held that this question had been “rendered
moot by the fact that the children were successfully reunited”
with Mother in each proceeding. In the court’s view, the question
of 	whether 	reasonable 	efforts had 	been 	made 	at 	providing
reunification services “need not be answered if the goal” of
reunification “was in fact accomplished,” which was the case here
in both of the prior proceedings. And the court found that DCFS
“was not ordered to provide reunification services following the

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 144
children’s removal in September 2024.” But having said that, the
court addressed whether DCFS had made reasonable efforts at
providing 	reunification 	services 	throughout 	the 	proceedings
anyway. The court acknowledged that “[a]t times, [DCFS’s]
efforts did not comply with division policies.” But even so, the
court pointed out that it had previously made findings that
reasonable efforts at reunification had been made in the prior
proceedings. It then found that the reunification efforts that DCFS
had made were “reasonable, fair, and serious,” and it further
found that any failure by DCFS to follow its policies likely did not
matter because “[M]other failed to seriously engage in a manner
that took advantage of the services provided.”
¶56 	The court also addressed the question of whether DCFS
had complied with the ADA. The court held that the services that
had been offered had satisfied “any need for ‘accommodations,’”
and 	it 	further 	concluded 	that 	even 	if 	Mother’s 	borderline
personality disorder had been identified earlier and she had
received treatment for it, the outcome of these proceedings would
not have changed.
¶57 	Turning 	to 	the 	statutorily 	required 	best 	interests
determination, the court found that termination was in the
children’s 	best 	interests 	in 	order 	to 	provide 	stability 	and
ultimately adoption, and the court found that this was so even
though this would mean that the children were separated from
each other.
¶58 	From all this, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights
to B.J., C.J., and S.W. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶59 	Mother raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that
the juvenile court erred in concluding that DCFS made reasonable

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 144
efforts at providing reunification services. A juvenile court’s
“determination that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide
reunification services involves an application of statutory law to
the facts that presents a mixed question of fact and law, requiring
review of the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and
its conclusions of law for correctness.” In re N.K., 2020 UT App 26,
¶ 	15, 	461 	P.3d 	1116 	(quotation 	simplified). 	“Because
reasonableness is an objective standard that depends upon a
careful consideration of the facts of each individual case, we
afford the juvenile court broad discretion in determining whether
reasonable reunification efforts were made.” In re L.J., 2026 UT
App 14, ¶ 3, 586 P.3d 531 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 591
P.3d 748 (Utah 2026).
¶60 	Second, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in
concluding that DCFS provided reasonable accommodations as
required by the ADA. A juvenile court is “in the best position to
evaluate . . . the parent’s level of participation in reunification
services, and whether services were appropriately tailored to
remedy the problems that led to the child’s removal.” In re K.F.,
2009 	UT 	4, 	¶ 	52, 	201 	P.3d 	985. 	“Accordingly, 	absent 	a
demonstration that the determination was clearly in error, we will
not disturb the determination.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also
In re D.R., 2022 UT App 124, ¶ 9, 521 P.3d 545 (applying this same
standard 	to 	a 	claim 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	“exceeded 	its
discretion” 	in 	denying 	a 	“motion 	to 	reinstate 	reunification
services on ADA grounds”).
¶61 	Third, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it
determined that termination was in the children’s best interests.
“We 	review 	deferentially 	a 	lower 	court’s 	best-interest
determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to
consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its
decision 	was 	nonetheless 	against 	the 	clear 	weight 	of 	the
evidence.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 2 (quotation simplified).

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 144
ANALYSIS
I. Reasonable Efforts at Providing Reunification Services
¶62 	Utah law requires that “in any case in which the juvenile
court has directed [DCFS] to provide reunification services to a
parent, the juvenile court must find that [DCFS] made reasonable
efforts to provide those services before the juvenile court may
terminate 	the 	parent’s 	rights.” 	Utah 	Code 	§ 	80-4-301(4)(a).
Relatedly, Utah law also requires a court to consider whether
“sufficient efforts were dedicated to reunification in accordance
with Section 80-4-301” when “determining whether termination
is in the best interest of the child, and in finding, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that termination of parental rights,
from the child’s point of view, is strictly necessary to promote the
child’s best interest.” Id. § 80-4-104(12)(b).
¶63 	As noted, the juvenile court entered findings during the
first 	removal 	proceeding 	and 	early 	in 	the 	second 	removal
proceeding that reasonable efforts had been made. But, as noted,
after the children were removed in April 2024, in the midst of the
second removal proceeding, Mother filed a document entitled
“Memorandum Opposing DCFS’s Reasonable Efforts Finding.”
There, 	she 	argued 	that 	DCFS 	had 	“failed 	to 	comply 	with
procedural rules” and that its response to the April 17, 2024,
incident of H.J. and S.W.’s non-supervision “lack[ed] adequate
justification and fail[ed] to meet the required legal standard for
reasonable efforts.” The court never made any ruling concerning
this filing, nor did it make any further findings about reasonable
efforts during the second removal proceeding, but it ultimately
reunified the children with Mother in August 2024 and closed the
second removal proceeding. Mother did not appeal any findings
in 	the 	first 	or 	second 	removal 	proceedings—which 	should
perhaps be no surprise given that reunification had ultimately
occurred in both of those proceedings. In the third removal
proceeding, however, Mother did raise the reasonable-efforts

