In re J.H.L.

2026 UT App 124
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF J.H.L.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
J.H.L.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20241183-CA
Filed August 6, 2026
Second District Juvenile Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Robert G. Neill
No. 1198819
Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Christopher A. Bates,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	A family fostered a fourteen-year-old boy, JHL. After some
disturbing behavior came to light, the placement was terminated,
and JHL was returned to the care of the foster agency. About a
year later, allegations surfaced that JHL had sexually abused the
children in the foster family. A petition was subsequently filed in
juvenile court, alleging sodomy, sexual abuse, and lewdness. At
trial, JHL testified in his own defense. He now complains that the
court did not adequately advise him about the danger of self-
incrimination 	as 	required 	by 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of 	Juvenile

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Procedure. We see no error in the juvenile court’s challenged
actions and therefore affirm its disposition of the case.
BACKGROUND
The Sexual Abuse
¶2 	Beginning in May 2021, Michael and Nicole were foster
parents to JHL, who was fourteen years old at the time.1 They had
five other children in their home, including John (age ten), Ariel
(age six), and Abilene (age four).
¶3 	John shared a bunk bed in the same bedroom as JHL, with
John sleeping on the top and JHL sleeping on the bottom. John
stated that JHL would sometimes hide under a blanket and cause
the bed to shake. When John asked JHL what he was doing, JHL
responded 	that 	he 	“was 	masturbating.” 	Specifically, 	John
explained that JHL moved the blanket and showed him his penis
as he was grabbing it and rubbing it. John demonstrated what he
saw by making an up-and-down motion with his hand. John said
that he masturbated too at JHL’s suggestion.
¶4 	John also described a “vampire game” in which he and JHL
would chase each other around and pretend to bite one another’s
shoulders. JHL started sucking on John’s neck during the game,
prompting John to tell him to stop.
¶5 	JHL also used his cell phone to show John pornographic
photos and videos of people having sex. And he showed John
videos of people talking about pills that made their “private[s]”
bigger. John later told his parents about the pornography, but he
1. We use the same pseudonyms for JHL’s foster parents and
foster siblings that were employed by the State in its briefing.

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did not tell them about the masturbation incident because JHL
had “threatened to hurt” him.
¶6 	Ariel 	and 	Abilene 	also 	complained 	of 	inappropriate
behavior from JHL. Specifically, Ariel said that, when JHL was in
the living room with the two sisters, JHL pulled down her pants
and put his penis “in [her] bum.” She said he also put his penis in
her mouth and moved it “up and down.” Ariel said that JHL did
the 	same 	thing 	to 	Abilene. 	Ariel 	specified 	that 	this 	abuse
happened more than one time to both her and Abilene. Abilene
revealed that JHL also touched her “privates” with his hands.
Ariel and Abilene didn’t tell their parents about what had
happened at the time.
¶7 	After about six weeks of JHL staying with them, Michael
and Nicole became concerned about JHL’s interactions with John
related to the “vampire game.” They were also troubled by “some
issues 	with 	pornography” 	because 	JHL 	was 	“looking 	at
pornography any time he got an [electronic] device” and John was
being exposed to pornography. They told the foster agency about
JHL’s behavior, leading to the termination of his placement in
their home.
¶8 	About a year later, Ariel told Nicole that JHL had “done
bad 	things” 	to 	her 	and 	Abilene, 	and 	Nicole 	shared 	this
information with Michael. This led to the involvement of law
enforcement and Children’s Justice Center (CJC) interviews of
John, Ariel, and Abilene.
The Proceedings
¶9 	The State filed a petition against JHL setting forth three
allegations of sodomy on a child and one allegation each of sexual
abuse of a child and lewdness involving a child. The State
arraigned JHL on these allegations. While there is no transcript of
the arraignment in the record, the minute entry states that “[a]ll

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rights [were] explained” to JHL, “including the right to trial, the
right to have the state meet its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the right to confront the state’s witnesses, the
right to have witnesses compelled to appear, the right to appeal,
and the right to remain silent.”
¶10 	At trial, the State’s witnesses included Michael, Nicole,
John, and Ariel, who testified to the facts described above. The
State 	also 	introduced 	recordings 	of 	the 	CJC 	interviews.
Additionally, the CJC interviewer testified, explaining that it is
common for children’s courtroom testimony to differ somewhat
from what they reported during a CJC interview due to the
amount of time between those events or because the courtroom
environment is frightening. Furthermore, the interviewer noted
that children frequently have a hard time remembering the exact
number of times something took place.
¶11 	After the State rested, JHL took the witness stand. Before
he did so, JHL’s lawyer (Counsel) stated, “I have gone over my
client’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination a number
of times with him.” Counsel also averred that he had spoken to
JHL’s guardian ad litem, who had “no objection to him waiving”
his 	constitutional 	right 	against 	self-incrimination. 	Counsel
nonetheless reiterated, “I want to just put on the record that I
explained to [JHL] that he does not have to testify, that it’s the
state’s burden of proof, that if he testifies, he’s waiving that right
against self-incrimination. And he would be subjecting himself to
answering questions by me and by the prosecutor and would be
under obligation to answer those questions.” Counsel concluded
by saying, “And he has said to me every time that this is the way
that he would like to proceed, even understanding that he does
not have to testify.”
¶12 	Once 	on 	the 	stand, 	JHL 	denied 	all 	allegations 	of
inappropriate 	behavior, 	including 	exposing 	himself 	to 	John,
showing him pornography, and inappropriately touching Ariel

