In re G.J.C.

2016 UT App 147
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I N THE INTEREST OF G.J.C.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
D.D.B.,
Appellant,
v.
J.L.C.,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20150432-CA
Filed July 14, 2016
First District Juvenile Court, Brigham Department
The Honorable Angela Fonnesbeck
No. 1083532
Paul W. Mortensen, Attorney for Appellant
J.L.C., Appellee Pro Se
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
JUDGE K ATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES
J. F REDERIC VOROS JR . and S TEPHEN L. R OTH concurred.
TOOMEY, Judge:
¶1 	The primary issue in this appeal is whether the juvenile
court improperly denied D.D.B.’s (Mother) petition to terminate
J.L.C.’s 	(Father) 	parental 	rights 	to 	their 	son, 	G.J.C. 	(Child).
Because we conclude the court’s decision regarding Child’s best
interest was against the clear weight of the evidence, we reverse
its order and remand for the juvenile court to enter an order
terminating Father’s parental rights.

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BACKGROUND
¶2 	Child was born in March 2008 while the parties were
married. But they separated in June 2009, and Mother filed for
divorce one month later. Stipulated orders from the divorce
court granted Mother sole physical custody of Child and granted
Father the minimum statutory parent-time. Since the parties’
separation, Child and Mother have continuously lived with
Mother’s parents.
¶3 	In 	November 	2009, 	Mother 	obtained 	a 	permanent
protective order against Father based on threats he made against
Mother and her parents. This protective order allowed Father to
maintain his parent-time schedule with Child but required him
to arrange for third parties to assist with exchanging Child. The
order also limited Father’s communications with Mother to only
those regarding Child.
¶4 	Upset 	with 	the 	parent-time 	arrangements, 	between
November 2009 and October 2010, Father repeatedly violated the
provisions of the court’s orders by threatening Mother and
refusing to return Child to her for days or weeks. In particular,
in July 2010, Father refused to return Child to Mother following
a visit, and Mother’s attorney reminded Father of the court-
ordered parent-time schedule.1 Father responded to Mother’s
attorney via text message, “This approach may cost your family
and hers more than your willing to wager its not a smart move
to try and corner a resourceful man.” Mother and her attorney
reported Father’s threats to law enforcement officials.
¶5 	On August 10, 2010, Father again refused to return Child
to Mother, but nevertheless he appeared at a hearing regarding
the parties’ divorce on August 18. At the hearing, the court
commissioner 	declared 	that 	Father’s 	messages 	to 	Mother’s
1. Father was unrepresented by counsel at the time.

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20150432-CA 	3 	2016 UT App 147
attorney could only be construed as a threat against the attorney
and his family and ordered Father to “immediately cease all
threatening communications.” The court also certified to the
district court issues of contempt of court against Father for,
among other things, his refusal to pay child support. Finally, the
commissioner ordered Father to inform the court of Child’s
whereabouts. Father stated that Child was with Father’s mother.
The court then ordered Father to wait at the court while law
enforcement officers accompanied Mother to Father’s mother’s
home to retrieve Child. Father was later convicted of criminal
custodial interference for his actions related to this incident.
¶6 	In September 2010, Father again refused to return Child to
Mother, demanding to speak personally with Mother. Although
Mother pleaded for Child’s return, by October 2, Father still had
not returned Child to Mother. Instead, he left her a menacing
voicemail in which she could hear him telling Child, who was
crying in the background, “Tell your mommy to come get you.”
Mother then applied for a writ of assistance to receive law
enforcement’s help to get Child. But the next day, October 6,
before 	the 	writ 	of 	assistance 	had 	been 	delivered 	to 	law
enforcement, Father called Mother’s parents to tell them he
would return Child at an arranged location.
¶7 	But 	instead 	of 	returning 	Child, 	Father 	left 	him 	with
Father’s sister and drove alone to the agreed-upon location.
Mother’s parents left Mother at a nearby store, and, when they
arrived at the location, Father jumped in their car and demanded
they take him to Mother. According to Mother’s parents, Father
threatened them with a handgun and threatened to shoot them if
they did not comply. They refused. At a stop sign, Mother’s
mother jumped out of the car. Father also exited the car and
threatened to shoot her if she did not return to the car. She ran
away. Father got back into the car and had Mother’s father
return them to the prior location, where he fled the scene. Father
was later apprehended in Wendover, Nevada, and charged with

