Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens

2026 UT App 68
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
BAADSGAARD F AMILY T RUST,
Appellant,
v.
R OBERT J. S TEVENS AND S UZANNE B. S TEVENS ,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20240921-CA
Filed April 30, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Thomas Low
No. 200400560
Jens P. Nielson, Attorney for Appellant
Joseph G. Ballstaedt, Attorney for Appellees
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	The Baadsgaard Family Trust (the Trust) and its neighbors,
Robert and Suzanne Stevens, mediated the Trust’s lawsuit to quiet
title to a portion of the Stevenses’ property, culminating in a
settlement agreement that the district court later enforced. The
Stevenses then moved to set aside the enforcement, arguing that
the Trust had failed to disclose its recent acquisition of another
adjoining parcel of property—a fact they asserted would have
affected the tenor and outcome of the mediation negotiations. The
court concluded that 	the Trust had 	a duty to disclose the
acquisition 	and 	accordingly 	vacated 	its 	enforcement 	of 	the
settlement agreement. On appeal, the Trust contends that the
court abused its discretion in doing so. We disagree and affirm.

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BACKGROUND
¶2 	A longstanding fence marked the purported boundary at
the north end of the Trust’s property and the south end of the
Stevenses’ adjoining property.1 The Trust raised hay and grazed
cattle on its property up to the fenceline, though it was later
discovered that this was not the correct boundary line and the
Trust was using a portion of the Stevenses’ property.
¶3 	The Trust sued the Stevenses, seeking to quiet title to the
disputed parcel under a theory of boundary by acquiescence. This
claim required the Trust to show, among other things, that it
occupied the disputed parcel up to the fenceline and that it and
the Stevenses were “adjoining landowners . . . for a period of at
least 20 years.” See B.G.T.S. Props., LLC v. Balls Bros. Farm, LLC,
2024 UT App 37, ¶ 15, 547 P.3d 215 (quotation simplified).
¶4 	In their pro se answer, the Stevenses acknowledged that
the Trust’s cattle had grazed on the disputed parcel. But they
stated 	that 	access 	to 	the 	disputed 	parcel 	“through
mosquito-infested tall grass . . . was neither easy nor pleasant.”
They further indicated that the disputed parcel was “mostly
sagebrush” that provided “very little forage for animals to feed
upon.” They also asserted that their property had been cleared of
“407,780 lbs of debris,” “a third or more” of which came from the
disputed parcel. And they alleged that “aerial views” of the
disputed parcel showed evidence of an irrigation ditch south of
the 	fenceline, 	which 	corresponded 	to the 	deeded 	boundary
between the disputed parcel and the Trust’s property.
¶5 	The 	parties 	agreed 	to 	mediate 	the 	Trust’s
boundary-by-acquiescence 	claim 	and 	signed 	an 	agreement
1. The Stevenses’ property includes two parcels, but for ease, we
refer to them collectively as one.

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20240921-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 68
outlining the terms of the mediation. One such term was a
provision (the Honesty Provision) that stated,
We agree to be honest and to completely disclose all
relevant information and documents concerning
this matter to the other party and the mediator. This
includes all documentation that would be available
through the discovery process in a normal legal
proceeding. If either party fails to disclose fully and
honestly, the agreement reached in mediation may
be voided.
¶6 	At the end of mediation, the parties signed a settlement
agreement in which the Stevenses agreed to deed a portion of the
disputed parcel to the Trust. Following a period of inaction by the
Stevenses, the Trust filed a motion in district court to enforce the
settlement agreement. The court granted the motion, concluding,
among other things, that the Stevenses had made “no argument
that the agreement is factually incorrect or factually unsupported,
such as due to fraud or mistake of fact or mistake of law.”
¶7 	But unbeknownst to the court at the time it enforced the
settlement 	agreement—and 	apparently 	unbeknownst 	to 	the
Stevenses at the time of mediation—shortly before filing its
complaint, the Trust had purchased another small parcel of land
(the East Parcel) located between a portion of its property and a
portion of the Stevenses’ property. Robert Stevens later declared
that, prior to mediation, he had reviewed his property and the
Trust’s property on “the Parcel Map Website” and believed that
the East Parcel already belonged to the Trust “because when [he]
clicked on the [Trust’s] Parcel, it encompassed the East Parcel.”
¶8 	After learning that the Trust’s acquisition of the East Parcel
was recent, the Stevenses filed a notice of appeal from the
enforcement order as well as a motion in the district court to
vacate the enforcement order under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. In their 60(b) motion, the Stevenses argued