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 144
issue, asking the court at the termination trial “to determine
whether” DCFS had “made reasonable efforts to reunify [Mother]
with her children.” In its termination ruling, the juvenile court
concluded that it was not required to answer that question
because Mother had been reunified with the children in the first
and second proceedings and because, with respect to the third
removal proceeding, DCFS had not been “ordered to provide
reunification services.” But even so, the court then found that
DCFS 	had 	made 	“reasonable, 	fair, 	and 	serious” 	efforts 	at
reunification—though it is a touch unclear from the ruling
whether this finding was directed at the first, second, or third
removal proceeding, or instead all of them together.
¶64 	On appeal, Mother advances two arguments. First, in
what’s 	essentially 	a 	“scope 	of 	review” 	argument, 	Mother
challenges the court’s conclusion that it was not required to
determine whether reasonable efforts were made in the first and
second removal proceedings. Second, turning to the merits,
Mother contends that DCFS did not make reasonable efforts at
providing 	reunification 	services 	during 	any 	of 	the 	removal
proceedings. For their part, DCFS and the Guardian ad Litem (the
GAL) both contend that because the first and second proceedings
were 	closed 	without 	an 	appeal, 	the 	question 	of 	whether
reasonable efforts were made in the first and second proceedings
is not subject to review by this or any court. And they both
contend 	that, 	in 	any 	event, 	reasonable 	efforts 	were 	made
throughout.
¶65 	For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that (A) even
though Mother was reunified with her children in both the first
and second removal proceedings, she can still argue on appeal
that 	DCFS 	did 	not 	make 	reasonable 	efforts 	at 	providing
reunification services, but (B) Mother has not persuaded us that
DCFS failed in this regard.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 144
A. 	Scope of Review
¶66 	The first question is whether Mother can argue that DCFS
did not make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services
in the first and second removal proceedings, even though Mother
was reunified with the children in both proceedings and both
proceedings were then “closed” without an appeal. This question
largely turns on the meaning of a single word—“case.” As noted,
the Utah Code states that “in any case in which the juvenile court
has directed [DCFS] to provide reunification services to a parent,
the juvenile court must find that [DCFS] made reasonable efforts
to provide those services before the juvenile court may terminate
the parent’s rights.” Utah Code § 80-4-301(4)(a) (emphasis added).
Mother asks us to interpret the word broadly, thus encompassing
not only the particular removal proceeding at issue but also any
past removal proceedings involving the same child, while DCFS
and the GAL ask us to interpret this word narrowly, meaning that
the statute only looks to the current proceeding (thus foreclosing
review of any past removal proceeding that was subsequently
closed). We agree with Mother.9
¶67 	“It is well settled that when faced with a question of
statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to evince the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Anderson v. Utah Dep’t of
Com., 2025 UT 19, ¶ 14, 572 P.3d 373 (quotation simplified). “We
begin by looking at the plain language of the statute itself because
the statutory language is the best evidence of the legislature’s
intent.” Id. (quotation simplified). And here, “our interpretive
task” starts with a look at “the ordinary meaning or usually
accepted 	interpretation 	of 	the 	statutory 	language.” 	State 	v.
Hatfield, 2020 UT 1, ¶ 17, 462 P.3d 330 (quotation simplified).
9. A careful reader may note that we’ve taken care to refer to these
as the first, second, and third removal proceedings, as opposed to
the first, second, and third cases. We’ve done so to avoid assuming
the answer to this question.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	27 	2026 UT App 144
“After determining our starting point, we then must look to the
context of the language in question.” Id. (quotation simplified).
“We do not view individual words and subsections in isolation;
instead, our statutory interpretation requires that each part or
section be construed in connection with every other part or section
so as to produce a harmonious whole.” Id. ¶ 16 (quotation
simplified).
¶68 	Here, the parties’ competing positions have persuaded us
that this term is, on the face of this statute, ambiguous. On a
surface level, the word “case” could plausibly and narrowly refer
to just one proceeding, or it could plausibly and more broadly
encompass past proceedings too. But several things persuade us
that, for purposes of this statute, Mother’s approach as to how to
interpret this term in this statute is the correct one.
¶69 	First, in the Utah Juvenile Code, the legislature has directed
that a juvenile court may terminate a person’s parental rights if
the court finds that termination is strictly necessary to promote
the 	child’s 	best 	interest 	“based 	on 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances.” Utah Code § 80-4-301(1). And this directive is
borne out in child welfare caselaw too. See In re N.E., 2026 UT App
24, ¶ 9, 586 P.3d 47 (“A best-interest analysis is a wide-ranging
inquiry 	that 	asks 	a 	court 	to 	weigh 	the 	entirety 	of 	the
circumstances, including a parent’s past behavior, to determine
what 	is 	in 	the 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	child 	under 	all 	of 	the
circumstances.” (quotation simplified)), cert. granted, 594 P.3d
1111 (Utah 2026); In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 47, 436 P.3d 206
(“The ‘best interest’ test is broad, and is intended as a holistic
examination of all the relevant circumstances that might affect a
child’s 	situation.”), 	aff’d, 	2020 	UT 	60, 	427 	P.3d 	827. 	As 	an
overarching matter, this general approach to child welfare law
suggests that a broad interpretive approach is likely warranted
with respect to this provision.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	28 	2026 UT App 144
¶70 	Second, there is support for a more expansive view of the
word “case” in the docketing practices that were followed by the
juvenile court in these proceedings and seem to be followed by
other juvenile courts in this state as well, wherein each child is
assigned a single case number that remains with that child
through the duration of the proceedings in the child welfare
system. 10 This approach aligns with the National Council of
Juvenile 	and 	Family 	Court 	Judges’ 	“one 	family–one 	judge”
model, where “[a]ll children, youth, and families will be served
by 	one 	family–one 	judge 	case 	assignments, 	to 	the 	extent
possible.”11
¶71 	Third, 	the 	parental 	termination 	scheme 	itself 	also
contemplates that there will be some analytical overlap between
separate removal proceedings involving the same children. For
example, Utah Code section 80-3-406(5)(h) states that “[t]here is a
presumption that reunification services should not be provided to
a parent if the juvenile court finds” that “the minor was removed
from the minor’s home on at least two previous occasions and
reunification services were offered or provided to the family at
those times.” 12 This statute creates a direct link between past
removal proceedings and a subsequent one in which termination
10 	. 	See 	Family 	Department 	Organization 	and 	Operations,
Utah State Courts, 	https://www.utcourts.gov/en/court-records-
publications/publications/court-publications/court-
reports/famctrpt/orgnops.html [https://perma.cc/78YF-BGVR].
11. See Nat’l Council of Juv. & Fam. Court Judges, Project ONE
Key Principles (Sep. 17, 2012).
12. As noted, DCFS relied on this very provision in the third
removal proceeding, invoking it as the basis for asking the court
to not order reunification services and setting the children’s
permanency goal as adoption.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	29 	2026 UT App 144
is sought. And this link is also predicated on reunification services
having actually been offered or provided in the prior proceedings.
¶72 	As another example, we note that Utah Code section 80-4-
104(12)(b) states that
[i]n determining whether termination is in the best
interest of the child, and in finding, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that termination of
parental rights, from the child’s point of view, is
strictly 	necessary 	to 	promote 	the 	child’s 	best
interest, the juvenile court shall consider, among
other relevant factors, whether . . . sufficient efforts
were dedicated to reunification in accordance with
[s]ection 80-4-301.
This provision does not contain any limitations—it does not say,
for example, that a juvenile court should only consider whether
“sufficient efforts” were made “in this proceeding,” but it instead
directs the court to consider the “totality of the circumstances”
more 	broadly. 	And since 	the 	best 	interest 	determination 	is
understood to be holistic, it makes sense to us that a parent could
at least argue, at the best interest step of the analysis, that the
parent’s ongoing problems would have been solved if DCFS had
made reasonable efforts to offer reunification services—and, thus,
that termination is not in the children’s best interests.
¶73 	Fourth, as Mother points out, adopting a narrow definition
of “case” for purposes of Utah Code section 80-4-301(4)(a) would
create pronounced review problems in this particular scenario—
namely, one in which DCFS removed a child in one or several past
proceedings, the child was returned in each past proceeding (thus
closing the proceeding), but DCFS is now using the past removals
in support of a petition seeking termination of parental rights.
Again, DCFS and the GAL are asking us to hold that in this
scenario, the parent is foreclosed from arguing that DCFS did not