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20150432-CA 	4 	2016 UT App 147
two 	counts of 	kidnapping. 	Law enforcement 	officers found
Child with Father’s sister, and he was returned to Mother.
¶8 	In addition to his previous protective order violations,
by June 2011, while he was out of jail on bail, Father was
arrested and 	charged 	with 	several 	new 	criminal 	offenses,
including 	criminal 	custodial 	interference, 	driving 	with 	a
measurable controlled substance, and reckless driving. Father
also failed to follow through with Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P) 	reporting 	requirements 	and 	tested 	positive 	for
methamphetamines.
¶9 	In 	December 	2011, 	Father 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	reduced
charges of attempted kidnapping. After pleading guilty, Father
failed to report to AP&P for his presentence interview and failed
to appear for his sentencing. Law enforcement officers later
arrested him and held him in jail until March 2012, at which time
Father 	was 	committed 	to 	the 	Utah 	State 	Prison 	for 	two
concurrent 	zero-to-five-year 	sentences 	for 	the 	attempted
kidnapping convictions.
¶10 	In May 2014, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights to Child on the grounds that Father was unfit and
that 	termination 	would 	be 	in 	Child’s best 	interest.2 At the
termination 	trial 	in 	January 	2015, 	the 	juvenile 	court 	heard
testimony 	from 	Mother, 	Father, 	Mother’s 	parents, 	Father’s
mother, 	Mother’s 	mental 	health 	counselor, 	Mother’s 	prior
attorney, and a probation officer. In particular, Mother testified
that early in their marriage Father became violent and had
outbursts of anger, and that she divorced him because of his
drug abuse. Although she did not contact the Division of Child
and Family Services to perform a welfare check, she testified that
2. 	This 	was 	Mother’s 	second 	petition 	to 	terminate 	Father’s
parental rights. She filed a similar petition in April 2013, but that
petition was voluntarily dismissed.

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she often had concerns for Child’s welfare when he was with
Father because she believed Father was neglectful when he was
using drugs. Importantly, she expressed that she was especially
worried about Child’s safety once Father is released from prison,
and stated, “I don’t think that that is very safe for my child.” But
she also testified that she felt that all Father’s anger was directed
at her. Mother further testified that although Father sent Child
cards from prison, she has kept them from Child because she
believed he is better off without Father.
¶11 	Father, representing himself, cross-examined each witness
and testified on his own behalf. He conceded that until the fall of
2010, he had paid only approximately $1,000 of the nearly
$20,000 he owed in child support. Father also testified that he
had been expelled from the prison drug treatment programs
three times and had no intention of going back because he did
not go to prison for drug issues and didn’t feel that the treatment
was “beneficial.” He further conceded that he had an extensive
criminal history and since being incarcerated had been found in
violation 	of 	a 	number 	of 	prison 	rules. 	With 	regard 	to 	his
violations of 	the 	parent-time 	order, 	Father 	testified 	that 	he
believed he was being “railroaded” by the court and that he had
not violated the terms of his parent-time because he was allowed
to keep Child for longer visits for statutorily allowed summer
vacation. With regard to the kidnapping and other threats, when
asked 	questions, 	Father 	either 	invoked 	his 	right 	not 	to
incriminate himself further3 or minimized his conduct, reasoning
that 	his 	threats 	were 	“simply 	words,” 	“there’s 	no 	physical
abuse,” and “[he’s] never put hands on any of them.”
¶12 	Mother’s parents testified about their relationship with
Child 	and 	about 	the October 2010 	kidnapping. 	Specifically,
3. It is not clear whether Father was entitled to invoke a Fifth
Amendment right, but it is not disputed on appeal and we do
not address it.