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20240921-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 68
that they “did not enter the settlement agreement based on true
and 	accurate 	facts, 	which 	were 	known 	to 	[the 	Trust] 	but
concealed.” The Stevenses claimed that the Trust’s failure to
disclose the recent acquisition of the East Parcel “distorted the
tone and factual discussions at mediation” and that they “never
would have entered into the settlement agreement had [the
Trust], as it agreed in writing to do in [the Honesty Provision],
acted honestly and transparently.”
¶9 	Specifically, 	the 	Stevenses 	argued 	that 	they 	and 	the
mediator “were led to believe” that the Trust’s cattle “would have
wandered west across a common east-west boundary between”
their properties and “would have crossed (if at all) into the East
Parcel”—which they mistakenly believed was, at all relevant
times, owned by the Trust. The Stevenses asserted that “because
the border at issue was not one by ‘adjoining landowners,’” the
Trust’s claim “for boundary by acquiescence could not succeed.”
Pointing to rule 60(b)(3), the Stevenses argued that the Trust’s
failure “to disclose the true boundary line and [the Trust’s]
purchase of the East Parcel after litigation began, despite agreeing
in the mediation agreement to honestly disclose all relevant facts,”
constituted “fraud—or at a minimum—a misrepresentation.”
They also argued that the Trust’s “failure to adhere to the Honesty
Provision” warranted relief under rule 60(b)(6).
¶10 	In response to the Stevenses’ motion, the district court
concluded 	that 	the 	information 	about 	the 	East 	Parcel 	was
“material and was reasonably likely to affect both summary
judgment and any mediated settlement,” and the court stated,
“The Trust knew about that evidence, had a duty to disclose it
under the mediation agreement, and failed to do so.” The court
noted that although “there very well may still be a claim for
boundary by acquiescence,” “the absence of information that the
Trust did not provide, but was required to provide, was material
and did affect [the Stevenses’] beliefs regarding the viability of
their defenses and their willingness to settle or not settle in

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mediation.” Accordingly, the court entered an order granting the
Stevenses’ rule 60(b) motion and vacating its enforcement order.
¶11 	The Trust then filed its own rule 60(b) motion, arguing that
the court should reinstate its enforcement order because the
Stevenses had made “fraudulent and/or misleading statements”
about the extent of their knowledge of the Trust’s ownership of
the East Parcel. After a hearing, the court denied the Trust’s
motion. The court noted the Stevenses’ representation that they
“were persuaded during mediation to relinquish their claims
because”—“notwithstanding the ditch or historical fences that
may or may not have been” on the southern border between the
two properties, which “may or may not have impeded the cattle’s
progress from the south to the north onto the disputed parcel—
“those cattle could have moved anyway from the east to the west
onto that same parcel.” And the court anticipated the Trust’s
concern about the court’s consideration of what occurred during
settlement discussions in the course of mediation. But the court
assured the parties that it was “relying less on that representation
that that’s how mediation went for the Stevens than on the
Stevens’ own pro se answer that’s on file with the Court.” The
court stated that the Stevenses’ answer to the Trust’s complaint
“goes on at length about the evidence of impediments that would
have prevented cattle from migrating onto the disputed parcel
from the south” and made “it very clear that, in the Stevens’ view
at least, the occupation element could not be met going south to
north.” Thus, the court concluded that “reading the Stevens’
answer,” the ownership of the East Parcel was “highly relevant to
their defenses” and the Trust “should have known that.”
¶12 	The 	district 	court 	dismissed 	the 	Trust’s 	claims 	with
prejudice and ordered the existing fence to be removed so the
Stevenses could take full possession of the disputed parcel. And

Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens
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this court eventually dismissed the Stevenses’ previously filed
appeal for failure to timely file their principal brief.2
¶13 	The Trust next moved for an order voiding the court’s
grant of the Stevenses’ rule 60(b) motion. The Trust argued that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the Stevenses’ motion
while their appeal was pending, though it noted that the district
court “likely has the authority to now enter an order setting aside
the parties’ settlement agreement” because the appeal had since
been dismissed. But the Trust claimed that the order vacating the
enforcement order was “premised on erroneous factual and legal
conclusions,” and the Trust argued that “the Court should
confirm that its prior ruling enforcing the parties’ settlement
agreement is reinstated and is the final adjudication of this
litigation.”
¶14 	The district court acknowledged “that it probably did lack
jurisdiction 	to 	enter” its order 	vacating enforcement 	of 	the
settlement agreement. But the court concluded that the Stevenses’
appeal only “temporarily divested” it of jurisdiction and that
when the appeal was dismissed, it regained authority over the
case. 	The 	court 	then 	found 	“that, 	at 	mediation,” 	the 	Trust
“persuaded the mediator, and the mediator persuaded” the
Stevenses, that the Trust occupied the disputed parcel “through
its boundary with” the Stevenses’ property “on the east side, and
no disclosure was made that another parcel, the East Parcel,
separated” the Trust’s and the Stevenses’ properties “on that east
side.” The court further found that “the east boundary was
squarely at issue in negotiations and mediation” and that it was
2. 	This 	prior 	appeal 	was 	taken 	from 	the 	district 	court’s
enforcement order, which the court later rescinded upon granting
the Stevenses’ motion to set the enforcement order aside. Given
that action by the district court, the Stevenses’ appeal had become
moot, which likely explains the Stevenses’ decision not to file a
brief.

Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens
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“somewhat not credible to believe [the Trust] did not know . . .
that the East Parcel was relevant to [the Stevenses’] defense”
because the Stevenses’ answer “notified the [Trust] that [the
Stevenses] did not believe that [the Trust’s] cattle could have
traversed the obstacles and land features” located in the disputed
parcel. 	Thus, 	the 	court 	maintained 	and 	restated 	its 	earlier
conclusion that the Trust’s ownership of the East Parcel “was a
fact 	that 	should 	have 	been 	disclosed 	under 	the” 	Honesty
Provision.
¶15 	Accordingly, the court reentered its prior order vacating
enforcement of the settlement agreement. The Trust appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 	The Trust argues the district court erred in granting the
Stevenses’ rule 60(b) motion and vacating its enforcement order.
“Because of the equitable nature of the rule, a district court has
broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion.” Capital Stack UT LLC
v. Reddy, 2025 UT App 103, ¶ 11, 575 P.3d 1192 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 43 (Utah 2026). Accordingly, we
review the court’s ruling here only for an abuse of that discretion.
See id. ¶ 10.
ANALYSIS
¶17 	Under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
“courts may relieve a party . . . from a judgment, order, or
proceeding based on an enumerated list of reasons.” Fritsche v.
Deer Valley Ridge at Silver Lake Ass’n of Unit Owners, 2022 UT App
11, ¶ 46, 504 P.3d 761 (quotation simplified). The Stevenses asked
the district court to set aside its enforcement order for two of those
reasons: rule 60(b)(3), which provides relief based on a showing
of “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an

Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens
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opposing party,” and rule 60(b)(6), which encompasses “any
other reason that justifies relief.”
¶18 	“A litigant invoking rule 60(b)(3) must clearly substantiate
the claim of fraud through clear and convincing proof, and must
demonstrate that the challenged behavior substantially interfered
with the aggrieved party’s ability” to “fully and fairly . . . prepare
for and proceed at trial.” Miner v. Miner, 2025 UT App 64, ¶ 15,
571 P.3d 788 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 526 (Utah
2025). Rule 60(b)(6) is a “catch-all provision,” In re Discipline of
Spencer, 2022 UT 28, ¶ 4 n.3, 513 P.3d 759 (quotation simplified),
that “embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one
other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through (5); second, that
the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within
a reasonable time,” Yknot Global Ltd. v. Stellia Ltd., 2016 UT App
132, ¶ 14, 379 P.3d 36 (emphasis in original; quotation otherwise
simplified), cert. denied, 387 P.3d 508 (Utah 2016). Rule 60(b)(6)
“should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the court
only in unusual and exceptional circumstances.” Id. (quotation
simplified).
¶19 	“We grant broad discretion to [a] trial court’s rule 60(b)
rulings because most are equitable in nature, saturated with facts,
and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness
that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review.” Fisher v.
Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 1198. Thus, “[t]he outcome of rule
60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack” on appeal. Id.
Nonetheless, 	the 	Trust 	argues 	the 	district 	court 	abused 	its
discretion in providing the Stevenses’ relief under rule 60(b) and
in vacating its enforcement order. In granting relief to the
Stevenses, the district court did not specify which subsection of
rule 60(b) it relied on. And the Trust’s arguments on appeal do
not make this distinction either. But we conclude that under either
subsection, 	the 	court 	acted 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	its 	broad

Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens
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discretion.3 We address the Trust’s arguments to the contrary in
turn.
¶20 	First, the Trust asserts it “had no reason to believe that the
East Parcel was relevant to negotiations at mediation” because
ownership 	of 	“the 	East 	Parcel 	does 	not 	affect” 	its
boundary-by-acquiescence claim. This claim required the Trust to
show:
(1) a visible line marked by monuments, fences,
buildings, or natural features treated as a boundary;
(2) the claimant’s occupation of his or her property
up to the visible line such that it would give a
reasonable landowner notice that the claimant is
using 	the 	line 	as 	a 	boundary; 	(3) 	mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary by adjoining
landowners; (4) for a period of at least 20 years.
B.G.T.S. Props., LLC v. Balls Bros. Farm, LLC, 2024 UT App 37, ¶ 15,
547 P.3d 215 (emphasis added; quotation otherwise simplified).
Our Supreme Court has stated that landowners are “adjoining”
for 	purposes 	of 	such 	claims 	where 	their 	properties 	are
“contiguous.” Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 38, 250 P.3d 56
(quotation simplified). See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420
(Utah 1990) (concluding that parties were shown to be “adjoining
landowners” where “the various diagrams and maps before the
trial court . . . all reflect[ed] that the parcels involved [were]
contiguous”). And the properties must have been contiguous for
at least 20 years. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 38 (stating that to satisfy
the temporal element of a boundary-by-acquiescence claim, “an
unbroken period of no less than twenty years must pass during
which each of the other elements is continuously met”).
3. In so stating, we recognize that rule 60(b)(6) comes into play
only if none of the other subsections do. But we choose to consider
the question as it has been briefed by the parties.

Baadsgaard Family Trust v. Stevens
20240921-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 68
¶21 	Under rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence is
relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact” that “is of
consequence in determining the action” “more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Whether the Trust owned
the East Parcel certainly affected whether it was an “adjoining
landowner” whose cattle could have “occupied” the disputed
parcel during the relevant 20 years. The East Parcel was nestled
between the Trust’s property and the Stevenses’ property at the
eastern boundary of the disputed parcel. And there was some
quarrel about whether the Trust’s cattle could have reached the
disputed parcel without crossing through the East Parcel. Thus,
the Trust’s acquisition of the East Parcel was relevant to the
Stevenses’ defense to the boundary-by-acquiescence claim and
absolutely should have been disclosed during mediation in
accordance with the Honesty Provision, wherein the parties
agreed “to be honest and to completely disclose all relevant
information.”
¶22 	Next, the Trust argues that the Stevenses had constructive
notice of its acquisition of the East Parcel through the recorded
deed and their firsthand knowledge of the property. See Lavender
v. FCOI Preserve, LLC, 2025 UT App 47, ¶ 72, 569 P.3d 1037
(“Constructive notice can include both (1) record notice which
results from a record or which is imputed by the recording
statutes, and (2) inquiry notice which is presumed because of the
fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact.”)
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 570 P.3d 660 (Utah 2025). But
the parties contracted over and above the constructive notice
provided by the recording statutes when they signed the Honesty
Provision and agreed “to be honest and to completely disclose all
relevant information and documents concerning this matter,”
including “all documentation that would be available through the
discovery 	process in 	a 	normal 	legal 	proceeding.” 	It 	is this
agreed-upon duty of full disclosure in the Honesty Provision that
matters here—not the bare consequences of the recording statute.