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	30 	2026 UT App 144
make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services in the
prior proceedings—unless, that is, the parent appealed in the
prior proceedings. But we have difficulty seeing how a parent
could really be expected to have done so.
¶74 	As noted, the statute at issue requires DCFS to provide
“reasonable efforts” at “reunification services.” Utah Code § 80-4-
301(4)(a). And in the first and second removal proceedings here,
Mother was indeed reunified with her children. As recently
emphasized by our supreme court, a “party who obtains the relief
it sought below generally is not aggrieved by the judgment
affording 	the 	relief 	and 	cannot 	appeal 	from 	it.” 	Phillips 	v.
Henderson, 2024 UT 19, ¶ 10, 552 P.3d 195 (quotation simplified).
“Simply stated, a party who prevails below is ordinarily not
entitled to appeal.” Id. Given this, it seems unlikely that Mother
could have appealed in the first and second removal proceedings,
because she had already received the final remedy provided by
the statute—reunification. In this sense, and as Mother’s counsel
highlighted at oral argument in this appeal, it’s therefore not clear
what additional remedy or relief Mother could have sought in a
prior appeal, given that she had already received the end-goal
contemplated by the statutory scheme in question.
¶75 	To avoid these problems, we conclude that for purposes of
Utah Code section 80-4-301(4)(a), the term “case” includes any
past proceeding involving the same child and the same parent in
which the court had ordered DCFS to provide reunification
services. Thus, if DCFS subsequently asks a court to terminate the
parent’s rights, 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	parent 	may 	argue 	in
response that those prior proceedings cannot be used as support
for that petition because DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts
at providing reunification services during the earlier removal
proceedings.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	31 	2026 UT App 144
B. 	Reasonable Efforts in Mother’s Case
¶76 	In light of this, we turn to the question of whether Mother
has 	shown 	that 	DCFS 	failed 	to 	make 	reasonable 	efforts 	at
providing reunification services in this case (with all that that
word entails). And again, we do so on the basis of what seems to
us to have been findings by the juvenile court that DCFS did
comply with its obligations with respect to each of the prior
removals. Here, we agree with DCFS and the GAL that Mother
has not shown that the court abused its discretion.
¶77 	For purposes of this statute, a “reasonable effort is a fair
and serious attempt to reunify a parent with a child prior to
seeking to terminate parental rights.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14,
¶ 15, 586 P.3d 531 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 591 P.3d 748
(Utah 2026). “Reasonableness in this context is an objective
standard and depends upon a careful consideration of the facts of
each individual case.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 51, 201 P.3d 985. In
making this determination, a juvenile court should consider “the
credibility of witnesses, the parent’s level of participation in
reunification services, and whether services were appropriately
tailored to remedy the problems that led to the child’s removal.”
Id. ¶ 52.
¶78 	Here, Mother makes what we regard as two groups of
challenges. We address each in turn.
¶79 	Mental health diagnosis and treatment. Mother’s first set
of challenges relates to her mental health, and her principal
argument is that DCFS did not make reasonable efforts at
providing 	reunification 	services 	because 	it 	“never 	correctly
identified 	Mother’s 	underlying 	mental 	health 	diagnosis:
Borderline Personality Disorder.” We see no error here.
¶80 	In the first removal proceeding, DCFS submitted a Child
and Family Plan that required Mother to “complete a mental