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Mother’s father testified he had often facilitated the exchange of
Child between Mother and Father, but had to stop because it
was too hard to watch Child “scream and cry” when he had to
visit Father. He also testified that he paid for Mother and Child
to have private security to protect them from Father. Finally,
Mother’s 	father 	testified 	he 	believed 	that 	since 	the 	parties’
separation he has acted as Child’s father because Child lives
with 	him 	and 	that 	he 	took 	care 	of 	Child’s 	emotional 	and
financial needs. Mother’s parents each testified that they had the
financial ability to continue to help care for Mother and Child,
that Child is a happy and well-adjusted child, and that they
believed permanency would be best for Child. Mother’s mother
also 	testified 	about 	her 	experience 	during 	the 	attempted
kidnapping. 	She 	recalled 	that 	Father 	was 	upset, 	took 	their
cellphones, and wanted them to take him to see Mother, but they
refused because it was in violation of a protective order. She
further testified that, when she jumped out of the car, Father
pointed a gun inches from her face and stated, “‘Get back in the
car or, I swear to God, I’ll blow your . . . brains all over the
sidewalk.’”
¶13 	Mother’s mental health counselor testified that, based on
Father’s criminal behavior and Mother’s descriptions of 	his
conduct, Father likely met the criteria for antisocial personality
disorder, 	which 	could 	negatively 	affect 	Child. 	Father’s
supervising 	probation 	officer 	at 	AP&P 	testified 	that 	after
supervising Father between August 2011 and March 2012 he
believed Father lacked accountability and did not appreciate the
severity of his crimes.
¶14 	Finally, Father’s mother testified about her relationship
with Child and her son. She testified that, despite many attempts
to 	contact 	Mother 	after 	the 	kidnapping, 	Mother 	refused 	to
communicate with her or let her visit Child. She explained she
thought there was “no logical explanation” for not letting Child
visit with her, because she was unaware of and had nothing to
do with her son’s criminal activity. Father’s mother also testified

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that Child idolized Father and would “light up” when Father
was around. She testified she tried to petition for grandparent
visitation rights, but the attorney she hired did not help her very
well. Mostly, she recalled the activities she used to do with Child
and testified about how she loved Child and wanted to spend
time with him.
¶15 	Although 	the 	juvenile 	court 	found 	five 	grounds 	for
termination, 	it 	ultimately 	determined 	that 	termination 	of
Father’s parental rights was not in Child’s best interest. Mother
appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶16 	On appeal, Mother raises several issues, challenging the
juvenile 	court’s 	determination 	that 	not 	terminating 	Father’s
parental rights is in Child’s best interest. In particular, she
argues 	that 	the 	court’s 	decision 	was 	clearly 	erroneous 	and
against the clear weight of the evidence. Child’s guardian ad
litem similarly argues that the juvenile court’s oral and written
findings are correct, but that “as they stand, [the findings] can
support only a best-interest determination” that termination is
appropriate. According to the guardian ad litem, the juvenile
court “erred in its choice of findings to rely on” by relying solely
on “inappropriate factors” in its best interest analysis, including
“Mother’s single status, Mother having once relied on state
assistance, [Child’s] lack of detriment or damage, grandparent
visitation, 	and 	actions 	taken 	earlier 	by 	the 	divorce 	court.”
Because 	we 	agree 	and 	determine 	that 	these 	issues 	are
dispositive, 	we 	do 	not 	address 	Mother’s 	other 	arguments
further.
¶17 	“Whether a parent’s rights should be terminated presents
a mixed question of law and fact.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12,
171 P.3d 435. “Because of the factually intense nature of such an
inquiry, the juvenile court’s decision should be afforded a high

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degree of deference.” Id. “Thus, in order to overturn the juvenile
court’s decision ‘[t]he result must be against the clear weight of
the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ¶¶ 33, 40, 147 P.3d 401).
Further, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in
the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing
of the evidence.” Id.
¶18 	“Utah law requires a court to make two distinct findings
before terminating a parent–child relationship.” In re R.A.J., 1999
UT App 329, ¶ 7, 991 P.2d 1118. “First, the court must find that
the parent is below some minimum threshold of fitness, such as
a finding that a parent is unfit or incompetent based on any of
the grounds for termination under [Utah Code section 78A-6-
507].” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing the
juvenile court the authority to “terminate all parental rights with
respect to a parent if the court finds any one” of the statute’s
enumerated grounds, including a finding that the parent “has
abandoned the child,” “has neglected or abused the child,” or
has only made “token efforts . . . to support or communicate
with the child”). “Second, the court must find that the best
interests and welfare of the child are served by terminating the
parents’ parental rights.” In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 7; see
also 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	78A-6-503(12) 	(LexisNexis 	2012)
(providing that if the court finds a parent, “by reason of his
conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any
of the grounds for termination . . . , the court shall then consider
the 	welfare 	and 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	child 	of 	paramount
importance 	in 	determining 	whether 	termination 	of 	parental
rights shall be ordered”); id. § 78A-6-506(3) (same). “A petitioner
has the burden of establishing both of these elements by clear
and convincing evidence.” In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 7;
accord Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-506(3).