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20240921-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 68
Taking refuge behind the recording statute is not consistent with
the requirements of the Honesty Provision.
¶23 	Relatedly, 	the 	Trust 	argues 	that 	the 	district 	court’s
interpretation of the Honesty Provision was unreasonable, as it
“would require the party with a duty to disclose to guess what is
in the mind of the other party and then disclose each and every
such item that would be discoverable, an impossible task.” But
this strikes us as rather hyperbolic here.
¶24 	“The overriding principle of contractual interpretation is
that the intentions of the parties are controlling.” Regal RealSource
LLC v. Enlaw LLC, 2024 UT App 95, ¶ 20, 554 P.3d 1112 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 558 P.3d 89 (Utah 2024). And “the best
indication of the parties’ intent is the language they chose to use
in the contract.” Id. (quotation simplified). “In many cases, we
need look no further than the plain language of the contract,
because that language may unambiguously tell us what the
parties intended.” Willow Creek Assocs. of Grantsville LLC v. Hy Barr
Inc., 2021 UT App 116, ¶ 41, 501 P.3d 1179 (quotation simplified).
Here, the parties’ intention in signing the Honesty Provision
could not be clearer. Again, they agreed, with our emphasis, “to
be honest and to completely disclose all relevant information and
documents concerning this matter to the other party and the
mediator.” And the district court rightly interpreted the Honesty
Provision “in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties.”
Bennion v. Stolrow, 2024 UT 14, ¶ 17, 550 P.3d 474 (quotation
simplified).
¶25 	Finally, the Trust faults the district court for making
“unsupportable 	conclusions” 	about 	the 	parties’ 	confidential
mediation discussions. The Trust points to the court’s finding that
the Trust “persuaded the mediator, and the mediator persuaded”
the Stevenses, to settle based on a mistaken belief about the access
to 	the 	disputed 	parcel. 	True, 	mediation 	negotiations 	are
confidential to protect the interests of the parties. See Reese v.

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Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, ¶ 8, 177 P.3d 605; id. ¶ 14 (emphasizing
that “the statutory mandate of confidentiality” in mediation “is to
be carefully observed”). But the court stated that in denying the
Trust’s 	rule 	60(b) 	motion—a 	ruling 	in 	which 	it 	essentially
affirmed its prior grant of the Stevenses’ rule 60(b) motion—that
it 	was “relying 	less on 	that 	representation 	that 	that’s how
mediation went for the Stevens than on the Stevens’ own pro se
answer that’s on file with the Court.” We do not read the court’s
conclusion here as being reliant on confidential communications
to which it was not privy. Nor does this conclusion appear to be
dispositive of the court’s ultimate determination that the Trust
had a duty to disclose its recent acquisition of the East Parcel.
Rather, it addresses the effect of the Trust’s failure to do so.
¶26 	“Ultimately, district courts not only have discretion, they
have broad discretion with respect to rule 60(b) motions,” and
“showing an abuse of discretion requires more than simply
disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion.” Goodrich Mud Co.
v. Tops Well Services, LLC, 2023 UT App 118, ¶ 16, 537 P.3d 649
(emphasis in original; quotation otherwise simplified), cert. denied,
544 P.3d 456 (Utah 2024). We conclude that the district court did
not abuse this broad discretion in granting the Stevenses’ rule
60(b) motion and in vacating its enforcement order.
CONCLUSION
¶27 	The 	Honesty 	Provision 	required 	the 	Trust 	and 	the
Stevenses “to be honest and to completely disclose all relevant
information” 	or 	risk 	voiding 	“the 	agreement 	reached 	in
mediation.” 	Whether 	the 	Trust 	owned 	the 	East 	Parcel 	was
relevant to its boundary-by-acquiescence claim. But the Trust did
not disclose this information during mediation. Accordingly, the
district court acted reasonably in vacating its enforcement order.
Affirmed.