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	32 	2026 UT App 144
health 	assessment.” 	As 	directed, 	Mother 	completed 	a
comprehensive 	mental 	health 	assessment 	in 	July 	2022 	with
Psychotherapist, who diagnosed Mother with four conditions,
none 	of 	which 	were 	borderline 	personality 	disorder.
Psychotherapist then recommended continued therapy, including
“cognitive behavioral interventions.” DCFS’s Child and Family
Plans 	from 	November 	2022 	and 	August 	2023 	noted
Psychotherapist’s 	assessment 	and 	incorporated 	his
recommendation for ongoing therapy. It was only in July 2024
that Mother was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder
by Psychologist, but neither DCFS nor the juvenile court were
presented with Psychologist’s report until the third removal
proceeding was underway.
¶81 	To the extent that Mother’s claim is about a failure to
diagnose her with borderline personality disorder earlier, she has
given us no reason to believe that her initial evaluation was
somehow 	suspect 	or, 	critically, 	that 	DCFS 	should 	have
understood that this evaluation was suspect and that Mother
might actually have some other condition that required a different
evaluation and a different course of treatment.
¶82 	Mother also argues that because of what she regards as the
“misdiagnosis,” 	she 	received 	the 	wrong 	mental 	health
treatment—which, in her view, then rendered DCFS’s efforts at
providing reunification services inadequate. But the statutory
standard at issue does not require DCFS to have acted with
omniscience, nor does it require the relevant actors to have acted
in real time with the benefit of hindsight. Instead, DCFS is
required to make “a fair and serious attempt to reunify” parents
with their children, In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 521 P.3d 887
(quotation simplified), and this would naturally turn on what
DCFS knew or reasonably should have known at the time of the
decisions 	in 	question. 	Here, 	Mother 	was 	evaluated 	by
Psychotherapist and was ordered to receive treatment that was
consistent with his diagnoses. While much of Mother’s argument

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	33 	2026 UT App 144
on appeal centers on her subsequent diagnosis of borderline
personality disorder and her related assertion that she should
have received DBT, DCFS did not learn of this diagnosis until the
termination proceedings were already underway, and testimony
from several witnesses suggested that DBT was related to the CBT
that she had already been receiving anyway. In light of all this, we
see no basis for concluding that DCFS did not make reasonable
efforts to provide reunification services based on a failure to
assess or treat Mother’s mental health problems.
¶83 	Other alleged errors. Mother next points to a series of
alleged failures that, based on the briefing and the arguments, we
think best to assess in the aggregate. These include:
• 	DCFS’s failure to respond to her discovery requests;
• 	DCFS’s failure to “follow its own policies” related to the
children’s removal from Mother in April 2024;
• 	Caseworker’s misuse of the UFACET assessment tool”;
• 	DCFS requiring Mother to participate in “services” that
were “unsupported by evaluations”;
• 	DCFS removing the children in April 2024 without the
caseworker 	having 	“watch[ed] 	exculpatory 	video
evidence” or “conducting a required risk assessment”; and
• 	Caseworker’s lack of ADA training.
¶84 	We have some question about whether all of these alleged
failures are actually germane to the particular question before us.
Again, the statutory requirement at issue looks to whether DCFS
made reasonable efforts at providing reunification services. On its
face, this statute doesn’t function as a catch-all for challenging
conduct that isn’t reasonably related to those reunification efforts,

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	34 	2026 UT App 144
and it’s at least arguable that some of Mother’s complaints fall
outside the scope of this provision.
¶85 	Regardless, having considered Mother’s complaints, we’re
simply not persuaded that these alleged errors were sufficient,
either alone or in the aggregate, to establish that DCFS did not
make 	reasonable 	efforts 	at 	providing 	reunification 	services.
Assessing this requirement, we have recently emphasized that “a
reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt at reunification, not
a perfect one.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 18 (quotation
simplified). And here, the record shows that DCFS did make some
efforts to reunify Mother with the children. For example, in the
first removal proceeding, DCFS facilitated Mother’s mental health
assessment 	with 	Psychotherapist, 	and 	it 	incorporated
Psychotherapist’s recommendation for continued treatment into
the Child and Family Plans that followed. In the second removal
proceeding, DCFS “provided cleaning supplies, trash bags, and
groceries” to Mother to help improve the condition of the home,
attempted to arrange a meeting with Mother and Father to help
support their care of the children, and provided weekly home
visits. Overall, the court found that the Child and Family Plans
were “formulated with [Mother’s] input, were individualized to
meet her and the children’s needs, and included the requirements
necessary for the children to safely return to her care.” And it
noted that Mother “never objected or requested to the court that
the services ordered or provided be modified for additional
accommodation.”
¶86 	To the extent that DCFS’s efforts failed, our cases have also
stressed that “the process of reunification is recognized as a two
way street which requires commitment on the part of the parents,
as well as the availability of services from the State, and [a parent]
[bears] the responsibility of participating in and completing those
services 	provided 	to 	[the 	parent] 	by 	DCFS.” 	Id. 	(quotation
simplified). In its termination order, the juvenile court echoed this
same language, finding that “although [DCFS] policy was not