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¶19 	Here, the juvenile court properly bifurcated the issues of
parental 	unfitness 	and 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	child. 	Expressly
applying section 78A-6-507, the court carefully and thoroughly
explained 	its 	reasoning 	for 	determining 	that 	five 	separate
grounds existed for finding Father unfit. In its oral ruling, the
court 	expressed 	a 	number 	of 	findings 	in 	favor 	of 	Father.
Specifically, the court explained that it believed Father “did have
a 	fairly 	close 	father–son 	relationship” 	before 	he 	kidnapped
Mother’s 	parents, 	which 	“contributed 	in 	some 	way 	to 	the
emotional 	health 	and 	support 	of 	[Child].” 	The 	court 	also
acknowledged that Father paid for a parent-time supervisor and
sent some cards to Child from prison. It also weighed heavily
that there was no evidence presented that Child had been
physically abused, witnessed any violence, or suffered from any
psychological effects, concluding “[Father] has never physically
injured the child.”
¶20 	But the court weighed the bulk of its determinations
against Father. Specifically, it found that Father “made less than
token efforts in support or communication in that his lack of
involvement in [Child’s] life over the past few years [is] a result
of his actions.” At the termination proceedings the court stated,
“[O]bviously, [Father’s] financial support was extraordinarily
lacking.” It also concluded, “[Father] has abandoned [Child] in
that he has failed to communicate with [him] by telephone or
otherwise in over 6 months.”
¶21 	The court further found that Father “is unfit in that the
crime that he committed [against Mother’s parents] is of such a
nature to prove his unfitness in caring for this child’s emotional
health 	and 	development.” 	It 	also 	expressed 	concern 	about
“[Father’s] custodial interference charges and his recent criminal
history,” stating that his “behavior is absolutely deplorable.” The
court did not believe Father was remorseful for his actions
against Mother’s parents, explaining, “I’m not convinced those
are genuine feelings on his part.” The court also determined that
Father “has neglected the child” because “the length [of his

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20150432-CA 	10 	2016 UT App 147
prison sentences] would deprive the child of a normal home for
one 	year 	and 	that 	there 	is 	a 	history 	of 	violent 	behavior.”
“[E]qually 	deplorable,” 	the 	court 	specified, 	is 	the 	“kind 	of
threat[s]” made via text message to Mother and her attorney; the
court opined, “No attorney doing their job should ever have to
receive 	a 	text 	message 	like 	that 	threatening 	himself 	or 	his
family” and “even in a . . . nasty divorce situation, that might be
taking things one step too far.”
¶22 	Further, although the court discounted the credibility of
Mother’s counselor’s testimony regarding Father’s psychological
evaluation, 	it 	gave 	Father’s 	probation 	officer’s 	testimony
“considerable weight.” Particularly, the court expressed concern
about Father’s drug dependency and mental health issues and
his failure to rectify them. It stated, “I’m . . . troubled that there
are no verifiable attempts by [Father] to improve his current
situation.” It further stated, “[T]here is a severe lack of follow-
through there to get himself in a situation where his mental
health is such as to be stable and healthy and happy and
productive.” Thus, the court concluded that Father “has only
made token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent.”
¶23 	Despite 	the 	lengthy 	and 	careful 	examination 	of 	the
evidence supporting its finding that Father is an unfit parent, the
court made few findings with regard to Child’s best interest. The
court concluded that Mother failed to meet her burden that
termination was in Child’s best interest because (1) there was a
lack of another person to step in to the role of Father; (2) Child
“could benefit from a positive, loving, nurturing relationship
with [Father and Father’s] extended family”; (3) “[t]he lack of
evidence that a relationship with [Father’s] extended family is or
would be a detriment to the child”; (4) there was “no evidence of
psychological 	or 	emotional 	damage 	from 	child’s 	previous
relationship with [Father]”; and (5) “[t]he District Court in the
divorce action did not find it necessary to cutoff contact between
[Child] and [Father] after becoming aware of the October 2010
incidents.” In making these findings the court explained only