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and 	Abilene. 	During 	his 	testimony, 	he 	offered 	alternative
explanations for several of the accusations. As for the bed shaking,
he claimed that it was caused by the family’s dogs jumping on the
bottom 	bunk. 	However, 	his 	description 	of 	the 	dogs 	was
contradictory; he initially called them “little dogs” but later stated
they were larger. He denied showing John pornography, stating
that he showed him only a video of a couple kissing on the beach
in their swimsuits. He also claimed that a video John thought was
about enlarging private parts was actually about taking steroids
for muscle growth. JHL did admit to viewing pornography in
private on one occasion, which he had discussed with Michael
and Nicole. He acknowledged playing a “vampire game” with
John but insisted the game was John’s idea. He denied biting
John’s neck, describing his actions as “just kind of a little sucking”
and claiming that the specific incident during the game that
concerned Michael and Nicole was merely an accident.
¶13 	JHL expressly denied any inappropriate contact with Ariel
or Abilene, asserting that he treated them like his own sisters and
that the girls were almost never left alone. He also accused Ariel
of being dishonest in the past, citing an incident where she ruined
a dress but blamed it on her younger sister.
¶14 	At 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the 	trial, 	the 	juvenile 	court
determined that the State successfully proved the allegations of
sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of 	a child beyond a
reasonable 	doubt, 	relying 	on 	the 	testimony 	and 	interview
statements provided by the children. The allegation of lewdness
involving a child was dismissed because the statute of limitations
had expired.
¶15 	The court deemed the children to be credible witnesses.
Specifically, the court noted that they lacked any motive to lie,
used age-appropriate language, and showed no signs of having
been coached. Furthermore, their accounts were corroborated by
other evidence: Ariel and Abilene gave matching descriptions of

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the abuse during separate interviews, and Michael’s testimony
regarding JHL’s frequent use of pornography backed up John’s
claim that JHL had shown him inappropriate material. The court
reasoned that while some minor details may have faded from the
children’s memories due to their young ages and due to the time
that had passed since the abuse, the core facts of the abuse
remained consistent.
¶16 	In contrast, the court found JHL to be an unreliable
witness. The judge characterized his testimony as full of “half
truths” 	and 	“quarter 	truths” 	designed 	to 	excuse 	his 	own
behavior by rebutting the children’s allegations. Specifically, the
court noted that JHL’s denial of his pornography use was
directly contradicted 	by 	Michael’s 	testimony, 	and 	the 	court
outright 	rejected 	his 	alternative 	explanations 	for 	specific
incidents—such as blaming a shaking bunk bed on dogs or
claiming 	he 	showed 	John 	a 	video 	about 	muscle-building
steroids—as “incredible.”
¶17 	In addition to ordering JHL to complete a sexual behavior
risk assessment, the court ordered him to have no unsupervised
contact 	with 	any 	child 	under 	fourteen 	years 	old 	and 	no
unsupervised access to the internet. The court later placed JHL on
formal probation, ordered him to complete community service,
and ordered him to have no contact with the victims or their
family.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 	JHL appeals, arguing that the juvenile court plainly erred
when it did not expressly advise him that anything he testified
about at trial could be used against him. “Because a claim of plain
error . . . involves no lower court ruling, we decide the claim in