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	35 	2026 UT App 144
always followed, the efforts made by [DCFS] were reasonable,
fair, and serious,” in part, because “[M]other failed to seriously
engage in a manner that took advantage of the services provided.”
The court found that borderline personality disorder “can result
in impulsiveness” and “poor decision making” and that “[e]ven
with the best treatment,” the success for treating the disorder “is
relatively 	low 	and 	normally 	takes 	years 	to 	accomplish.”
Nonetheless, 	the 	court 	found 	that 	Mother’s 	“diagnosis 	of
borderline 	personality 	disorder 	[did] 	not 	alleviate 	her 	of
responsibility to engage in services ordered by the court or
provided by [DCFS],” and it also found that throughout the case,
Mother was “not only . . . sporadic in her compliance with court
ordered services” but was “additionally engaged in criminal
activities that led to her being unable to care for the children due
to prolonged incarceration.”
¶87 	In light of all this, Mother has simply failed to carry her
burden of persuading us that the juvenile court’s findings on
reasonable efforts were clearly erroneous, and this is particularly
so because, even if those efforts were “not as fulsome” as they
should have been, id., Mother failed to engage with many of the
reunification efforts that were provided.13
13. In this portion of her brief, Mother also pointed to a recent
legislative audit of DCFS, wherein the auditor concluded that
there were “concerning patterns in a significant number of cases”
in which DCFS caseworkers had “violate[d] key investigation
policies, leading to less safe conditions for families and unfair
actions against families.” See Off. of the Legis. Auditor Gen., A
Performance Audit of the Division of Child and Family Services,
Report No. 2026-03, at ii (Jan. 2026). In Mother’s view, this
supports her claims that DCFS did not comply with its obligations
in this case. But this report was not made part of the record below,
so we have no occasion to consider it now. See State v. Hawkins,
(continued…)

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	36 	2026 UT App 144
¶88 	We think one final note is in order. We recognize that the
reasonable efforts requirement is an important one, and we agree
with Mother that it needs to be taken seriously by DCFS and the
juvenile courts. See In re A.H., 2026 UT App 88, ¶ 42 n.4, 594 P.3d
616 (observing that since “our supreme court has made clear that
[matters related to DCFS misfeasance] may not generally be raised
in the best-interest portion of the inquiry, similarly affected
parents in future cases would seem to have no place other than
the reasonable-efforts portion of the inquiry in which to raise such
matters” 	(quotation 	simplified)). 	We 	likewise 	recognize that
appellate review of such decisions is not and should not be a
rubber stamp. Token efforts alone will not suffice. But in this case,
while the juvenile court recognized that DCFS could have done
more, and while it further recognized that DCFS’s actions in this
case did not always comport with its own policies or with best
practices, the court still concluded that DCFS had at least made
reasonable 	efforts 	to 	provide 	Mother 	with 	meaningful
opportunities to address her issues and be reunified with the
children. On this record, we see no reversible error in that
decision.
2016 UT App 9, ¶ 61, 366 P.3d 884 (refusing to consider extra-
record evidence attached as an addendum to a brief because “an
appellate court’s review is limited to the evidence contained in the
record on appeal” (quotation simplified)).
In any event, as a court, our role is not to supervise DCFS
as a general matter. That is a task for the legislative and executive
branches, not the judiciary. Instead, our role is to determine
whether the juvenile court erred in finding that DCFS made
reasonable efforts at providing reunification services in this case.
As explained above, regardless of what is or is not happening
systemically, Mother has not persuaded us that she is entitled to
reversal in her case on this basis.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	37 	2026 UT App 144
II. The ADA
¶89 	The ADA “prohibits public entities from discriminating
against disabled individuals.” In re K.C., 2015 UT 92, ¶ 15, 362 P.3d
1248 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). Specifically, it provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability, shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. For purposes of the ADA, a government agency
discriminates against a disabled individual if it fails to make
“reasonable modifications.” In re K.W., 2018 UT App 44, ¶ 15, 420
P.3d 82 (quotation simplified). And it is “readily apparent” that
the ADA applies to reunification services in a child welfare case.
In re K.C., 2015 UT 92, ¶ 18.
¶90 	Here, Mother argues that she has a disability because of her
mental health conditions—including those diagnosed by both
Psychotherapist 	and, 	later, 	Psychologist. 	In 	light 	of 	these
conditions, she argues that DCFS should have provided her with
simplified service plans, enhanced case management, and, of
note, 	DBT 	as 	the 	treatment 	once 	she 	was 	diagnosed 	with
borderline personality disorder by Psychologist. And on this
front, 	she 	further 	argues 	that 	the 	fact 	she 	showed 	some
“‘improvement’ after receiving five sessions of DBT is evidence
that 	reasonable 	accommodations 	would 	have 	provided
meaningful access to services and likely changed the outcome of
this case.”14
14. In the termination order, the court made a finding that Mother
“participate[d] in approximately five sessions of DBT treatment”
with her therapist in January 2025, but the record is unclear on
this point. At the hearing on DCFS’s motion for no reunification
services in the third removal proceeding, Mother testified that she
planned to address her mental health by “doing DBT” with her
(continued…)