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that 	it 	gave 	“little 	consideration” 	to 	the 	fact 	that 	Child’s
grandfather (Mother’s father) has stepped in as a role model and
caregiver, concluding that “it is a matter of policy in the state
that a child have two parents.” It then explained,
I do, however, believe that this child could benefit
from a positive, loving, nurturing relationship with
his extended family. I think he has a second family
in his life, and having that second family in his life
would be in his best interest. And if I were to
terminate [Father’s] parental rights today, I would
be going against what I think is best for this child
in that regard.
We have an extended family here who has
not proven to be any direct detriment to this child.
The court further explained it was not sure that Father would be
able to have a positive, loving, nurturing relationship with
Child, but believed that, with Father’s family’s support, that
kind of relationship could be possible. The court restated that it
“was so surprised to find that there was no evidence presented
that this child was actually suffering any psychological damage
or effect from his previous relationship with [Father].” Finally,
the court found it “compelling that the divorce court, even when
becoming aware of these inciden[ts] in October of 2010, did not
feel that it was necessary to prohibit [Father’s] contact with this
child,” 	then 	asked 	rhetorically, 	“[W]hy 	would 	I”? 	Thus, 	it
concluded there was not “any compelling reason to terminate
[Father’s] rights if [Child] is not suffering that detriment.”
¶24 	Determining 	a 	child’s 	best 	interest 	in 	termination 	of
parental rights proceedings is a subjective assessment based on
the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances. 	“To 	determine 	whether
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child,
the 	juvenile 	court 	must 	consider 	‘the 	physical, 	mental, 	or
emotional condition and needs of the child.’” In re T.E., 2011 UT

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51, ¶ 18, 266 P.3d 739 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1)(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). When the child is not in the parent’s
custody, Utah Code section 78A-6-509(b) also requires the court
to consider the effort the parent has “made to adjust their
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make [restoring the
parent–child relationship] in the child’s best interest.” But “the
court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of
what is in the child’s best interest.” In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18;
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509 (2012). Accordingly, it is
proper, in the context of a best-interest determination, for the
court to consider the child’s bond with caregivers, their need for
permanency and stability, and the potential risk of harm if
returned to the parents’ care. See In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118,
¶¶ 30–33, 208 P.3d 1058 (affirming the grant of a mother’s
petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and relying on
evidence that the children’s medical and emotional needs were
met by the mother and that the children were “doing well” in
their new schools).
¶25 	Furthermore, 	“while 	evidence 	of 	unfitness 	may 	be
probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best
interest 	analysis 	includes 	consideration 	of 	the 	impact 	of
termination 	on 	the 	child, 	rather than 	simply 	on 	evaluating
whether the statutory grounds for termination have been met.”
In re M.J., 2013 UT App 122, ¶ 26, 302 P.3d 485 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, evidence that
proves 	one 	or 	more 	statutory 	grounds 	for 	termination 	of
parental rights may also constitute evidence demonstrating that
termination is in the child’s best interest, but the court’s focus
should be on the impact of termination on the child. In re J.D.,
2011 UT App 184, ¶ 34, 257 P.3d 1062 (Orme, J., concurring)
(“Procedurally, [b]ifurcating the [parental termination] analysis
does not require courts to separately hear and consider evidence
pertaining to unfitness and best interest.” (alterations in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “And legally,
[i]f the parent–child relationship has been destroyed by the

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parent’s conduct, or lack of conduct, it is usually in the best
interest of the child to terminate that relationship.” Id. (alteration
in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is
an unusual case where grounds for termination are found but
termination is held not to be in the child’s best interest. Id. ¶ 35
(explaining 	that 	these 	types 	of 	cases 	“are 	rare”). 	“Indeed,
although 	the 	requirement 	of 	bifurcated 	analysis 	is 	clearly
established by statute and jurisprudence as a practical matter,
where grounds for termination are established, the conclusion
that termination will be in [a child’s] best interest follows almost
automatically.” Id. ¶ 34 (citations omitted). Accordingly, “the
two 	requirements, 	while 	theoretically 	distinct, 	usually 	are
satisfied hand-in-glove.” Id. ¶ 36. Thus, although the court must
consider the enumerated factors in Utah Code sections 78A-6-
507 and 78A-6-509 in finding the grounds for termination when
the child is not in the custody of the parent, the court should also
consider these factors in deciding whether termination of the
parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest.
¶26 	Here, the juvenile court did not consider its findings
under 	section 	78A-6-507 	in 	making 	its 	best-interest
determination; there are no references to those findings in the
court’s oral or written rulings. Rather, the court’s determination
focused on ideals and speculative possibilities in the future. But
in view of its factual determinations, the court’s decision not to
terminate is against the clear weight of the evidence and leaves
us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re
B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.
¶27 	The 	court 	improperly 	discounted 	Father’s 	criminal
conduct, neglectfulness, and nominal efforts to adjust simply
because there was a possibility he could improve in the future
with help from his family. But
the weight which a juvenile court must give any
present ability evidence is necessarily dependent
on the amount of time during which the parent