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the first instance as a matter of law.” State v. Dew, 2025 UT App
22, ¶ 28, 566 P.3d 53, cert. denied, 568 P.3d 264 (Utah 2025).2
ANALYSIS
¶19 	JHL argues that he was “inadequately advised by the
Juvenile 	Court 	of 	his 	right 	against 	compulsory 	self-
incrimination.” Because he “was not told that if he testified, not
2. JHL also argues that exceptional circumstances justify reaching
the same unpreserved issue. “The exceptional circumstances
doctrine allows this court to reach an unpreserved issue in cases
involving rare procedural anomalies. We apply the exception
sparingly, reserving it for the most unusual circumstances where
our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved
for appeal would result in manifest injustice.” State v. Munguia,
2011 UT 5, ¶ 11, 253 P.3d 1082 (cleaned up). JHL does not identify
“any rare procedural anomaly or other exceptional circumstance
that might justify his failure to preserve” this issue. See State v.
Guzman, 2018 UT App 93, ¶ 48 n.12, 427 P.3d 401; see also Kelly v.
Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 21 n.3, 507
P.3d 357 (“Because [the plaintiff] has not demonstrated that a rare
procedural anomaly prevented or excused him from raising this
argument 	before 	the 	district 	court, 	he 	has 	not 	shown 	that
exceptional circumstances overcome our preservation rule.”). He
simply asserts that the alleged “incomplete advisement regarding
[his] right against compulsory self-incrimination resulted in an
uninformed, and therefore unknowing and involuntary ‘choice’
. . . to testify.” But a “rare procedural anomaly” does not directly
concern the alleged error itself; rather, it concerns some defective
procedural circumstance that prevented a claimed error from
being raised before the juvenile court and thereby preserved for
appeal. That’s not what happened here, and JHL makes no
assertion to the contrary. “Accordingly, we decline to address this
argument further.” Guzman, 2018 UT App 93, ¶ 48 n.12.

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only would the prosecutor cross-examine him, but that anything
he said would be used against him,” JHL argues that “his decision
to testify cannot be deemed knowing or voluntary.” Thus, he
argues that the juvenile court ran afoul of rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of 	Juvenile 	Procedure 	and 	the 	constitutional 	principles
underlying it. See Utah R. Juv. P. 26(a)(7) (“A minor who is the
subject of a delinquency petition . . . shall be advised of the [right]
. . . to remain silent and to be advised that anything the minor says
can and will be used against the minor in any court proceedings
. . . .”). Due to this alleged error, JHL asks that we reverse his
adjudications and remand this matter for a new trial. JHL
recognizes that he did not preserve this issue for appellate review
and therefore asks us to review it for plain error. We reject this
claim because JHL has failed to show that an error occurred.
¶20 	“To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful. If any one of these
requirements is not met, plain error is not established.” State v.
Cissel, 2024 UT App 139, ¶ 18, 558 P.3d 911 (cleaned up), cert.
denied, 564 P.3d 956 (Utah 2025). “For an error to be obvious to the
trial court, the law governing the error must be clear or plainly
settled.” State v. Van Huizen, 2019 UT 1, ¶ 30, 435 P.3d 202 (cleaned
up). The law is clear or plainly settled when, for example, there is
a Utah case addressing the “specific factual scenario” at issue or
the plain language of the applicable statute or rule makes clear
that there was error. See id. ¶¶ 31–32. Stated differently, “an error
is obvious if from a review of the record, the appellate court is led
to the conclusion that given the circumstances, the trial court
should have been aware that an error was being committed at the
time.” State v. Marquina, 2020 UT 66, ¶ 30, 478 P.3d 37 (cleaned
up). JHL’s claim of error falls short for two reasons, which we
address in turn.

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A. 	Inadequate Record
¶21 	The first problem with JHL’s claim of plain error is that the
record he supplied is inadequate to show that the claimed error
took place at all. “A party bringing a claim of error before this
court has the duty and responsibility to support such allegation
by an adequate record. When an appellant fails to provide an
adequate record on appeal, this court presumes the regularity of
the proceedings below.” State v. Case, 2020 UT App 81, ¶ 19, 467
P.3d 893 (cleaned up). It naturally flows from this point that
“when crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing
portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.”
State v. Chettero, 2013 UT 9, ¶ 32, 297 P.3d 582 (cleaned up); see also
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah 1994) (“In the absence
of a complete record we assume that the proceedings at trial were
regular and proper.” (cleaned up)).
¶22 	Such is the case here. The record indicates that the juvenile
court held no fewer than fourteen hearings in this case. But JHL
has 	provided 	transcripts 	from 	only 	two 	of 	these 	fourteen
hearings—the trial and the disposition hearing. Notably, he has
not provided the transcript for the arraignment hearing, the
minute entry for which clearly states that all of JHL’s rights were
explained to him, “including the right to trial, the right to have the
state meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
right to confront the state’s witnesses, the right to have witnesses
compelled to appear, the right to appeal, and the right to remain
silent.” 	Nor 	has 	he 	provided 	the 	transcript 	for 	another
preliminary hearing that took place about six months later, the
minute entry for which states that the juvenile court informed
“the parties [of] the importance of [JHL] being allowed ample
opportunity to speak with [Counsel] and [his] guardian ad litem
so he [would be] able to understand his rights and the matters”
before the court.