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	38 	2026 UT App 144
¶91 	But Mother has not persuaded us that DCFS violated the
ADA. This is so for two reasons.15
¶92 	First, a government agency does not have “an affirmative
obligation” to identify “potential reasonable accommodations
that the parent did not request.” In re D.R., 2022 UT App 124, ¶ 13,
521 P.3d 545 (quotation simplified). Instead, the burden is “on the
individual requesting accommodation under the ADA to present”
the agency “with information regarding their disability, how it
affects them, and the accommodations that would allow them to
participate” in the services at issue. Id. ¶ 14.
¶93 	Mother has not shown that she ever made such a request
in this case. Again, after Mother was diagnosed with various
conditions by Psychotherapist, she was ordered to receive therapy
that seemed consistent with those diagnoses. Mother has not
persuaded us that “the reasonable accommodations” requirement
obligated DCFS to have done more than it did.
therapist, but she noted that she hadn’t “had time to do DBT” yet
because of her incarceration. And at trial, Mother’s therapist
testified that he had familiarity with DBT and he would do things
with 	Mother 	such 	as 	“mindfulness 	practice,” 	“breathing
exercises,” “progressive muscle relaxation,” and “activities that
would bring about more positive emotions to counteract the
negative ones.” But he testified that he was “trying to get her into
the DBT group,” which was already full at the time. Accordingly,
it is unclear exactly how much DBT Mother had participated in
prior to her January 2025 incarceration.
15. In the briefing, the parties have discussed the question of
whether Mother’s diagnoses even qualify as a disability for
purposes of the ADA. Given our resolution on other grounds, we
need not answer that question.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	39 	2026 UT App 144
¶94 	The real thrust of Mother’s complaint on appeal is what
happened (or, more accurately, what didn’t happen) once she was
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder in July 2024. But
as noted, DCFS did not learn of this diagnosis until the third
removal proceeding. At the December 2024 evidentiary hearing
on DCFS’s Motion for Dispositional Order of No Reunification
Services, Psychologist testified about his diagnosis and about how
this disorder can be treated. For her part, Mother also testified at
this hearing. She said that if the juvenile court ordered additional
reunification 	services, 	she 	would 	take 	“her 	mental 	health
seriously” 	because 	she 	now 	knew 	that 	she 	had 	borderline
personality disorder. And Mother also expressed her desire to be
accepted into mental health court. But Mother did not specifically
link this diagnosis to any argument that she then made under the
ADA—i.e., Mother did not testify that she had ever asked DCFS
to provide her with DBT, much less that DCFS had been unwilling
to do so, nor did she ask the court to order DCFS to provide DBT
as part of ongoing reunification services moving forward. Indeed,
to the seeming contrary, Mother testified that she hadn’t yet “had
time to do DBT” because of her incarceration, and she further
testified that she had “talked to [her] therapist and was going to
be starting DBT with him.” In this sense, she seemed to indicate
that she was already going to be receiving it, which undercuts her
claim 	that 	DCFS 	had 	somehow 	violated 	the 	ADA 	by 	not
providing it.
¶95 	Second, we also conclude that Mother has not shown that
any lack of reasonable accommodation affected her ability to
engage with the services DCFS provided. See In re L.J., 2026 UT
App 14, ¶ 18 (“The process of reunification is recognized as a two
way street which requires commitment on the part of the parents,
as well as the availability of services from the State, and [a parent]
[bears] the responsibility of participating in and completing those
services 	provided 	to 	[the 	parent] 	by 	DCFS.” 	(quotation
simplified)).

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	40 	2026 UT App 144
¶96 	At the December 2024 evidentiary hearing, Psychologist
testified that DBT is the “gold standard” for treating borderline
personality disorder. Seizing on this, Mother argues that if she
had been given that treatment, she would have been able to solve
the problems that ultimately led the court to terminate her
parental rights.
¶97 	But we think the record is not so clear cut. At the same
December 2024 evidentiary hearing, Psychologist testified that
DBT requires “intensive involvement,” and he expressed his view
that, 	given 	Mother’s 	history 	of 	“sporadic 	treatment
interventions,” her “prognosis would be in the poor range.”
Moreover, he also said that CBT—which is the type of therapy
that was recommended in Mother’s July 2022 mental health
assessment—is “related” to DBT and “kind of runs through the
whole of DBT.” Psychologist testified that if “a person chooses to
participate [in treatment] and does so reasonably effectively,
there’s an expectation of growth,” and he said that this is so
regardless of what type of treatment the person receives.
¶98 	Psychotherapist testified to this same commonality as well.
At the termination trial, he testified that DBT is a category of CBT
and that in “the recommendations that [he] made, [he] didn’t say
DBT,” 	but 	they 	were 	“essentially 	the 	same 	kind 	of
recommendations 	that 	one 	would 	think 	about 	when
recommending DBT.”
¶99 	In its termination decision, however, the juvenile court
found that although Mother was ordered to receive mental health
treatment during the first removal proceeding, she had only
“sporadically demonstrated an ability and willingness on various
occasions to obtain services and follow through with treatment.”
The court observed that “even when” mental health “support was
given, [M]other failed to progress.” And it thus concluded that
even if Mother’s borderline personality disorder “had been
identified earlier in the case,” any resultant “recommendations of

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	41 	2026 UT App 144
mental 	health 	evaluations 	and 	treatment 	would 	not 	have
changed” the outcome because Mother had “never consistently
engaged with” mental health resources that had been provided
throughout the course of the three removal proceedings. We’re
not persuaded that these findings or conclusions were in error.
¶100 	Finally, as to Mother’s testimony that because she had now
learned 	of 	this 	condition, 	she 	would 	take 	treatment 	more
seriously moving forward, the juvenile court specifically found
that despite Mother’s “good intentions,” it was “unconvinced” by
this assertion. The juvenile court is in a better position than we are
to make a credibility determination, and we are not persuaded
that we can or should reassess this one here. See In re J.C., 2016 UT
App 10, ¶ 13, 366 P.3d 867 (“We defer to the juvenile court because
of its advantaged position with respect to the parties and the
witnesses in assessing credibility and personalities.” (quotation
simplified)).
¶101 	In sum, it does not appear that Mother ever invoked the
ADA to request the particular accommodations at issue. And even
if she had, Mother has not persuaded us that they would have
mattered. 	As 	a 	result, 	we 	see 	no 	basis 	for 	reversing 	the
termination decision based on an alleged violation of the ADA by
DCFS.
III. Best Interests of the Children
¶102 	“The fundamental right of parents to raise their children is
recognized by both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.” In re A.H., 2024 UT 26, ¶ 30, 554 P.3d 969.
“Wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and
preserved, but if a parent is found, by reason of the parent’s
conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any
of the grounds for termination . . . , the juvenile court shall then
consider the welfare and best interest of the child of paramount
importance in determining whether termination of parental rights