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20150432-CA 	14 	2016 UT App 147
displayed an unwillingness or inability to improve
his or her conduct and on any destructive effect the
parent’s 	past 	conduct 	or 	the 	parent’s 	delay 	in
rectifying the conduct has had on the parent’s
ability to resume a parent–child relationship with
the child. Thus, although the court has a duty to
look forward—i.e., to look at the parent’s present
ability and the likelihood that the parent will be
able 	to 	resume 	parenting 	within 	a 	reasonable
time—the court must consider such evidence in
light 	of 	the 	parent’s 	past 	conduct 	and 	its
debilitating effect on the parent–child relationship.
That 	is, 	if 	a 	parent 	has 	demonstrated 	some
improvement in parenting ability but not a strong
likelihood that the parent can provide a proper
home for the child in the very near future, after a
long period of separation, a history of problems
and failure to remedy, and deterioration of the
relationship between the child and parent, this
court 	should 	not 	overturn 	a 	court’s 	order
terminating parental rights.
See 	in re 	M.L., 	965 P.2d 	551, 	561–62 	(Utah 	Ct. 	App. 	1998)
(footnotes omitted). Here, the court had just determined that
Father was unlikely to improve in the future and had “only
made token efforts” to avoid being unfit. Specifically, in finding
that Father was unfit, the court expressed concern that Father
had a complete lack of accountability, he felt no remorse for his
conduct toward Mother’s parents, he refused to seek treatment
for his mental health and drug issues, and his financial support
had been nominal. The court went so far as to say, “I’m just not
convinced that [Father] ever will provide support for this child. I
do think he sees it as a burden and an obligation that he’s not
obligated to follow through with unless he’s getting what he
wants.” 	Furthermore, 	although 	the 	court 	determined 	that
Father’s mother “was not involved or an accomplice to [Father’s]

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20150432-CA 	15 	2016 UT App 147
attempts to extend his parent-time,” the record is clear that even
when he was violating the parent-time order and failing to
properly support Child, Father received assistance from his
family, including his mother and sister. Yet, in explaining its
hope for Father to have a positive relationship with Child in the
future, the court indicated a positive relationship could only
exist “with his extended family on [his] side.”
¶28 	The court concluded the evidence did not demonstrate
that 	Father’s 	family 	would 	be 	any 	detriment 	to 	Child. 	It
determined that Child needed a person to “legally” step into a
role as parent and that he “could benefit from a positive, loving,
nurturing 	relationship 	with 	his 	extended 	family.” 	Although
ideally children are raised by two nurturing parents and have
the benefit of a positive relationship with an extended family,
such is not the case in many children’s lives today. See, e.g., In re
B.O., 2011 UT App 215, ¶ 14, 262 P.3d 46 (affirming termination
of parental rights where the child was placed in a single-parent
home); In re C.A., 2006 UT App 159U, para. 3 (per curiam)
(affirming termination of parental rights where adoptive home
had not yet been found). Indeed, the children who are the
subject of these types of termination proceedings often have
fractured and disjointed lives, and frequently rely on a single
parent or adults other than their parents to provide for their
most basic needs. Although we may consider the fact that
Mother is single and that Child may benefit from having two
parents and a relationship with extended family, those factors
alone are not determinative and do not outweigh the realities of
his circumstances—Child is currently in a stable and permanent
home with a parent who is capable of supporting him and Father
has done almost nothing to provide for him. So, though the court
determined that both Mother and Father were often self-serving,
the court also determined that it was Father’s conduct that
destroyed the parent–child relationship in this case. Mother
complied with the court’s parent-time orders and gave Father
every opportunity to have a relationship with Child.