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¶23 	In the absence of a complete record of what the juvenile
court told JHL—particularly regarding what was communicated
at the two proceedings noted above—“we presume the regularity
of the proceedings below,” see State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13,
69 P.3d 1278, including that the juvenile court did what the
minutes say it did in apprising JHL of all of his rights.
¶24 	Given the lack of an adequate record that shows anything
to the contrary, JHL’s claim of plain error fails at the threshold.
There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that the court
failed to warn him that anything he said could be used against
him.
B. 	No Obvious Error
¶25 	The second fault in JHL’s claim is that he has not shown
the juvenile court was required to warn him that his trial
testimony could be used against him, especially in light of the
statement made by Counsel that he had explained to JHL that he
would be waiving his right against self-incrimination if he elected
to testify.
¶26 	Rule 26 states that a “minor who is the subject of a
delinquency petition. . . shall be advised of the [right] . . . to remain
silent and to be advised that anything the minor says can and will
be used against the minor in any court proceedings.” Utah R. Juv.
P. 26(a)(7) (emphasis added). This provision is phrased in the
passive voice; the rule does not specify which person or entity is
to do the advising. In particular, nothing in the rule states that this
warning must come from the juvenile court. As noted, the trial
transcript clearly indicates that Counsel explained to JHL his right
against self-incrimination and his right not to testify. Counsel also
explained to JHL that he would be required to answer some
difficult questions from both him and the prosecutor if he chose
to testify.

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¶27 	Given these assertions from Counsel, two things would
have been clear to the juvenile court. First, by Counsel’s telling
JHL that he would have to answer some tough questions if he
testified, the juvenile court would have concluded that JHL knew
that his answers could potentially hurt his defense. In other
words, telling JHL about his obligation to answer questions from
Counsel and the prosecutor may well have sufficed to warn him
that his testimony could be used against him. In no way would it
have been obvious to the juvenile court that a more fulsome
warning was needed.
¶28 	Second, there is nothing in rule 26 that would have
indicated to the juvenile court that more needed to be done to
advise JHL of his rights. Counsel said that he had explained JHL’s
rights to him. And there is every reason to believe that the juvenile
court would have reasonably concluded that this explanation
included an admonition that JHL’s testimony could be used
against him. Moreover, we know from the limited record that
“[a]ll rights” were explained to JHL at the time of his arraignment.
And nothing in the plain text of rule 26 requires that a warning
given at one point during the proceedings must be repeated later
in the proceedings, for example, when a minor testifies at trial, as
happened here. See id. Under the presumption of regularity, see
Case, 2020 UT App 81, ¶ 19, JHL had already received the warning
at his arraignment. The juvenile court knew this had happened
and would have had no reason to revisit the issue prior to JHL’s
testimony at trial.
¶29 	Because JHL identifies no error—much less an obvious
one—in how the juvenile court addressed his decision to testify at
trial, this claim necessarily fails.3
3. JHL’s complaint of plain error also falls short on prejudice
grounds. See State v. Thompson, 2025 UT App 185, ¶ 19, 583 P.3d
(continued…)

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CONCLUSION
¶30 	JHL’s claim of plain error fails for two compelling reasons.
He 	has 	neglected 	to 	provide 	an 	adequate 	record 	of 	the
proceedings, including a transcript of a hearing in which he was
advised of his rights. And the plain text of rule 26 imposes no duty
on the juvenile court to undertake the admonition prior to a minor
offering trial testimony, especially where the minor’s attorney
assures the court that the attorney has already explained to the
minor what the minor’s rights are.
¶31 	Affirmed.
1095 (stating that failing to demonstrate prejudice proves fatal to
a plain error claim). Even if JHL had chosen not to testify after
receiving a perfectly worded rule 26 warning from the court at
trial, he would have still been adjudicated delinquent. The
children’s testimony—at trial and through the CJC interviews—
was 	deemed 	credible 	and 	corroborated 	by 	the 	court, 	a
determination that did not depend on JHL’s testimony. In other
words, the credibility of their testimony did not rest in any way
on JHL’s testimony. Therefore, the court did not rely on JHL’s
testimony to reach the conclusion that the State had proved the
allegations of sodomy and sexual abuse beyond a reasonable
doubt. 	That 	determination 	was 	moored 	in 	the 	children’s
testimony, with JHL’s testimony being a non-factor. The juvenile
court’s finding that JHL was not credible was not a reason it found
the children’s testimony credible. The children’s testimony was
credible in its own right, independent of JHL’s testimony. Simply
put, because JHL cannot show his testimony affected the outcome,
his claim of plain error also fails on prejudice grounds.