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	42 	2026 UT App 144
shall be ordered.” Utah Code § 80-4-104(12)(a). “A court may
terminate 	parental 	rights 	only 	after 	making 	two 	necessary
findings—first, the court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that at least one statutory ground for termination exists,
and second, the court must find that termination of the parent’s
right is in the best interest of the child.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14,
¶ 	4 	(quotation 	simplified). 	A 	juvenile 	court 	is 	required 	to
determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child
“based on the totality of the circumstances.” Utah Code § 80-4-
104(12)(b).
¶103 	Here, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s decision that
termination was in the children’s best interests, and she does so
on three grounds. First, Mother argues that the court “completely
disregarded the uncontroverted testimony of [Expert], the only
expert who testified as to the best interests of the children.”
Second, Mother argues that the court “failed to properly consider
[a] permanent custody and guardianship as an alternative to
termination.” Third, Mother argues that the court failed to
consider “a structured framework for preserving [sibling] bonds
via ongoing sibling visitation.” We disagree on all fronts.
¶104 	First, we see no error relating to the court’s alleged failure
to consider Expert’s testimony about “the impact termination
would have on these children going forward.” A juvenile court is
not required to specifically mention every piece of evidence
before it in its termination order. See Tilleman v. Tilleman, 2024 UT
App 54, ¶ 50, 549 P.3d 65 (“[T]he trial court is not required or
expected to make a finding on every bit of evidence presented.”);
In re A.R., 2017 UT App 153, ¶ 26, 402 P.3d 206 (“Courts are not
required to make a credibility finding for each witness, rather, the
findings of ultimate facts implicitly reflect consideration of the
believability of the witnesses’ testimony.” (quotation simplified));
In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“A trial court is
not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads to its
conclusions, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	43 	2026 UT App 144
of them.” (quotation simplified)). And a trial court is also not
required to follow an expert’s recommendation at all. See, e.g.,
Woodward v. LaFranca, 2016 UT App 141, ¶ 13, 381 P.3d 1125 (“The
trial court thus has the discretion not only to choose between
experts as to relative credibility but also to disbelieve all the expert
testimony 	placed 	before 	it—provided 	it 	can 	articulate 	a
reasonable basis for doing so.” (quotation simplified)).
¶105 	Here, the juvenile court heard the testimony of Expert and
acknowledged it (albeit in passing) in its order. Thus, to the extent
that its decision ran contrary to the opinions of Expert, the clear
implication is that the court simply disagreed with Expert’s
recommendations.
¶106 	And there was ample support for its decision to do so.
Again, Expert testified about the trauma the children might
experience if Mother’s parental rights were terminated and the
children were then adopted by others. But in its best interests
determination, the juvenile court was required to consider “the
totality of the circumstances,” Utah Code § 80-4-104(12)(b), and in
this case, it made detailed findings supporting its conclusion that
termination was warranted. For example, the juvenile court found
the following:
• 	Evidence 	from 	the 	children’s 	therapists 	“clearly
demonstrate[d] that the children have suffered multiple
adverse childhood experiences” while in Mother’s care.
• 	Mother 	failed 	to 	provide 	“consistent 	mental 	health
treatment [for the children] over three years and three child
welfare” proceedings, “despite the obvious need of the
children to receive such care.”
• 	“The 	children’s 	foster 	parents 	testified 	about 	the
tremendous progress of each child in their respective
placements . . . .”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	44 	2026 UT App 144
• 	“The risk . . . in not securing the relationships they have
established with their current caregivers is great. This is the
first real stability these children have ever experienced.
[Mother] offered little to no evidence regarding how she
could or would focus on the best interest[s] of the children
if custody were returned to her.”
• 	“If the court were to return custody to [Mother], it would
simply be removing the children from a placement of love[]
and support and putting them back into a world of
neglect.”
• 	B.J. himself was “the most qualified expert regarding his
lived experience,” and he testified about “chronic conflict
and chaos at [Mother’s] home.”
• 	B.J. testified that “he finally has a family and parents who
act as parents” and he “wants to remain where he is.”
• 	B.J.’s “emotional exhaustion and fatigue were apparent as
he testified.”
• 	“The children need safe, stable, nurturing parent-child
relationships, 	which 	they 	have 	in 	their 	current
placements.”
• 	“Requiring 	the 	children 	to 	resume 	the 	chaos 	and
uncertainty of going between [Mother] and foster parents
in the hope that [Mother] will be able to overcome her
lifelong 	patterns 	would 	further 	traumatize 	and 	harm
them.”
• 	“Over the past three years, the children have spent most of
their time outside of [Mother’s] care because of her pattern
of neglect.”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	45 	2026 UT App 144
• 	“The evidence clearly demonstrates that [Mother] is unable
and/or unwilling to parent the children safely and properly
because of her long-term pattern of neglect.”
• 	“[Mother] is currently incarcerated and will not be released
from jail until September 2025. She is not available to care
for 	the 	children. 	Her 	pattern 	of 	leaving 	the 	children
without a caregiver due to incarceration has repeatedly
occurred.”
• 	“Terminating 	[Mother’s] 	parental 	rights 	allows 	the
children to remain with and benefit from fit, competent
parents who can meet their needs, including maintaining
relationships 	among 	siblings 	and 	with 	[Mother].
Terminating [Mother’s] rights does not mean she can never
see the children again.”
• 	“Relying on the testimony of the experts in this case, the
court finds that the children’s greatest need is stability and
permanency. This can only be done through terminating
[Mother’s parental] rights and adoption.”
¶107 	In light of these detailed findings, it’s clear enough to us
that the court simply disagreed with the views advanced by
Expert in this case. And it’s also clear that the court grounded its
decision about what would be in the children’s best interests in
other testimony that was presented at trial. We accordingly see no
error on this point.
¶108 	Second, we likewise see no error relating to the court’s
alleged failure to properly consider a permanent custody and
guardianship as an alternative to termination. “Where permanent
guardianship is feasible and before the juvenile court, the statute
requires the court to consider it on the record and determine if it
can equally protect and benefit the children in the case before it.”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	46 	2026 UT App 144
In re K.Y., 2022 UT App 149, ¶ 37, 523 P.3d 1159 (quotation
simplified).
¶109 	In addition to the findings recounted above, the juvenile
court provided detailed findings about its attempts to explore
kinship placements for the children. While we need not recount
all of them here, it suffices to say that the court identified various
options and then explained why each was either not available or
not advisable. From there, the court then found that “even if an
appropriate 	relative 	did 	exist,” 	a 	permanent 	custody 	and
guardianship 	would 	“not 	provide 	the 	children 	the 	needed
stability to promote growth and healing.” It found that “[e]ach of
the children’s foster parents” had “been consulted regarding the
distinctions between [a] permanent custody and guardianship” as
opposed to “termination and adoption.”16 It found that each of
them “strongly prefer[red] adoption, while retaining the right and
authority to monitor [Mother’s] future contact with the children.”
It found that “[r]equiring the children to resume the chaos and
uncertainty of going between [Mother] and foster parents in the
hope that [Mother] will be able to overcome her lifelong patterns
would further traumatize and harm [the children].” And “[a]fter
considering 	all 	possibilities,” 	it 	found 	that 	termination 	was
“strictly necessary in that no lesser option provides the stability
these children desperately need and have never been given.”
¶110 	On this record, we cannot say that the juvenile court failed
to properly consider a permanent custody and guardianship over
termination and adoption. On the contrary, the juvenile court
16. As noted, it appears that this finding was correct as to the
foster parents of C.J. and S.W., but not as to the foster parents of
B.J. 	Regardless, 	B.J.’s 	foster 	mother 	testified 	that 	she 	(and
apparently her husband) were not amenable to a permanent
guardianship because “[a]dopting” B.J. “was something that
[they] wanted to do to make him permanently part of [their]
family.”