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20150432-CA 	16 	2016 UT App 147
¶29 	It is common to affirm termination of parental rights
where 	children 	have 	bonded 	with 	their 	caregivers 	or 	are
thriving. See, e.g., In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 21 (considering
that, 	although 	they 	were 	not 	yet 	in 	an 	adoptive 	home,
termination was appropriate and the children at issue were
adoptable 	because 	they 	were 	“mentally, 	physically, 	and
emotionally well” and “capable of bonding in a stable home
despite their connection with” their unfit mother); In re T.H.,
2009 UT App 340U, para. 5 (per curiam) (considering that child
was thriving in foster home); In re C.B., 2009 UT App 290U, para.
7 (per curiam) (explaining that children had stability and had
bonded with foster family). Based on the court’s undisputed
findings of fact, Child has lived with Mother and her parents for
seven of the eight years he has been alive, and he was happy and
well-adjusted. The court also found that Mother and her parents
“have provided for the child financially during that time” and
“intend to continue to support” him. Although no evidence was
presented that Child has been psychologically or physically
harmed by Father’s unfitness, the evidence does show that
between 	June 	2009 	and 	October 	2010, 	Child’s 	life 	was
significantly disrupted. As the court found, during that time,
Child “had involvement with law enforcement as a result of the
troublesome relationship between [Mother] and [Father].” And,
though 	Child 	was 	not 	present 	when 	Father 	kidnapped 	his
grandparents at gunpoint in an attempt to reach Mother, police
had trouble locating him; and Child, Mother, and Mother’s
parents had to stay the night in a hotel out of fear of Father.
¶30 	Father last saw Child over four years ago (more than half
of Child’s life) in March 2012, but aside from a few cards and
letters he has not communicated with Child, and has repeatedly
failed to adjust his condition and circumstances, such as by
completing drug treatment or mental health counseling, to make
himself fit to parent. Even when Father’s parent-time rights were
limited to supervised visitation once per week, between October
2010 and March 2012, Child’s and Father’s relationship was not

In re G.J.C.
20150432-CA 	17 	2016 UT App 147
consistent. 	Father 	did 	not 	support 	Child, 	and 	his 	criminal
conduct 	continued: 	in 	May 	2011, 	Father 	pleaded 	guilty 	to
violating a protective order and was sentenced to thirty days in
jail, and in November 2011, he was found guilty of two counts of
criminal interference with custodial rights and sentenced to
serve 180 days in jail.
¶31 	In 	determining 	Child’s 	best 	interest, 	the 	speculative
possibility of Father experiencing a dramatic transformation and
providing Child with a “positive, loving, nurturing relationship
with his extended family” must be weighed against Father’s
real-world actions as found by the court—his escalating and
repeated 	criminal 	conduct, 	his 	lack 	of 	remorse 	and
accountability for his crimes, his lack of support for Child, his
unaddressed drug addiction and mental health issues, and his
failure to make more than token efforts to adjust. Based on the
juvenile court’s own findings of fact, we must conclude that this
balance 	tips 	decisively 	in 	favor 	of 	termination 	of 	Father’s
parental rights.4
4. Another 	concern 	that 	touches—not 	insubstantially—on
Child’s best interest is Father’s pattern of violence and threats
toward Mother, her parents, and her attorney, a pattern that is
coupled with Father’s troubling sense of victimization and a
failure to take responsibility. While, as the court noted, Father
might improve, it seems at least as likely that the pattern he has
already 	established 	would 	continue 	or 	even 	escalate. 	It 	is
difficult to see how Father’s prior obsessive focus on Mother and
those connected with her in defiance of court admonishments,
orders, and criminal charges does not substantially implicate
Child’s best interest in a very negative way. A decision that this
father, with the potential for any physical or parental proximity
to the child and those closes to him, seems to hold much more
threat than promise.

In re G.J.C.
20150432-CA 	18 	2016 UT App 147
¶32 	We 	recognize 	that the 	decision 	to 	terminate 	parental
rights is among the most difficult of decisions, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court or reweigh
the evidence. But we agree with Child’s guardian ad litem on
appeal that “[t]he juvenile court’s oral and written findings as
they stand can support only a best-interest determination” that
termination is appropriate. We also recognize that termination
leaves Father’s family without remedy and less of a chance to be
involved 	in 	Child’s 	life. 	But 	Mother 	and 	her 	parents 	each
testified that they want what is best for Child, and the evidence
supports a termination of Father’s parental rights.
CONCLUSION
¶33 	We will not engage in a reweighing of the evidence. But
even 	viewing 	the 	evidence 	and 	the 	court’s 	findings 	with
deference 	to 	the 	court’s 	more 	advantageous 	position, 	we
conclude that its conclusion that termination is not in Child’s
best interest is against the clear weight of the evidence, and
leaves this court with a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s decision not to
terminate Father’s parental rights and remand with the directive
to enter an order consistent with this opinion.