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	47 	2026 UT App 144
made clear findings about why it chose termination over a
permanent custody and guardianship. Thus, we see no error on
this point either.17
¶111 	Finally, we see no error in the juvenile court’s decision not
to keep the children together in one placement. The court found
that DCFS had “attempted to place the children together, in
various configurations,” but that the “children do much better
with the individualized attention of not having their siblings with
them in the same home.” It found that the children have “a
17. Mother asserts that the State failed “to prove it was ‘strictly
necessary’ 	for 	[the 	children] 	to 	have 	their 	relationships
terminated” 	because 	“the 	State 	had 	already 	proved 	that
guardianship was a viable and practicable alternative by placing
[H.J.] in a successful permanent guardianship with an aunt.” But
Mother has pointed to no authority that would prevent the
juvenile court from making a determination for the three children
at issue in this appeal that was different than the determination
that had previously been made for H.J.
In any event, there were material differences between the
decision involving H.J. and the subsequent decisions regarding
the other children. First, the decision to place H.J. in a permanent
custody and guardianship with her aunt was the result of the
parties’ mediation and stipulation; it was not a decision directed
by the juvenile court after a termination trial. Second, H.J. was
placed 	in 	a 	permanent 	custody 	and 	guardianship 	at 	the
conclusion of the second removal proceeding, which meant that
the facts that led to the third removal proceeding had not yet
happened, and which also meant that the court had not yet heard
those new facts either. For these reasons, we see no merit in
Mother’s argument that because H.J. had previously been placed
in a permanent custody and guardianship, the juvenile court
could not later order something different with respect to the other
children at the close of trial.

In re B.J.
20250836-CA 	48 	2026 UT App 144
difficult relationship” with one another and that there had been
past instances of violence by one of the children in particular
toward one of the others. It found that the “foster parents for the
children have ensured that the siblings continue to have contact
with one another, including their sibling [H.J.], who is in the
permanent custody” of her aunt. Further, the court found that
terminating Mother’s parental rights would allow the children to
better “maintain[] relationships among siblings.”
¶112 	Beyond that, the juvenile court found that B.J.—whom it
identified as “a compelling and truthful witness”—had testified
“that he has observed and believes his siblings are doing well
although they are not in the same placement.” And it credited
B.J.’s testimony that his siblings were receiving “individual
attention, care, and nurturing” in their current placements, which
the court saw as a positive thing.
¶113 	From all this, the court concluded that “[a]fter considering
all possibilities[,] termination is strictly necessary in that no lesser
option provides the stability these children desperately need and
have never been given,” even though this meant that the siblings
would not be placed together. On this record, we see no basis for
overturning that decision.
CONCLUSION
¶114 	Mother has raised several challenges to the juvenile court’s
decision to terminate her parental rights, but we’re not persuaded
that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	committed 	any 	reversible 	error. 	We
accordingly affirm that decision.